ÿWPCË ˜´ª’×7' ‘‰Àeâ7 ’š.%O?pW÷)$àï SR*'¡øN.Qב6cÿ\7ÃI›-¼*ߘIˆÓŽÀxÝ9‚0‘lbÝ+öbÒfqÔ๯!¿&!ÝàÕÇ …•K^(GƒÕ— ÖìaDN³-° q¶‘*ÒìúŽŒ¾¤uo°Ì6¬äÓ0²¬Î÷àÑþɘŽOÝ툲VÆM:lÛˆæà´Êï dã óݶ‚©!YŠ ÷Åeô¡oî8îÎùÝ­µ)pcnVÈ~‡3ÍHè™G0üï m8³ZÛs°©í2A–Õ–æ Z ·è“¯”ŽËŠ×׷ᦋÜl¨Ä= û‚gò¬r¾LUb;Yª·àá÷kJà·šG¶vQwÉÙ=y³.ÖÖ¾p‹²KP>Zr¹òÉŠƒ—>è6éRp¨+YBê׸EtG•Пţ8 ¿Ý…—ô¤`@ G `¡K€}ÑJ®JT‘ÞT¸²Ÿ¶NëijIì«ï&êH¨3˜H…ɶå_mE6Fƒu¨74M$馢ÂhÓ¨šþ’t/¯ÚQG<9½ƒbê©?°•¦·ç¨ú¬C#è•a`’`$ß(m 2ř޸¹°PÉÓËð“¦8|3oB’vÉ#!üU8N %k 0(qU!B™w@Û4/> m@U:W 0’‘UB#be 0D‡˜HP LaserJet 4000 N PSÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0xuHš Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ô\  `*Times New RomanTT DEEFEGDHIDJKLDM…Á*ˆ„d„3|xMÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTP! ÿÿ8Body Text 2Body Text 2Ó  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  Ó"ÞB è 0*Times New RomanTTPage ù of &ù (3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý›ÑÀ°Ñò òÔ‡XØ¥XXXÔÓ  ÓÑ€ÑÑ8€Ø¥XXdìdì8ÑFEBRUARY€2001Ð ° ÐBOARDððS€ANALYSISÌÌQUESTION€1ó óÐ tÄ ÐÓLÓÌ€€€€€1.€€Clearly,€a€limited€liability€company€will€better€enable€Alan€and€Brittany€to€implement€theirÏobjectives.€€The€principal€reason€is€that€a€general€partnership€will€not€shield€Alan€from€liability€toÏbusiness€creditors,€and€therefore,€may€require€him€to€increase€his€investment.ÌÌ€€€€€A€limited€liability€company,€on€the€other€hand,€will€enable€Alan€and€Brittany€to€achieve€all€ofÏtheir€objectives.€€Specifically,€ÌÌ€€€€€(a)€€òòLimited€Liabilityó󀄀As€a€member€of€the€LLC,€Alan€will€not€be€liable€for€the€obligations€ofÐ À  Ðthe€company€solely€by€reason€of€being€a€member.€€He€would€have€to€personally€guaranty€LLCÏobligations€in€order€for€personal€liability€to€exist.€€€ðð4A„301€of€Corporations€Article.Ì€€€€€Ì€€€€€(b)€€òòLimited€Investment€óó„€The€Operating€Agreement€may€limit€Alanððs€obligations€toÐ pÀ Ðcontribute€capital€and€should€specify€that€he€is€to€perform€no€services.€€ðð4A„502.ÌÌ€€€€€€(c)€€òòProfitsó󀄀Profits€and€losses€will€be€allocated€to€Alan€and€Brittany€in€proportion€to€theirÐ 4„ Ðrespective€capital€interests,€unless€the€Operating€Agreement€specifies€otherwise.€€Since€profitsÏare€to€be€allocated€equally,€regardless€of€the€capital€accounts,€the€Operating€Agreement€should€soÏspecify.€€ðð4A„505.ÌÌ€€€€€€(d)€€òòAlanððs€Loan€óó„€Unless€the€Operating€Agreement€provides€otherwise,€Alan,€as€a€member€ofÐ Ð  Ðthe€LLC,€may€lend€money€to€the€LLC€and,€subject€to€other€applicable€law,€has€the€same€rightsÏand€obligations€with€respect€to€the€loan€as€a€person€who€is€not€a€member.€€ðð4A„405.€€Therefore,ÏAlanððs€rights€as€a€creditor€may€be€detailed€in€a€Promissory€Note,€signed€by€the€LLC.ÌÌ€€€€€(e)€€òòVeto€Poweró󀄀The€Operating€Agreement€may€limit€Brittanyððs€right€to€act€as€an€agent€forÐ l¼ Ðthe€LLC.€€However,€Alanððs€creditors€may€not€be€bound€by€this€limitation€where€the€LLC€shouldÏbe€estopped€from€denying€that€Brittany€was€its€agent.€€à p àðð4A„401.€à  àÐ D!” ÐÌ€€€€€2.à  àIn€order€to€accomplish€the€clientððs€objectives,€the€following€documents€are€necessary.€€Ð #l! ÐÌ€€€€€(a)à  àòòArticles€of€Organizationóó€ð!ð€the€purpose€of€Articles€of€Organization€is€to€legally€establishÐ ô$D # Ðthe€LLC.€€This€is€accomplished€by€filing€the€Articles€of€Organization€with€the€State€DepartmentÏof€Assessments€and€Taxation.€€The€Articles€of€Organization€need€not€be€signed€by€Alan€orÏBrittany,€but€can€be€signed€by€anyone€over€18.ÌÌ€€€€€(b)à  àòòOperating€Agreementóó€ð!ð€the€purpose€of€an€Operating€Agreement€is€to€define€the€rights€andÐ )à$( Ðobligations€of€Alan€and€Brittany€vis„„vis€the€LLC€and€each€other.€€The€Operating€AgreementÏshould€spell€out€the€agreements€of€Alan€and€Brittany€regarding€his€investment,€his€veto€powerÏover€basic€decisions,€Brittanyððs€salary€and€duties€and€the€division€of€profits.€€The€OperatingÐ T,¤'+ ÐAgreement€may€contain€other€provisions,€relating€for€example,€to€restrictions€on€transfer,Ïdeadlock€and€dissolution.€€The€Operating€Agreement€must€be€signed€by€Alan€and€Brittany,€sinceÏthey€are€the€Members.€à  àÐ ˆØ ÐÌ€€€€€(c)à  àòòPromissory€Noteó󀄀Alanððs€investment€of€$60,000€should€be€documented€by€a€PromissoryÐ `° ÐNote,€containing€the€interest€rate€and€terms€of€repayment.€€The€purpose€of€the€Promissory€Note€isÏto€establish€Alanððs€legal€rights€and€allow€him€to€enforce€them€easily€by€legal€means€in€the€eventÏof€default€by€the€LLC.ÌÌ€€€€€(d)à  àòòSecurity€Agreement€and€Financing€Statementó󀄀Alan€wants€to€secure€his€investment€by€aÐ ü L  Ðlien€on€the€equipment€and€other€assets€of€the€LLC.€€A€Security€Agreement€(by€which€the€LLCÏgrants€him€a€security€interest)€and€a€Financing€Statement€must€be€signed€by€the€LLC€andÏrecorded€among€the€financing€records€of€the€SDAT€in€order€to€perfect€Alanððs€lien.ÌÌ€€€€€(e)à  àòòEmployment€Agreement€for€Brittanyó󀄀Brittanyððs€right€to€receive€a€salary€of€$500€perÐ ˜è  Ðweek€and€her€employment€rights€and€duties€may€be€spelled€out€in€an€Employment€Agreement€ÌÌ€€€€€3.à  àòòOther€Issuesóó€ð!ð€The€question€raises€issues€of€professional€responsibility.€€No€discussion€ofÐ \¬ Ðthese€issues€is€required.€€An€answer€which€mentions€or€addresses€these€issues€may€receiveÏadditional€credit.€ÌÐ   p ÐÑÀ°ÑÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥-#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔÑ  Ñà@%ìàò òQUESTION€2ˆÐ À Ðà@ìì*ìàó óˆÌDear€Ronnie:ÌÌ€€€€€(a)à  àòòPurchase€of€the€shopping€centeróó.€€€A€claim€may€exist€against€Sam€for€failing€to€adviseÐ p° Ðyou,€as€a€co„director€of€S€&€R,€Inc.,€of€the€opportunity€to€purchase€the€shopping€center.€€ÌA€director€is€not€allowed€to€profit€personally€by€acquiring€property€that€the€director€knows€theÏcorporation€will€need€or€intend€to€acquire,€so€long€as€the€interest,€actual€or€in€expectancy,€existedÏwhile€Sam€€was€involved€as€a€director€of€S€&€R,€Inc.€€Corporate€managers€are€ð ðprecluded€fromÏdiverting€unto€themselves€opportunities€which€in€fairness€belong€to€the€corporation.ðð€MarylandÏMetals,€Inc.€v.€Metzner,€282€Md€31,€49,€382€A.2d€564€(1978).ÌÌ€€€€€In€this€case,€it€must€be€recognized€that€S€&€R,€Inc€was€not€in€the€same€line€of€business€asÏowning€a€shopping€center.€€But€S€&€R,€Inc.€did€have€a€lease€in€this€center,€and,€at€least,€had€aÏleasehold€interest€as€a€tenant.€€Sam€may€argue€that€purchasing€the€shopping€center€is€not€aÏcorporate€opportunity€for€S€&€R,€Inc.,€whose€purpose€is€to€operate€a€hair€salon.€€However,€thisÏissue€is€likely€to€be€a€question€of€fact,€to€be€decided€by€a€judge€or€jury,€and€not€as€a€matter€of€law,Ïsince€S€&€R,€Inc.€also€is€authorized€to€engage€in€other€business€activities.€ÌÌ€€€€€Sam€has€exposed€himself€to€a€potential€liability€by€not€disclosing€the€opportunity€to€the€BoardÏof€Directors€of€S&€R,€Inc.,€together€with€an€explanation€of€the€surrounding€circumstances.€EvenÏif€it€were€unlikely€that€S€&€R€would€have€or€could€have€taken€advantage€of€the€opportunity,€SamÏcould€have€avoided€potential€liability€if€he€had€notified€Ronnie€of€his€opportunity€to€purchase€theÏshopping€center€and€invited€S€&€R,€Inc.€to€participate€as€a€partner€with€Carl.€€See€generally,ÏòòBillamn€v.€State€Dep.€Corpóó.,€86€Md.€App.€1,€585€A.2d€238€(1991);€òòInd.€Distributors€v.€Katzóó,€99Ð à  ÐMd.€App.€441,€637€A.2d€886€(1994);€ÌÌ€€€€€(b)à  àòòFailure€to€renew€the€leaseóó.€€S€&€R,€Inc.€may€have€rights€against€Sam€for€the€loss€of€itsÐ ¤ä Ðlease.€€As€an€existing€tenant,€S€&€R,€Inc.€had€an€expectancy€of€the€renewal€of€its€lease.€€Sam,€aÏdirector€of€S€&€R,€Inc.,€was€in€a€conflict€of€interest€position€when€the€acquiring€partnershipÏrefused€to€renew€the€lease.€€Sam,€it€appears,€made€no€effort€to€avoid€his€conflicting€interest.€ÏFurther,€he€did€not€disclose€to€the€directors€of€S€&€R,€Inc.€that€the€shopping€center€was€being€soldÏand€that€he€was€involved€as€a€partner€of€the€purchaser.€€€Had€this€information€been€known,€S€&ÏR,€Inc.€arguably,€could€have€taken€steps€to€better€protect€its€interests.€€On€the€other€hand,€SamÏwill€argue€that€there€is€no€obligation€on€the€partnership€to€renew€or€extend€S€&€Rððs€lease,€andÏthat€it€dealt€at€arms€length€with€S€&€R,€Inc.€€Equal€credit€will€be€given€for€a€reasoned€answerÏreaching€either€conclusion.ÌÌ€€€€€(c)à  àòòWho€can€sue?óó€€€Ronnie,€as€a€stockholder,€has€no€rights€directly€against€Sam.€€The€rightsÐ È&#& Ðbelong€to€S€&€R,€Inc.€€€Ronnie€must€demand€that€S€&€R,€Inc.€seek€to€enforce€its€rights€againstÏSam.€€€If€S€&€R€refuses,€as€is€likely,€Ronnie€may€bring€a€stockholdersðð€derivative€action€on€behalfÏof€S€&€R.€Inc.€Ìâ âÐ x*¸&* Ѐ€€€€(d)à  àòòInterested€Director€Transactionóó.€€These€facts€do€not€give€rise€to€the€ð ðinterested€directorððÐ À Ðprovisions€of€ðð2„419€of€the€Corporations€Article,€because€the€purchase€of€the€shopping€center€byÏSamððs€partnership€is€not€a€transaction€with€S€&€R.€Inc.€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥©#ÔÐ ˜Ø Ðâ âÐ  „Ä ÐÑÈÑò òà@%ìàQUESTION€3ó óˆÐ À ÐÌ€€€€€First,€Valerie€may€file€for€a€Protective€Order€under€4„504€of€the€Family€Law€Article€of€theÏAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland.€€Such€an€Order€would€require€Steven€to€vacate€the€family€home,Ïgive€Valerie€the€temporary€use€and€possession,€and€to€refrain€from€further€abuse€or€threats€ofÏabuse,€and€award€her€temporary€custody€of€the€minor€children.€€Such€an€order€might€also€requireÏSteven€to€pay€the€mortgage€on€the€family€home€and€provide€additional€financial€support.ÌÌ€€€€€Secondly,€Valerie€may€file€for€an€absolute€divorce€in€accordance€with€7„103(7)€(cruelty€ofÏtreatment)€or€7„103(8)€(excessively€vicious€conduct)€of€the€Family€Law€Article.€€It€is€likely€that,Ïbecause€of€Steven's€history€of€abuse,€she€will€be€awarded€custody€of€the€children.ÌÌ€€€€€In€connection€with€her€complaint€for€divorce,€she€would€be€eligible€for€an€award€of€childÏsupport€based€upon€the€parties€total€monthly€gross€income.€Such€an€award€would€also€include€anÏaward€toward€the€daycare€expenses,€the€private€school€tuition€of€the€children€and€their€healthÏinsurance.€€If€she€is€awarded€custody€of€the€children,€she€will€probably€also€be€awarded€the€useÏand€possession€of€the€family€home€for€up€to€three€years€following€an€absolute€divorce.€€DuringÏthe€period€of€use€and€possession,€Steven€might€also€be€required€to€pay€the€mortgage€on€theÏfamily€home.ÌÌ€€€€€She€would€also€be€eligible€for€an€award€of€alimony€which€should€allow€her€the€funds€toÏcontinue€to€pay€the€mortgage€payment€on€the€marital€home€following€the€use€and€possessionÏperiod€and€to€pay€the€necessary€family€expenses.€€The€length€of€the€alimony€period€would€be€setÏby€the€Court,€but,€because€of€her€current€age€and€because€of€her€lack€of€education,€it€is€possibleÏthat€the€incomes€of€the€parties€will€be€so€disparate€that€she€might€qualify€for€permanent€alimony.€ÌÌ€€€€€When€the€home€is€finally€disposed€of,€she€would€be€entitled€to€receive€her€share€of€the€equityÏvalue.ÌÌÌÌÌà@ìì*ìàˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òÐ P,(, Ðó óà@%ìàò òQUESTION€4ó óˆÐ À ÐÌ€€€€€1.€€In€order€to€assume€his€defense,€Sam€must€first€notify€his€attorney€of€record€that€his€servicesÏare€no€longer€required€and€requesting€that€he€strike€his€appearance€in€accordance€with€Rule€2„¼132(a)€of€the€Maryland€Rules€of€Procedure€and€request€that€he€forward€a€complete€copy€of€theÏfile€to€you.€€You€must€file€a€Motion€to€Enter€Appearance€in€accordance€with€Rule€2„131(b)€andÏserve€a€copy€upon€all€parties.€€Since€his€former€attorney€is€now€a€trustee€for€the€sale€of€theÏproperty,€he€must€be€served€with€a€copy€of€the€Motion.ÌÌ€€€€€2.€€Because€of€Gladys'€death,€on€May€15,€1999,€prior€to€the€sale€of€the€property,€Sam,€as€aÏjoint€tenant,€acquired€sole€title€to€the€property.€€The€Consent€Order€signed€by€the€Court€andÏappointing€the€attorneys€for€the€parties€as€trustees€for€the€sale€of€the€property€is€of€no€legal€effectÏbecause€Sam's€attorney€did€not€have€his€authorization€to€enter€into€such€an€agreement.€€While€anÏattorney€has€the€right€to€make€certain€tactical€decisions€on€behalf€of€his€client€in€a€lawsuit,€RuleÏ1.4(b)€requires€that€the€attorney€explain€a€matter€to€the€extent€reasonably€necessary€to€permit€theÏclient€to€make€an€informed€decision,€and€Rule€€1.2(a)€requires€the€attorney€to€abide€by€the€client'sÏdecisions€concerning€the€objectives€of€the€representation.€€An€attorney€must€abide€by€a€client'sÏdecision€whether€to€accept€an€offer€of€settlement€of€a€matter.ÌÌ€€€€€3.€€As€Sam's€new€attorney,€you€must€file€a€Motion€to€Strike€the€Consent€Order€because€it€wasÏentered€into€without€Sam's€knowledge€or€consent,€and€move€to€dismiss€the€suit€as€moot€becauseÏof€Gladys'€death.ÌÌ€€€€€4.€€You€may€also€wish€to€consider€an€action€against€Sam's€previous€attorney€for€breach€ofÏcontract€for€his€failure€to€consult€with€Sam€and€properly€represent€his€interests.ÌÌ€€€€€5.€€You€may€also€wish€to€refer€the€matter€to€Bar€Counsel€for€investigation€and€possible€action.ÌÌà@ ìàò òEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€4ˆÐ Ð ÐÌAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€Maryland€RulesÌÌTitle€1.€€General€Provisions:€€Rule€1„331ÌÌTitle€2.€€Civil€Procedure€ð"ð€Circuit€Court:€€Rulesó ó€ò ò2„131€and€2„132Ð #X" ÐÌTitle€3.€€Civil€Procedure€ð"ð€District€Court:€€Rules€3„131€and€3„132ÌÌñFññCñAnnotated€ñCññCñCode€ñCññCñof€ñCññCñMaryñCññFññDññCñalñCññDññFññEñlnñEññFñThe€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€ConductñGñÌÌà  àñGññHñ:€€ñHñRules€1.2,€1.4,€1.7€and€1.8ó óÐ  Ì& #& ÐÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôà@%ìàò òÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥3#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔQUESTION€5ˆÐ À Ðó óÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥u3#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔÌ€€€€€1.€€The€testimony€of€Ms.€Plaintiff€as€to€her€alleged€agreement€with€Mr.€Elderly€generallyÏwould€be€admissible€as€an€admission€by€Mr.€Elderly.€€MR€5„803(a).€€However,€the€claim€againstÏthe€Estate€based€on€an€oral€agreement€between€the€decedent€and€the€plaintiff€is€thus€subject€toÏMarylandÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Ú3#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝB5#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€"Dead€ManÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥ˆ5#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝÕ5#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€[sic]€statute",€Md.€Code€Cts.€&€Jud.€Pro.€Art.€€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥6#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ6#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ô€9„116€whichÐ \œ Ðprohibits€a€party€to€a€proceeding€against€an€estate€from€testifying€as€to€a€transaction€with€or€aÏstatement€by€the€decedent€unless€the€statement€(or€evidence€of€it)€is€first€introduced€by€theÏopposite€party€or€the€claimant€is€called€as€a€witness€by€the€opposite€party.€€The€testimony€isÏclearly€not€admissible€under€the€Dead€ManÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Õ6#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ€8#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€Statute.€€òòSeeóó€òòFarah€v.€Stoutóó,€112€Md.€App.€106,Ð  R  Ð117,€684€A.2d€471€(1996),€òòcert.€denóó.€344€Md.€567,€688€A.2d€445€(1997).Ð  D  ÐÌ€€€€€2.€€There€are€two€components€of€MichaelÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Æ8#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝè9#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€testimony.€€The€first€component€is€what€AnneÐ Ü  Ðtold€him€what€Mr.€Elderly€promised.€€This€is€hearsay€within€hearsay€and€can€be€admitted€only€ifÏboth€statements€qualify€for€admission€under€one€or€more€exceptions€to€the€general€rule€againstÏthe€admission€of€hearsay€evidence.€€This€statement€does€not€fall€into€any€of€the€hearsayÏexceptions.€€The€second€component€is€a€description€of€AnneÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥.:#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ<#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€intent.€€It€would€normally€beÐ ’Ò Ðadmissible€as€a€statement€of€intent€or€state€of€mind€if€used€to€help€prove€the€declarantÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥K<#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ=#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€futureÐ „Ä Ðactions.€€MR€5„803(b)3).€€However,€the€testimony€also€would€fall€afoul€of€the€Dead€ManÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥_=#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ>#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔsÐ v¶ ÐStatute:ÌÌà8  àThe€statement€was€one€that€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Z>#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔAÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝã>#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôshe€could€not€have€testified€to€herself,€as€she€was€aÐ @€ Ðparty€to€the€suit€and€prohibited€by€the€dead-man's€[sic]€statute€from€testifying€to€itÏ.€.€.€.€€€It€should€be€obvious€that€if€she€could€not€testify€to€these€matters€herself,€sheÏcould€not€render€them€admissible€by€the€simple€expedient€of€telling€them€toÏsomeone€else.€€òòJones€v.€Selvaggi,óó€216€Md.€1,€10,€133€A.2d€246€(1958).Ðö6Ð Ð  ÐÌ€€€€€3.€€The€testimony€of€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Witness€is€admissible.€€Mr.€ElderlyÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥&?#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝeA#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€statement€thatÐ Î ÐPlaintiff€provided€him€with€assistance€and€that€he€promised€to€leave€her€$125,000€in€his€will€areÏadmissions€by€Mr.€Elderly€against€his€pecuniary€interest.€€MR.€5„803(a).€€The€Dead€ManÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥«A#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝÊB#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔsÐ ¬ì ÐStatute€does€not€apply€since€the€Witnesses€are€not€parties€to€the€claim.ÌÌ€€€€€4.€€The€testimony€of€Rev.€Knox€would€not€be€admissible€unless€and€until€Mrs.€PlaintiffÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥C#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ D#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔsÐ v!¶  Ðcredibility€was€attacked€by€the€defendant.€€L.€McLain€òòMaryland€Evidenceóó€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥SD#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝùD#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ô€608.3.€€Thus€it€isÐ h"¨! Ðinadmissable€in€PlaintiffÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥?E#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝÂE#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€case€in€chief.Ð Z#š" ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ ˜,Ø(, ÐÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥F#ÔÓB.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°œXBÓò òÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôà@%ìàQUESTION€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥ÒF#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ô6ó óˆÐ À ÐÌ€€€€€The€First€Amendment€of€the€United€States€Constitution€provides,€in€pertinent€part,€thatÏCongress€shall€make€no€law€respecting€an€establishment€of€religion,€or€prohibiting€the€freeÏexercise€thereof€(the€Ô#†XØ¥XXXØ¥/G#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔEstablishment€ClauseÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥[H#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ô).€€Through€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€FourteenthÐ p° ÐAmendment,€this€restraint€is€binding€on€the€states.€€ÌÌ€€€€€Does€the€City€Revitalization€Program€satisfy€this€test€under€the€facts€presented?€€There€areÏtwo€aspects€to€the€problem:€€first,€the€construction€of€the€chapel€and,€second,€the€use€of€theÏchapel€for€religious€purposes.Ìà  àÌ€€€€€The€Supreme€Court€applies€a€three€part€test€to€determine€whether€a€law€violates€theÏEstablishment€Clause:Ìà  àÌà  à1.à ` àà ¸ àThe€law€must€serve€a€secular€legislative€purpose.Ð ¨è  Ðà  à2.à ` àà ¸ àThe€lawÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥±H#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝuK#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€primary€effect€must€be€one€that€neither€advances€Ð ”Ô  ÐÓ?+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°X?Óà0 ` àà ¸ ànor€inhibits€religion.Ð ` (#` (# ÐÓB+° °¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°` ‹XBÓà0  àà0¸ (#(#àà  à3,à ¸ àThe€law€must€not€foster€an€excessive€government€entanglement€withÐ r² Ðreligion.Ð ¸ (#¸ (# ÐÓH.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°¸ ŠXHÓòòÌ€€€€€€Lemon€v.€Kurtzmanóó,€403€U.S.€602€(1971òò).€€€See€also,€Roemer€v.€Board€of€Public€Worksóó,€426Ð 6v ÐU.S.€736,€748€(1976);€òòBowen€v.€Kendrickóó,€487€U.S.€589,€602€(1988);€and€òòAgostini€v.€Feltonóó,Ð "b Ð____€U.S.€_____€117€S.Ct.€1997,€2010€and€2015„2106€(1997).ÌÌ€€€€€With€regard€to€the€first€test,€a€law€that€seeks€to€revitalize€inner€city€neighborhoods€by€usingÏstate€funds€to€finance€the€acquisition€and€renovation€of€vacant€buildings€to€serve€the€community,Ïhas€a€secular€purpose.€€Therefore€the€first€test€is€satisfied.ÌÌ€€€€€With€regard€to€the€second€test,€the€Court€has€held€that€providing€aid€to€an€organization€that€isÏpervasively€sectarian€has€the€primary€effect€of€advancing€religion.€€However,€when€anÏorganization€has€religious€and€secular€activities€that€can€be€separated,€aid€for€the€secularÏactivities€does€not€have€the€primary€effect€of€advancing€religion.€€òòTilton€v.€Richardsonóó,€403€U.S.Ð Z š Ð672,€679„681€(1971),€òòHunt€v.€McNairóó,€413€U.S.€734,€742„743€(1973),€and€òòRoemeróó,€426€U.S.€atÐ F!†  Ð755.€€By€applying€this€distinction,€the€Court€has€upheld€state„sanctioned€financial€assistance€forÏinstitutions€of€higher€education€which€have€a€religious€affiliation€upon€finding€that€the€religiousÏand€secular€functions€can€be€separated,€and€that€the€assistance€is€focused€on€secular€purposes.€ÏòòTiltonóó,€403€U.S.€at€679„682€and€òòHuntóó,€413€U.S.€at€742„745.€€An€important€factor€in€concludingÐ ö$6!$ Ðthat€the€assistance€was€focused€on€secular€activities€was€a€prohibition€on€the€use€of€the€facilitiesÏfor€religious€services€or€other€religious€activities.€€òòTiltonóó,€403€U.S.€at€680„681€and€òòHuntóó,€413Ð Î&#& ÐU.S.€at€744.€€Providing€public€money€to€an€organization€to€construct€or€renovate€a€building€inÏwhich€religious€services€are€conducted€is€an€advancement€of€religion.€ÌÌÌÌÐ V,–(, Ѐ€€€€The€Church€is€an€organization€that€is€sectarian€by€its€very€nature,€but€its€plan€to€serve€lowÏincome€and€elderly€families€by€offering€child€and€adult€day€care,€job€training€classes,€andÏrecreation€for€youths€can€be€separated€from€its€religious€functions.€€However,€using€a€portion€ofÏthe€CRP€grant€to€construct€a€chapel€for€religious€devotions,€even€though€attendance€is€voluntary,Ïwould€advance€religion€and€violate€the€Establishment€Clause€under€òòTiltonóó,€òòsupra,€and€Hunt,Ð p° Ðsupraóó.Ð \œ ÐÌ€€€€€While€the€signs€are€intended€to€convey€the€message€that€attendance€at€the€chapel€services€areÏvoluntary,€they€nonetheless€contain€a€clear€religious€import€because€it€announces€the€schedule€ofÏservices.€€Again,€it€advances€religion.Ìà  àÌ€€€€€The€third€test€may€be€met€because€the€Court€has€indicated€that€a€one€time€grant€presents€lessÏpotential€for€entanglement€than€a€continuing€financial€relationship.€€òòTiltonóó,€403€U.S.€at€688.Ð Ð  ÐÌ€€€€€In€conclusion,€the€CRP€grant€to€the€Church€probably€would€violate€the€Establishment€Clause.€ÏThe€second€test€would€not€be€met€because€using€State€funds€to€construct€a€chapel€for€religiousÏservices€would€appear€to€advance€religion.€€Were€the€chapel€not€constructed,€there€probablyÏwould€not€be€a€violation€of€the€Establishment€Clause€because€the€ChurchÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥»K#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝñZ#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€activities€at€theÐ l¬ ÐCenter€would€be€secular,€and€would€not€have€the€primary€effect€of€advancing€religion.€€Ì€ÌÌÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥7[#ÔÌÐ  N Ðò òÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔÓ  ÓQUESTION€7òòÐ À ÐÓ4\ÓÌó óóóÌ€€€€€a.)€€To€prevail€on€negligence€claims€against€the€Hotel,€Chris€will€need€to€prove€all€fourÏelements€of€the€tort.€€First,€Chris€must€show€that€the€Hotel€owed€a€duty€to€Chris€to€provide€safeÏlodgings.€€Next,€Chris€must€show€that€the€Hotel€breached€its€duty€to€Chris.€€The€third€elementÏthat€Chris€must€prove€is€that€the€breach€of€duty€by€the€Hotel€proximately€caused€injury€to€Chris.€ÏFinally,€Chris€will€have€to€prove€damages.€€In€this€case,€Chris€may€be€able€to€show€that€the€HotelÏowed€him€a€duty€to€provide€safe€lodging,€including€safe€access€to€and€from€the€Hotel.€€Chris€canÏalso€prove€injury€and€damages.€€What€Chris€cannot€show€is€that€the€Hotel€breached€a€duty€owedÏto€Chris€or€that€any€action€of€or€failure€to€act€by€the€Hotel€proximately€caused€Chris'€injuries.ÌÌ€€€€€The€Hotel€does€owe€its€guests€the€duty€to€provide€safe€lodgings,€and€to€maintain€the€Hotel€in€aÏsafe€condition.€€The€Hotel€did€provide€a€safe€entrance€for€its€guests,€which€was€reasonable€underÏthe€circumstances€of€a€sudden€storm€with€quick€accumulation.€€The€danger€of€slipping€and€fallingÏon€the€ice€was€clearly€evident,€and€the€facts€show€that€Chris€had€actual€knowledge€of€the€danger.€ÏChris€cannot€prevail€unless€his€conduct€was€reasonable€in€the€face€of€a€known€danger.€€In€thisÏcase,€Chris€knew€about€the€storm,€because€it€forced€him€to€seek€emergency€shelter.€€Chris€alsoÏknew€through€both€personal€observation€and€the€clerk's€warning€that€the€sidewalks€and€parkingÏlots€were€icy€and€that€the€footing€was€dangerous.€€In€fact,€Chris€had€firsthand€knowledge€of€theÏdanger€because€he€struggled€across€the€ice€to€the€hotel€room€once€and€slipped€all€the€way€there.€ÏChris€voluntarily€put€himself€in€peril€by€taking€a€second€trip€out€onto€the€icy€walkways€afterÏnearly€falling€once.€€€Chris€could€have€avoided€danger€or€minimized€exposure€to€it€by€taking€aÏroom€near€the€front€of€the€Hotel€where€the€walkways€were€clear,€or€even€by€unloading€the€dogÏand€the€luggage€in€the€clear€area.€€However,€Chris€insisted€on€having€an€isolated€room€in€anÏuncleared€and€untreated€section€of€the€parking€lot€and€on€hauling€a€dog€and€luggage€into€theÏroom€where€it€was€dangerous€to€do€so.ÌÌ€€€€€Because€Chris€was€fully€aware€of€the€dangerous€condition€of€the€parking€lot€and€voluntarilyÏand€knowingly€assumed€the€risk€of€injury,€the€Hotel€should€raise€the€affirmative€defense€ofÏassumption€of€the€risk.€€The€doctrine€of€assumption€of€the€risk€provides€that€a€person€who,€withÏfull€knowledge€and€understanding€of€an€existing€danger,€voluntarily€chooses€to€expose€himself€toÏthat€danger,€cannot€recover€for€injury€resulting€from€exposure€to€the€danger.€€It€is€clear€that€aÏperson€of€average€intelligence€in€Chris'€position€would€have€understood€the€danger€of€the€ice€andÏsnow,€especially€after€having€difficulty€walking€on€it€once€and€escaping€injury.€€The€Court€shouldÏdetermine€that€Chris€assumed€the€risk€of€injury€as€a€matter€of€law.ÌÌ€€€€€In€addition€to€the€defense€of€assumption€of€the€risk,€the€Hotel€might€assert€the€affirmativeÏdefense€of€contributory€negligence€as€an€alternative.€€While€contributory€negligence€is€similar€toÏassumption€of€the€risk€in€several€respects,€it€is€also€different€in€that€it€requires€an€underlyingÏfinding€of€negligence€by€the€Defendant.€€Contributory€negligence€defeats€recovery€by€a€PlaintiffÏbecause€it€is€a€proximate€cause€of€an€accident€that€happens€and€causes€injury.€€While€it€could€beÏargued€that€Chris€was€contributorily€negligent€as€a€matter€of€law€in€deciding€to€park€and€walk€onÏuncleared€areas€that€were€covered€in€snow€and€ice,€the€trier€of€fact€would€first€have€to€determineÏthat€the€Hotel€was€negligent.€€If€the€Hotel€is€found€to€be€negligent,€the€fact€finder€can€then€make€aÐ P,(, Ðfinding€that€Chris€was€contributorily€negligent€based€on€Chris'€testimony€regarding€his€actionsÏand€motivations€at€the€time€of€the€accident€before€determining€that€Chris€was€contributorilyÏnegligent.ÌÌ€€€€€In€òòSchroyer€v.€McNealóó,€323€Md.€275,€592€A.2d€1119€(1991),€the€Court€of€Appeals€consideredÐ p° Ðthe€affirmative€defenses€of€contributory€negligence€and€assumption€of€the€risk,€and€explained€theÏdistinctions€and€similarities€between€the€two€defenses.€€The€Court€in€relying€on€the€distinction€inÏWarner€v.€Markoe,€171€Md€351,€359„60,€189€A.€260,€264€(1937),€explained:ÌÌÓB.ÜÜ4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!°°XBÓ€€€€€The€distinction€between€contributory€negligence€and€voluntary€assumption€of€the€risk€is€oftenÏdifficult€to€draw€in€concrete€cases,€and€under€the€law€of€this€state€usually€without€importance,€butÏit€may€be€well€to€keep€it€in€mind.€€Contributory€negligence,€of€course,€means€negligence,€whichÏcontributes€to€cause€a€particular€accident,€which€occurs,€while€assumption€of€the€risk€of€accidentÏmeans€a€voluntary€incurring€of€an€accident€which€may€not€occur,€and€which€the€person€assumingÏthe€risk€may€be€careful€to€avoid€after€starting.€€Contributory€negligence€defeats€recovery€becauseÏit€is€a€proximate€cause€of€the€accident,€which€happens,€but€assumption€of€the€risk€defeatsÏrecovery€because€it€is€a€previous€abandonment€to€complain€if€an€accident€occurs.Ìà0 Ü àà  àÐ Ü(#Ü(# ÐÓE+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ‚,Œ ŠXEÓ€€€€€b.)€€The€Hotel€should€prevail€on€its€affirmative€defense€of€assumption€of€the€risk.€€Clearly,ÏChris€knew€of€the€clear€and€obvious€danger€of€slipping€and€falling€on€the€ice,€and€chose€to€takeÏthe€risk€anyway.€€The€Hotel€did€not€force€or€coerce€Chris€to€take€a€room€in€the€unclear€area,€but,Ïinstead€it€provided€a€safe€alternative€and€warned€Chris€of€the€obvious€danger.€€Under€MarylandÏlaw,€Chris€should€not€recover€on€the€claims€raised€in€the€Complaint.€€ÌÓ  Óò òÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ P,(, ÐQUESTION€8ó óÐ À ÐÌÌÓ  Ó€€€€€Prior€to€undertaking€the€representation,€Jones€and€Brown€must€consider€and€satisfy€severalÏrules€of€the€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct.ÌÌ€€€€€Jones€must€consider€the€conflicts€of€interest€arising€from€the€recent€meeting€with€Smith€andÏClark.€€Jones€must€identify€the€client€Jones€seeks€to€represent,€and€Jones€must€describe€the€scopeÏof€representation€(Rule€1.2).€€In€the€past,€Jones€has€represented€Smith,€individually,€and€theÏcorporation.€€Jones€now€seeks€to€represent€Clark,€the€corporation,€Smith,€and€possibly€hisÏexisting€client€who€Jones€believes€may€become€an€investor.€€Also,€Jones€should€refrain€fromÏdisclosing€any€confidential€information€regarding€Ms.€Investor€(Rule€1.6).€€In€addition,€JonesÏmust€undertake€to€disclose€the€conflict€fully€and€obtain€consent€from€his€former€and€prospectiveÏclients€after€consultation€with€them€conducted€in€accordance€with€Rule€1.7(c).€€Jones€mustÏreasonably€believe€that€JonesÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥\#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝÿv#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ô€representation€of€the€client€will€not€be€adversely€affected€by€hisÐ ¨è  Ðrepresentation€of€another€client€or€that€the€client€will€not€be€materially€limited€by€JonesÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Ew#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ:x#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔÐ šÚ  Ðresponsibilities€to€another€client€or€by€the€lawyerÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥€x#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ y#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€own€interests€(Rule€1.7).Ð ŒÌ ÐÌ€€€€€Jones€must€also€consider€whether€Jones€possesses€the€legal€knowledge€and€skill€reasonablyÏnecessary€to€undertake€the€representation.€€Even€though€Jones€has€never€handled€an€IPO,€it€isÏpossible€that€through€diligent€and€thorough€preparation,€Jones€may€satisfy€the€requirement€ofÏRule€1.1.ÌÌ€€€€€The€Rules€require€consideration€as€to€whether€either€the€quoted€fee€or€the€proposed€feeÏarrangement€is€ethically€permissible.€€A€lawyer€may€accept€an€ownership€interest€in€a€client€asÏlong€as€the€lawyer€complies€with€Rule€1.8(a)€regarding€business€transactions€with€clients,€andÏwith€Rule€1.5€regarding€the€reasonableness€of€fees.€€It€is€clear€that€Rule€1.8(a)€requires€that€theÏtransaction€with€the€client€must€be€fair€and€reasonable€and€must€be€fully€disclosed€to€a€client€inÏwriting€in€a€manner€so€that€the€client€can€reasonably€understand€the€disclosure.€€In€addition,€theÏclient€must€be€given€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€seek€the€advice€of€independent€counsel,€and€theÏclient€must€give€written€consent€to€the€transaction.ÌÌ€€€€€In€providing€ongoing€legal€services€to€either€the€corporation,€Smith,€or€Clark€while€JonesÏowns€stock€in€the€corporation,€Jones€must€carefully€avoid€conflicts€between€the€clientÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Py#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ|~#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€interestsÐ >"~! Ðand€the€lawyerÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥Â~#ÔÔ‡ XÌÝXXXØ¥ÔððÔ#†XØ¥XX XÌÝ2#ÔÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥Ôs€personal€economic€interests€as€a€stockholder€and€otherwise€comply€with€theÐ 0#p" Ðrequirements€of€Rule€1.7.€€The€lawyer€must€also€exercise€independent€professional€judgment€inÏadvising€the€client€concerning€legal€matters€as€required€by€Rule€2.1.ÌÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥x#ÔÌÌÌò òÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔñHñÓ  ÓÓb€ÓñHñÌÓ  ÓÐ  ª)ê%) ÐQUESTION€9ÌÓ ÓÌÌ€€€€€ó ó(a)€Crimes€Bob€has€committed:Ð „Ä Ðò òÌ€€€€€ó ó(1)€Forgery€of€Charlesðð€name€on€the€check€issued€by€Trust€Bank€by€endorsing€the€check€withÐ `  ÐCharlesðð€name.€€Article€27,€Section€44(a)ÌÌ€€€€€(2)€Uttering€of€forged€instrument€by€knowingly€presenting€the€forged€check€to€County€BankÏfor€deposit€to€his€account.€€Article€27,€Section€44(b)ÌÌ€€€€€(3)€Theft€by€deception€from€Trust€Bank€by€misrepresenting€to€Trust€Bank€that€the€proceeds€ofÏthe€check€were€going€to€be€given€to€Charles.€€Article€27,€Section€341€and€342€(false€pretense)ÌÌ€€€€€(b)€Trust€Bankððs€entitlement€to€recover€its€loss€from€County€Bank:ÌÌ€€€€€Trust€Bank€can€sue€County€Bank€alleging€it€breached€its€warranty€under€Section€4„207€of€theÏUCC€when€it€negotiated€a€check€containing€a€forged€endorsement.ÌÌ€€€€€Generally,€the€burden€of€loss€from€a€forged€endorsement€(Charlesðð€name)€is€placed€on€theÏbank€who€dealt€with€and€took€the€instrument€from€the€forger€(Bob).€€County€Bank€was€aÏcollecting€bank.€€Trust€Bank€was€the€payor€bank.€€The€collecting€bank€warrants€to€the€payor€bankÏit€has€good€title€for€the€instrument€under€Section€4„207(1)(a).€€Also,€since€both€Bob€and€CharlesÏwere€customers€of€County€Bank,€County€Bank€was€required€to€check€the€validity€of€theÏendorsements€prior€to€accepting€the€check.€€It€does€not€appear€County€Bank€has€any€validÏdefenses€and€Trust€Bank€should€be€entitled€to€recover€its€loss€assuming€Trust€Bank€acts€promptlyÏunder€Section€4„207(d)€and€(e).€€òòSee€generallyóó,€òòBank€of€Glen€Burnie€v.€Elkridge€Bankóó,€120€Md.Ð À ÐApp.€402,€707€A.2d€438€(1998),€4„207€UCC.ò òÐ ¬ì ÐÌà@W W ìàEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTIONS€9ˆà  àó óÔ#†XØ¥XXXإŀ#ÔÐ „Ä ÐÌò òAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€Commercial€Law€ArticleÐ \ œ ÐÌTitle€3.€Negotiable€InstrumentsñIñÌÌà h àñIññJñ:€€ñJñðð3„403€and€3„404ó óÐ 4"t! ÐÌò òTitle€4.€Bank€Deposits€and€CollectionsñKñ:ñKññLñÐ  $L # ÐÐ  $L # Ðà À àñLññMñ€€ñMñðð4„104,€4„105,€4„207,€4„208,€4„401,€4„403,€and€4„406ó óÐ  $L # ÐÐ  ø$8!$ Ðò òÔ‡XØ¥XXXØ¥ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓQUESTION€10Ô ŠÔó óÐ À ÐÓŠÓÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÓ  Ó€€€€€Andy€has€committed€a€solicitation.€€A€solicitation€occurs€when€one€counsels,€incites€orÏsolicits€another€to€commit€a€felony€or€breach€of€the€peace€misdemeanor,€even€though€theÏsolicitation€is€of€no€effect.€€When€Andy€agreed€to€pay€Doug€to€murder€Zeke,€he€clearlyÏcounseled,€incited€and€solicited€Doug€to€commit€a€felony.€ÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿmŠƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àÌ€€€€€Andy€has€not€committed€an€attempted€murder.€€An€attemptò òòò€ó óóórequires€(1)€an€intent€to€commitÐ 4 t Ðthe€crime,€(2)€a€direct€and€substantial€act€done€toward€its€commission€which€falls€short€of€theÏactual€commission€of€the€crime,€and€(3)€at€least€the€apparent€ability€to€commit€the€crime.€€The€actÏneed€not€itself€be€unlawful,€but€must€be€something€more€than€mere€preparation.€€The€purchase€ofÏthe€gun€is€not€a€sufficient€act,€although€delivery€of€the€gun€to€Doug,€particularly€at€or€near€theÏintended€place€of€the€crime,€might€be€sufficient.Ìà  àÌ€€€€€Andy€may€assert€the€defense€of€entrapment€to€the€charge€of€solicitation.€€Entrapmentò òòò€ó óóóoccursÐ ¬ì  Ðwhen€a€person€has€no€intent€to€violate€the€law,€but€is€induced€or€persuaded€by€law€enforcementÏofficers€to€commit€a€crime.€€If€there€is€any€predisposition€on€the€part€of€the€defendant€to€commitÏthe€crime,€there€is€no€entrapment,€even€where€law€enforcement€officers€provide€a€favorableÏopportunity€to€commit€the€crime.€€Andy€certainly€had€a€predisposition€when€he€approached€Bert.€ÏIf€Andy€had€abandoned€his€predisposition,€and€Doug's€statements€induced€a€new€purpose€ofÏsolicitation,€then€the€defense€may€be€successful.€€However,€Andy's€reluctance€appears€to€beÏminimal€and€the€defense€will€be€unsuccessful.Ìà  àÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÓ  Ó€€€€€Andy€and€Bert€have€formed€a€conspiracy€to€commit€murder.€€A€conspiracy€is€an€agreementÏbetween€two€or€more€persons€to€commit€a€crime.€€No€overt€act€is€required.€€When€Andy€asked€forÏBert's€assistance€to€have€Zeke€killed€and€Bert€agreed€to€help€Andy,€there€was€an€agreement€toÏcommit€the€murder€of€Zeke.ÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿ…‘ƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  Ýà  àAndy€has€not€committed€arson.€€A€conspirator€is€liable€for€any€offense€committed€by€anotherÏconspirator€with€the€purpose€of€furthering€the€common€design€and€which€is€a€natural€and€foreseeableÏconsequence€of€the€common€design.€€However,€the€object€of€the€conspiracy€between€Andy€and€BertÏwas€murder,€and€Andy€could€not€foresee€that€Bert€would€commit€arson.ÌÝ‚ ÿÿÿX“ƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àÌà  àAndy€may€assert€a€defense€of€insufficiency€of€the€evidence€of€a€conspiracy.€€A€defendantÏmay€not€be€convicted€solely€on€the€uncorroborated€testimony€of€an€accomplice.€€Bert€may€be€anÏaccomplice.€€If€so,€there€must€be€some€additional€evidence€tending€to€show€that€Andy€engaged€inÏa€conspiracy.€€Only€slight€corroboration€is€necessary.€€The€testimony€of€Carl€against€Andy,€if€CarlÏis€called€as€a€witness€and€if€Carl's€testimony€is€not€hearsay€inadmissible€against€Andy,€might€beÏsufficient.€€The€ultimate€solicitation€might€corroborate€the€criminal€intent€of€Andy,€but€does€notÏtend€to€prove€the€existence€of€a€conspiracy.€€The€evidence€is€legally€insufficient€to€convict€AndyÏof€conspiracy.€ÌÔ#†XØ¥XXXØ¥ð‰#ÔÐ  ”)Ô%) ÐÔ‡ X;ìXXXØ¥ÔÓ  Óò òQUESTION€11ó óÐ À ÐÓq˜Óà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€A.€€The€issue€raised€in€the€first€deed€is€the€tenancy€created.€€The€parties€were€not€married€atÏthe€time€the€deed€was€executed.€Had€they€been€validly€married,€a€tenancy€by€the€entirety€wouldÏhave€been€created.€€However,€a€tenancy€by€the€entirety€can€only€be€created€when€the€parties€standÏin€relationship€of€husband€and€wife€at€the€time€of€the€grant€to€them.€€Absent€such€a€relationshipÏthe€attempt€to€create€a€tenancy€by€the€entirety€fails€and€generally,€this€would€create€a€presumptionÏfavoring€tenancy€in€common.€€However,€this€presumption€can€be€overcome€by€showing€aÏcontrary€intent.€€Proof€of€that€intent€would€overcome€the€presumption€and€create€a€joint€tenancyÏwith€right€of€survivorship.Ìà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€The€subsequent€marriage€does€not€convert€a€joint€tenancy€(or€a€tenancy€in€common)€into€aÏtenancy€by€the€entirety.€€Thus,€neither€the€subsequent€marriage€nor€waiting€until€after€they€wereÏmarried€to€record€the€deed€would€convert€the€tenancy€to€ð ðtenancy€by€the€entireties.ððÌà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€The€second€deed€raises€the€question€of€conflicting€descriptions.€€The€parcel€is€describedÏgenerally€as€consisting€of€6€acres€and€then€more€specifically€as€Lot€10,€being€one€acre.€€GenerallyÏspeaking,€when€a€deed€contains€both€a€general€description€of€the€property€and€a€particularÏdescription€of€such€property,€weight€should€be€given€to€the€specific€description€unless€a€differentÏintention€is€shown€by€the€deed€when€considered€as€a€whole.€€The€two€descriptions€in€this€case€areÏcontradictory.€€The€general€description€of€ð ð6€acresðð€is€inconsistent€with€the€specific€descriptionÏof€Lot€10.€€In€this€case,€particular€description€will€control€to€convey€Lot€10€being€one€acre.Ìà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€B.à  àAngie€does€have€a€problem€with€J.€Creditor.€€Angie€and€Bert€never€held€title€to€the€firstÐ ô4 Ðparcel€as€tenants€by€the€entireties.€€Thus,€a€judgment€creditor€could€have€levied€on€Bertððs€interestÏin€the€subject€property€(either€as€joint€tenant€or€tenant€in€common)€prior€to€the€divorce€takingÏplace.€€J.€Creditor€could€also€levy€on€the€second€parcel.€€While€the€property€was€held€as€tenantsÏby€the€entireties€during€the€marriage€it€was€converted€to€a€tenancy€in€common€when€the€divorceÏwas€granted.€€Thus,€the€judgment€of€J.€Creditor€would€have€become€a€lien€on€Bertððs€interest€inÏthe€property€and€would€have€continued€as€a€lien€even€though€the€property€was€transferred€by€BertÏto€Angie.€€ÌÌà  àà ` àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ P,(, Їò òÓ  ÓQUESTION€12ó óÐ À ÐÓ´¢Óà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€The€facts€raise€third€party€beneficiary€and€Statute€of€Frauds€issues.€€When€and€under€whatÏcircumstances€can€a€person€not€a€party€to€a€contract€enforce€its€provisions€for€his/her€benefit.€€Ìà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€At€common€law,€privity€between€the€plaintiff€and€defendant€is€requisite€in€maintaining€anÏaction€on€a€contract,€even€though€the€contract€was€for€the€benefit€of€a€third€party.€€Now,€inÏMaryland,€a€person€for€whose€benefit€a€contract€is€made€can€maintain€an€action€upon€it€if€he/sheÏcan€show€that€the€contract€was€intended€for€his/her€benefit€as€a€third€party€beneficiary.Ìà  àà ` àÌ€€€€€It€is€not€enough€that€the€contract€may€operate€to€his/her€benefit.€€It€must€clearly€appear€that€theÏparties€intended€to€recognize€him/her€as€a€primary€party€in€interest€and€as€privy€to€the€promise.€ÏAn€incidental€beneficiary€acquires€by€virtue€of€the€promise€no€right€against€the€promisor€or€theÏpromisee.ÌÌ€€€€€Maryland€has€recognized€two€kinds€of€third€party€beneficiaries:€€(a)€€A€donee€beneficiary,€and€Ï(b)€€creditor€beneficiary.€€In€determining€whether€one€is€a€third€party€beneficiary€of€either€type,Ïthe€intention€of€the€parties€revealed€by€the€contract€terms,€in€light€of€the€surroundingÏcircumstances,€is€determinative.€€ÌÌ€€€€€A€person€is€a€donee€beneficiary€if€it€appears€from€the€terms€of€the€promise€that€the€purpose€ofÏthe€promisee€in€obtaining€all€or€part€of€the€performance€is€to€make€a€gift€to€the€beneficiary€or€toÏconfer€upon€him/her€a€right€against€the€promisor€of€some€performance€neither€due€nor€supposedÏor€asserted€to€be€due€from€the€promisor€to€the€beneficiary.ÌÌ€€€€€The€language€of€the€instrument€is€the€primary€source€for€the€determination€of€the€intention€ofÏthe€parties.ÌÌ€€€€€A€person€is€a€creditor€beneficiary€if€the€performance€of€the€promise€will€satisfy€an€actual€orÏsupposed€or€asserted€€duty€of€the€promisee€to€the€beneficiary.ÌÌ€€€€€In€this€case,€Susan€is€a€creditor€beneficiary€and€can€sue€Beacon€because€its€contract€withÏSampo€obligates€it€to€assume€all€liabilities€of€Sampo,€with€respect€to€unfilled€orders.ÌÌ€€€€€Susan€may€also€sue€Sampo€because€she€has€an€enforceable€claim€against€Sampo€as€the€initialÏobligor€or€promisor.€€Sampo€would€then€be€subrogated€to€Susanððs€rights€under€the€contractÏagainst€Beacon.ÌÌ€€€€€The€Statute€of€Frauds€does€not€bar€Susanððs€€contractual€rights€as€a€third€party€beneficiaryÏunder€these€facts.€€Her€agreement€with€Sampo€contemplated€a€series€of€individual€serviceÏcontracts€with€Susan€for€which€it€would€pay€a€commission€for€her€performance.€€It€was€indefiniteÏand€clearly€could€be€performed€within€a€year.€€The€commission€Susan€claims€is€for€fullyÏperformed€contracts€and€are€not€barred€by€the€statute.€€à p àà È àÔ#†XØ¥XX X;ìR˜#Ô