ÿWPC ²þüo ðôéåo­¯›Š"–Tl‚ ªk…Ž.$ûå Dº¯5ÒíÌ«©ƒ#¢FøG Ü%—Ð<‹¯bé¾çî ;ybÑå¨l98—;Î…ÅÓï[ÄØƒpšáY˜q2uÖM 4¿*ÿ1¯eàÄ LU–Ͻ 5Ö×ݨòˆ(Dï½äÊsüKp5b=WæƒOýøA·ï’íêÜ2ý,Pä“hû¶Bb+öp‘$R·¹ÕȯõkUÕwäÓ¼É4_aÂÕßP[ð¡˜Ò"Òú2|G¸Ù„-õE5 ñí*s19Ê´,Ac Ó·0$®%,{Pÿ­<ýÔ–¡·ƒPê±ÿš_¥0…(‘\@1{Юa¦þŒ"M» È±* ò¡“¦3*Øå±”;¶@!´2E›¸"Ö¦™‹?W˜¤!ñÆÛU®…âG‚‹5Y|™S”›Ÿ"‚ؽrØòÖíð¿Ð†ê¨—Ø“6÷d9Óü½›h˜œdhÍñØ”Än٠Έ°èxŒy\±Pô> Ÿìo }¯¿S¿‰v¢•žóé|-â¿ÈÐq⹃&•ÕxÉ ·vÞJ-ÜÅ^KÝŸXEQ;7$ K_-ß–·xÑpÜKe ,&U.n­B %ïšõ#ÁŸ(` 0:ˆ N ^ Ä wÐ 4Ô U6@è ( m* A U>I U@‡ 1‡Ç 1‡N 72Õ 1u 72| 0c® 72 0bC U>¥U@ããUN#bqÌs 0V?? 0”• 0 „) 0r­<þ6X9`(Courier«<þ6X9`(CourierXôxþ6X@ɹ`7ûX@X' Ò #BAREX18A 2BAREX  0 .   3|x ˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL$,,,,$0!(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,ÔèrÈ,â Šƒ},ê:i¢Ø+00(ÖÃ9 Z(Times New Roman ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ô\  `‹&Times New Roman'þÿ Z‹(Garamond Regular(EhCEKQW]cioAutoList21.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à1.<‘”ÿÿ:Body Text InÓ X ÓÓ2(4 4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!2ÓÔS‡ô\  `&Times New RomanSÔÓ  ÓÓ5+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!5ÓÔS‡ô\  `&Times New RomanSÔô\  `&Times New Roman(ÀÊO Z‹(Times New Roman (ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular ÂÝ ƒ!½þ)ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€X<¿XXXÔà@üüüìàò òBoardððs€Analysis€Page€Ú  Ú1Ú  Ú€of€Ú  Ú18Ú  Úó ó(.3½þ$©©Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý6//ÿÿ4WP9_TitleÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÔ‡XXXÔÓ  ÓÑ  ÑÔ‡XXXÔ<$$ÿÿ:WP9_Body TexÑ  ÑÔ‡XXXÔÑ  ÑÔ‡XXXÔ*$$ÿÿ(_53Ñ  ÑÔ‡XXXÔÑ  ÑÔ‡XXXÔÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  ÓÔ€ Xì3XXXÔÑ8€ÔÚXXdÈdÈ8Ñò òÑ€Ñà@ô ô ìàFEBRUARY€2002€BAR€EXAMINATIONˆÐ ° Ðà@"ìàBOARD'S€ANALYSISó óˆÐ xÈ ÐÌà@%ìàò òQUESTION€1ó óˆÐ X ÐÌò òÖ€ ÿÿÖ1.à  àa.ó óà ` àRobbery€„€Robbery€is€the€taking€and€carrying€away€property€from€someone's€presenceÐ ˜è Ðor€control€by€force€or€the€threat€of€force€with€the€intent€to€permanently€deprive€the€victim€of€theÐ b ² Ðproperty.€€Bob€pointed€the€BB€gun€at€the€store€clerk€and€forced€him€to€turn€over€the€contents€of€theÐ * z Ðcash€register.€€He€then€fled€the€store€taking€the€cash€with€him.€€Therefore,€Bob€could€be€charged€withÐ ò B Ðrobbery.Ð º   ÐÌò òà  àb.ó óà ` àRobbery€with€a€dangerous€or€deadly€weapon€„€All€of€the€elements€of€robbery€mustÐ J š  Ðexist,€and€the€defendant€must€use€a€dangerous€or€deadly€weapon€in€the€perpetration€of€the€robbery.€Ð d  ÐA€dangerous€weapon€is€an€object€that€is€capable€of€causing€death€or€serious€bodily€harm.€€BobÐ Ü,  Ðcommitted€the€robbery,€and€he€used€the€BB€gun€to€intimidate€the€clerk.€€It€is€not€necessary€that€a€gunÐ ¤ô  Ðbe€capable€of€discharging€a€lethal€bullet€to€be€a€deadly€weapon.€òòGrant€v.€Stateóó,€65€Md.€App.€547,€501Ð l¼  ÐA.2d€475€(1985)€€Therefore,€Bob€could€be€charged€with€robbery€with€a€dangerous€or€deadly€weapon.Ð 4„  ÐÌò òà  àc.ó óà ` àFelony€Murder€„€Bob€was€in€the€process€of€committing€a€felony€when€Joe€was€killedÐ Ä Ðby€the€clerk.€€However,€Maryland€applies€the€"Agency€Theory"€to€homicides€that€occur€during€theÐ ŽÞ Ðcourse€of€a€felony.€€In€order€for€Bob€to€be€charged€with€felony€murder,€the€homicide€must€beÐ V¦ Ðcommitted€by€an€accomplice€during€the€course€of€or€in€connection€with€the€felony.€€Therefore,€BobÐ n Ðcould€not€be€charged€with€felony€murder.Ð æ6 ÐÌò òà  àd.ó óà ` àBattery€„€Battery€is€the€causing€of€an€offensive€contact€with€the€victim€which€is€theÐ vÆ Ðresult€of€intentional€or€reckless€conduct€by€the€defendant€and€to€which€the€victim€did€not€consent.€Ð @ ÐBob€discharged€the€BB€gun€striking€the€clerk€in€the€chest.€€This€certainly€was€an€intentional€orÐ X Ðreckless€act€causing€offensive€contact€to€which€the€clerk€did€not€consent.€€Therefore,€Bob€could€beÐ Ð  Ðcharged€with€batteryÐ ˜è ÐÌò òà  àe.ó óà ` àAssault€„€Bob€committed€an€act€with€the€intent€of€placing€the€victim€in€fear€ofÐ (x Ðimmediate€bodily€harm€by€pointing€the€BB€gun€at€him.€€He€had€the€apparent€ability€to€bring€aboutÐ òB Ðphysical€harm€and€the€victim€reasonably€feared€immediate€physical€harm€and€Bob's€actions€were€notÐ º   Ðlegally€justified.€€Therefore,€Bob€could€be€charged€with€assault.Ð ‚Ò! ÐÌò òà  àf.ó óà ` àPossession€of€a€controlled€dangerous€substance€„€Bob€knowingly€possessedÐ  b# Ðmarijuana,€a€controlled€dangerous€substance,€in€his€motel€room.€€We€must€assume€that€he€knew€thatÐ Ü ,$ Ðthe€substance€was€illegal€and€that€it€was€a€controlled€dangerous€substance.€€Therefore,€he€could€beÐ ¤!ô% Ðcharged€with€possession€of€a€controlled€dangerous€substance.Ð l"¼& ÐÌò òà  àg.ó óà ` àPossession€of€a€controlled€dangerous€substance€with€the€intent€to€distribute€„€WhileÐ ü#L( Ðit€is€true€that€Bob€possessed€a€controlled€dangerous€substance€and€the€facts€described€it€as€a€largeÐ Æ$ ) Ðquantity,€there€were€not€sufficient€facts€concerning€the€quantity€to€allow€us€to€determine€whether€itÐ Ž%Þ * Ðwas€so€large€a€quantity€as€to€suggest€that€it€was€for€other€than€personal€use.€€Therefore,€while€Ð V&¦!+ ÐBob€may€be€charged€with€possession€with€intent€to€distribute,€further€facts€are€required.Ð 'n", ÐÌò òà  àh.ó óà ` àTheft€„€Although€it€might€be€suggested€that€Bob€could€be€charged€with€theft€for€takingÐ ®(þ#. Ðthe€cigarettes€as€he€fled€the€store,€the€robbery€was€one€continuous€act€and€the€theft€would€merge€intoÐ x)È$/ Ðthe€robbery.€€Therefore,€he€should€not€be€charged€with€theft.Ð @*%0 ÐÌò òà  ài.ó óà ` àConspiracy€„€Conspiracy€is€a€combination€or€agreement€by€two€or€more€persons€toÐ Ð+ '2 Ðaccomplish€an€unlawful€act€or€to€do€a€lawful€act€by€unlawful€means.€€Bob€and€Joe€agreed€to€commitÐ ° Ðthe€robbery€together.€€Therefore,€they€conspired€to€commit€the€robbery.€€Bob€could€be€charged€withÐ xÈ Ðconspiracy.Ð @ ÐÌò ò2.ó óà  àFirst,€I€would€enter€my€appearance€on€Bob's€behalf€in€accordance€with€Rule€4„214.€€Next,Ð Ð  ÐI€would€file€a€motion€for€discovery€and€inspection€in€accordance€with€Rule€4„263.€€Next,€I€would€fileÐ šê Ða€motion€to€suppress€the€evidence€obtained€in€the€search€of€the€motel€room€in€accordance€with€RuleÐ b ² Ð4„252.€€This€motion€must€be€filed€within€thirty€(30)€days€after€Bob's€arraignment.€€Lastly,€I€wouldÐ * z Ðfile€a€motion€for€a€separate€trial€of€the€robbery€case€and€the€CDS€case€under€Rule€4„253.€€I€wouldÐ ò B Ðalso€consider€asking€for€a€trial€separate€from€Marjorie's€on€the€CDS€charge.à x àÐ º   ÐÐ  ‚ Ò  Ðò òà@"ìàBOARD'S€ANALYSISó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà@%ìàò òQUESTION€2ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌò òòòó óóóà  àSince€John€wants€to€leave€the€marital€home,€he€should€obtain€a€limited€divorce.€€This€wouldÐ Ð  Ðallow€the€court€to€establish€child€custody€and€visitation,€child€support,€use€and€possession€of€theÐ ˜è Ðfamily€home€and€temporary€alimony.€€The€determinations€made€by€the€court€would€remain€in€placeÐ ` ° Ðuntil€there€is€either€an€absolute€divorce€or€a€reconciliation€of€the€parties.Ð ( x ÐÌà  àThere€is€nothing€in€the€facts€to€indicate€that€John€is€aware€of€Jocelyn's€suspicions€concerningÐ ¸   Ðhis€possible€adultery.€€If€he€was€aware€of€her€suspicions,€I€would€advise€him€that€she€would€have€toÐ € Ð  Ðprovide€evidence€sufficient€to€convince€a€judge€that€he€was€guilty€of€adultery.€€If€she€was€able€to€doÐ H ˜  Ðthat,€there€would€be€serious€ramifications.€€It€would€entitle€her€to€file€for€and€obtain€an€absoluteÐ `  Ðdivorce.€€Since€she€is€not€currently€employed,€the€court€would€make€a€determination€concerningÐ Ø(  Ðeither€rehabilitative€or€permanent€alimony.€€Since€it€is€probable€that,€even€if€she€was€able€to€makeÐ  ð  Ðas€much€progress€as€possible€in€becoming€employed€and€receiving€a€salary,€the€difference€betweenÐ h¸  Ðher€income€and€his€income€would€still€be€substantial.€€It€is€possible€that€she€would€be€grantedÐ 0€  Ðpermanent€alimony.Ð øH  ÐÌà  àRegarding€the€issue€of€child€support,€since€the€partiesðð€income€exceeds€the€maximum€amountÐ ˆØ Ðfor€use€with€the€child€support€guidelines,€the€child€support€will€be€determined€based€upon€otherÐ P  Ðfactors.€€These€factors€include€the€children's€current€standard€of€living.€€Therefore,€he€would€haveÐ h Ðto€continue€to€pay€the€oldest€daughter's€private€school€tuition.€€In€order€for€Jocelyn€to€work,€it€wouldÐ à0 Ðbe€necessary€for€her€to€have€child€care.€€Since€the€family€experience€includes€a€full€time€nanny,€itÐ ¨ø Ðis€probable€that€a€court€would€also€require€him€to€continue€to€pay€that€cost.€€He€would€also€beÐ pÀ Ðresponsible€for€the€payment€of€the€outstanding€medical€bill€since€he€is€the€sole€support€of€the€family.Ð 8ˆ ÐÌà  àA€visitation€schedule€should€be€devised€based€upon€the€children's€activities€and€the€parties'Ð È Ðwork€schedules€so€that€John€will€continue€to€be€involved€with€them.€€There€should€also€be€a€decisionÐ à Ðmade€concerning€legal€custody.€€John€should€be€sure€to€request€joint€legal€custody€(that€is,€jointÐ X¨ Ðdecision€making)€of€the€children.Ð  p ÐÌà  àIn€settling€the€parties'€rights€to€their€marital€property,€the€court€would€consider€the€equity€inÐ °  Ðthe€marital€home€and€John's€share€in€his€partnership.€€Following€the€period€of€use€and€possession,Ð xÈ! Ðthe€property€may€be€sold€and€an€equitable€distribution€made€from€the€proceeds.Ð @" ÐÌà  àSince€John's€share€of€the€partnership€is€also€marital€property,€the€partnership€would€have€toÐ Ð $ Ðbe€valued,€and€Jocelyn€would€be€entitled€to€a€marital€award€equal€to€50%€of€the€current€value€ofÐ ˜!è% ÐJohn's€partnership€interest.Ð `"°& ÐÌà  àI€would€advise€John€to€talk€to€Jocelyn€either€directly€or€in€the€presence€of€a€mediator,€andÐ ð#@( Ðattempt€to€resolve€all€of€the€issues€and€enter€into€a€separation€agreement€concerning€all€issues€if€thatÐ ¸$ ) Ðis€possible.Ð €%Ð * ÐÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àÐ  h)¸$/ Ðò òÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3ÔÔ‡ô”òXX<¿Ôà@"ìàÔ#†X<¿Xòô”~%#ÔBOARDððS€ANALYSISó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà@%ìàò òQUESTION€3ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌà  àThis€question€involves€the€liability€of€makers,€endorsers€and€payors€for€payment€of€forgedÐ Ð  Ðchecks.Ð ˜è ÐÌà  àThe€facts€establish€that€Twigg€induced€Wood€Productsðð€bookkeeper€to€issue€checks€payableÐ ( x Ðto€persons€to€whom€the€company€was€not€indebted,€intending€the€named€supplier€on€each€check€toÐ ð @ Ðbe€the€payee€(Sec.€3„110).€€When€the€check€was€given€to€Twigg€he€became€a€holder€entitled€toÐ ¸   Ðenforce€the€instrument€(3„404).€€Ð € Ð  ÐÌà  àDollar€Bankððs€liability€turns€on€whether€or€not€it€exercises€ordinary€care€(reasonableÐ `  Ðcommercial€standards)€in€depositing€or€paying€the€checks.€€€The€fact€that€Twiggððs€signature€and€thoseÐ Ø(  Ðof€the€suppliers€were€on€record€with€Dollar€Bank€and€could€have€been€compared€at€the€time€that€theÐ  ð  Ðtransactions€took€place,€is€some€evidence€that€the€Bank€did€not€exercise€ordinary€care.€€On€the€otherÐ h¸  Ðhand,€Twigg€was€a€regular€customer€and€maintained€an€account€there€and€there€are€no€other€facts€toÐ 0€  Ðsuggest€that€these€endorsements€should€have€been€viewed€with€suspicion.€This€is€an€issue€of€fact€andÐ øH  Ðthe€Bankððs€liability€€turns€on€all€of€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€transaction.€Ð À ÐÌà  àWhen€he€forged€the€name€of€the€supplier„payee,€the€check€became€payable€to€the€bearerÐ P  Ðbecause€it€was€indorsed€in€blank€(3„205(b)).€€Under€these€facts€it€was€not€necessary€that€TwiggÐ h Ðindorsed€it€himself.€€The€check€may€be€negotiated€by€transfer€of€possession€alone€which€he€did€onÐ à0 Ðtwo€of€the€three€checks€that€he€forged.€(3„201(b)€).€Under€3„204,€Dollar€Bank€could€have€requiredÐ ¨ø ÐTwigg€to€indorse€but€its€failure€to€do€so€is€probably€explained€by€the€fact€that€he€had€an€account€withÐ pÀ Ðthe€bank€and€was€known€to€it.€€In€any€case€no€additional€indorsement€was€required€for€a€checkÐ 8ˆ Ðpayable€to€the€bearer.€€€Unless€Dollar€Bank€was€not€exercising€ordinary€care€or€was€acting€in€badÐ P Ðfaith,€it€became€a€holder€in€due€course;€that€is,€the€instrument€when€negotiated€to€Dollar€Bank€didÐ È Ðnot€bear€such€apparent€evidence€of€forgery€or€alterationð8ð.as€to€call€into€question€its€authenticity.€€Ð à ÐÌà  àIf€Dollar€Bank€observed€reasonable€commercial€standards€it€has€not€breached€its€warrantyÐ  p Ðto€City€Trust€under€Section€3„407€because€it€was€at€the€€time€the€person€entitled€to€enforce€theÐ è8 Ðchecks,€had€not€altered€them,€nor€did€it€have€knowledge€that€the€signature€of€the€drawer€or€endorserÐ °  Ðwas€unauthorized.Ð xÈ! ÐÌà  àUnless€Dollar€Bank€was€not€exercising€ordinary€care€or€was€acting€in€bad€faith,€it€becameÐ  X# Ða€holder€in€due€course;€that€is,€the€instrument€when€negotiated€to€Dollar€Bank€did€not€bear€suchÐ Ð $ Ðapparent€evidence€of€forgery€or€alterationð8ð€as€to€call€into€question€its€authority.€€(3„404;€3„302).€€Ð ˜!è% ÐThe€facts€do€not€establish€that€Dollar€Bank€acted€in€a€way€that€substantially€contributed€to€the€lossÐ `"°& Ðsustained€by€Wood€Products.€Ð (#x' ÐÌà  àUnder€3„406,€a€person€whose€failure€to€exercise€ordinary€care€contributes€to€an€alteration€ofÐ ¸$ ) Ðan€instrument€or€to€the€making€of€a€forged€signature€on€an€instrument€is€precluded€from€assertingÐ €%Ð * Ðsuch€alteration€or€forgery€against€a€person€who,€in€good€faith,€pays€the€instrument€or€takes€for€value.€Ð H&˜!+ ÐÌÌà  àIf€a€person€asserting€preclusion€also€fails€to€exercise€ordinary€care,€and€the€failureÐ  (ð#. Ðsubstantially€contributes€to€the€loss,€it€is€allocated€between€the€parties€according€to€the€extent€toÐ h)¸$/ Ðwhich€the€failure€of€each€to€exercise€ordinary€care€contributes€to€the€loss.€€Under€these€facts,€WoodÐ 0*€%0 ÐProducts€failed€to€exercise€ordinary€care€in€the€following€respects:Ð ø*H&1 ÐÌà  à(a)à ` àIt€violated€its€own€policies€by€giving€both€copies€of€the€scaling€slip€to€Twigg.Ð ˆ,Ø'3 Ðà  àà ` àÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà  à(b)à ` àThe€scaling€slips€were€not€numbered€or€otherwise€marked€in€a€manner€which€wouldÐ xÈ Ðpermit€Wood€Products€to€control€and€account€for€them.Ð@` (#` (# Ðà  àà ` àÌà  à(c)à ` àIt€had€no€policy€in€place€€to€safeguard€the€scaling€slips€or€prevent€their€theft.Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` àÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà  à(d)à ` àIt€delivered€the€payment€check€to€Twigg€without€authorization€of€the€owner€to€whomÐ ` ° Ðthe€check€was€payable.Ð( x` (#` (# ÐÌÌà  àThese€actions€are€evidence€of€Wood€Productsðð€failure€to€observe€reasonable€commercialÐ € Ð  Ðstandards.€Ð H ˜  Ðà  àà ` àÌà  àUnder€the€preclusion€provision€of€Section€3„406,€unless€City€Trust€also€failed€to€exerciseÐ Ø(  Ðordinary€care,€it€would€not€be€liable€for€the€loss.€€Wood€Products€is€clearly€negligent€in€its€handlingÐ  ð  Ðof€the€scaling€slips€and,€if€it€is€concluded€that€Dollar€Bank€did€not€exercise€ordinary€care€when€itÐ h¸  Ðfailed€to€compare€the€signatures,€then€it€would€share€in€the€loss€as€provided€in€3„406.€Ð 0€  ÐÌÌà@ ìàò òEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€3ó óˆÐ ˆØ ÐÌò òAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€Commercial€Law€Articleó óÐ h ÐÌò òTitle€3.€Negotiable€Instruments:€€ðð€3„103,€3„104,€3„109,€3„110,€3„201,€3„203,€3„204,€3„205,€3„301,Ð ¨ø Ð3„401,€3„403,€3„404,€3„406,€3„416Ð pÀ ÐÌTitle€4.€Bank€Deposits€and€Collections:€€ðð€4„105ó óÐ P ÐÌÌÌÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿_%#Ôò òÐ   p Ðà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISó óˆÐ ° ÐÌò òà@%ìàQUESTION€4ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌà  àThe€question€is€designed€to€raise€issues€with€regard€to€Rules€7.1€CommunicationsÐ Ð  ÐConcerning€a€Lawyerððs€Services,€7.2€Advertising,€and€7.3€Direct€Contact€with€Prospective€Clients.Ð ˜è ÐÌà  àUnder€7.1(a)€a€web€page€constitutes€advertising€and€it€is€a€communication€ð ð€ð8ðnot€involvingÐ ( x Ðin„person€contactðð.€€Therefore,€the€rules€in€general€allow€such€advertising.€€While€it€is€notÐ ð @ Ðimpermissible€to€state€that€she€is€a€lawyer,€her€advertising€in€states€where€she€is€not€licensed€toÐ ¸   Ðpractice€could€be€violative€under€7.1€which€prohibits€misleading€communications€about€oneððsÐ € Ð  Ðservices.€€Because€the€ad€is€intended€for€people€beyond€the€state€of€Maryland,€the€web€site€shouldÐ H ˜  Ðmake€very€clear€that€Ann€is€only€licensed€to€practice€law€in€the€state€of€Maryland.Ð `  ÐÌà  àDirect€solicitations€in€the€form€of€telephone€calls€to€obtain€real€estate€listings€present€aÐ  ð  Ðproblem€if€Ann€discloses€that€she€is€a€practicing€attorney.€€The€disclosure€even€if€intended€primarilyÐ h¸  Ðfor€the€purpose€of€obtaining€real€estate€listings,€constitutes€a€ð ðpersonal€contactðð€by€a€lawyer€whichÐ 0€  Ðviolates€7.1(a).€€Because€her€intended€communication€states€that€using€her€services€as€a€realtor€andÐ øH  Ðattorney€may€save€money,€it€could€raise€the€issue€of€a€false€or€misleading€communication€about€theÐ À Ðlawyer€or€the€lawyerððs€services€and€be€violative€of€Rule€7.1.€€While€application€of€these€Rules€is€onÐ ˆØ Ða€case€b€case€basis,€one€could€conclude€that€a€violation€has€occurred€under€7.1(b)€b€creating€anÐ P  Ðunjustified€expectation€about€the€results€the€lawyer€can€achieve.€€It€is€also€possible€to€suggest€aÐ h Ðviolation€of€Rule€7.1(c).€€This€Rule€allows€a€comparison€with€the€services€of€other€lawyers€only€ifÐ à0 Ðthe€comparison€can€be€factually€substantiated.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€direct€mail€advertisement€at€open€houses€is€not€generally€prohibited€because€itÐ 8ˆ Ðconstitutes€a€communication€which€does€not€involve€personal€contact.€€However,€if€Ann€actuallyÐ P Ðattends€the€open€house€with€the€flyers€it€could€be€interpreted€as€a€personal€contact.€€Thus,€whetherÐ È Ðthis€is€violative€of€the€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€depends€on€her€presence€at€the€open€house€andÐ à Ðwhether€her€presence€so€closely€identifies€her€with€the€ad€as€to€constitute€a€personal€contact.€€TheÐ X¨ Ðcalendar€also€raises€the€prohibition€of€a€lawyer€giving€anything€of€value€to€prospective€clients€underÐ  p ÐRule€7.2(c).€€The€information€on€the€calendar€is€otherwise€permissible.Ð è8 ÐÌà  àUnder€normal€circumstances,€written€advertisements€on€windshields€of€automobiles€are€notÐ xÈ! Ðð ðin€personðð€contacts.€Neither€is€placing€the€material€on€the€vehicle€an€in„person€contact.€€However,Ð @" Ðthe€quote€at€the€bottom€of€the€flyer€would€almost€certainly€run€afoul€of€7.1(c)€regarding€theÐ  X# Ðcomparison€of€the€lawyerððs€services€with€the€services€of€other€lawyers.Ð Ð $ ÐÌà  àEven€nonpersonal€contact€advertisements€must€follow€the€provisions€of€Rule€7.2.€€€TheseÐ `"°& Ðinclude€keeping€a€copy€or€recording€of€the€ad€for€three€ears€along€with€a€record€of€where€or€whenÐ (#x' Ðit€was€used€and€refraining€from€giving€anything€of€value€for€recommending€the€lawyerððs€services.Ð ð#@( ÐIt€must€include€the€name€of€the€lawyer€responsible€for€its€content,€and€it€must€make€disclosure€withÐ ¸$ ) Ðregard€to€legal€expenses.Ð €%Ð * ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ ˆ,Ø'3 Ðò òÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3Ôà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISòòˆÐ ° ÐÌóóà@!!%ìàQuestion€5òòˆÐ @ ÐÑ  ÑÌà@ÐÐ'ìàPart€AˆÐ Ð  ÐÌó óóóÌòòò òNEGLIGENCEó óóóÐ ( x ÐÌà  àTo€determine€if€Lumpy€was€negligent,€it€must€be€determined€if€Lumpy€used€reasonable€careÐ ¸   Ðto€avoid€injury€to€Theodoreððs€property.€€The€five€elements€of€a€negligence€action€include:€(1)€dutyÐ € Ð  Ðof€reasonable€care;€(2)€breach€of€duty;€(3)€causation;€(4)€proximate€cause;€and€(5)€damages.Ð H ˜  ÐÌà  àTheodore€was€a€reasonable€plaintiff€harmed€by€Lumpyððs€action.€€Lumpy€failed€to€take€properÐ Ø(  Ðprecautions€to€monitor€the€tank€on€a€regular€basis.€€If€Lumpy€had€monitored€the€tank€on€a€regularÐ  ð  Ðbasis€he€would€have€Ô_ÔknownÔ_Ô€the€tank€was€leaking.€€The€leak€caused€the€contamination€of€TheodoreððsÐ h¸  Ðwell.€€The€contamination€of€the€ground€water€was€reasonably€foreseeable€and€that€damage€causedÐ 0€  Ðan€actual€loss€to€Theodore€in€that€he€can€no€longer€use€his€well.Ð øH  ÐÌòòò òSTRICT€LIABILITYó óóóÐ ˆØ ÐÑ  ÑÌÑ  Ñà  àLumpy€may€be€held€strictly€liable€for€the€damage€to€Theodoreððs€real€property.€€For€an€actionÐ h Ðin€strict€liability€for€abnormally€dangerous€activity€it€must€be€shown€that€(1)€the€activity€wasÐ à0 Ðð ðabnormally€dangerousðð;€(2)€that€the€Defendant€had€control€of€the€activity;€and€(3)€that€the€PlaintiffÐ ¨ø Ðor€his€property€was€injured€as€a€result€of€the€abnormally€dangerous€activity.Ð pÀ ÐÌÑ  Ñà  àThe€factors€to€be€considered€in€determining€whether€an€activity€is€abnormally€dangerous€are:Ð P ÐÌà  à(a)€€existence€of€a€high€degree€of€risk€of€harm€to€the€person,€land€or€chattels€of€others;Ð à Ðà  à(b)€€likelihood€that€the€harm€that€results€from€it€will€be€great;Ð X¨ Ðà  à(c)€€inability€to€eliminate€the€risk€by€the€exercise€of€reasonable€care;Ð  p Ðà  à(d)€€extent€to€which€the€activity€is€not€a€matter€of€common€usage;Ð è8 Ðà  à(e)€€inappropriateness€of€the€activity€to€the€place€where€it€is€carried€on;€andÐ °  Ðà  à(f)€€extent€to€which€its€value€to€the€community€is€outweighed€by€its€dangerous€attributes.Ð xÈ! ÐÌà  àThe€most€crucial€factor€is€the€appropriateness€of€the€activity€in€the€particular€place€where€itÐ  X# Ðis€being€carried€on.€€The€activity€need€only€be€abnormally€dangerous€in€relationship€to€itsÐ Ð $ Ðsurroundings.Ð ˜!è% ÐÌà  àLumpyððs€storing€of€gasoline€in€a€residential€development€is€not€an€appropriate€non„naturalÐ (#x' Ðuse€of€the€land€compared€to€the€residential€use.€€The€inherent€dangers€of€fire,€explosion€andÐ ð#@( Ðcontamination€cannot€be€totally€eliminated€notwithstanding€its€proven€social€utility.Ð ¸$ ) ÐÑ  ÑÌòòò òTRESPASSó óóóÐ H&˜!+ ÐÑ  ÑÌÑ  Ñà  àTrespass€upon€land€consists€of€any€physical€entry€upon€the€land€of€another€without€regardÐ Ø'(#- Ðto€harm€if€the€entry€interferes€with€the€possession€or€use€of€anotherððs€property.€€The€elements€to€aÐ  (ð#. Ðcause€of€action€for€trespass€include€(1)€Entry€upon€land€(2)€In€an€unlawful€manner€(3)€In€theÐ h)¸$/ Ðpossession€of€another;€and€(4)€Without€consent.Ð 0*€%0 ÐÌÑ  Ñà  àWhen€a€tortfeasor€is€engaged€in€abnormally€dangerous€activity,€a€non„negligent€unintentionalÐ À+'2 Ðentry€upon€land€can€constitute€trespass.Ð ˆ,Ø'3 Їòòò òNUISANCEó óóóÐ ° ÐÌà  àThe€elements€for€an€action€for€private€nuisance€are:€(1)€Unreasonable€or€intentional€conduct;Ð @ Ð(2)€Which€causes€substantial€and€unreasonable€injury€or€interference;€(3)€With€anotherððs€use€andÐ X Ðenjoyment€of€his€real€property.Ð Ð  ÐÌÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òòòPart€BÐ ` ° ÐÌó óóóÓ  Óà  àThere€are€four€elements€to€Ô_ÔestablishÔ_Ô€actual€agency.€€(1)€Selection€and€engagement€of€servant;Ð ð @ Ð(2)€Payment€of€wages;€(3)€Power€of€dismissal;€(4)€Power€of€control€over€servantððs€conduct.Ð ¸   ÐÌà  àFrom€these€facts€there€is€an€insufficient€control€of€Lumpy€by€KO€to€establish€actual€agency.Ð H ˜  ÐÌà  àFor€there€to€be€liability€on€the€ground€of€apparent€agency€or€agency€by€estoppel€there€mustÐ Ø(  Ðbe€actual€reliance€on€the€care€and€skill€of€the€apparent€agent€by€the€person€injured.Ð  ð  ÐÌÑ  Ñà  àThe€attraction€of€a€customer€to€a€station€by€gasoline€companies€signs€and€loyalty€to€a€certainÐ 0€  Ðbrand€of€gasoline€is€not€sufficient€to€establish€apparent€agency€or€agency€by€estoppel.€€It€is€not€anÐ øH  Ðactual€reliance€on€the€care€and€skill€of€the€apparent€agent.Ð À ÐÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿N#ÔÐ  ¨ø Ðà@"ìàò òBOARDððS€ANALYSISó óˆÐ ° ÐÔ‡XÙ²XX Xì3ÔÌà@%ìàò òQUESTION€6ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌà@ìì*ìàò òˆÌÓ?+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!°œX?Óó óÔ#† Xì3XXXÙ²Sc#Ôà  àò ò1.à ` àó óYates€would€argue€that€say€that€District€Court€action€bars€the€action€for€personalÐ ˜è Ðinjuries.€€òòDill€v.€Averyóó,€305€Md.€206,€502€A.€2d€1051€(1986),€quoted,€and€applied,€the€ruleÐ b ² Ðenunciated€in€Restatement€Second€of€Judgments:Ð * z ÐÌò òà8  àð ðSection€24.€Dimensions€of€ððClaimðð€for€Purposes€of€Merger€oró ó€ò òBar€ð"ðð"ð€GeneralÐ º   ÐRule€Concerning€ððSplittingððó ó€(1)€When€a€valid€and€final€judgment€rendered€in€anÐ „ Ô  Ðaction€extinguishes€the€plaintiff's€claim€pursuant€to€the€rules€of€merger€or€bar€.€.€.€theÐ N ž  Ðclaim€extinguished€includes€all€rights€of€the€plaintiff€to€remedies€against€theÐ f  Ðdefendant€with€respect€to€all€or€any€part€of€the€transaction,€or€series€of€connectedÐ Þ.  Ðtransactions,€out€of€which€the€action€arose.ðð€€Id.€at€209,€210.Цö Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIf€Samððs€action€in€District€Court€is€an€action€to€recover€damages€caused€by€the€collision,€thenÐ 6†  Ðhis€subsequent€claim€for€damages€for€personal€injuries€is€barred.Ð þN  Ð``Ð Æ Ðà  àSamððs€action€was€for€breach€of€contract.€€Does€this€change€the€result?€€Probably€not.€€In€òòKentÐ ŽÞ ÐCo.€v.€Bilbrough,€óó309€Md.€487,€497€„€501,€525€A.2d€232òò€óó(1987),€the€Court€of€Appeals€adopted€theÐ V¦ Ðð ðtransactionalðð€analysis€claim€preclusion€issues:Ð n ÐÌà8  àThe€present€trend€is€to€see€claim€in€factual€terms€and€to€make€it€coterminous€with€theÐ ®þ Ðtransaction€regardless€of€the€number€of€substantive€theories,€or€variant€forms€of€reliefÐ vÆ Ðflowing€from€those€theories,€that€may€be€available€to€the€plaintiff;€regardless€of€theÐ >Ž Ðnumber€of€primary€rights€that€may€have€been€invaded;€and€regardless€of€theÐ V Ðvariations€in€the€evidence€needed€to€support€the€theories€or€rights.€€The€transactionÐ Î Ðis€the€basis€of€the€litigative€unit€or€entity€which€may€not€be€split.€Ð–æÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àConsequently,€the€American€Law€Institute€in€ðð€24€of€Restatement€(Second)Ð &v Ðof€Judgments€has€adopted€the€following€standards€for€determining€the€"DimensionsÐ î> Ðof€'Claim'€for€Purposes€of€Merger€or€Bar€--€General€Rule€Concerning€'Splitting'":€Ð¶ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  à(1)€When€a€valid€and€final€judgment€rendered€in€an€action€extinguishes€the€plaintiff'sÐ F–" Ðclaim€pursuant€to€the€rules€of€merger€or€bar€(see€ðððð€18,€19),€the€claim€extinguishedÐ  ^# Ðincludes€all€rights€of€the€plaintiff€to€remedies€against€the€defendant€with€respect€toÐ Ö &$ Ðall€or€any€part€of€the€transaction,€or€series€of€connected€transactions,€out€of€which€theÐ ž!î% Ðaction€arose.€Ðf"¶&Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(2)€What€factual€grouping€constitutes€a€"transaction",€and€what€groupings€constituteÐ ö#F( Ða€"series",€are€to€be€determined€pragmatically,€giving€weight€to€such€considerationsÐ ¾$ ) Ðas€whether€theòò€facts€are€related€in€time,€space,€origin,€or€motivationóó,€whether€theyÐ †%Ö * Ðform€a€convenient€trial€unit,€and€whether€their€treatment€as€a€unit€conforms€to€theÐ N&ž!+ Ðparties'€expectations€or€business€understanding€or€usage.ðð€€€(Emphasis€added.)Ð'f",Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àImmediately€after€the€accident,€Yates€admitted€fault€and€promised€to€make€amends.€€SamÐ ¦(ö#. Ðcouched€his€District€Court€claim€in€terms€of€breach€of€contract€but€the€facts,€both€as€to€time,€space,Ð n)¾$/ Ðorigin€and€motivation€are€the€same.€€The€question€of€Ô_ÔwhetherÔ_Ô€a€court€would€rule€that€the€offer€to€payÐ 6*†%0 Ðfor€the€property€damage€was€part€of€the€same€ð ðtransactionðð€is€an€open€one;€examinees€were€givenÐ þ*N&1 Ðcredit€for€either€analysis.Ð Æ+'2 Їà  àThe€same€result€would€apply€to€the€claim€against€Bill€based€on€òòrespondeat€superioróó,€as€hisÐ ° Ðliability€must€be€based€on€his€agentððs€liability.Ð xÈ ÐÌÓ€ (5h83ÓØ! !Øà  àò ò2.ó óà ` à€The€fact€that€the€judgment€was€entered€by€default€does€not€bar€its€claims€preclusiveÐ X Ðeffect.€€òòUnited€Book€Press€v.€Maryland€Compóó.,€141€Md.€App.€460€(2001.)€€Ð Ò" ÐÌà  àò ò3.ó óà ` àThere€is€a€different€result€for€the€negligent€entrustment€action€against€Bill.€€Here,€theÐ b ² Ðfacts€are€not€the€same€transaction€as€those€of€the€accident.€€Instead,€they€focus€on€Billððs€allowing€hisÐ , | Ðnon„licensed€employee€to€use€Billððs€van€after€Bill€knew€he€had€been€drinking.€€The€timing€andÐ ô D Ðlocation€of€the€pertinent€events€is€different.€€This€action€could€proceed.Ð ¼   Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  àà x àà Ð àÐ  „ Ô  Ðò òà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3ԈР° ÐÌà@%ìàQUESTION€7ó óˆÐ @ ÐòòÌÓ XÓóóThe€Jones€and€Smith€LLC€was€properly€formed€when€the€Maryland€State€Department€ofÐ Ð  ÐÔ_ÔAssessmentsÔ_Ô€and€Taxation€accepted€the€Articles€of€Organization€for€the€Jones€and€Smith€LLC.€€Md.Ð ˜è ÐAnn.€Code,€Corp.€&€Assoc.€Art.;€ðððð€4A„101€et€seq.€€The€LLC€was€not€defective€because€it€did€notÐ ` ° Ðadopt€an€operating€agreement.€€Although€advisable,€an€LLC€does€not€require€an€operating€agreement.€Ð ( x ÐMd.€€Ann.€Code,€Corp.€&€Assoc.€Art.€ðð€4A„402€(a).Ð ð @ ÐÑ  ÑÐ ¸   ÐSmith,€as€a€licensed€architect€is€individually€liable€to€Mark€and€Mary€for€faulty€design€andÐ € Ð  Ðsupervision€of€construction€of€the€deck.€€Pursuant€to€Section€4A€ð!ð301.1,€an€individual€who€rendersÐ H ˜  Ða€professional€service€in€Maryland€as€an€employee€of€a€Maryland€limited€liability€company€is€liableÐ `  Ðfor€negligent€or€wrongful€acts€or€omissions€in€which€the€individual€personally€participated€to€theÐ Ø(  Ðsame€extent€as€if€the€individual€rendered€the€service€as€a€sole€practitioner.€€Smith€designed€andÐ  ð  Ðsupervised€construction€of€the€deck.€€Consequently,€Smith€should€be€personally€liable.Ð h¸  ÐÐ 0€  ÐJones,€a€licensed€architect,€supervised€the€construction€of€the€deck.€€He€may€be€personallyÐ øH  Ðliable€to€Mark€and€Mary€to€the€extent€that€damages€were€caused€by€that€supervision.Ð À ÐÐ ˆØ ÐÑ  ÑBrown€should€not€be€personally€liable€to€Mark€and€Mary.€€Although€Brown€is€a€member€ofÐ P  Ðthe€Jones€and€Smith€LLC,€Brown€did€not€participate€in€the€design€and/or€construction€of€the€deck.€Ð h ÐSection€4A„301€provides,€ð ðð8ðno€member€shall€be€personally€liable€for€the€obligations€of€the€limitedÐ à0 Ðliability€company,€whether€arising€in€contract,€tort€or€otherwise,€solely€by€reason€of€being€a€memberÐ ¨ø Ðof€the€limited€liability€company.ðð€€ò òIn€addition,€€an€individual€who€renders€a€professional€serviceÐ pÀ Ðin€Maryland€as€an€employee€of€a€Maryland€limited€liability€company€is€not€liable€for€negligentÐ :Š Ðor€wrongful€acts€or€omissions€of€another€employee€or€member€of€the€limited€liability€companyÐ R Ðunless€the€employee€is€negligent€in€appointing,€supervising,€or€cooperating€with€the€otherÐ Ê Ðemployee€or€member.€€ó óSince€Brown€neither€appointed,€supervised€nor€cooperated€with€Smith€orÐ ’â ÐJones€in€either€the€design€or€supervision€of€construction€of€the€deck,€Brown€is€not€personally€liableÐ \¬ Ðto€Mark€or€Mary.€€See,€ðð€4A„301.1(a)(2).Ð $t ÐÑ  ÑÐ ì< ÐMrs.€Smith€was€not€a€member€of€the€LLC.€€She€only€acted€as€a€manager€and€authorizedÐ ´  Ðperson.€€Provided€she€did€not€participate€in€appointing,€supervising€or€cooperating€with€Smith€orÐ |Ì! ÐJones€in€either€the€design€or€construction€of€the€deck,€she€is€not€personally€liable€to€Mark€and€Mary.Ð D”" ÐÑ  ÑÓ XÓÌÓ jÿÓà  àJones€and€Smith€LLC€accepted€the€assignment€and€adopted€the€contract€for€the€constructionÐ Ô $$ Ðof€Mark€and€Maryððs€deck€entered€into€by€Jones€and€Smith€before€the€formation€of€the€Jones€and€SmithÐ œ!ì% ÐLLC,€and€Mark€and€Mary€consented€to€such€assignment.€€In€addition€to€Smith€and€Jones,€the€LLC€isÐ d"´& Ðliable€for€the€acts€of€its€employees€who€perform€professional€services€within€the€scope€of€theirÐ ,#|' Ðemployment€or€within€the€scope€of€the€employeesðð€apparent€authority€to€the€same€extent€as€itsÐ ô#D( Ðemployees.€€See,€ðð€4A„301.1(b).Ð ¼$ ) ÐÓ jÿÓÌÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿yy#ÔÐ  L&œ!+ Ðò òÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3Ôà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@%ìàQUESTION€8ó óòòˆÐ @ ÐóóÓ  ÓÌà  àThe€trial€court€should€rule€in€favor€of€Hilary,€and€should€require€Kay€to€allow€Hilary€toÐ Ð  Ðcontinue€using€the€waterline.€€Ð ˜è ÐÑ  ÑÌà  àThe€original€common€grantor€of€the€Wet€Parcel€and€the€Dry€Parcel€was€Mike.€€MikeÐ ( x Ðcreated€a€dominant€tenement€and€a€servient€tenement€by€reserving€easements€on€the€Wet€ParcelÐ ð @ Ðfor€the€benefit€of€the€Dry€Parcel€before€he€severed€the€property€into€two€different€parcels.€€MikeÐ ¸   Ðand€all€of€his€successors,€including€Olive€and€Kay,€recognized€the€obligation€of€the€servientÐ € Ð  Ðparcel,€the€"Wet€Parcel,"€to€provide€water€and€access€to€the€water€to€the€Dry€Parcel.€€The€OwnersÐ H ˜  Ðof€the€Dry€Parcel€accepted€and€used€their€easements€for€access€and€to€use€the€water€from€the€WetÐ `  ÐParcel.€€Xavier€enhanced€the€access€onto€the€Wet€Parcel€for€the€Dry€Parcel€by€constructing€theÐ Ø(  Ðwaterline.€€By€changing€the€mode€of€access,€he€did€not€relinquish€the€right€of€the€Owners€of€theÐ  ð  ÐDry€Parcel€to€continue€using€water€from€the€Wet€Parcel€for€the€benefit€of€the€Dry€Parcel.Ð h¸  ÐÌÑ  Ñà  àThe€Owners€of€the€Dry€Parcel€do€not€have€riparian€rights€in€the€spring€on€the€Wet€Parcel.€€Ð øH  ÐThe€Dry€Parcel€is€not€riparian€land€because€it€is€not€"land€bordering€upon,€bounded€by,€frontingÐ À Ðupon,€abutting€or€adjacent€and€contiguous€to€and€in€contact€with€a€body€of€water,€such€as€a€river,Ð ˆØ Ðbay€or€running€stream."€€òòPeople's€Counsel€v.€Maryland€Marineóó,€316€Md.€491,€493€n.1,€560€A.2dÐ P  Ð32,€33€n.1€(1989).€€In€this€case,€the€Dry€Parcel€does€not€abut€any€body€of€water,€and€the€nature€ofÐ h Ðthe€interest€in€the€water€is€a€real€property€right€rather€than€a€riparian€right.€€€òòKirby€v.€Hookóó,€347Ð à0 ÐMd.€380,€389„391,€701€A.2d€397€(1997).Ð ¨ø ÐÑ  ÑÌÑ  Ñà  àHilary€might€argue€that€she€had€acquired€a€prescriptive€easement€to€use€the€waterline.€Ð 8ˆ ÐKay's€permission€to€Xavier€to€construct€the€waterline€did€not€extinguish€any€claim€that€XavierÐ P Ðmight€have€had€to€access€the€spring€or€to€use€the€water€from€the€Wet€Parcel.€€€€Kay's€permissionÐ È Ðto€construct€the€waterline€and€to€access€the€spring€through€the€waterline€was€in€the€nature€of€anÐ à Ðinterest€in€the€land.€€The€statute€of€frauds€requires€that€any€conveyance€of€an€interest€in€land€for€aÐ X¨ Ðperiod€of€greater€than€one€year€must€be€in€writing€to€be€effective.€€In€òòKirby€v.€Hookóó,€òòsupraóó,€theÐ  p ÐCourt€of€Appeals€determined€that€when€the€grantor€of€an€easement€to€construct€a€waterline€failedÐ è8 Ðto€reduce€that€easement€to€writing,€the€grant€was€no€longer€permissive,€but€rather€it€was€adverse.€Ð °  ÐHowever,€the€fact€that€the€waterline€installed€by€Xavier€was€used€for€more€than€19€years€but€notÐ xÈ! Ðthe€full€statutory€period€of€20€years€destroys€the€claim€that€a€prescriptive€easement€was€created.€Ð @" ÐTacking€the€use€of€the€waterline€to€a€predecessor€in€title€before€Xavier€is€not€appropriate€becauseÐ  X# Ðthe€waterline€did€not€exist€prior€to€1975.€€Ð Ð $ ÐÑ  ÑÌÑ  Ñà  àIt€is€also€clear,€as€it€was€in€òòKirby€v.€Hookóó,€òòsupraóó,€that€Kay€intended€to€create€more€than€aÐ `"°& Ðmere€license€in€Wet€Parcel€for€Dry€Parcel's€benefit€when€she€gave€permission€for€the€waterline€toÐ (#x' Ðbe€constructed.€€As€in€òòKirbyóó,€òòsupraóó,€the€parties€recognized€that€Dry€Parcel€had€no€other€source€ofÐ ð#@( Ðwater€than€Wet€Parcel.€€The€Parties€also€recognized€that€by€constructing€a€waterline,€XavierÐ ¸$ ) Ðwould€be€expending€considerable€effort€and€spending€significant€sums€to€construct€theÐ €%Ð * Ðunderground€waterline.€€Moreover,€Hilary€can€also€argue€that€the€original€reservation€of€theÐ H&˜!+ Ðeasements€benefitting€Dry€Parcel€in€the€deed€to€Olive€did€not€specify€how€that€access€was€to€beÐ '`", Ðachieved.€€Kay€and€Xavier€agreed€to€a€modification€of€the€surface€ingress€and€egress€to€obtainÐ Ø'(#- Ðwater€from€the€spring€on€the€Wet€Parcel.€€For€the€reasons€stated€earlier,€Xavier€and€KayÐ  (ð#. Ðunderstood€that€the€construction€of€the€waterline€was€intended€to€be€permanent,€and€Xavier€madeÐ h)¸$/ Ðthe€investment€and€changed€his€position€in€reliance€on€the€fact€that€he€and€his€successors€wouldÐ 0*€%0 Ðbe€able€to€use€the€waterline.€€Because€Kay€allowed€Xavier€to€make€the€investments€in€theÐ ø*H&1 Ðwaterline€and€allowed€Hilary€to€use€the€waterline€for€approximately€18€months€before€she€cappedÐ À+'2 Ðit,€Kay€may€be€estopped€to€deny€Hilary's€right€to€continue€using€the€waterline.Ð ˆ,Ø'3 ÐÑ  Ñà  àIn€the€alternative,€Hilary€might€also€successfully€argue€that€she€and€Xavier€haveÐ ° Ðestablished€an€easement€by€necessity€for€use€of€the€waterline.€€An€easement€by€necessity€isÐ xÈ Ðcreated€when€a€common€grantor€creates€a€beneficial€use€of€one€part€of€the€land€for€another€partÐ @ Ðprior€to€subdividing€or€conveying€the€land.€€A€necessity€exists€because€there€is€no€other€source€ofÐ X Ðthe€benefit€for€the€dominant€tenement.€€In€this€case,€a€common€grantor,€Mike,€used€the€spring€onÐ Ð  ÐWet€Parcel€for€the€benefit€of€Dry€Parcel.€€The€Deed€conveying€the€Wet€Parcel€to€OliveÐ ˜è Ðspecifically€reserved€the€easement€favoring€Dry€Parcel.€€There€was€no€other€source€of€water€forÐ ` ° ÐDry€Parcel.€€Typically,€easements€by€necessity€are€found€in€cases€where€rights€of€way€areÐ ( x Ðestablished€to€enable€land€to€have€an€access€to€a€public€road.€€Easements€by€necessity€are€notÐ ð @ Ðconfined€solely€to€rights€of€way.€€In€this€case,€it€is€arguable€that€a€right€to€use€water€is€a€necessity,Ð ¸   Ðand€that€installing€a€waterline€to€use€the€water€is€the€least€intrusive€and€reasonable€way€ofÐ € Ð  Ðobtaining€the€water.€€There€were€no€facts€stated€that€indicated€the€level€of€use€was€eitherÐ H ˜  Ðexcessive,€disruptive€to€the€Ownerððs€enjoyment€of€€the€Wet€Parcel,€or€unreasonable€in€this€case.€€Ð `  ÐUnder€these€conditions,€the€Court€might€find€that€an€easement€by€necessity€existed.€€TheÐ Ø(  Ðeasement€would€be€extinguished€when€the€necessity€no€longer€exists.€€In€this€case,€that€may€be€atÐ  ð  Ðthe€time€public€water€is€available€to€serve€Dry€Parcel.€€See,€Tong€v.€Feldman,€136€A.822,152Ð h¸  ÐMd.398€(1927)€(easement€for€gas€line).Ð 0€  ÐÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿g‰#ÔÌÌÌÐ  P  Ðà@"ìàÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3Ôò òBOARDððS€ANALYSISó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà@%ìàò òQUESTION€9ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌà  àò ò1.ó ó€€ò òContract€Construction€and€the€Parol€Evidence€Rule:€€ó óThe€cardinal€rule€inÐ Ð  Ðinterpreting€a€contract€is€to€determine€the€intention€of€the€parties.€€òòSeigneur€v.€National€FitnessÐ šê ÐInstitute,€Inc.,€óó132€Md.€App.€271€(2000).€€When€a€contract€is€unambiguous,€it€is€presumed€thatÐ b ² Ðthe€parties€meant€what€they€expressed.€€òòState€v.€Rodriguez,€óó125€Md.€App.€428€(1999),€cert.Ð * z Ðdenied,€354€Md.€573€(1999).€€Therefore,€because€the€GIC€defines€ð ðFundsðð€as€an€amount€not€toÐ ò B Ðexceed€the€net€income€earned€by€the€Company€in€1995,€the€Bankððs€limitation€on€the€amount€itÐ º   Ðmust€invest€may€be€justified.€€However,€if€the€GIC€is€ambiguous€and€susceptible€of€more€thanÐ ‚ Ò  Ðone€meaning,€surrounding€circumstances€may€be€considered€to€determine€the€intent€of€theÐ J š  Ðparties.€€òòMascaro€v.€Snelling€&€Snelling€of€Baltimore,€Inc.,€óó250€Md.€215€(1968).€€In€this€case,€theÐ b  Ðprovision€of€the€GIC€setting€the€$100€million€dollar€ð ðcapðð€arguably€creates€an€ambiguity.€€If€theÐ Ú*  Ðparties€intended€ð ðFundsðð€to€be€limited€to€$10€million€dollars,€there€would€be€no€reason€toÐ ¢ò  Ðnegotiate€and€place€a€$100€million€dollar€cap€on€the€amount€invested€under€the€GIC.€€AnotherÐ jº  Ðpossible€source€of€ambiguity€is€the€fact€that€the€Companyððs€bid€specifications€were€included€asÐ 2‚  Ðpart€of€the€contract.€Either€or€both€provisions€could€allow€a€court€to€find€that€the€GIC€isÐ úJ  Ðambiguous,€and€thus€permit€outside€aids€to€interpret€the€GIC.€€Looking€outside€the€ð ðfour€cornersððÐ Â Ðof€the€GIC,€the€Companyððs€position€is€enhanced€significantly.€€The€Bankððs€ongoing€acceptance€ofÐ ŠÚ Ðfunds€in€excess€of€$10€million€dollars€indicates€that€the€parties€intended€that€the€GIC€not€beÐ R¢ Ðlimited€to€1995€income€amounts.€€€€€€€€ò òÐ j ÐÓ?+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒX?ÓÓ XÓà ` àÌÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿œ¥#Ô2.€€Mistake:€€ó óMutual€or€unilateral€mistake€can€invalidate€a€contract.€€òòBartlett€v.Ð ªú ÐDepartment€of€Transportation,€óó40€Md.€App.€(1978).òò€€óóTherefore,€the€Company€should€not€argueÐ tÄ Ðthat€the€definition€of€ð ðFundsðð€was€a€mistake,€or€the€GIC€will€be€invalidated€and€the€Bank€willÐ <Œ Ðhave€the€right€to€return€all€Funds€to€the€Company.€€The€Bank€will€not€argue€that€the€definition€ofÐ T Ðð ðFundsðð€was€a€mistake€(thus€invalidating€the€GIC),€because€to€do€so€would€support€the€positionÐ Ì Ðof€the€Company€regarding€the€intent€of€the€parties.€€Ð ”ä ÐÐ \¬ Ðò ò3.€€Equitable€Estoppel:€€ó óThe€Company€could€claim€that€the€Bank€is€estopped€fromÐ $t Ðasserting€a€$10€million€dollar€limit€on€the€GIC.€€Estoppel€prevents€a€party€from€asserting€a€rightÐ î> Ðagainst€another€who,€in€good€faith,€relies€on€the€conduct€of€the€other€party,€and€prejudicially€actsÐ ¶  Ðon€it.€€òòGould€v.€Transamerican€Associates,€óó224€Md.€285€(1961).€€The€Company€could€claim€thatÐ ~Î! Ðit€relied€on€the€Bankððs€acceptance€of€payments€in€excess€of€$10€million€dollars.€€The€reliance€wasÐ F–" Ðin€good€faith€given€the€GICððs€negotiated€ð ðcapðð,€and€was€prejudicial€because,€had€the€BankÐ  ^# Ðrejected€the€additional€payments€immediately,€the€Company€could€have€invested€the€funds€whenÐ Ö &$ Ðinterest€rates€were€higher.Ð ž!î% ÐÐ f"¶& Ðò ò4.ó ó€€ò òWaiver:€€ó óThe€doctrine€of€waiver€may€prevent€the€Bank€from€successfully€claimingÐ .#~' Ðthat€the€GIC€has€a€$10€million€dollar€limit.€€Waiver€is€the€intentional,€voluntary€surrender€of€aÐ ø#H( Ðknown€right.€€òòCubbage€v.€State,€óó304€Md.€237€(1985).€€A€waiver€may€be€inferred€fromÐ À$ ) Ðcircumstances.€€òòFood€Fair€Stores,€Inc.€v.€Blumberg€óó234€Md.€521€(1964).€€Waiver€must€beÐ ˆ%Ø * Ðsupported€by€an€agreement€founded€on€consideration,€or€the€conduct€on€which€the€waiver€isÐ P& !+ Ðbased€must€be€such€as€to€stop€a€party€from€insisting€on€performance€of€a€contract€or€forfeiture€ofÐ 'h", Ða€condition.€€òòOne€Twenty€Realty€Co.€v.€Baer,€óó260€Md.€400€(1971).€€The€Company€could€argueÐ à'0#- Ðthat€the€Bank€knowingly€accepted€payments€in€excess€of€$10€million€dollars,€and€thereforeÐ ¨(ø#. Ðwaived€its€right€to€limit€the€amount€of€funds€to€be€invested€under€the€GIC.€€The€consideration€forÐ p)À$/ Ðthe€waiver€is€the€additional€profit€made€by€the€Bank€by€investing€the€additional€proceeds.€€Ð 8*ˆ%0 ÐÐ +P&1 Ðò òÓ<(` ` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒX<Ó5.€€Laches:€€ó óThe€Company€could€raise€the€defense€of€ð ðlachesðð.€€Laches€is€an€inexcusableÐ È+'2 Ðdelay€in€the€assertion€of€a€right€resulting€in€a€disadvantage€to€another.€€òòSalisbury€Beauty€SchoolsÐ ° Ðv.€State€Bd.€Of€Cosmetologistsóó,òò€óó268€Md.€32€(1973).€€The€Company€could€claim€that€the€BankððsÐ xÈ Ðdelay€in€asserting€the€$10€million€dollar€cap€prevented€it€from€investing€the€funds€when€interestÐ @ Ðrates€were€higher.€Ð X ÐÐ Ð  Ðò òó ó€ò ò6.€€Construction:€€ó óThe€fact€that€Companyððs€counsel€prepared€the€GIC€may€cause€it€to€beÐ ˜è Ðconstrued€most€strongly€against€the€Company.€€òòTruck€Ins.€Exchange€v.€Marks€Rentals,€Inc.,€óó288Ð b ² ÐMd.€428€(1980).€€However,€this€rule€of€construction€has€little€force€where,€as€in€this€case,€bothÐ * z Ðparties€were€represented€by€counsel.€€òòAcme€Markets,€Inc.€v.€Dawson€Enterprises,€Inc.,€óó€253€Md.Ð ò B Ð76€(1969).€€€Ð º   ÐÐ  ‚ Ò  Ðò òÔ‡X<¿XX Xì3Ôà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISòòˆÐ ° ÐÐ xÈ Ðóóà@^^%ìàQUESTION€10ˆÐ @ ÐòòÐ X ÐÑ  Ñà@ÐÐ'ìàPart€AˆÐ Ð  ÐÐ ˜è Ðó óóóà 4 àò òA.ó óà Œ àGeorge€will€argue€that€the€collision€was€primarily€caused€by€the€negligence€ofÐ ` ° ÐReckless€in€driving€while€intoxicated€and€speeding.€€George€will€assert€that€he€was€notÐ * z ÐÔ_ÔcontributorilyÔ_Ô€negligent,€but€if€he€is,€that€Reckless,€nevertheless,€had€the€last€clear€chance€toÐ ò B Ðavoid€the€collision€and,€therefore,€is€legally€responsible.€€George€will€rely€on€the€testimony€of€theÐ º   ÐPolice€Officer€who€was€eyewitness.Ð ‚ Ò  ÐÐ J š  Ðà 4 àò òB.ó óà Œ àRecklessððs€first€defense€would€be€contributory€negligence.€€He€will€argue€thatÐ b  ÐGeorgeððs€entry€into€the€intersection€to€make€a€left€turn€was€also€negligent€and€thus€a€bar€toÐ Ü,  Ðrecovery.€€A€plaintiff€cannot€recover€if€the€plaintiffððs€negligence€is€a€cause€of€the€injury,€andÐ ¤ô  Ðplaintiffððs€negligence€is€a€complete€defense€to€plaintiffððs€allegations€of€negligence,€subject€to€theÐ l¼  Ðdoctrine€of€last€clear€chance.Ð 4„  ÐÐ üL  Ðà 4 àà Œ àReckless€could€also€argue€that€George€was€in€violation€of€a€statute€by€enteringÐ Ä Ðthe€intersection€before€it€was€clear.€€If€that€violation€was€a€cause€of€the€injuries,€it€is€evidence€ofÐ ŒÜ Ðnegligence€by€George€and€will€bar€recovery.Ð T¤ ÐÐ l Ðò òòòà@ÕÕ'ìàPart€BˆÐ ä4 ÐÐ ¬ü Ðó óóóÓ  Óà 4 àA€good€answer€will€discuss€the€agency€relationship€between€Acme€and€George€andÐ tÄ Ðwhether€when€the€incident€occurred,€George€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€his€employment€withÐ <Œ ÐAcme.€€Acme€will€argue€that€driving€to€and€from€work€is€not€generally€within€the€scope€ofÐ T Ðemployment,€that€it€asserted€no€control€over€the€method€or€means€that€George€operated€his€vehicle;Ð Ì Ðthat€it€did€not€supply€or€pay€directly€for€the€vehicle€that€George€used€or€for€its€maintenance;€and€thatÐ ”ä Ðit€did€not€specify€the€route€to€be€taken.€€See,€òòOaks€v.€Connors,óó€339€Md.€24,€660€A.2d€423€(1995)Ð \¬ ÐÑ  ÑÐ $t ÐÑ  Ñà 4 àAcme€will€also€argue€that€even€if€George€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€his€employment,Ð ì< Ðit€was€the€acts€of€Reckless€that€were€the€cause€of€the€injuries.€€Should€the€jury€believe€Acme€andÐ ´  ÐGeorge,€Reckless€would€be€solely€liable.Ð |Ì! ÐÐ D”" ÐÑ  Ñà 4 àHapless€will€have€the€burden€to€show€which€negligent€act€was€the€cause€of€his€injuries;Ð  \# Ðhowever,€there€may€be€more€than€one€cause€of€an€injury.€€If€the€jury€finds€against€Acme,€George€andÐ Ô $$ ÐReckless€in€favor€of€Hapless,€Acme,€George€and€Reckless€would€be€jointly€and€severally€liable€andÐ œ!ì% Ðat€a€minimum,€Acme's€potential€exposure€will€be€reduced.Ð d"´& ÐÐ ,#|' ÐÐ ô#D( ÐÐ ¼$ ) ÐÐ „%Ô * ÐÔ#† Xì3XXX<¿à½#ÔÐ L&œ!+ ÐÐ 'd", ÐÐ Ü',#- ÐÐ ¤(ô#. ÐÐ  l)¼$/ Ðà@þþ"ìàò òBOARDððS€ANALYSISó ó€ˆÐ ° ÐÐ zÊ Ðà@^^%ìàò òQUESTION€11ó óˆÐ B’ ÐÐ  Z ÐThe€answer€should€first€address€whether€each€person€has€standing€to€challenge€the€StateððsÐ Ò" Ðdress€code.€€Under€the€facts,€Mary€was€not€a€State€employee€and€may,€therefore,€be€precluded€fromÐ šê Ðchallenging€the€law.€€To€have€standing,€a€person€must€have€a€concrete€stake€in€the€outcome€of€theÐ b ² Ðcase.€€The€test€for€standing€set€forth€in€the€Federal€case,€òòSiera€Club€v.€Mortonóó,€405€US€727€(1972)Ð * z Ðis€1)€actual€or€threatened€injury,€and€2)€injury€traced€to€a€challengeable€action,€and€3)€€injuryÐ ò B Ðredressable€by€adjudication,€4)€injury€is€within€the€zone€of€interest.Ð º   ÐÓ XÓÌà Ü àThere€does€not€appear€to€be€a€conflict€of€interest€that€precludes€the€attorney€from€representingÐ J š  Ðthe€three€employees.€€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€Rule€1.7€requires€that€the€attorneyÐ b  Ðrefrain€from€representing€more€than€one€client€when€the€clientsðð€interests€could€be€adverse.€€To€beÐ Ú*  Ðsafe,€the€attorney€should€seek€the€consent€of€all€of€the€employees€involved.Ð ¢ò  ÐÌà Ü àThe€law€that€enacted€the€dress€code€may€violate€the€procedural€Due€Process€clause€of€theÐ 2‚  ÐConstitution€14òòthóó€Amendment€since€no€notice€nor€hearing€was€provided€prior€to€the€enactment€of€theÐ úJ  Ðlegislation€or€the€employeesðð€terminations.€€The€law€is€also€violative€of€due€process€safeguards€inÐ Â Ðthat€it€is€vague€(what€is€offensive€to€others?)€and€overbroad.€€Ð ŠÚ ÐÌà Ü àThe€vagueness/overbreadth€of€the€law€makes€it€susceptible€to€challenges€under€the€1òòstóóÐ j ÐAmendment,€as€well,€since€portions€of€the€law€affect€the€employeesðð€rights€of€free€speech,€freedomÐ â2 Ðof€association,€and€freedom€of€religion.€€All€of€these€are€considered€primary€rights;€any€lawÐ ªú Ðinfringing€upon€them€must€be€the€least€restrictive€means€of€addressing€an€important€governmentalÐ r Ðpurpose.€€Since€itððs€unclear€what€clothing€the€law€restricts,€it€canððt€possibly€be€the€least€restrictiveÐ :Š Ðmeans.Ð R ÐÌà Ü àFinally,€the€breadth€of€the€law€makes€it€susceptible€to€challenge€on€Equal€Protection€grounds.€Ð ’â ÐWhy€is€some€clothing€worn€by€one€person€better€than€others?€€Why€can€an€individual€tattoo€wordingÐ Zª Ðon€his€arm,€but€not€emblazon€it€on€his€shirt.€€Why€is€one€symbol€on€a€dress€professional€clothing,Ð "r Ðbut€letters€or€certain€colors€not?Ð ê: ÐÐ  ²  Ðò òà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÝ‚#ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚#ÿÿÿ\×ÝÝ  ÝòŒòóŒóó ó݃#ÿÿ\׺×݌̌Ó  ÓÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  Ýà@^^%ìàò òQUESTION€12ó óˆÐ @ ÐÌÝ‚$ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚$ÿÿÿxØÝÝ  ÝÔCEUS.,Ô݃$ÿÿxØÊØ݌̌Ñ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÔUS.,CE.,éØÔÝ‚$ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚$ÿÿÿeÙÝÝ  Ýò òà Ü àI€would€make€the€following€arguments€against€the€admission€of€the€evidence€and€theÐ ˜è Ðimposition€of€the€sentence:ó ó݃$ÿÿeÙ·Ù݌Р` ° ÐŒÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÌÝ‚$ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚$ÿÿÿÏÚÝÝ  Ýà Ü àThe€Court€clearly€erred€in€allowing€the€Assistant€Managerððs€hearsay€testimony.€€The€AssistantÐ ð @ ÐManager€repeated€a€conversation€he€had€with€Louie,€who€did€not€testify.€€There€is€no€exception€inÐ ¸   ÐSection€5„€803€of€the€Maryland€Rulesðð€prohibition€against€hearsay€that€would€allow€this€evidenceÐ € Ð  Ðto€come€in.݃$ÿÿÏÚ!Û݌РH ˜  ÐŒÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÌÝ‚$ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚$ÿÿÿÝÝÝ  ÝÔ‡ ô òX Xì3Ôà Ü àÔ#† Xì3X ò ôÝ#ÔThe€facts€indicate€that€Bailey€was€not€seen€by€Dolly€on€the€night€in€question€and€muffled€hisÐ Ø(  Ðvoice.€€Arguably,€her€testimony€wasnððt€credible,€under€these€circumstances,€and€in€violation€ofÐ  ð  ÐMaryland€Rule€5„802.€€However,€the€State€may€successfully€argue€that€Bailey€spoke€clearly€insideÐ h¸  Ðof€the€vehicle€and€Dolly€would€know€his€voice€from€their€employment€relationship€of€two€years.Ô‡ ô òX Xì3Ô݃$ÿÿÝqÝ݌Р0€  ÐŒÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3X ò ôÔÝ  ÝÝ‚%ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚%ÿÿÿàÝÝ  Ý݃%ÿÿàŽà݌̌Ñ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÔ#† Xì3XX Xì3šß#Ôà Ü àBailey€has€a€5òòthóó€Amendment€right€not€to€be€compelled€to€give€evidence€against€himself€in€aÐ À Ðcriminal€proceeding.€€To€protect€this€right,€the€Supreme€Court€recognizes€certain€proceduralÐ ˆØ Ðsafeguards€during€custodial€interrogations.€€òòMiranda€v.€Arizonaóó,€384€U.S.€436,€86€S.€Ct.€1602Ð P  Ð(1966).€€Once€he€invoked€his€right€to€remain€silent€the€Officer€should€not€be€allowed€to€testifyÐ h Ðconcerning€his€alibi€and€refusal€to€put€his€statement€in€writing.€€Of€course,€the€State€may€argue€thatÐ à0 Ðthese€things€occurred€prior€to€his€invocation,€and€are,€therefore,€admissible.€Ô‡ ô òX Xì3ÔÐ ¨ø ÐÝ‚%ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3X ò ôÔÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚%ÿÿÿýãÝÝ  ÝÔ#† Xì3XX Xì3Éã#ÔÔ‡ ô òX Xì3Ô݃%ÿÿýãnä݌̌Ñ  ÑÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÝ  ÝÝ‚%ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3X ò ôÔÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚%ÿÿÿ>åÝÝ  ÝÔ#† Xì3XX Xì3°ä#ÔÔ‡ ô òX Xì3Ôà Ü àÔ#† Xì3X ò ôñå#ÔBaileyððs€prior€conviction€for€arson€is€not€admissible€to€prove€his€guilt€since€it€was€neither€anÐ f Ðinfamous€crime€nor€relevant€to€his€credibility.€€Maryland€Rule€5„609.€€The€prior€conviction€was€alsoÐ Þ. Ðmore€than€fifteen€years€ago,€and€can€be€excluded€on€those€grounds.€€Accordingly,€it€should€not€haveÐ ¦ö Ðbeen€allowed€into€evidence.Ô‡ ô òX Xì3Ô݃%ÿÿ>å¯å݌Рn¾ ÐŒÑ  ÑÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÝ  ÝÝ‚%ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3X ò ôÔÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚%ÿÿÿeèÝÝ  ÝÔ#† Xì3XX Xì3Ãç#ÔÔ‡ ô òX Xì3Ô݃%ÿÿeèÖè݌̌Ñ  ÑÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÔ€ ô ò ò ôÔÝ  ÝÌÔ#† Xì3X ò ôé#ÔÝ‚%ÿÿÿÝÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÝ‚%ÿÿÿÊéÝÝ  ÝÔ‡ ô òX Xì3Ôà Ü àÔ#† Xì3X ò ô;ê#ÔFinally,€the€Court€should€not€have€imposed€a€penalty€that€was€not€in€effect€at€the€time€Bailey€wasÐ ‚Ò Ðconvicted.€€Assuming,€arguendo,€it€was€proper€to€impose€the€law,€I€would€still€challenge€it€asÐ Jš  Ðviolative€of€the€8òòthóó€Amendmentððs€prohibition€against€cruel€and€unusual€punishment.Ô‡ ô òX Xì3Ô݃%ÿÿÊéê݌Рb! ÐŒÑ  ÑÔ€ Xì3X ò ôÔÔ€ Xì3XX Xì3ÔÝ  ÝÔ#† Xì3XX Xì3Îë#Ô