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S9\  `&Times New RomanS   (-2$ !USUS.,  6-1..22,Title    XXX     4852Subtitle    XXX     6KK4Body Text    XXX    6-1.0CEKSY_ekqAutoList1A.(1)A.A.A.A.A.A.GA.(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#   X            X  !USUS.,  _    8lXXdd8K/VLOaM?cNOaO/V FEBRUARY2004BAREXAMINATION  BOARDSANALYSIS  QUESTION1  ` @   XlXXX  ThefactssuggestseveralcausesofactiononbehalfofBigCoandLarge. 8    BigCohaspossiblecausesofactionfortortiousinterferencewithaneconomicrelationship.  ` Theelementsofthiscauseofactionare:  L  8  (1)intentionalandwillfulacts;(2)calculatedtocausedamagetotheplaintiff[]in $  [his]lawfulbusiness;(3)donewiththeunlawfulpurposetocausesuchdamageand   loss,withoutrightorjustifiablecauseonthepartofthedefendants(whichconstitutes   malice);and(4)actualdamageandlossresulting.Kramerv.MayorofBaltimore,   124Md.App.616,637(1999).    B.` hp x (#XB  Here,theactsofSmithandAttorneywereintentionalandcalculatedtocauseBigCotolose \ thecontract.Sincethecontractwouldhavebeenprofitable,BigCowasdamaged.Theissueis H whethertheyhavesatisfiedthethirdelement.TheCourtofAppealshasdefinedthiselementas 4 follows:  p 8  [W]rongfulormaliciousinterferencewitheconomicrelationsisinterferenceby H conductthatisindependentlywrongfulorunlawful,quiteapartfromitseffectonthe 4 plaintiff'sbusinessrelationships.Wrongfulorunlawfulactsincludecommonlaw   tortsand"violenceorintimidation,defamation,injuriousfalsehoodorotherfraud,   violationsofcriminallaw,andtheinstitutionorthreatofgroundlesscivilsuitsor  criminalprosecutionsinbadfaith."Alexander&Alexander,Inc.v.B.DixonEvander  Assocs.,Inc.,336Md.635,657(1994)(citingK&KManagementv.Lee,316Md.  137,166(1989)(quotingProsser,LawofTorts130,952953(4thEd.1971)).l   e  Attorneysconductdoesnotmeetthisstandard.SheaskedtheCountyCounciltoawardthe D! contracttoalocalcontractorandpersuadedthenewspapertopublishaneditorialwiththesame 0"  message.Thesestatementswerenot independentlywrongfulorunlawful.ButifSmiths #l! statementstotheindividualCouncilmembers,however,putbothLargeandBigCoinafalselightor $X" wereotherwisetortious,thenhewouldbeliable. $D #   ThestatementsmadebySmithastoBigCoscivillitigationandLargescriminalrecordwere &"% not,strictlyspeaking,untrue,buttheypresentboththebusinessandtheindividualinafalselight. '#& Marylandhasrecognizedthetortofinvasionofprivacy,whichincludestheunreasonableplacingof (#' anotherinfalselightbeforethepublicthroughthemedia.R.Gilbert,MarylandTortLawHandbook )$( 184;191193(3rded.,2000).Tobeactionable,thestatementmusthavebeenpublishedandthe |*%) informationmustbefalseoruntrue,atleasttotheextentthatitplacedtheplaintiffinafalseor h+&* objectionablelight.Smithsstatementsmeetthisstandard.    Inapersonalcapacity,LargehasanactionforinvasionofprivacyfalselightagainstSmith  aswell. t   b.Attorneysconductincontactingthenewspaperandpublicofficialswithoutdisclosingher L  attorney/clientrelationshipwithSmithraisesissuesofprofessionalethics.MarylandRuleof 8  ProfessionalConduct4.1governsalawyersdutytobetruthfultopersonsotherthanclients.It $ t prohibitsfalsestatementsofmaterialfactstoanonclient.ThefactthatAttorneywasrepresenting  ` Smithwasmaterial.HerstatementtotheCountyCouncilandthenewspaperthatshewasactingon  L  behalfoftheChamberofCommercewasfalse.ShehasviolatedMRPC4.1.#XlXX Xl#  8  _ h+&*    QUESTION2   >  1.ThetransfertoBulldozerwasnotvalidfortworeasons.First,oncearticlesof  incorporationarerevokedbytheState,thecorporationsabilitytoconductbusinessiscurtailed.In t particular,MarylandAnno.CodeCorporationsandAssociationsArticle( Code)3514(a) ` prohibitsanypersonfromtransactingbusinessonbehalfofthecorporation.Ablenolongerhasthe L  authorityaspresidenttosignacontract;instead,titletothepropertyofthecorporation(andthepower 8  toconveyit)devolvesuponthedirectorsofthecorporationactingastrusteesfortheshareholdersand $ t creditors.Code3515;_Cloverfields_ԀImp.v._Seabreeze_ԀProp.,32Md.App.421(1976),_affd_280  ` Md.382(1977).Second,theBoarddidnotapprovethecontract,thus,Ablesactwasultravires.  L  Third,evenifthecorporationwerestillinesse,theproposedtransferwouldhavetobeaccomplished  8  bytheadoptionofarticlesofsaleandtransfer,whichmustbeapprovedbyboththebytheboardand $  amajorityoftheshareholdersasatransferinvolvingallorsubstantiallyalloftheassetsofthe   corporation,Code3105,andrecordedwiththeStateDepartmentofAssessmentsandTaxation.   Thisprocedureisintendtoassurethatboardofdirectorandshareholderconsentisobtainedforsuch   transfers._Recordation_Ԁofarticlesofsaleandtransferistheexclusivemannerfortransferringtitleto   realestateofacorporationinMarylandwhentherealestateisallorsubstantiallyalloftheassetsof p thetransferor,ashere.ClerkofCircuitCourtv.ChesapeakeBayShores,Inc.,271Md.627(1974). \   2.Bothastrusteesanddirectors,neitherBakernorCarlaispersonallyliabletoBankorany  p othercreditorofthecorporation.Oncethecharterisforfeited,theybecometrusteesoftheassetsof  \ thecorporationforthebenefitofitscreditorsandshareholders.Theyarenotpersonallyliablefor H corporateliabilitiesinthatcapacity.TheBanksonlyothermeansofrecourseagainstBakerand 4 Carlawouldbetoattemptto piercethecorporateveil,i.e.toconvinceacourttodisregardthe   existenceofthecorporationtomakeshareholderspersonallyliable.InMaryland,thisremedyis   rarelyemployedandisused onlywhennecessarytopreventfraudortoenforceaparamountequity.  Dixonv.ProcessCorp.,38Md.App.644,654(1978).Thereisnobasisforaclaimoffraudbased  onthefacts.A paramountequityisonewhichismoreimportantthantheordinaryexpectationof  limitedliabilityonthepartofthestockholder,StarfishCondominium_Assn_.v._Yorkridge_ԀService l Corp.,295Md.693,714((1983).Marylandcourtstypicallyholdshareholdersliableinthecontext X  ofenforcingaparamountequitywhenshareholderwrongdoingiscombinedwithapervasive D! disregardforcorporateformalitiesandduties.HereBakerandCarlaarevictims,nottheperpetrators, 0"  ofAbleswrongdoing.Acourtwillnotfindthemliableunderthesecircumstances.SeeJ.Hanks #l! MarylandCorporationLaw4.18(1994,2003Supplement). $X"   3.Astrustees,theyhavethepowertotransferassetsaspartoftheprocessofpayingdebts %0!$ anddistributingassets.Code3515._Cloverfields_ԀImp.v._Seabreeze_ԀProp.,supra.Sincethey &"% constituteamajorityoftheBoard,theydonotneedAblesconsenttotransfertitle.Alternatively,as '#& themajorityofthetrustees,theycanfilearticlesofrevivaltoreinstatethecorporationsgoodstanding (#' status.Code3507. )$(    h+&* K/V KX K    QUESTION3   &  TomcouldbeprosecutedforthefirstrapeofGeorgiaasaprincipalinthefirstdegree.Tom  wastheactualperpetratorofthecriminalactanditwashisvoluntaryact.Itisafirstdegreerape,as t opposedtoaseconddegreerapeduetoDebbiesassistanceinsubduingGeorgia. `   AlthoughTomtooknopartinHarrysrapeofDebbiehewouldbeguiltyasanaccessoryafter 8  thefactduetohisparticipationwithHarryandDebbieinattemptingtoobscureHarrysrapeof $ t Georgia.  `   TomcouldbeprosecutedontheattemptedrapeofGeorgiabecausehisintentcouldbeshown  8  fromthecircumstancesimmediatelyprecedinghisattemptatintercourse.Hisphysicalincapacityis $  notadefensetoattemptedrape.     Debbiecouldassertwithregardtobothofthechargesofrapethatshe,asafemale,was   physicallyincapableofcommittingtherapeofanotherfemaleandthereforethiswasalegal   impossibility.Thisasserteddefenseshouldnotbesuccessfulashercriminalliabilityisbasedupon p accompliceliabilityasanaiderorabettorofbothTomandHarryintheircriminalacts. \   DebbiecanalsoassertthatshewasintoxicatedduringthetimewhenallcontactwithGeorgia 4 tookplaceandthatduetoherlevelofintoxicationshewasunabletoformulateanycriminalintent  p withregardtotheseoffenses.  \   Voluntaryintoxicationisthesubstantialimpairmentofmentalcapabilitiesasaresultof 4 voluntaryconsumptionofalcoholand/ordrugs.InMarylandvoluntaryintoxicationcannegatethe   mens_rea_bycreatinganinabilitytoformtherequisitementalstateforaspecificintentcrime.This   defensewouldfailastothetwochargesofrape,asrapeisageneralintentcrime,notaspecificintent  crimeunderMarylandlaw.Withregardtotheattemptedrapethisdefensecouldbesuccessfulasan  attemptedraperequiresaspecificintent.  Ѐ l   WithregardtothechargeofattemptedrapeDebbiecouldarguethatshetooknopartinthe X  attemptedrapeofGeorgiaandthatshewasintoxicatedduringallofhercontactwithGeorgia.Her D! defensetothisoffenseshouldsucceedforseveralreasons: 0"  "=3"      =312#  1  .3  0    FactuallyshedidnottakeanypartinTomsattemptedrapeofGeorgiaandtherefore $X" wouldnothavehadanyliabilityasanaiderorabettor;=31V1݌$D # (# (# Ќ    "=3"  =322#  2  .3  0    Debbiesvoluntaryintoxicationcouldbeasuccessfuldefensetotheattemptedrape %0!$ ifshewerefoundtohaveparticipatedintheattemptedrapeastheattemptisaspecific &"% intentoffense;and=322݌'#& (# (# Ќ    "=3"  =3f42#  3  .3  0    DebbieslackofactualphysicalcontactwithGeorgiaduringTomsattemptwould (#' meanthatshewasnotanaiderorabettorinthisactandalthoughafterthefactshe )$( actedwithTomandHarrytocoverupallofthecrimes,liabilityasanaccessoryafter |*%) thefactappliesonlytofelonyoffenses.=3f44݌h+&* (# (# Ќ      Thetwocountsoffirstdegreerapewerefelonies.Theattemptedrapewouldonlybea @-(, misdemeanorand,therefore,Debbiewouldhaveasuccessfuldefensetothatoffense. ,.|)- LOa LX L    QUESTION4   7A.0  Thesefactssuggestaconflictofinterestfortheattorney.Rule1.7oftheMarylandRulesof  ProfessionalConductprohibitsrepresentationofaclientifitwillbedirectlyadverseto t anotherclient.Here,AdamisapotentialdefendantinthesuitbroughtbyBenandthe ` attorneyshoulddeclinedualrepresentation.IftheconsultationwithAdamandBenresults L  intheattorneyobtaininginformationthatwouldworktothedisadvantageofeitherAdamor 8  BenheshoulddeclinetorepresenteitherofthemperRule1.9.$ t(#(# B.0  NomandatorymotionsrequiredunderRule2322aresuggestedbythesefacts.Permissive  L  motiontodismissforfailuretostateaclaimuponwhichreliefcanbegrantedisoptionalas  8  apreliminarymotionoritmaybefiledintheAnswertotheComplaint.Rule2322(b).$ (#(# 0  AdamwillberequiredtofileanAnswerinaccordancewithRule2321andRule2323.The   Answershouldincludetheaffirmativedefenseofcontributorynegligenceonthesefactsin   accordancewithRule2323(g)(6).AdamshouldfileacounterclaimagainstCarlforRule2   331inconjunctionwithhisAnswer,althoughaseparatesuitfiledbeyond30daysfromthe p datehisAnswerisdueispermissible.Acounterclaimfiledbeyondthetimeforanswering \ theComplaintisopentoaMotiontoStrikeforlatefiling.Rule2332(b).H(#(# C.0  AnswerstoInterrogatoriesfiledwithaComplaintareduewithin15daysafterthedateon  p whichDefendantsinitialpleadingormotionisrequired,whicheverislaterperRule2421.  \ Inthiscasewithin45daysofserviceoftheComplaint.H(#(# D.0  ThenewinformationshouldpromptCarlsattorneytofileanAmendedComplaintbringing   inBenasacodefendant.ThisinformationindicatesthatAdamwastheagentofBenatthe   timeoftheaccident.AmendmentsarepermittedperRule3341(a)and(c)(6)toaddaparty  withouttheconsentofthedefendant.CarlmayaddapartywithouttheconsentofAdamor  leaveofcourtunderthesefacts.(#(# E.0  IsAdamentitledtoanyofthedocumentssought?Explainyourreasons.X (#(#   _i_.0  Yes.PerRule2402(b).0"  (# (#   ii.0  Yes,butonlyonshowingthatthematerialisdiscoverableunderRule2402(a).#l! (# (#   iii.0  Yes,underRule2402(b).$X" (# (#   iv.0  Onlyexpertsexpectedtobecalledattrialwithoutmeeting2402(c)requirements.$D # (# (# @7 7  EXTRACTSECTIONSFORQUESTION4 󀀈 &"%  AnnotatedCodeofMaryland,MarylandRules  (#'  TITLE2.CIVILPROCEDURE!CIRCUITCOURT:2321,2322,2323,2331,2332,2 *%) 341,2402,2421  l+&* Ї   QUESTION5   E(A)  Eligibilityfordivorce.    Underthefactspresented,neitherpartyhasagroundforabsolutedivorceatthistime.One ` ortheothermayhavegroundsforalimiteddivorce. L    (1)  AlcouldmaintainthereisavoluntaryseparationasofJanuary1,2003,butBarbara $ t couldmaintainsheonlyacquiescedinthemoveasshecouldnotpreventit.  `   (2)  Barbaracouldmaintainavoluntaryseparationorthattherewasadesertiononthepart  8  ofAl.afurtherconcernundereitherscenarioiswhetherthepartiesare,infact,livingseparateand $  apartorarestillconsideredlivingunderthesameroof.IfAlislivinginanapartmentabovea   detachedgarage,theymaybelivingseparateandapart.     *SeeMountv.Mount,59MdApp538,47642nd,1175(1984).   (B)  AlsWorkEthic p   Ifthepartiescontinuetoliveseparateandapartandanactionforchildcustodyandchild H supportisbroughtbyBarbara,theCourtwilldeterminethegrossincomeofeachparentunderthe 4 MarylandChildSupportGuidelinesformula.IfAlhadahistoryofearning$75,000andnow  p maintainshecanonlyearn$50,000,BarbaracouldassertAlisvoluntarilyimpoverishinghimselfto  \ reducehisexposuretochildsupport.IftheCourtmadeafindingthatAlhadvoluntarily H impoverishedhimselfforChildSupportGuidelinespurposes,hecouldhaveimputedtohimhis 4 potentialforincomeof$75,000eventhoughheallegedlywasonlyearning$50,000.Inthecontext   ofadivorceproceeding,theterm voluntarilyimpoverishedmeansfreelyorbyanactofchoiceand   notcompelledbyfactorsbeyondhiscontroltoreduceoneselftopovertyortodepriveoneselfof  resourcesortorenderoneselfwithoutadequatemeans(seegenerally_Stull_v._Stull_,144MdApp237,  797A2nd809(2002).WhetheraCourtwoulddetermineAlisvoluntarilyimpoverished(suchthat  hewillbeimputedthehigherincome,whetherheearnsitornot)willrequireaconsiderationof l severalfactors: X      (1)  CurrentphysicalconditionofAl. 0"    (2)  Hislevelofeducation. #l!   (3)  Thetimingofhischangeinemploymentincomeorfinancialcircumstances. $X"   (4)  RelationshipofAlandBarbarapriortothedivorceproceeding. $D #   (5)  Alseffortstofindandretainemploymentorsecureretrainingifneeded. %0!$   (6)  WhetherAlhaseverwithheldsupport. &"%   (7)  Alspastworkhistory. '#&   (8)  Areawherepartiesliveandstatusofjobmarket. (#' IfthebadeconomyistheprimarysourceofthereductionofincomeandnotAlsworkethic,afinding |*%) thatheisvoluntarilyimpoverishedisunlikely. h+&* M?c M M  (C)  FamilyEconomicAssistance    IfBarbarafilesadivorceactionandhascustodyofthechildren,shecan:    (1)  GetchildsupportpayablebyAlthroughtheBureauofSupportEnforcementbywage ` lienforDavidbeyondage18untilhegraduatesfromprivatehighschool(Article1,Section24, L  ConstitutionalCodeofMaryland):shecanreceivechildsupportforTonybeyondtheageof18asa 8  disabledadultunderSection13101&102oftheFamilyLawArticle;shecangetchildsupportfor $ t Maryuntilage18.  `   (2)  Shecanmakeaclaimforalimony,thoughrecoveryisunlikelyunderthefactsgiven.  8    (3)  Shecanaskforuseandpossessionofthefamilyhomeandfamilyusepersonal   propertyforamaximumofthreeyearsfollowingthegrantingofanabsolutedivorce.     (4)  ShecanasktheCourttorequireAltocontributetothemortgageandutilityexpenses   ofmaintainingthefamilyhomeduringtheperiodofuseandpossession. p   (5)  ShecanasktheCourttorequireAltocontributetoherattorneysfees. H   (6)  Medicalinsuranceisavailabletothefamilyasafringebenefitwithoutcostthrough  p Barbarasemploymentandthereforeshewouldnotbesuccessfulinmaintainingthatclaimagainst  \ Al. H   (D)  ContributiontoPrivateSchoolTuition     In_Witt_Ԁv._Listaidaeio_,118MdApp155,701A2d1227(1997),theCourtinterpretedthe  meaningofthewords particulareducationneedsasutilizedinSection12204(_i_)(1)oftheFamily  LawArticletoallowtheCourttorequirethecostofprivateschooltuitionassubjecttoguidelines  consideration.TheCourttellsusthatconsiderationshouldbegiven: l     (1)  Achildseducationalhistory,thatis,howlongthechildmayhavebeenataparticular D! privateschool. 0"    (2)  Thechildsneedforstabilityandcontinuityduringdomesticturmoil. #l!   (3)  Thechildsperformancewhileintheprivateschool. $X"   (4)  Thefamilyhistory(traditionofattendingprivateschool/religiouslyoriented $D # institution). %0!$   (5)  Hadparentsmadeprivateschooldecisionpriortoseparation? &"%   (6)  Theparentsabilitytopayfortheschooling. '#& Consideringthesefactors,Davidstuitionexpense,whohasbeenatPrivateHighSchoolforthree )$( yearsandisdoingwellacademically,shouldbepartoftheChildSupportGuidelinesformula |*%) establishinghischildsupport.Likewise,Marystuitionprobablyshouldbeallowedasapartofthe h+&* childsupportformulaestablishingherchildsupportalso.  T,'+ NOa N N    QUESTION6   obMarvinmaychallengethelawas_violative_Ԁofthe14thAmendmentsDueProcessClauseandEqual  ProtectionClause,the1stAmendmentsprohibitionagainsttheestablishmentofreligion,andthe5th t Amendmentsprohibitionagainstthetakingofprivatepropertywithoutjustcompensation.Marvin ` hasstandingtobringanactionsincehewillsufferaninjuryinfactifthelawisenforced. L    SubstantiveDueProcess $ t dLandusecontrolssuchastheoneatissuearesubjecttotheDueProcessClauseandmust,therefore,  L  berationallyrelatedtolegitimategovernmentalinterestsinfurtheranceofthepublichealth,safety,  8  moralsandgeneralwelfare.Thelawwasenactedinfurtheranceofwhatappearstobealegitimate $  governmentalinterestinfurtheranceofthepublichealthandwelfare.However,dueprocessalso   requiresthatthelawalsobedraftedinawaythatisreasonableandsubstantiallyfurtherssaidinterest.   Accordingly,Marvinmaybesuccessfulinhisattempttochallengethelawonthisgroundsincethe   lawunreasonablyallowsablanketexemptionforchurchesandlotslessthan2acresinsize.     EqualProtection \     TheEqualProtectionClausealsorequiresashowingthatthelawadvancesalegitimatepurposeand 4 doesnotunreasonablydiscriminate.Sincenofundamentalrightisinvolved,theCountyslawwill  p bereviewedundertherationalbasistest.EvenunderthismorelenienttestMarvinshouldbe  \ successfulsincethereisnorationalbasisfortheassumptionthatsmallerparcelslocatedascloseto H theriverasMarvinswillnotequallyaffectit.Similarly,thereisnoreasontoassumethatproperties 4 ownedbychurcheswillnotadverselyimpacttheriver.   h  EstablishmentClause      Marvinmayalsobesuccessfulinarguingthatthelawis_violative_Ԁofthe1stAmendmentbecauseit  advancesreligionbyexemptingchurchesfromitsreach.AsnotedbytheSupremeCourtinLarkin l v._Grendel_sDen,Inc.,459U.S.116,122(1982), [_t]he_ԀpurposesoftheFirstAmendmentguarantees X  relatingtoreligionweretwofold:toforeclosestateinterferencewiththepracticeofreligiousacts,and D! toforeclosetheestablishmentofastatereligion....Courtsapplya3prongtestarticulatedin 0"  Lemonv._Kurtzman_,403U.S.602(1971)todeterminewhetheranestablishmenthasoccurred(1) #l! whetherthelawhasasecularpurpose;(2)whetheritsprimaryeffectistheadvancementofreligion; $X" and(3)whetherthereisexcessivegovernmententanglement.Asnotedabove,thereisnorational $D # basisinconcludingthatachurchwillnotnegativelyimpacttheriver,sosuchanexclusionmaybe %0!$ anunconstitutionaladvancementofreligion. &"% k  TakingsClaim (#'     TheTakingsClauseofthe5thAmendmentprovidesthatprivatepropertyshallnotbetakenforpublic |*%) usewithoutjustcompensation.Ithasbeenheldthatasubdivisiondedicationisanexactionthatmay h+&* resultinataking.Indeterminingwhetherit_is,_ԀstandardsdiscussedinDolanv.Cityof_Tigard_,512  U.S.374(1994)areconsidered!thatis,whetherthereisanessentialnexus,andwhethertheproperty  interesttakenisroughlyproportionalwiththedemandonpublicservicescreatedbythedevelopment.  TheexactionofacremayreasonablybefoundtobeanunconstitutionaltakingofMarvinsproperty t sinceitprecludeshimfrombuildingthenumberofhomeshecouldbuildbutforthelaw,andthelaw ` doesnotbeararationalnexustoitsstatedpurposesincethosewithlessacreageandchurchesare L  allowedtodevelop.Assumingarationalnexusbetweentheregulationanditspurpose,atakingcould 8  stillbefoundtohaveoccurredifitcanbeshownthatMarvinsinvestmentbackedexpectationof $ t constructingtwoadditionalhomeswasreasonableandwasthwartedbythelaw.EasternEnterprises  ` v._Apfel_,524U.S.498(1998)  L  q h+&* Ї  QUESTION7   Jw  PartI  w    Thebasicfactpatternarisesoutof_Gussin_Ԁv_Shockey_,725_F.Supp_Ԁ271,_affd_.933F.2d1001 t (4thCir.1991).ThecruxofthecaseinvolvesDavesdutyasanagentofPaultoprovideaccurate ` informationandavoidselfdealing. L    TheissuewillturnonwhetherDaveisanagentofPaulforthepurchaseofthevehicles.A $ t goodanswerwilldiscusstherequirementsandscopeofagencyrelationships.  `   Agencyisthefiduciaryrelationshipwhichresultsfromthemanifestationofconsentbyone  8  person[theprincipal]toanother[theagent]thattheothershallactonhisbehalfandbesubjecttohis $  controlandconsentbytheothertosoact.Restatement(second)ofAgency1.Thedutiesanagent   owestohisorherprincipalarewellestablished.Anagenthas adutytohisprincipaltoactsolely   forthebenefitoftheprincipalinallmattersconnectedwiththisagency.RESTATEMENT   (SECOND)OFAGENCY387.Thepowersoftheagentaretobe_exercised_Ԁforthebenefitofthe   principalonly,andnotoftheagentorofthirdparties.InsuranceCompanyofNorthAmericav. p Miller,II,362Md.361(2001).Thus,agentsmustavoidplacingthemselvesinapositionwherehis \ orherowninterestsorthoseofathirdpartymayconflictwiththeinterestoftheirclientorother H principal. 4   Davewouldarguehewasonlyanemployeeforthepurposeofrepairingandmaintainingthe  \ carsandhadnodutyasanagentregardingtheirpurchase.Hewouldclaimhewasnotanagentas H hehadnoauthoritytobindPaultoanyagreementorundertakeanytransactionsonhisbehalf. 4   PaulwillclaimDavewashisagentandassuchhadadutytoactasafiduciaryandwith   absoluteloyaltytohim.Hetookadvantageofhispositionasanagentandengagedinselfdealing  toPaulsdetriment.Daveclearlyviolatedhisfiduciaryrelationshipandfurthermorecommittedfraud.  ЀOneoftheprimaryobligationsofanagentistodiscloseanyinformationtheprincipalmay  reasonablywanttoknow.Certainly,Paulwouldwanttoknowthebestpriceforwhichhecould l purchasethevehicles. X    Davealsobreachedhisfiduciarydutybynotactingwithloyaltytohisprincipalandplacing 0"  hisinterestindirectconflictwithPauls. #l!   Furthermore,anagenthasadutytodisclosetotheprincipalanyinformationhemay $D # reasonablywanttoknow,particularlywhenDavereceivesadirectbenefitfromthetransactionfrom %0!$ athirdparty. &"%   Whenanagentbreachesafiduciaryduty,theprincipalmayreceivecompensatorydamages (#' proximatelycausedbythebreachinthiscase,$20,000.Punitivedamagesforfraudarenot )$( recoverableinMarylandabsentashowingofactualmalice,andtherefore,recoveringpunitive |*%) damagesisunlikely. h+&* Їw  PartII      A.  DavesobjectiontoPaulstestimonyshouldbeoverruled.AstatementbyDave,a  partyopponentisnotexcludedbythehearsayrule.Rule5803(a).TheSellersstatement, hewont t takeanythingless,isnothearsay,becauseitisnotofferedinevidencetoprovethetruthofthematter ` asserted.Rule5801. L    B.  PaulsobjectiontoDavestestimonyshouldbesustained.Therehasbeenno $ t foundationlaidthatDaveisanexpertinthevalueofantiqueautomobiles.Unlessqualifiedasan  ` expertinthevalueofantiquecars,Daveisalaywitnessandisnotqualifiedtoexpressanopinion  L  astothevalueoftheseautomobilesbecausesuchevidenceisspeculative.Rule5702.  8    Moreover,thetrialcourtmayconsiderthatthevalueoftheautomobilesisnotrelevantto   Paulsclaims,unlessheisseekingtorecovercompensatorydamagesinexcessofthefeepaidbythe   SellertoPaul.IfDavewerefoundtobreachhisfiduciarydutybyobtainingafeefromtheSeller,the   amountofthefeemayberecoveredbyPaulregardlessofthevalueofthecars.     Relevantevidencemeansevidencehavinganytendencytoprovetheexistenceofanyfact \ thatisofconsequencetothedeterminationoftheactionmoreorlessprobablethanitwouldbe H withouttheevidence.Evidencethatisnotrelevantisnotadmissible.Rules5401and5402. 4    h+&* O/V  OX O  _QUESTION_Ԁ8       BrownandSamsignedawrittencontractforapriceinexcessof$500,whichcomplieswith  theStatuteofFrauds.2201,CommercialLawAct.Samsoldthetractorupontheexpress t statementthatitis a2001_Everfarm_Ԁtractor.Thisstatementconstitutedanexpresswarrantythat ` thetractorwasa2001model.2213.The AsIstermdoesnotnegateanexpresswarranty.2 L  316(a) 8    Twoweeksaftertakingdeliveryandafterusingthetractorseveraltimes,Brownwantsto  ` rescindthecontractandrejectthetractor(orrevokehisacceptance,ifheacceptedthegoods).  L    Under2608,abuyermayrevokehisacceptanceifhisacceptanceofnonconforminggoods $  wasreasonablyinducedeitherbythedifficultyofdiscoverybeforeacceptanceorbythesellers   assurances.ThefactssupportBrownsrevocationonthesegrounds.Further,asrequiredby2   608(2),Brownsrevocationofacceptanceoccurredwithinareasonabletimeafterhediscoveredthe   nonconformityandbeforeanysubstantialchangeintheconditionofthetractor.     Section2711,CommercialLawArticlemakesclearthatwhenabuyerjustifiablyrevokes \ acceptanceofgoodshemaycancel(rescind)thecontractinadditiontorecoveringsomuchofthe H priceashadbeenpaid. 4   IfBrownwerefoundtohavelosthisrighttorevokeacceptance,hewouldbelimitedto  \ damagesforbreechofSamsexpresswarranty.Themeasureofdifferencewouldbethedifference H atthetimeandplaceofacceptancebetweenthevalueofthetractor($15,000)andthevalueitwould 4 havehadifithadbeenaswarranted($20,000).2714.Thesedamagesequalthe$5,000price   reductionofferedbySam.Thedamagescouldbedeductedfromtheunpaidbalancedue.2717.       AnalysisundertheseprovisionsoftheUCCmirrortraditionallegalprinciplesgoverning  rescissionofcontracts.Inarescissionaction,Brownwillneedtoshowheenteredintothecontract  astheresultoffraud,negligentmisrepresentation,undueinfluenceorduress,materialbreachor l mutualmistakeoffact. X    Inrescissionactionsresultingfromclaimsoffraud,negligentmisrepresentation,undue 0"  influenceorduress,inmakingthecontractthePlaintiffmustprovetheunderlyinggroundinaddition #l! totheelementsforrescission. $X"   Brownsclaimwouldbeforrescissionofthecontractonthegroundofnegligent %0!$ misrepresentationormutualmistake.Basedonthefacts,thereisnoevidenceoffraud,undue &"% influenceorduresspracticedbySam. '#&   Toobtainrescissiononthegroundsofnegligentrepresentation,Brownmustshow: )$(   1.ThenegligentassertionofafalsestatementbyaDefendantowingadutyofcaretothe h+&* Plaintiff; T,'+    2.TheintentionoftheDefendantforthePlaintifftoactorrelyuponthenegligentassertion; @-(,   3.TheknowledgeoftheDefendantthatthePlaintiffwillprobablyrelyuponthenegligent   assertionorstatementswhich,iferroneous,willcausedamage;    4.JustifiableactionbyPlaintiffinrelianceuponthestatementorassertion;and    5.TheincurringofdamagescausedbyDefendantsnegligence. t   _Flaherty_Ԁv.Weinberg,303Md.116,135(1985). `   Samdidnotknowthetractorwasayear2001model.Nevertheless,theassertionofaneasily 8  discernablefalsestatement(2001model)bySamandthereasonablerelianceonthesestatementsby $ t Brownalongwiththedifferenceinvaluebetweena1999and2001tractormaysatisfytheelements  ` ofnegligentmisrepresentation.Experttestimonyonthedutyofafarmequipmentdealertoverify  L  modelyearsmayberequiredtoestablishthestandardofcare.  8  Ѐ $   XEvenwereSamnotnegligent,thefactsindicatethatSamandBobmadeamutualmistakeof   materialfactinbelievingthiswasa2001model.Rescissionisgrantedwhereamutualerroror   mistakedefeatstherealintentionofthecontractingparties._C.J.S._,Contracts,149.Toobtain   rescissionundereithertheory,Brownneedstoshowhereturnedorwasunconditionallywillingto   returntheconsiderationandanybenefitsreceivedunderthecontracttoSam._Lazorcak_Ԁv._Feuerstein_, p 273Md.69.BrowntookthetractorbackandSamrefused.ThiswouldshowBrownsunconditional \ willingnesstoreturntheconsiderationreceivedunderthecontract. H  4  X  Also,Brownmustshowthatheinvokedtherighttorescindpromptlyanddidnottreatthe  p contractasacontinuingobligation._Billmyre_Ԁv.SacredHeartHosp.,273Md.638.Brownattempted  \ toreturnthetractorthenextdayafterhefoundoutthetractorwasa1999.Brownhasmadeno H installmentpayments. 4   Brownisentitledtorescindthecontract,returnthetractor,andhavehis$5,000.00down   paymentreturned.ThefactthatSamiswillingtoreducethepriceofthetractortoeliminatea  monetarylosstoBobdoesnotbarBobsrighttorescind.     ,.|)- Ї  QUESTION9       Danny'sattorneywillattempttosuppressbothDanny'sstatementandtheevidenceseizedfrom  Dannyasaresultofthesearch. t   Inorderfora_warrantless_Ԁsearchorarresttobelegalitmustbebaseduponprobablecause. L  Intermsof_quantifiable_Ԁprobability,theprobablecauseforasearchisthesameastheprobablecause 8  fora_warrantless_Ԁarrest.PursuanttoMd.CodeAnn.,_Crim_.Pro.2202,apoliceofficercanarrest $ t anaccusedwithoutawarrantiftheofficerhasprobablecausetobelieveacrimehasbeenorisbeing  ` committedbyanallegedoffenderintheofficer'spresence.InCarrollv.UnitedStates,267U.S.132  L  (1925),theSupremeCourtfirstrecognizedan"automobileexception"totheFourthAmendment's  8  warrantrequirements.Theexceptionallowsvehiclestobesearchedwithoutawarrantprovidedthat $  theofficerhasprobablecausetobelievethatacrime!itemiswithinthecar.FollowingCarroll,the   SupremeCourthasheldthatduringalawfultrafficstop,officerscancompelthedriverand   passengerstoexitthevehicle.TheSupremeCourthasgoneontoholdthatapassenger'sproperty   leftwithinavehicle,whenoccupantsareorderedoutofacar,fallswithinthepermissiblescopeof   theautomobileexceptiontoa_warrantless_Ԁsearch.ThelawinMarylandissettledthatwhenaproperly p trainedK9alertstoavehicleindicatingthelikelihoodofcontraband,sufficientprobablecauseexists \ toconducta_warrantless_Ԁ"Carroll"searchofthevehicle. H Ѐ 4   WhileunderMarylandlawthealertbyadrugdog,undisputedly,givesapoliceofficer  p probablecausetobelievethatthereiscontrabandsomewhereinthecaroronthepersonofsomeone  \ inthecar,theK9sniffofthevehiclealonedoesnotamounttoprobablecausetothensearcheach H ofthepassengers.WithoutadditionalinformationthatOfficerBlairhadtoestablishDanny's 4 knowledgeanddominionorcontroloverthecontrabandbeforehissearch,theK9sniffofthecarwas   insufficienttoestablishprobablecauseforasearchofanonowner,nondriverforpossessionof   CDS.Merelysittinginthebackseatofacardoesnotamounttoprobablecause,underthefactsof  thiscase,tosearchandsubsequentlyarrestDanny.IfOfficerBlairhadindependentconstitutional  justificationtodetainDannyandtheK9officerhadsniffedDanny,andspecificallyalertedtohim,  beforeOfficerBlairsearchedhim,probablecauseforthesearchmighthaveexisted.Instead,Danny l wassearchedmerelybaseduponthefactthatprobablecauseexistedtosearchEarlsvehiclebased X  uponageneralK9scanofthecar,andnothingmore.TheCourtwillmostlikelysuppressthe D! physicalevidenceobtainedfromDanny.See,StateofMarylandv.Wallace,379Md.137(2002). 0"    TheFifthAmendmentprotectsagainstcompelledselfincrimination.Accordingly,inorder $X" toassurethatdefendantshavevoluntarilywaivedtheirrighttosilenceduringacustodial $D # interrogation,theymustfirstbeadvisedoftheirMirandawarnings.TheFifthAmendment,however, %0!$ doesnotprotectagainstnoncompelledorvoluntaryadmissionsorutterances.AlthoughDannywas &"% mostlikelyincustodyatthetimehewashandcuffedbyOfficerBlairdespiteOfficerBlair's '#& disclaimer,OfficerBlairdidnotelicitanystatementsfromDanny.Dannysimplyblurtedthathedid (#' notknowanythingabouttheCDSwithoutanyfurtherencouragement.Notwithstandingthis,because )$( Dannywasprobablyunderarrestatthetimehemadethestatement,andthatarrestwaswithout |*%) probablecause,itwasunlawful.Thus,Danny'sattorneymayarguethatDanny'sstatementwhichwas h+&* subjecttotheunlawfularrestshouldalsobeexcludedasafruitofthatunlawfularrest. T,'+    ,.|)- Ї  QUESTION10         TheissuespresentedherearewhatrightsPratthastorecoverasasecuredpartytotheDollarNote  pledgedbyMs.Logan. t Title9oftheCommercialLawArticlesetsforthasecuredpartysrighttodisposeofcollateralafter L  adefault.AlthoughPrattdoesnothavepossessionofthenotebyfilingthefinancestatement,ithas 8  avalidsecurityinterestinthenoteunder9312. $ t Prattmaytakepossessionofthenotepursuanttothelawfulmeasuresunder9609.Pratthastheright  L  totakepossessionofthecollateralsinceMs.Logandefaulted.Section9609.  8  PratthastherighttodisposeoftheDollarNoteinacommerciallyreasonablemanner.9610.Ms.   Loganowed$150,000toPrattontheloanfromPratt.IfPrattreceivesmorethanthatamountupon   sellingorcollectingontheDollarnote,afterithasaccountedforallofitsfeesandexpenses,itmust   payoffothersecuredcreditorsonthenote,ifany,andreturntheremaindertoMs.Logan.9608.     EXTRACTSECTIONSFORQUESTION10 \ RAnnotatedCodeofMaryland,CommercialLaw 4 TITLE3.NEGOTIABLEINSTRUMENTS:3301  \ TITLE9.SECUREDTRANSACTIONS:9310,9312,9313,9608,9609,9610  4   @-(,   QUESTION11      (A)  Atcommonlawajointtenancyrequiredfourunities!unityoftime(interestsvestatthesame  time),unityoftitle(interestacquiredatthesametime),unityofinterest(interestsofthesametype t andduration),andunityofpossession.Atenancybytheentiretyinvolvedthesameunitiesbutcould ` onlybecreatedwhenthegranteesarehusbandandwifeatthetimeoftheconveyance.SinceBoband L  Carolwerenotmarriedatthetimeoftheconveyancetheeffectofthedeedpurportingtogranttitle 8  tothemastenantsbytheentireties,absentfraud,wastocreateeitherajointtenancyoratenancyin $ t common.Youngv.Young,37Md.App.211,216(1977)PursuanttoSection2117ofthe  ` MarylandRealPropertyCodeAnnotated [_n]o_Ԁdeed8whichaffectslandorpersonalproperty,  L  createsanestateinjointtenancy,unlessthedeed8expresslyprovidesthatthepropertygrantedis  8  tobeheldinjointtenancy.Noparticularwordsarerequiredtocreatethejointtenancy,however. $  Ithasbeenheldthat [_t]he_Ԁprincipalcharacteristicofajointtenancyistherightofsurvivorshipand   thespecificexpressioninadeedofsucharightisaclearindicationofanintentiontocreateajoint   tenancy.Youngv.Young,at217,citingGardnerv.Gardner,25Md.App.638,642(1975).The   factsindicatethatBobandCarolintendedarightofsurvivorship.Ifso,Bobsestatewouldhaveno   interestintheFrederickCountypropertyanditwouldvestinCarol.CarolsgrantofanoptiontoTed p didnotaffectthejointtenancy.Alexanderv.Boyer,253Md.511(1969) \ (B)  Atenancyincommonisanestatethatonlyrequirestheunityofpossessionanddoesnot 4 includearightofsurvivorship.IfCarolhadleasedthepropertytoTed,saidleasewouldhave  p destroyedoneormoreofthefourunitiesofinterest,title,timeandpossessionthatajointtenancy  \ enjoys,therebyterminatingthejointtenancyandcreatingatenancyincommon.Alexanderv.Boyer, H 253Md.511(1969)Sincetherewouldnolongerbearightofsurvivorship,CarolandBobwould 4 eachhaveainterestintheproperty.BobsinterestwouldpasstoAliceasaresultofthewill.   (C)  Similarly,ifBobhaddeededhisportionofthepropertytoAlicein1997hewouldhave  terminatedthejointtenancywithCarolandcreatedatenancyincommonwherebyCarolretainedher  interestandBobandAliceeachhadainterestintheproperty.Uponhisdeathhisinterest  wouldpasstohisheirs(Aliceunderthetermsofthewill). l   h+&*   QUESTION12   ! ! G(03;"=3"    =32  A  .3  0    EricsrepresentationofWanda.=3݌t (# (# Ќ  ">;"    >;0  2(  1  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ1.3: Alawyershallactwithreasonablediligenceandpromptness L  inrepresentingaclient.Ericfailedtorespondtothemotionforsummary 8  judgment.>;݌$ tm (#m (# Ќ  ">;"    >;0  2(  2  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ1.4(a): Alawyershallkeepaclientreasonablyinformedaboutthe  L  statusofamatterandpromptlycomplywithreasonablerequestsfor  8  information.>;݌$ m (#m (# Ќ  0  0 (#(#0m  (# (#_MRPC_Ԁ1.4(b): Alawyershallexplainamattertotheextentreasonably   necessarytopermittheclienttomakeinformeddecisionsregardingthe   representation.EricfailedtoreturnWandascallsaboutthesummary   judgmentmotionortoadviseherregardingthesummaryjudgmentmotion.pm (#m (# "=3"    =3C2  B  .3  0    EricsassociationwithMax.=3C|݌H (# (# Ќ  ">;"    >;80  2(  1  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ5.5: Alayershallnot:***(b)assistapersonwhoisnota  p memberofthebarintheperformanceofactivitythatconstitutesthe  \ unauthorizedpracticeoflaw.EricallowedMaxtoassistinthecase,attend H astatusconferenceinchambersinthecase,includedhisnameonthe 4 pleadings,didnotrequestadmissionpro_hac_ԀviceofMaxinthecase,and   turnedthecaseovertoMax.EricassistedMax,whoisnotamemberofthe   MarylandBar,intheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.>;8q݌m (#m (# Ќ  ">;"    >;0  2(  2  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ7.5(b): Alawfirmwithofficesinmorethanonejurisdictionmay  usethesamenameineachjurisdiction,butidentificationofthelawyersin l anofficeofthefirmshallindicatethejurisdictionallimitationsonthosenot X  licensedtopracticeinthejurisdictionwheretheofficeislocated.Erichad D! onlyoneofficeinGlenBurnie,Maryland.WhileMaxwaslistedasan 0"  associateontheletterhead,therewasnodesignationontheletterheadthat #l! MaxwasnotlicensedtopracticelawinMaryland.>;݌$X"m (#m (# Ќ  ">;"    >;P0  2(  3  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ7.1: Alawyershallnotmakeafalseormisleadingcommunication %0!$ aboutthelawyerorthelawyersservices.Acommunicationisfalseor &"% misleadingifit:(a)containsamaterialmisrepresentationoffactorlaw,or '#& omitsafactnecessarytomakethestatementconsideredasawholenot (#' materiallymisleading***.TheomissiontodesignatethatMaxwasonly )$( admittedintheDistrictofColumbiawasmisleadingasWandacouldhave |*%) believedthatshewasreceivingproperrepresentationfrombothEricand h+&* Max.>;P݌T,'+m (#m (#    @-(, "=3"    =32  C  .3  0    &   EricsfailuretorespondtoBarCounsel.=3J݌ (# (#   ">;"    >;30  2(  1  )3  0m  (# (#  _MRPC_Ԁ8.1: ...alawyer...inconnectionwithadisciplinarymatter,shall'  not:***(b)failtodiscloseafactnecessarytocorrectamisapprehension t knownbythepersontohaveariseninthematter,orknowinglyfailto ` respondtoalawfuldemandforinformationfromanadmissionsor L  disciplinaryauthority,exceptthatthisRuledoesnotrequiredisclosureof 8  informationotherwiseprotectedbyRule1.6.Ericdidnotrespondtothe $ t requestforinformationfromBarCounsel.Noconfidentialityof  ` informationwasinvolvedintherequestofBarCounselforinformation  L  basedonthegivenfacts.>;3l݌ 8 m (#m (# Ќ  AttorneyGrievanceCommissionv.Brown,   353Md.271,725A.2d1069(1999)   MarylandRulesofProfessionalConduct:     1.3Diligence p   1.4(a)Communication \   1.4(b)Communication H   5.5(b)Unauthorizedpracticeoflaw 4   7.1(a)Communicationconcerningalawyersservices  p   7.5(b)Firmnamesandletterheads  \   8.1(b)Baradmissionanddisciplinarymatters