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ÐÌBOARD€ANALYSISÐ ˆØ ÐÌQUESTION€1ó óÐ `° ÐÓ„ÓÌà  àAnyone€seeking€to€challenge€the€constitutionality€of€a€statute€must€show€that€they€are€inÐ 8 ˆ Ðdanger€of€substantial€injury€from€the€operation€of€said€statute.€€Mega€Martððs€rights€to€develop€its€landÐ $ t Ðin€the€manner€that€it€would€like€are€infringed€by€the€law.€€Accordingly,€it€will€have€standing€toÐ  ` Ðchallenge€the€law.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€Legislation€enacted€by€the€Town€Council€adversely€affected€Mega€Martððs€propertyÐ Ô$  Ðrights.€€While€a€property€owner€is€not€entitled€to€rely€upon€the€zoning€of€its€land,€he€is€entitled€to€theÐ À  Ðassurance€that€laws€will€not€be€enacted€unless€they€are€rationally€related€to€the€furtherance€of€theÐ ¬ü  Ðpublic€health,€safety,€morals€and€general€welfare€of€the€Townððs€inhabitants.€€òòLevinson€v.Ð ˜è  ÐMontgomery€Countyóó,€95€Md.€App.€307€(1993)€€The€facts€do€not€reveal€any€rational€basis€for€the€law,Ð „Ô  Ðother€than€the€protection€of€local€interests.€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àMega€Mart€may€argue€that€the€law€violates€the€Equal€Protection€Clause€of€the€FourteenthÐ H˜ ÐAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€since€any€noncommercial€use€or€commercial€use€lessÐ 4„ Ðthan€5,000€square€foot€in€size€may€locate€within€Southside.€€The€Town€must€have€a€rational€basisÐ  p Ðto€discriminate€in€this€manner.€€Under€the€facts,€it€does€not€appear€to€have€one€since€the€emergencyÐ  \ Ðlegislation€was€enacted€solely€to€thwart€Mega€Mart.Ð øH ÐÌà  àMega€Mart€may€argue€that€Article€I,€Section€8,€of€the€United€States€Constitution€empowersÐ Ð  ÐCongress€to€regulate€interstate€commerce€and€precludes€the€Town€from€enacting€a€law€that€burdensÐ ¼  Ðor€obstructs€interstate€commerce.€€The€law€bars€any€commercial€use€in€excess€of€5,000€square€feetÐ ¨ø Ðand€is€a€clear€burden€upon€a€sizable€portion€of€the€commerce€within€the€Town.€€It€clearly€favorsÐ ”ä Ðð ðlocalðð€commerce.€€As€a€national€chain,€Mega€Mart€and€its€customersðð€rights€are€being€obstructedÐ €Ð Ðsince€the€former€may€not€be€able€to€sell,€and€the€latter€may€not€purchase,€Mega€Mart€products€withinÐ l¼ Ðthe€Town.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àMega€Mart€may€argue€that€its€rights€were€infringed€without€benefit€of€procedural€due€processÐ 0"€  Ðof€law.€€Again,€the€facts€state€that€emergency€legislation€was€enacted€to€thwart€Mega€Mart.€€ItÐ #l! Ðarguably€was€not€informed€of€the€hearing€and€could€not€participate€prior€to€enactment.€€The€law€alsoÐ $X" Ðviolates€Mega€Martððs€substantive€due€process€rights€since€it€is€unclear€what€activity€is€beingÐ ô$D # Ðprohibited€(i.e.€„€the€law€is€vague€as€to€what€is€intended€by€commercial€use)€or,€in€the€alternative,€theÐ à%0!$ Ðlaw€goes€much€further€than€it€must€(i.e.€„€prohibits€all€activity€of€a€commercial€nature)€without€anyÐ Ì&"% Ðrational€basis€for€so€doing.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àAlthough€not€as€strong€an€argument,€Mega€Mart€may€argue€that€the€Stateððs€legislation€is€aÐ )à$( Ðviolation€of€Article€I€Section€10€of€the€Constitution,€which€is€commonly€referred€to€as€the€ContractsÐ |*Ì%) ÐClause.€€Although€the€Contract€Clause€ð ðdoes€not€operate€to€obliterate€the€police€powerðð,€a€court€canÐ h+¸&* Ðlook€at€the€degree€to€which€the€governmentððs€action€is€a€valid€exercise€of€the€police€power.€Ð ° ÐòòKeystone€Bituminous€Coal€Association€v.DeBenedictusóó,€480€U.S.€470,€503€(1987)€€Mega€MartÐ œì Ðwould€argue€that€the€State€legislation€created€a€substantial€impairment€upon€its€contractualÐ ˆØ Ðrelationship€with€the€property€owner€and€the€Town€has€not€demonstrated€a€significant€and€legitimateÐ tÄ Ðpublic€purpose€for€said€impairment.€Ð `° ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* ÐÓ  Óò òQUESTION€2ó óÐ ° ÐÓ;ÓÌà  àThe€issue€is€whether€there€was€a€binding€agreement€between€the€parties.€€If€supported€byÐ ˆØ Ðconsideration,€an€option€is€a€binding€agreement€that€cannot€be€withdrawn€by€the€optionor€during€itsÐ tÄ Ðterm.€€òòBlondell€v.€Turoveróó,€195€Md.€251€(1950).Ð `° ÐÌà  àUnder€the€facts,€Sheila€may€argue€that€neither€the€original€option€nor€the€addendum€meetsÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€requirements€of€the€Statute€of€Frauds.€€The€Statute€of€Frauds€requires€that€the€option€(1)€beÐ $ t Ðsigned€by€the€party€to€be€charged€or€his€agent;€(2)€name€each€party€with€sufficient€definiteness€toÐ  ` Ðidentify€them;€(3)€describe€the€land€to€which€it€relates;€and€(4)€set€forth€the€terms€and€conditions€ofÐ ü L  Ðall€the€promises€constituting€the€agreement.€€òòForsyth€v.€Brillhartóó,€216€Md.€437€(1958).€€The€originalÐ è 8  Ðoption€and€the€addendum€do€not€specifically€describe€Blackacre.€€This€is€a€fatal€flaw,€given€the€factÐ Ô$  Ðthat€Sheila€and€Ben€own€other€property.Ð À  ÐÌà  àIf€the€court€allows€Steve€to€get€past€that€hurdle,€however,€Sheila€may€argue€that€there€was€noÐ ˜è  Ðconsideration€for€the€extended€option.€€An€option,€or€an€agreement€in€general,€must€be€supported€byÐ „Ô  Ðconsideration€in€order€to€be€binding€and€enforceable.€€òòChernick€v.€óóChernick,€327€Md.€470€(1992);Ð pÀ ÐòòBeall€v.€óóBeall,€291€Md.€224€(1981)€€Next,€Steve€may€argue€that€the€extension€was€not€a€contract,€butÐ \¬ Ðan€offer,€which€he€duly€accepted.€€However,€Ben€had€died€by€that€time,€and€the€general€rule€is€thatÐ H˜ Ðthe€death€of€an€offeror€causes€the€offer€to€lapse.€€òòBeall.óó€€So,€upon€Benððs€death€there€no€longer€wasÐ 4„ Ðan€offer€on€the€table,€and€unless€Sheila€extended€an€offer€to€Steve€he€has€no€right€to€Blackacre.Ð  p ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ_ÔÐ h+¸&* ÐÓ  Óò òQUESTION€3ó óÐ ° ÐÓoÓÌà  àMaryland€Rule€5„702€governs€the€admissibility€of€expert€testimony.€€The€rule€sets€out€a€threeÐ ˆØ Ðpart€analysis:€€1.€€is€the€witness€qualified€as€an€expert€ð ðby€knowledge,€skill,€experience,€training€orÐ tÄ Ðeducationðð;€2.€€the€appropriateness€of€the€expert€testimony€on€a€particular€subject€and€3.€€whetherÐ `° Ðthere€is€a€factual€basis€to€support€expert€testimony.€€Ð L œ ÐÌà  à1.€€In€order€to€qualify€as€an€expert,€the€witness€must€demonstrate€a€ð ðminimal€amount€ofÐ $ t Ðcompetence€or€knowledge€in€the€area€in€which€he€purports€to€be€an€expert.ðð€€òòWood€v.€Toyotaóó,€134Ð  ` ÐMd.€App.€512,€521€(2000).€€Here,€Smith€has€studied€the€issues€pertaining€to€the€relationship€betweenÐ ü L  Ðmold€and€respiratory€disease.€€While€admission€of€expert€testimony€is€within€the€sound€discretionÐ è 8  Ðof€the€trial€court,€òòMyers€v.€Ô_ÔCelotexÔ_Ô€Corpóó.,€88€Md.€App.€442,€460€(1991),€Smithððs€knowledge€is€suchÐ Ô$  Ðthat€he€would€probably€be€admitted€as€an€expert€witness.Ð À  ÐÌà  à2.€€Although€Smith€may€be€recognized€as€an€expert,€his€testimony€would€be€limited€to€areasÐ ˜è  Ðwithin€his€expertise,€i.e.€the€relationship€between€airborne€mold€and€respiratory€ailments.€€InÐ „Ô  ÐMaryland,€testimony€as€to€the€cause€of€medical€condition€in€a€particular€person€is€generally€reservedÐ pÀ Ðfor€physicians.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€T„Up€v.€Consumer€Protection€Divisionóó,€145€Md.€App.€27,€801€A.2dÐ \¬ Ð173,cert.€denied,€369€Md.€661€(2002)€(biologist€with€a€Ph.D.€not€permitted€to€testify€on€theÐ H˜ Ðeffectiveness€of€the€use€of€aloe€vera€in€treating€cancer,€HIV,€and€AIDS;€the€Court€of€Special€AppealsÐ 4„ Ðnoted€the€witness€did€not€have€a€medical€degree€and€was€a€ð ðnon„physician€witnessðð€òòidóó.€at€55€&€56);Ð  p ÐòòNewman€v.€Motorolaóó,€218€F.€Supp.2d€769€(D.€Md.€2002)€(Plaintiff€claimed€that€his€cellular€phoneÐ  \ Ðcaused€brain€cancer.€He€attempted€to€use€an€expert€who€held€a€Ph.D.€in€biochemistry€and€had€doneÐ øH Ðsignificant€research€on€the€biological€effects€of€electromagnetic€radiation.€€The€court€rejected€theÐ ä4 Ðplaintiffððs€efforts€to€have€this€expert€express€opinions€on€the€causation€of€the€plaintiffððs€brain€tumor,Ð Ð  Ðpointing€out€his€lack€of€a€medical€degree€and€the€fact€he€had€never€diagnosed€a€patient€with€cancer.Ð ¼  Ðòòid.óó€at€780€n.€24;€òòÔ_ÔGiddingsÔ_Ô€v.€Bristol„Myers€Squibb€Co.óó,€192€F.€Supp.2d€421,€425€(2002).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  à3.€€Generally€in€Maryland,€expert€scientific€testimony€is€admissible€according€to€the€so„calledÐ €Ð ÐòòFrye/Reedóó€test€(òòFrye€v.€United€Statesóó,€293€F.€1013€(D.C.€Cir.,€1923);€òòReed€v.€Stateóó,€283€Md.€374,Ð l¼ Ð388€(1978),€i.e.€only€when€it€reflects€€what€is€generally€accepted€within€the€relevant€scientificÐ X ¨ Ðcommunity.€òò€Hutton€v.€Stateóó,€339€Md.€480,€493€(1995).€€In€that€case€the€Court€of€Appeals€discussedÐ D!” Ðthe€standard€for€scientific€evidence:Ð 0"€  ÐÌà8  àThis€Court€has€adopted€the€standard€of€admissibility€for€scientific€evidence€expertÐ $X" Ðtestimony€announced€in€òòFrye€v.€United€Statesóó,€293€F.€1013€(Ô_ÔD.C.CirÔ_Ô.1923).€òòSee€ReedÐ ô$D # Ðv.€Stateóó,€283€Md.€374,€391€A.2d€364€(1978).€Under€the€òòFrye-Reedóó€standard,€in€orderÐ à%0!$ Ðto€be€admissible,€a€court€must€determine€that€a€scientific€process€or€technique€isÐ Ì&"% Ðgenerally€accepted€within€the€relevant€scientific€community.€òòSee€Fryeóó,€293€F.€atÐ ¸'#& Ð1014,€òòReedóó,€283€Md.€at€381,€391€A.2d€at€367.€Recently,€however,€in€òòÔ_ÔDaubertÔ_Ô€v.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÔ_ÔMerrellÔ_Ô€Dow€Pharmaceuticalsóó,€509€U.S.€579,€113€Ô_ÔS.CtÔ_Ô.€2786,€125€Ô_ÔL.EdÔ_Ô.2d€469Ð )à$( Ð(1993),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€reviewed€the€òòFryeóó€standard€"in€light€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ðsharp€divisions€among€the€courts€regarding€the€proper€standard€for€the€admission€ofÐ h+¸&* Ðexpert€testimony."€Id.€at€----,€113€Ô_ÔS.CtÔ_Ô.€at€2792,€125€Ô_ÔL.EdÔ_Ô.2d€at€478.€It€held€that€theÐ ° Ðadoption€by€Congress€of€Federal€Rule€of€Evidence€702€has€modified€the€òòFryeóóÐ œì Ðstandard,€reasoning:€ÐˆØÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àGiven€the€Rules'€permissive€backdrop€and€their€inclusion€of€a€specific€rule€on€expertÐ `° Ðtestimony€that€does€not€mention€"general€acceptance,"€the€assertion€that€the€RulesÐ L œ Ðsomehow€assimilated€òòFryeóó€is€unconvincing.€òòFryeóó€made€"general€acceptance"€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðexclusive€test€for€admitting€expert€scientific€testimony.€That€austere€standard,€absentÐ $ t Ðfrom€and€incompatible€with€the€Federal€Rules€of€Evidence,€should€not€be€applied€inÐ  ` Ðfederal€trials.€Ðü L Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àòòÔ_ÔDaubertÔ_Ôóó,€at€----,€113€Ô_ÔS.CtÔ_Ô.€at€2794,€125€Ô_ÔL.EdÔ_Ô.2d€at€480.€ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àOn€July€1,€1994,€this€Court€adopted€Maryland€Rules€of€Evidence€patterned€after€theÐ ¬ü  Ðfederal€rules.€Our€counterpart€to€Federal€Rule€of€Evidence€702€is€Ô_ÔMd.R.EvidÔ_Ô.€5-702.Ð ˜è  ÐAs€a€committee€note€makes€clear,€however,€the€adoption€of€the€Rule€"is€not€intendedÐ „Ô  Ðto€overrule€òòReedóó€.€.€.€and€other€cases€adopting€the€principles€enunciated€in€òòFrye.óó.€.€.Ð pÀ ÐThe€required€scientific€foundation€for€the€admission€of€novel€scientific€techniquesÐ \¬ Ðor€principles€is€left€to€development€through€case€law."ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌ339€Md.€at€493€ftn.€10.Ð  p ÐÌà  àUnder€this€standard,€Smithððs€evidence€would€not€be€admissible€since€its€conclusions€are€notÐ øH Ðgenerally€accepted€within€the€scientific€community.€€Contrast€the€federal€rule€enunciated€in€òòÔ_ÔDaubertÔ_ÔÐ ä4 Ðv.€Ô_ÔMerrellÔ_Ô€Dow€Pharmaceuticals,€Incóó.,€òòsupra,óó€which€would€(perhaps)€allow€admission€of€theÐ Ð  Ðevidence€based€upon€the€trial€courtððs€evaluation€of€the€overall€reliability€of€the€proposed€evidence.Ð ¼  ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* Їò òÓ  ÓQUESTION€4ó óÐ ° ÐÓ®4ÓÌà  àAs€a€party,€Connie€cannot€serve€process.€€Maryland€Rule€3„123(a).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àBill€is€not€authorized€to€accept€service€of€process€for€the€corporation€since€he€is€not€theÐ `° Ðresident€agent,€president,€secretary€or€treasurer,€Maryland€Rule€3„124€(d).€€The€Maryland€RulesÐ L œ Ðpermit€service€upon€persons€ð ðexpressly€or€impliedly€authorized€to€receive€service€of€processðð€onlyÐ 8 ˆ Ðif€a€good€faith€attempt€to€serve€the€resident€agent,€president,€secretary€or€treasurer€had€failed.€€EvenÐ $ t Ðif€Bill€has€the€ð ðimplied€authorityðð€to€accept€service,€there€has€been€no€previous€good€faith€attemptÐ  ` Ðto€serve.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àAs€a€result€of€these€defects,€there€has€been€no€proper€service€on€Ô_ÔEZÔ_Ô€Compute.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àSince€proper€service€was€never€effected,€the€District€Court€lacked€òòin€personam€óójurisdictionÐ ¬ü  Ðover€Ô_ÔEZÔ_Ô€Compute€and€the€judgment€is€null.€€òòMiles€v.€Hamiltonóó,€269€Md.€708,€309€A.2d€631€(1973).Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àMaryland€Rule€3„535(b)€provides€that€a€court€can€reopen€a€judgment€at€any€time€for€fraud,Ð pÀ Ðmistake€or€irregularity.€€Failure€to€make€proper€service€falls€within€this€category.€€Post„trial€motionsÐ \¬ Ðallowed€by€other€rules,€Maryland€Rules€3„534€and€3„535,€are€barred€by€the€passage€of€time.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€proper€procedure€would€be€for€Ô_ÔEZÔ_Ô€Compute€to€file€a€motion€to€revise€the€judgmentÐ  p Ðpursuant€to€Maryland€Rule€3„535(b)€because€this€can€be€done€ð ðat€any€time.ðð€€Pursuant€to€this€Rule,Ð  \ Ðin€revising€a€judgment,€the€Court€may€exercise€any€of€the€powers€it€has€under€Rule€3„534,€includingÐ øH Ðto€open€a€judgment€to€receive€additional€evidence,€amend€the€judgment€or€enter€a€new€judgment.€Ð ä4 ÐThis€authority€enables€the€District€Court€to€set€aside€the€judgment€and€allow€a€trial€on€the€merits€ofÐ Ð  ÐMs.€Consumerððs€claim.Ð ¼  ÐÌà@ ìàò òEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€4ó óˆÐ ”ä ÐÌò òAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€MARYLAND€RULESÐ l¼ ÐÌTITLE€3.€COMMENCEMENT€OF€ACTION€AND€PROCESS:€Rules€3„121,€3„€123,€3„€124,€3„Ð D!” Ð306,€and€3„€533.Ð 0"€  Ðó óÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* ЇÓ  Óò òQUESTION€5ó óÐ ° ÐÓË>ÓÌA.à  àThe€LLC€should€not€be€liable€for€Martyððs€claims.€€The€LLC€was€formed€after€Martyððs€claimsÐ ˆØ Ðarose€(claim€arose€in€September€2002;€the€LCC€was€formed€in€June€2004).€€The€facts€do€not€stateÐ tÄ Ðthat€Andy€and€Chris€intended€for€the€LCC€to€be€liable€for€claims€incurred€by€them€in€their€individualÐ `° Ðpractices€prior€to€creation€of€the€LLC.€€òòSeeóó,€Md.€Code€Ann.€Corps€and€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_Ô€ðððð4A„701and€4A„Ð L œ Ð709.€€Unless€the€Articles€of€Organization€or€Operating€Agreement€provide€that€the€LLC€will€assumeÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€liability€for€claims€against€the€individual€members€prior€to€the€date€of€formation,€the€LLC€shouldÐ $ t Ðnot€be€liable€for€any€claims€made€by€Marty.€€The€limitation€on€liability€is€not€grounded€in€theÐ  ` Ðlimitation€on€liability€provision€contained€in€the€Articles€of€Organization,€but€in€Md.€Code€Ann.Ð ü L  ÐCorps€&€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_Ô€ðð4A„301.1(a).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àChris€should€not€be€liable€for€alleged€malpractice€committed€by€Andy€before€the€LLC€wasÐ À  Ðformed.€€Individual€members€are€not€liable€for€the€professional€malpractice€committed€by€otherÐ ¬ü  Ðmembers€unless€the€member€either€appointed,€cooperated€with,€or€supervised€the€individualÐ ˜è  Ðproviding€the€negligent€services.€€òòSeeóó€Md.€Code€Ann.€Corps.€&€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_Ô€ðððð4A„301.1(a)€and€(d).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€Court€should€rule€that€Andy€is€liable€for€any€professional€malpractice€that€he€committedÐ \¬ Ðbefore€he€and€Chris€formed€Counselor€and€Attorney,€LLC.€€Under€Md.€Code€Ann.€Corps€&€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_ÔÐ H˜ Ððð4A„301.1(a),€individual€professionals€retain€individual€liability€for€their€acts€of€professionalÐ 4„ Ðmalpractice.Ð  p ÐÌB.à  àSally€Stationery,€Inc.€(ð ðSSIðð)€should€prevail€in€its€claim€against€Andy€because€SSI€can€showÐ øH Ðthat€Andy€ratified€the€purchase€of€stationery€when€Andy€used€the€stationery€to€thank€SSI€for€itsÐ ä4 Ðprompt€service€and€to€notify€his€important€client.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àSSI€should€prevail€against€the€LLC€because€the€LLC€had€not€yet€been€formed€since€itsÐ ¨ø ÐArticles€of€Organization€had€not€yet€been€accepted€by€Ô_ÔSDATÔ_Ô€(formation€occurs€at€the€time€thatÐ ”ä ÐÔ_ÔSDATÔ_Ô€accepts€the€Articles€of€Organization€for€record€[Md.€Code€Ann.€Corps€&€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_Ô€ðð€4A„Ð €Ð Ð202(b)].€€SSI€should€show€that€even€though€the€LLC€did€not€exist€at€the€time€that€the€order€wasÐ l¼ Ðplaced,€the€LLC€ratified€Chrisðð€action€in€ordering€the€stationery€by€using€it€to€conduct€its€businessÐ X ¨ Ðand€to€notify€its€clients.€€In€fact,€Chris€told€SSI€that€the€LLC€was€ð ðready€to€operate.ðð€€Therefore,€theÐ D!” ÐLLC€should€be€prevented€from€denying€that€Chris€acted€as€an€agent€of€the€LLC€in€ordering€theÐ 0"€  Ðstationery.€€òòSeeóó,€Md.€Code€Ann.€Corps,€and€Ô_ÔAssððnsÔ_Ô€ðð€4A„401(a)€and€(b).Ð #l! ÐÌà  àSSI€may€prevail€against€Chris€individually€since€Chris€signed€individually€for€the€order.€€SSIÐ ô$D # Ðmay€show€that€SSI€fully€expected€that€Chris€would€pay€for€the€stationery.€€On€the€other€hand,€it€isÐ à%0!$ Ðalso€arguable€that€since€SSI€understood€that€the€LLC€was€operating,€SSI€should€not€be€permitted€toÐ Ì&"% Ðrecover€against€the€individual€members.€€Rather,€payment€should€be€obtained€solely€from€the€assetsÐ ¸'#& Ðof€the€LLC.€€If€the€LLC€refuses€to€pay,€then€Chris€should€seek€indemnification.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* Їò òÓ  ÓQUESTION€6€Ð ° Ðó óÓÅNÓÌà  àA€Ô_ÔtortfeasorÔ_Ô€is€responsible€for€his€own€actions.€€Therefore,€Mike€is€responsible€to€Sue€for€hisÐ ˆØ Ðnegligent€or€intentional€actions.€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àSue€will€prevail€against€Milky€King€if€she€is€able€to€show€that€(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€even€though€Tim€terminatedÐ L œ ÐMikeððs€employment€that€fact€was€either€not€generally€known€or€had€been€concealed€by€Tim,€and€(ii)Ð 8 ˆ ÐTim€had€knowledge€of€Mikeððs€bad€temper€and€propensity€to€endanger€the€health€and€safety€of€othersÐ $ t Ðwith€implements€of€the€ice€cream€trade.€€If€Tim€had€allowed,€in€the€past,€Mike€or€other€formerÐ  ` Ðemployees€to€go€behind€the€counter€and€scoop€ice€cream,€then€Tim€may€be€found€to€be€liable€for€notÐ ü L  Ðhaving€stated€and€enforced€a€strict€policy€limiting€behind€the€counter€access€to€current€employeesÐ è 8  Ðonly.€€Sue€will€have€to€demonstrate€that€Tim,€as€manager,€had€authorized€Ray€to€give€MikeÐ Ô$  Ðpermission€to€scoop€ice€cream€anytime€and€that€Tim€had€reason€to€believe€that€Mike€might€goÐ À  Ðbeyond€the€lawful€bounds€of€scooping€ice€cream€when€provoked.€€Although€Mikeððs€employment€hadÐ ¬ü  Ðbeen€terminated€by€Milky€King,€it€may€still€be€held€responsible€for€Mikeððs€actions.€€Under€ordinaryÐ ˜è  Ðcircumstances€a€principal„agent€relationship€must€exist€for€the€principal€to€be€held€vicariouslyÐ „Ô  Ðresponsible.€However,€if€a€third€person€is€not€aware€of€the€termination€of€the€relationship,€theÐ pÀ Ðprincipal€may€still€be€held€responsible.€€Milky€King€and€Tim€should€be€able€to€avoid€any€liability€byÐ \¬ Ðshowing€that€even€if€it€was€unclear€whether€or€not€Mike€was€still€a€Milky€King€employee,€theÐ H˜ Ðcompany€did€not€sanction€or€encourage€torts€to€be€committed€against€its€customers.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIt€is€likely€that€Tim€would€not€have€individual€liability€for€Mikeððs€individual€wrongful€actÐ  \ Ðcommitted€outside€the€scope€of€either€employment€(whether€actual€or€implied)€or€permissiveÐ øH Ðparticipation€in€the€business€enterprise€of€Milky€King.€€The€facts€do€not€show€that€Tim€eitherÐ ä4 Ðencouraged€or€sanctioned€Mikeððs€conduct€either€in€scooping€ice€cream€or€in€wounding€Sue€with€theÐ Ð  Ðhot€fudge.€It€is€plausible€that€Tim€was€negligent€in€leaving€Ray,€a€15€year€old,€in€charge€of€the€iceÐ ¼  Ðcream€store€as€it€was€Rayððs€first€job.€€However,€the€finder€of€fact€must€determine€whether€Tim€actedÐ ¨ø Ðreasonably€in€leaving€the€operation€of€the€store€to€Ray.€€Finally,€if€either€Milky€King€or€Tim€is€heldÐ ”ä Ðvicariously€liable€for€Sueððs€injuries,€Milky€King€or€Tim€should€seek€indemnification.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àSue€is€likely€to€prove€that€Ray€was€negligent€in€allowing€Mike€behind€the€counter.€€Ray€mayÐ X ¨ Ðbe€held€liable€as€a€minor€for€his€negligence.€The€standard€of€care€would€be€based€on€a€child€the€sameÐ D!” Ðage,€experience€and€intelligence.€€It€is€arguable€that€Ray€was€acting€in€an€adult€capacity€by€managingÐ 0"€  Ðthe€shop.€€Therefore,€Ray€would€be€liable€to€the€same€extent€as€would€an€adult.€€To€hold€a€childÐ #l! Ðliable€for€a€tort,€the€child€must€have€committed€the€tort€herself€or€himself.€€A€child€may€not€appointÐ $X" Ðanother€(Mike)€to€act€as€his€agent.€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àRay€was€acting€under€apparent€authority€from€Milky€King.€€It€appears€that€he€was€in€controlÐ Ì&"% Ðof€Milky€King€during€Timððs€absence.€€Sue€will€try€to€show€that€Milky€King€is€vicariously€liable€forÐ ¸'#& ÐRayððs€negligent€conduct€as€there€was€clearly€a€principal„agent€relationship€between€Ray€and€MilkyÐ ¤(ô#' ÐKing.€€However,€the€principal€will€not€be€held€liable€for€any€actions€of€the€agent€that€are€outside€theÐ )à$( Ðagentððs€scope€of€authority.€€Ray€would€have€to€show€that€Tim€encouraged€him€to€have€his€friendsÐ |*Ì%) Ðfill€in€as€free€counter€help€or€that€he€knew€and€did€not€object€to€Rayððs€actions€in€order€to€Ð h+¸&* Ðsuccessfully€show€that€he€was€only€acting€as€Milky€Kingððs€agent€within€the€scope€of€his€authorityÐ ° Ðwhen€Mike€wounded€Sue.€Ray€may€wish€to€seek€indemnification€from€Mike€and€Milky€King€if€RayÐ œì Ðis€found€vicariously€liable€for€Mikeððs€actions.Ð ˆØ ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* ÐÓ  Óò òÔ‡SJ”RXXÔÓ3óÓQUESTION€7ó ó€Ð ° ÐÓxaÓÌà  àThese€facts€raise€the€issue€of€the€relative€rights€of€tenants€by€the€entireties€to€the€proceedsÐ l¼ Ðfrom€the€sale€of€real€property.€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àTenancy€by€the€entireties€is€the€unique€relationship€applicable€only€to€spousesðð€ownershipÐ  P Ðstatus.€€Each€spouse€owns€an€equal€undivided€interest€in€the€whole€of€the€property€which€cannot€beÐ Ü , Ðaltered€or€terminated€during€the€marriage€without€the€joint€action€of€the€spouses.€€Upon€the€death€ofÐ ¸  Ðone€spouse,€the€entire€fee€simple€interest€in€real€property€vests€in€the€survivor.Ð ” ä ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€facts€indicate€that€prior€to€his€marriage€to€Wilma€on€May€1,€1995,€HughÐ L œ  Ðowned,€individually,€an€improved€parcel€of€real€estate€in€Baltimore€County€which€he€sold€onÐ (x  ÐFebruary€2,€2001.Ð T  ÐÌà  àWhen€he€purchased€the€$800,000€home€in€Charles€County,€he€had€title€transferred€by€deedÐ ¼  Ðto€himself€and€Wilma,€as€tenants€by€the€entireties.€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àWhen€a€spouse€purchases€real€property€with€his€own€funds€and€has€the€deed€made€to€himselfÐ P  Ðand€his€wife€as€tenants€by€the€entireties,€he€has€made€a€gift€to€her€of€the€interest€thereby€conveyed,Ð ,| Ði.e.,€an€undivided€one„half€interest€in€the€whole.€Ð X ÐÌà  àWhen€Hugh€and€Wilma€jointly€conveyed€the€ð ðSidneyðð€house€to€a€third€party,€the€proceedsÐ À Ð($1,200,000)€retained€the€character€of€tenancy€by€the€entireties€property€in€absence€of€an€agreementÐ œì Ðto€the€contrary.Ð xÈ ÐÌà  àThe€fact€that€Hugh€used€tenants€by€the€entireties€funds€to€purchase€the€$200,000€property€inÐ 0€ Ðhis€name€alone€did€not€create€a€tenancy€by€the€entireties€in€the€real€property€so€purchased.€€TenancyÐ  \ Ðby€the€entireties€is€not€presumed€except€in€cases€in€which€title€is€in€fact€in€the€name€of€both€spousesÐ è8 Ðwithout€any€clear€understanding€as€to€how€title€is€held.€€Ð Ä ÐÌà  àIf€one€spouse€uses€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€tenancy€by€the€entireties€property€for€theÐ |Ì Ðpayment€of€individual€debts€of€that€spouse,€personal€use€and€the€payment€of€joint€living€expenses,Ð X¨ Ðwith€the€acquiescence€of€his€spouse,€there€is€no€obligation€to€repay€any€portion€thereof€in€the€absenceÐ 4 „  Ðof€an€express€promise€to€do€so.Ð !`! ÐÌà  àThe€facts€here€negate€acquiescence€by€Wilma€to€the€use€of€the€tenancy€by€the€entireties€fundsÐ È"# Ðto€purchase€the€$200,000€home.€€To€the€extent€that€Wilma€knew€and€consented€to€the€use€of€theÐ ¤#ô$ Ðfunds€for€medical€bills,€etc.€she€is€not€entitled€to€recover€them.€€While€Wilma€cannot€obtain€title€toÐ €$Ð% Ðthe€real€property€in€question,€she€can€claim€in€his€estate€the€purchase€price€of€$200,000€as€traceableÐ \%¬ & Ðto€tenant€by€the€entireties€property.€€Ð 8&ˆ!' ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€Wilma€is€entitled€to€these€funds€in€the€bank€that€are€traceable€to€the€proceeds€ofÐ ð'@#) Ðsale€of€the€$1,200,000€property,€less€expenditures€for€individual€debts,€medical€expenses€and€jointÐ Ì($* Ðliving€expenses.€Ð ¨)ø$+ ÐÌà  àUnless€Wilma€renounces€Hughððs€will,€she€is€also€entitled€to€the€$200,000€bequest.€Ð `+°&- ÐÓ3ó¦aÓò òÔ#†XAdXRSJ”‡a#ÔÓ  ÓÐ <,Œ'. ÐQUESTION€8ó óÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓÌà  àAliceððs€suit€would€allege€negligence€on€the€part€of€Bennett.€€To€establish€a€òòprima€facieóó€case,Ð ˆØ ÐAlice€must€introduce€facts€which€show€that€Bennett€owed€her€a€duty€of€care;€that€by€failing€toÐ tÄ Ðexercise€reasonable€care€under€the€circumstances,€he€breached€his€duty€to€her;€that€his€breach€wasÐ `° Ðthe€proximate€cause€of€the€accident;€and€that€her€damage€and€injuries€were€the€direct€and€proximateÐ L œ Ðresult€of€the€alleged€negligence.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àBennett€would€respond€to€the€complaint€with€a€general€denial€of€negligence€on€his€part.€Ð  ` ÐHowever,€he€would€include€in€his€defense€(assuming€Alice€alleges€and€ultimately€makes€out€a€primaÐ ü L  Ðfacie€case)€that,€as€one€of€the€class€of€persons€intended€to€be€protected€by€the€quoted€statute,€AliceÐ è 8  Ðviolated€its€mandatory€provisions€and€was,€therefore,€Ô_ÔcontributorilyÔ_Ô€negligent€as€a€matter€of€law€andÐ Ô$  Ðbarred€from€any€recovery€against€Bennett.Ð À  ÐÌà  àFactors€bearing€on€Bennettððs€negligence,€as€well€as€Aliceððs€contributory€negligence,€includeÐ ˜è  ÐAliceððs€location€on€ð ðAðð€Street€when€struck,€any€obstructions€which€may€have€impaired€their€abilityÐ „Ô  Ðto€see€each€other,€including€other€vehicles,€structures,€trees,€etc.,€and€the€speed€of€Bennettððs€vehicle,Ð pÀ Ðtime€of€day€and€weather€related€factors.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àThe€fact€that€the€light€changed€to€a€flashing€red€ð ðdonððt€walkðð€signal€as€Alice€ð ðwas€about€toÐ 4„ Ðstep€off€the€medianðð€suggests€that€Alice€elected€to€cross€ð ðAðð€Street€against€the€light€rather€thanÐ  p Ðremain€in€a€place€of€relative€safety€and€would€support€an€argument€by€Bennett€that€she€had€actedÐ  \ Ðnegligently.€€Whether€or€not€Alice€can€bring€herself€within€the€statutory€provision€ð ð(c)ðð€as€havingÐ øH Ðpartially€completed€her€crossing€would€be€a€question€of€statutory€construction€as€would€theÐ ä4 Ðdistinction,€if€any,€between€the€steady€and€flashing€ð ðdonððt€walkðð€signal€and€whether€the€grassyÐ Ð  Ðmedian€was€a€safety€island€within€the€purview€of€the€statute.€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àAlice€should€argue€in€rebuttal€that,€in€Maryland,€violation€of€a€statute€is€not€negligence€òòperÐ ”ä Ðseóó€but€is€evidence€of€negligence,€and€that,€assuming€her€contributory€negligence,€Bennett€had€the€lastÐ €Ð Ðclear€chance€to€avoid€the€accident.€€The€success€of€this€position€would€turn€on€the€evidence€presentedÐ l¼ Ðwith€regard€to€factors€noted€above.€Ð X ¨ ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* ÐÓ  Óò òQUESTION€9ó óÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓÌà  àThe€issues€here€concern€what€rights€Kappa€Title€has€to€recover€its€losses€as€a€result€of€theÐ ˆØ ÐAcme€Bankððs€refusal€to€pay€the€$1€million€forged€certified€check.€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àTitle€3€of€the€Commercial€Law€Article€establishes€that€if€a€bank€accepts€a€certified€check€andÐ L œ Ðthen€wrongfully€refuses€to€pay€it,€the€person€asserting€the€right€to€enforce€the€check€is€entitled€toÐ 8 ˆ Ðcompensation€for€expenses€and€loss€of€interest€resulting€from€the€non„payment€and€may€recoverÐ $ t Ðconsequential€damages€if€the€obligated€bank€refuses€to€pay€after€receiving€notice€of€particularÐ  ` Ðcircumstances€giving€rise€to€the€damages.€€ðð3„411.€Acceptance€must€be€in€writing,€but€need€onlyÐ ü L  Ðconsist€of€a€signature€of€a€bank€official.€€It€may€also€consist€of€a€stamp€mark€that€indicates€that€theÐ è 8  Ðcheck€is€certified.€€Under€ðð3„408,€acceptance/certification€becomes€effective€upon€notification€byÐ Ô$  Ðthe€bank.€€Thus,€acceptance€occurs€when€a€check€has€the€certification€stamp€on€the€check€and/or€theÐ À  Ðsignature€of€a€bank€official€indicating€certification,€and€the€holder€notified.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àAlthough€generally€an€unauthorized€signature€is€ineffective€except€as€the€signature€of€theÐ „Ô  Ðunauthorized€signer,€an€unauthorized€signature€may€be€ratified€by€the€actions€of€the€person€whoseÐ pÀ Ðname€was€forged€or€his€agent.€€ðð3„403Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àThus,€it€must€be€determined:€whether€the€Bank€by€its€branch€manager€accepted€the€certifiedÐ 4„ Ðcheck€by€adopting€the€forged€stamp€and/or€signature€on€the€stamp€as€its€own€and€then€wrongfullyÐ  p Ðrefused€to€pay€it;€whether€the€Bank€ratified€the€unauthorized€signature€of€its€officer;€or€whether€theÐ  \ ÐBank€or€Kappa€Title€had€any€negligence€contributing€to€the€forged€signature.Ð øH ÐÌà  àIf€the€Bank€accepted€the€check,€then€the€Bank€steps€into€the€shoes€of€Biggins€as€the€obligatedÐ Ð  Ðparty€to€Kappa€Title,€and€must€pay€all€consequential€damages€from€its€failure€to€pay€the€certifiedÐ ¼  Ðcheck,€including€Kappa€Titleððs€loss€of€business.€€If€the€check€was€not€accepted€by€the€Bank,€then€BillÐ ¨ø ÐBiggins€is€still€liable€to€Kappa€Title€on€the€underlying€debt.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àKappa€Title€may€also€have€common€law€causes€such€as€negligent€misrepresentation€whichÐ l¼ Ðsupplement€the€Maryland€Commercial€Law.€€ðð€1„103.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@ ìàò òEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€9ó óˆÐ 0"€  ÐÌò òAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€COMMERCIAL€LAWó óÐ $X" ÐÌò òTITLE€1.€GENERAL€PROVISIONS:€€ðð€1„103.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌTITLE€3.€NEGOTIABLE€INSTRUMENTS:€€ðð€3„403,€3„406,€3„408,€3„409,€3„411,€3„413,€andÐ ¸'#& Ð3„414.ó óÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÓ  ÓÌÌÐ h+¸&* ЇÓ  Óò òQUESTION€10Ð ° Ðó óÌÓ  Óà  àLawful€stop,€off„duty€status€makes€no€difference.€Search€of€vehicle€illegal€because€noÐ ˆØ Ðconsent„„€òòCarroll€v.€United€Statesóó,€267€U.S.€132€(1925),€the€Supreme€Court€first€recognized€anÐ tÄ Ð"automobile€exception"€to€the€Fourth€Amendment's€warrant€requirements.€€The€exception€allowsÐ `° Ðvehicles€to€be€searched€without€a€warrant€provided€that€the€officer€has€probable€cause€to€believe€thatÐ L œ Ða€crime€ð!ð€item€is€within€the€car.€€The€search€of€Dannyððs€car€was€illegal€because€consent€was€deniedÐ 8 ˆ Ðand€the€police€did€not€have€probable€cause.€€But,€Earl€has€no€standing€to€assert€4òòthóó€Amend€ViolationÐ $ t Ðof€Dannyððs€car.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àPassengers€can€be€asked€out€of€car„„€Following€òòCarrollóó,€the€Supreme€Court€has€held€thatÐ è 8  Ðduring€a€lawful€traffic€stop,€officers€can€compel€the€driver€and€passengers€to€exit€the€vehicle.€€TheÐ Ô$  ÐSupreme€Court€has€gone€on€to€hold€that€a€passenger's€property€left€within€a€vehicle,€when€occupantsÐ À  Ðare€ordered€out€of€a€car,€falls€within€the€permissible€scope€of€the€automobile€exception€to€aÐ ¬ü  ÐÔ_ÔwarrantlessÔ_Ô€search.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àArrest€of€both€suspects€valid€under€common€enterprise€theory.€€òòSee€State€v.€Ô_ÔPringleÔ_Ôóó,€2003€WLÐ pÀ Ð22938461€(Dec€2003).Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àStatement€coerced€from€Danny€may€have€been€Ô_ÔviolativeÔ_Ô€of€Dannyððs€5òòthóó€Amend€rights,€butÐ 4„ ÐEarl€has€no€standing€to€object€to€statement€coerced€from€co„defendant.Ð  p ÐÌà  àDiscussion€of€whether€there€is€state€action€by€state€actor€to€impact€4òòthóó€Amend€when€airmanÐ øH Ðgoes€into€Earlððs€pockets€that€would€suppress€all€evidence€resulting€from€Ô_ÔviolativeÔ_Ô€search.€€No€searchÐ ä4 Ðby€State€actor.Ð Ð  ÐÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðò òÓ  ÓQUESTION€11ó óÐ ° ÐÓ~ÓÌÓ  Óà  àò òFirst€degree€burglary€charge.ó óÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àFirst€degree€burglary€charge.€€Section€6„202€€(a)€of€the€Criminal€Law€Article€of€the€AnnotatedÐ `° ÐCode€of€Maryland€(as€amended).€€The€elements€of€the€crime€are€breaking€and€entering€the€dwellingÐ L œ Ðof€another€with€the€intent€to€commit€theft€or€a€crime€of€violence.€€Able€has€the€following€defensesÐ 8 ˆ Ðto€the€crime.€€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àThe€events€did€occur€at€Bakerððs€dwelling,€€but€there€was€no€breaking€and€entering.Ð ü L  ÐWhile€Able€did€push€the€partially€opened€door€so€that€it€was€fully€opened,€he€was€told€by€Baker€inÐ è 8  Ðresponse€to€his€knock€on€the€door€to€ð ðcome€on€inðð.€€Therefore,€there€was€consent€of€the€owner.€€AbleÐ Ô$  Ðdid€not€commit€an€act€of€trespass.€€€There€was€no€actual€breaking€by€Able.Ð À  ÐÌà  àTo€gain€entrance€to€Bakerððs€house,€Able€knocked€on€the€door.€€He€did€not€say€anything.€Ð ˜è  ÐBaker€told€him€to€come€in.€€Entry€was€not€by€fraud,€trickery,€or€threat€of€force.€€Baker€never€inquiredÐ „Ô  Ðas€to€who€was€at€the€door€or€for€what€purpose.€€There€was€no€constructive€breaking.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àAble€did€announce€that€he€was€hungry€and€he€did€demand€money.€€Baker€felt€threatened€byÐ H˜ ÐAbleððs€presence€and€statements.€€€When€Able€stuck€his€hand€in€his€own€pocket,€Baker€feared€thatÐ 4„ ÐAble€had€a€weapon.€€However,€the€purpose€or€motive€of€Able€would€not€be€sufficient€to€constituteÐ  p Ða€constructive€breaking€without€the€other€elements€of€the€crime.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àò òAssault€chargesó óÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àCharge€of€assault€in€the€first€degree.€€Section€3„202€(a)€of€the€Criminal€Law€Article€of€theÐ ¼  ÐAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland€(as€amended).€€Able€did€not€reveal€or€show€any€weapon€to€Baker.€€HeÐ ¨ø Ðtook€only€one€step€over€the€threshold€of€the€door€and€stopped.€€There€was€no€attempt€to€cause€seriousÐ ”ä Ðphysical€injury€to€Baker.€€There€was€no€assault€in€the€first€degree.€Ð €Ð ÐÌCharge€of€assault€in€the€second€degree.€€Section€3„203€(a)€of€the€Criminal€Law€Article€of€theÐ X ¨ ÐAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland€(as€amended).€€The€basis€of€this€charge€would€be€of€the€intentionalÐ D!” Ðthreatening€variety€from€the€viewpoint€of€Baker€that€Able€had€a€weapon€in€his€pocket.€€The€factsÐ 0"€  Ðrelate€that€Baker€was€threatened€by€Ableððs€presence€and€statements.€€Baker€feared€that€Able€had€aÐ #l! Ðweapon€in€his€pocket.€€However,€Able€had€only€put€his€hand€in€his€own€pocket;€he€did€not€displayÐ $X" Ða€weapon€or€make€any€reference€to€a€weapon.€€€However,€Able€did€have€a€lock€blade€pen€knife€whichÐ ô$D # Ðthe€police€recovered€from€his€pocket.€€There€was€reasonable€apprehension€of€an€imminent€battery.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€defenses€stated€for€the€first€degree€burglary€charge€and€the€first€degree€assault€chargeÐ ¸'#& Ðwould€be€successful.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àThere€is€sufficient€evidence€to€convict€Able€of€assault€in€the€second€degree.€€Baker€fearedÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€Able€had€a€weapon€when€Able€stuck€his€hand€in€his€own€pocket.€€€In€fact,€Able€did€have€the€lockÐ h+¸&* Ðblade€pen€knife€in€his€pocket,€but€he€never€revealed€it€to€Baker.€€There€was€reasonable€apprehensionÐ ° Ðby€Baker€of€an€imminent€battery.€€Ð œì ÐÌÌòòòòHolland€v.€Stateóó,€óó154€Md.€App.€351,€839€A.2d€806€(2003)Ð `° Ðand€cases€cited.Ð L œ ÐÌòòòòHill€v.€Stateóóóó,€134€Md.€App.€327,€759€A.2d€1164€(2000)Ð $ t Ðand€cases€cited.Ð  ` ÐÌSection€6„202€(a),€€Criminal€Law€Article,€Annotated€Code€of€Maryland€(as€amended)Ð è 8  ÐÌSection€3„202€(a),€Criminal€Law€Article,€Annotated€Code€of€Maryland€(as€amended)Ð À  ÐÌSection€3„203,€(a).€Criminal€Law€Article,€Annotated€Code€of€Maryland€(as€amended)Ð ˜è  ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* Їò òÓ  ÓQUESTION€12ó óÐ ° ÐÓe¡ÓÌà  àA€fee€must€be€reasonable.€€Rule€1.5(a).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€terms€of€a€contingent€fee€agreement€must€be€communicated€to€the€client€in€writing,Ð `° Ðincluding€the€percentage(s)€to€be€charged€in€the€event€of€a€settlement,€trial€or€appeal,€expenses€to€beÐ L œ Ðdeducted€from€the€recovery,€and€whether€expenses€are€to€be€deducted€before€or€after€calculation€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€fee.€€Rule€1.5(a).€€Bentley€failed€to€communicate€the€contingent€fee€agreement€to€Abe€in€writing.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àWhen€the€attorneyððs€stake€in€a€case€exceeds€the€clientððs€stake,€the€fee€is€generallyÐ ü L  Ðunreasonable.€€òòAttorney€Grievance€Commission€v.€Ô_ÔKorotkiÔ_Ôóó,€318€Md.€646€(2003).€€The€contingentÐ è 8  Ðfee€of€50%€of€the€recovery€before€deduction€of€expenses€is€unreasonable€under€these€facts.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThe€application€of€a€contingent€fee€percentage€to€a€personal€injury€protection€payment€is€anÐ ¬ü  Ðexcessive€fee.€€òòAttorney€Grievance€Commission€v.€Kempóó,€303€Md.€664€(1990).€€Bentley€should€haveÐ ˜è  Ðcharged€Abe€a€reasonable€hourly€or€fixed€fee€for€obtaining€the€PIP€payment.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àA€lawyer€may€not€charge€a€contingent€fee€for€representing€a€client€in€a€criminal€case.€€(RuleÐ \¬ Ð1.5(d)).€€The€ð ðbonusðð€was€a€contingent€fee€in€violation€of€the€Rule.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àIt€is€questionable€whether€Bentley€should€have€deposited€the€$1,000€for€the€criminal€fee€inÐ  p Ðhis€general€operating€account€until€he€had€completed€the€work€associated€with€representing€Abe€inÐ  \ Ðhis€defense€to€the€criminal€charge.Ð øH ÐÌà  àA€retainer€from€which€hourly€billings€are€to€be€deducted€remains€client€property€until€the€feesÐ Ð  Ðare€earned€and€must€be€maintained€in€an€escrow€account.€òòAttorney€Grievance€Commission€v.€Ô_ÔDuvallÔ_Ôóó,Ð ¼  Ð373€Md.€482€(2003).€€The€flat€fee€designation€in€the€circumstance€may€allow€for€a€differentÐ ¨ø Ðtreatment,€however.