WPC /D8FL'˷VXIL-/S<˻-=~WļX9xmSy/WU!tv W!AŒD4%Z C   IkUe njL䦳ݞKzy\L wIߨ}YI9N9Ą{㤷 nI FEڧX580~ƟWMsdDBٍ(8 =c:^¾rQ쿌͔f < :ъ.5,"S;W/QTl 1Z k.%ܔم">pLDIYuݘprPniq)~+D 9p!nwO f]ZtBܽyvv-%%4Ͻ{e#Ŏgh@zPU@n..YbU`pÛ3ӆA)µﬡ]݉MD8h2 ō'^r##U{N % 0:U>9^ ww4 mN 0VX 0 0:3U4m 1uU@ U@V  72 0 x UB   0V_ 0V 0g  1UHP LaserJet 4000 Series PS0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,\  `&Times New RomanMz4s SZ32̚Corel3|xU )USUS.,  _  Page  1  ڀof  18  (.3$ !USUS.,  0> .Footer !>44 <DL!>:8Page Number\  `Calisto MT3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(A Z(Times New Roman '5 Z(Garamond Regular  i)@-" 0Style 1Style 1       ??  US        \  `*Times New RomanTT  )USUS.,  _   !X    ??US.,    _Board__s_Ԁ_Analysis_Ԁ_Page_Ԁ    ????.,  @    17  A  Ԁ_of_Ԁ2m ??.,??.,        ?+ A IQY!!? XX  *USUS.,  _F  _Part_Ԁ17_of_Ԁ  18  (.3$ !USUS.,  (.3$ !USUS.,  .22,Title    XXX     $359=AEIMQ111111111 !USUS.,  _ XXXX   OYBOARDANALYSIS  QUESTION1   _    Thisissueisoneofagency.DidHanksconductratifytheotherwiseinvalidPowerof L  Attorneyandmortgage? 8      Thehusbandandwiferelationshipdoesnotestablishanagencyrelationshipunlessthe  ` spouseknowinglyacceptsbenefitsfromtheunauthorizedactsoftheotherspouse.Duckv.Quality  L  CustomHomes,242Md.609,220A.2d143(1966).  8      InthesefactsHankreceivedthebenefitofuseofsomeofthemortgageproceeds.Thepool   table,refrigeratorandfurniturewereinthehouse.Hespecificallyreceivedthewatchforhis   exclusiveuse.       Afterlearningofthefraudulentlyobtainedmortgage,Hankdidnothingtorepudiatethe p transaction.Hemadenoefforttoreturnthegoodsobtained.Further,hemadepaymentsonthe \ itemspurchasedbyWilmawiththeproceedsofthemortgage,therebyratifyingthefraudulent H transaction. 4     Hankmayarguethattheonlybenefithereceivedwasthewatchandhe,therefore,should  \ onlyowe$1000.Thisargumentwillfailasheratifiedthewholetransaction. H     Oncearatifyingprincipalknowsallrelevantfacts,hisliabilityisnotlimitedtothebenefits   retainedbyhimbecausetheprincipalcannotratifyatransactioninpartandrepudiatetherest.The   principalmustadoptallornothing.Smithv.MerrittSavingsandLoan,Inc.,266Md.526,295A.2d  219(1972).      HankwillbeliabletoBankfortheentiremortgageamountplusinterestandfeesasprovided l intheloandocuments. X  #XXXX@#   XXXX h+&* QUESTION2    XMCCmustproveithadanenforceablecontractwithDDDtouseitasasubcontractoronthe  project.Atissueisthedoctrineofdetrimentalreliance(promissoryestoppel).Toproveitscase, t MCCmustshowthefollowing: ` ?+ ` <DL!X? L  1. 4 Aclearanddefinitepromise; 8   X H+` ` ` <DL!` X!H2. 4 Wherethepromisorhasareasonableexpectationthattheofferwillinduceactionor $ t forbearanceonthepartofthepromisee;  ` 3.Whichdoesinduceactualandreasonableactionorforbearancebythepromisee;and  L  4.Causesadetrimentwhichcanonlybeavoidedbytheenforcementofthepromise.  8   $     H+ 4 <DL` ` ` X!HCitiroofCorp.v.TechContractingCompany,Inc.,159Md.App.578;860A.2d425(2004);   PavelEnterprises,Inc.v.AS.JohnsonCompany,Inc.,342Md.143,674A.2d521(1996);   Restatement(Second)ofContracts90(1);    X XB(4 44 <DL4XB X X XE+ 4 <DL!444XEMCCwillfirstarguethatDDDsestimateconstitutedanoffertoperformthejobatthe p estimatedprice.Judgmentabouthowpreciseabidmustbetoconstituteanofferisbestreachedon \ acasebycasebasis.Thereisadisputeherethattheestimateconstitutedacontract.Itwillbea H factualdispute,likelybaseduponexperttestimonywithinthetradeastowhethertheestimate 4 constitutedacontract.  p   \ Second,MCCmustprovethatDDDreasonablyexpectedthatMCCwouldrelyuponthe H offer.ThiswillbethestrongestdefensebyDDD:namely,DDDwouldarguethattheprice 4 discrepancyshouldhavealertedtheMCCtoapotentialerrorandthatiteithershouldnothaverelied   ontheestimatedpriceorperformeditsownreviewintoitsaccuracy,particularlysinceMCCsensed   thepricewas,insomemanner,incorrect.DDDsdefenseisanalogoustothedoctrineoflastclear  chancealthoughDDDerred,theerrorwasalsoattributabletotheMCCbecauseitdidnotdecline  toacceptDDDslowprice.DDDwouldlikelylosethisargumentasitisnottheresponsibilityofthe  generalcontractortoguaranteetheaccuracyofsubcontractorsbid.However,itwouldbeafactual l determinationastowhethertheamountsweresoinaccuratethatMCCkneworshouldhaveknown X  theywerewrong D!  0"  Astothethirdelement,MCCmustprovethatitactuallyandreasonablyreliedontheDDDs #l! estimate.Althoughthereisnochecklistofpotentialmethodsofprovingthisreliance,thefinderof $X" factwillconsiderseveralissuessuchas:(1)ashowingbytheMCC,thatitengagedin bid $D # shopping,oractivelyencouraged bidchopping,or bidpeddling,(2)promptnoticebyMCCto %0!$ DDDthattheydidintendtouseDDDonthejob,isweightyevidencethattheMCCdidrelyonthe &"% bidor,(3)ifabidissolowthatareasonablyprudentgeneralcontractorwouldnotrelyuponit,the '#& trieroffactmayinferthatthegeneralcontractordidnotinfactrelyupontheerroneousbid. (#'  )$( Astothefourthelement,thetrialcourt,andnotajury,mustdeterminethatbindingDDDis |*%) necessarytopreventinjustice.Thiselementistobeenforcedasrequiredbycommonlawequity h+&* courtstheCountymusthave cleanhands.Thereisnoevidencethateitherpartyactedwith  uncleanhands.  Theprincipleofdetrimentalrelianceisamoreaccuratetermthanpromissoryestoppel  althoughtheissuesaresimilar.Pavel,supra.#XXXX #  t  `  8    `  XXXX  8   X#XXXX8#  XXXX #XXXX䌬#   X:XXX  @,'+ OY    QUESTION3         #XXXX:*#XXXX1.Darrylmustfilehisanswerorotherresponsivepleadingwithin30days.Eventhoughhe p isnotaMarylandresident,hewasservedwithintheState.MarylandRule2321(a). \     2.Richhas60daystofilehisanswerashewasservedoutsideoftheState.MarylandRule 4  2321(b)(1).  p     3.MarylandAnnotatedCodeCourtsandJudicialProceedingsArticleSection6202(11)  H providesthatanactionagainstanonresidentindividualmaybebroughtinanycounty.Section6  4  201(b)providesthat,wherethereismorethanonedefendantandnosinglevenueisapplicableto   all,thesuitmaybebroughtinacountywhereanyoneofthemcouldbesuedorinthecountywhere   thecauseofactionarose.HereNeitherDarrylnorRichareresidentsofMaryland,thustheaction   canbebroughtinBaltimoreCity.However,acourt,invokingthedoctrineofforumnonconveniens,   may,initsdiscretion,transferacivilcaseintheinterestsofjusticeandtheconvenienceofthe   parties.Here,theplaintiffisaresidentofKentCounty,allormostofthefactwitnesses,otherthan l  Darryl,liveorworkinKentCountyandtheaccidenttookplacethere.TransferofthecasetoKent X Countyunderthesecircumstanceswouldbeappropriate.Stidhamv.Morris,161Md.App.562,569 D (2005). 0     IfDarrylslawyerwantstochangethevenue,hemustfileapreliminarymotionpriortohis X answer,ortheissueiswaived.MarylandRule2322. D     4.ThecomplaintallegesthatRichisliablebecausehenegligentlyentrustedthepickupto  Darryl.ThisacttookplaceinMaine,wherebothliveandthetruckisregistered.Thus,Richis  allegedtobeliableforatortiousacttakingplaceoutsideofMaryland.CourtsandJudicial  ProceedingsArticleSection6103setsoutthebasisfortheexerciseofpersonaljurisdictionunder  thesecircumstances: | 8  8`    ` x` x   (b)Acourtmayexercisepersonaljurisdictionoveraperson,whodirectlyorbyanagent: T 8  8`   (4)CausestortiousinjuryintheStateoroutsideoftheStatebyanact ,!| oromissionoutsidetheStateifheregularlydoesorsolicitsbusiness, "h  engagesinanyotherpersistentcourseofconductintheStateor #T! derivessubstantialrevenuefromgoods,food,services,or #@" manufacturedproductsusedorconsumedintheState...$, #` x` x   ThestandardinSection6103isintendedtoextendMarylands longarmjurisdictionto &"% thefullextentpermittedbyconstitutionallaw.AdefendantmustmeettheSupremeCourts '"&  minimumcontactstest,Harrisv.ArlenProperties,256Md.185(1969).Richscontactswith (#' Marylandhaveconsistedofattendanceataprofessionalconferencefiveyearsagoandvisitstohis x)$( son. d*%) 8  Todeterminewhethertheexerciseofspecificjurisdictioncomportswithdueprocess, P+&* thecourtmustconsider"(1)theextenttowhichthedefendanthaspurposefully <,'+ availeditselfoftheprivilegeofconductingactivitiesinthestate;(2)whetherthe  plaintiffs'claimsariseoutofthoseactivitiesdirectedatthestate;and(3)whetherthe  exerciseofpersonaljurisdictionwouldbeconstitutionallyreasonable."....A  defendanthaspurposelyavailedhimselfoftheprivilegeofconductingbusinessin t theforumstateifthedefendanthascreateda"substantialconnection"totheforum. ` Ѐ    HarteHanksDirectMarketingBaltimore,Inc.v.VarileaseTech.Fin.Group,Inc.,299F.Supp2d 8  505,512(D.Md.,2004).RichscontactswithMarylandhavebeensporadicandwerenot $ t connectedwiththenegligententrustmentclaim.HisotherconnectiontotheStateliesinhis  ` relationshipwithHiTech.However jurisdictionoverashareholderofacorporationcannotbe  L  predicatedonjurisdictionoverthecorporation.Personaljurisdictionmustbebasedonan  8  individual'spersonalcontactswithorpurposefulavailmentoftheforumstate.Idat513514 $  (Citationsomitted).Thesameruleappliestodirectorsandofficersofacorporation.Id.     Someexamineesappliedaprincipal/agentanalysistothefacts.TheyindicatedthatDarryl   wasactingashisfathersagentinoperatingthepickuptruck.IfDarrylwereactingasRichsagent,   Section6103(b)(3)wouldprovideabasisforpersonaljurisdictionsinceRich,throughhisagent p Darryl,causedatortiousinjurywithintheState.ThisargumentfindssomesupportinMarylandcase \ lawforMarylandrecognizesthatthereisapresumptionthattheoperatorofamotorvehicleisacting H astheagentoftheowner,see,e.g.,Toscanov.Spriggs,343Md.320,328(1996)(presumption 4 rebutted):  p 8        Proofofpermissiveuseisnottheequivalentofproofofagency....[t]hemerefactthatthe H ownerhasgivenpermissiontothedrivertousehiscarisnotenough.(Citationsomitted.) 4 .   Ѐ0  ThebasisoftheclaimagainstRichisnotrespondeatsuperiorbutnegligententrustment: (#(# Onewhosuppliesdirectlyorthroughathirdpersonachattelforuseofanotherwhomthesupplier  knowsorhasreasontoknowtobelikelybecauseofhisyouth,inexperience,orotherwise,touseit  inamannerinvolvingunreasonableriskofphysicalharmtohimselfandotherswhomthesupplier  shouldexpecttoshareinorbeendangeredbyitsuse,issubjecttoliabilityforphysicalharm l resultingtothem. X    RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS390(1965);quotedinRobbv.Wancowicz,119Md. 0"  App.531,538(1998).Marylanddoesnotrecognize,evenintherelationshipofabirthparentand #l! child,theso-called"familypurposedoctrine."Talbottv.Gegenheimer,245Md.186,189(1967). $X" Fromthefacts,thereisnobasistoarguethatDarrylwasactingasRichsagent. $D #   Richmustraisethisissueinapreliminarymotionpriortofilinghisanswer,orhewaivesthe &"% defense.MarylandRule2322.BeyondSystems,Inc.v.SecureMedical,Inc.,Number2793, '#& SeptemberTerm,2004(CourtofSpecialAppeals,April7,2006).#XXXX!# (#'  h+&* ЇXXXXX  QUESTION4  X <    1.Lot2isownedinequalsharesbyMrs.BakerandtheYMCA.Atdivorce,thecommon 0 lawconceptual unityofpersonswasseveredandtheBakerstenancybytheentiretiesconverted  intoatenancyincommon.Mr.BakersundividedinterestinLot2isalienablebyhim,eitherin  hislifetimeorbyhiswillathisdeath.Seegenerally,Beallv.Beall,291Md.224(1981).      2.AcmeStreetsisownedjointlybyMrs.BakerandtheYMCA(interest)andAcme( t interest).WhenAcmerecordedthesubdivisionplat,andconveyedlotsfromthatplat,heconveyed  ` feesimpleinterestinthebedofAcmeStreettobindingpropertyowners.MarylandAnnotatedCode  L  RealPropertyArticle2114.Lots1and2,asbindinglotsowntothecenterlineofAcmeStreet,  8  subjecttotherightofotherabuttinglotownerstousetheroadforaccesspurposes. | $      3.Lots1,2and3eachhaveanimpliedeasementtouseAcmeStreetforpurposesofaccess T  toandfromEastStreet.(Lots1and2,asabuttingowners,eachownonehalfofthestreetinfee @  simpleaswell.Theirownershipinterestissubjecttotheeasementenjoyedbytheownersofallthree ,  lotstousethestreet.).TheeasementbyimplicationwascreatedwhenAcmerecordedtheplatand  conveyedtheLots2and3byreferencetotheplat.Boucherv.Boyer,301Md679(1984).Lot3has  aneasementeventhoughithasaccesstoanotherpublicroad.Boucherv.Boyer,supra:  8      0  Therefore,absentanexpressprovisiontothecontraryinthedeed,thosewhopurchasealot p withreferencetoaplatdepictinganabuttingstreetacquireaprivateeasementtothatstreet \ regardlessofwhetherithasbeendedicatedtothepublicandacceptedbythelocal H government.Byvirtueofthiseasement,thepurchaserhastherighttokeepthestreetopen 4 andtomakeusethereof.Id.at694.#XXXX䌵<#x (#(# _ -T+/ X  >  XXpXXX QUESTION5    >NarcissistandDessertFlowerhavestandingtochallengethelaw.Narcissistisforcedtopay \ moreforinstateMineralXandDessertFlowerandsimilarlysituatedcompaniesareforbiddento H shiptheirproductintoMaryland.Thefollowingchallengesmaybebrought: 4  CommerceClause :Article1,Section8,clause3oftheUnitedStatesConstitution(the   CommerceClause)grantsCongressthepowertoregulatecommerceamongtheseveralstates.It  x isgenerallyheldthatitisaviolationoftheCommerceClauseforastatetoenactlegislationthat  d requires differentialtreatmentofinstateandoutofstateeconomicintereststhatbenefitsthe  P  formerandburdensthelatter. OregonWasteSystemsInc.v.DepartmentofEnvironmental  <  QualityofOregon ,511U.S.93,99(1994)Legislationwillbeupheldifit regulateseven  ,  handedlytoeffectuatealegitimatelocalpublicinterestanditseffectsoninterstatecommerceare   onlyincidental8. Pikev.BruceChurch,Inc .,397U.S.137,141(1970)Thelegislationat   issuebansthepurchaseofoutofstateMineralXaproductofnationalconcernandinterest |  sincethefactsshowthatitisapprovedbytheFederalDrugAdministration.Thelawwas h  enactedto encouragethepurchaseofMarylandproductsandtheStatemayassertthatthelaw T furthersalegitimatelocalpublicinterest.However,theeffectuponinterstatecommerceisnot @  incidentalandmayonlybeupheldifMarylandcanshowthatallalternativesthatdonotimpact , interstatecommerceareunworkable. Mainev.Taylor ,477U.S.131(1986)Therehasbeenno  suchshowingunderthefacts.Narcissistandtheaffectedcompaniesmaysuccessfullyarguethat  thelegislationshouldthereforebestruckdownasaviolationoftheCommerceClause. p      EqualProtectionClause :Thelegislationtreatstwoclassesofconsumersdifferently!the H MarylandconsumerpurchasinginstateMineralXandtheMarylandconsumerwhowishesto 8 purchaseoutofstateMineralX.TheEqualProtectionClauseofthe14thAmendmenttothe $ UnitedStatesConstitutionprecludesastatefromdenyinganypersonwithinitsjurisdictionthe  equalprotectionofthelaws.Thedisparatetreatmentatissuedoesnotappeartobebasedonany  protectedclass,nordoesitaffectafundamentalright,sothelawcouldbeupheldifthereisa l rationalbasisforthedistinction.Thecourtmayfindthereisnorationalpurposeforthelaw, X givenitsclearimpairmentofcommerce.DessertFlowerandNarcissistmaybesuccessfulinits D challengeofthelawonthisground. 0       DueProcessClause :The14thAmendmentDueProcessClausedoesnotgrantanabsolute "! freedomfromreasonableregulationbutdoesprotectoneslibertiesfrombeinglimitedby "t" arbitraryrestraints.Therewasnorationalbasisforthelegislation;indeed,thefactssuggestthat #` # themanufacturersofAmericasIdolpersuadedtheGeneralAssemblythatitwasneededto $L!$ encouragethepurchaseofMarylandproductsandnottheircompetitors.Thus,Narcissists %8"% libertyinterestinpurchasingalesscostlyproduct,andDessertFlowerslibertyinterestinselling &$#& toMarylandresidentsarebeingrestrictedforanarbitraryreasonandthelawshouldbevoided. '$'      PrivilegesandImmunitiesClause :ArticleIVoftheConstitutionstatesthatthecitizensofeach l)%) StateshallbeentitledtoallPrivilegesandImmunitiesofCitizensintheseveralstates.Narcissist \*&*   4,(, maychallengethelawas_violative_ԀofArticleIVandthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseofthe   14thAmendmentsinceheiseffectivelybeingbarredaccesstolesscostlyMineralXproduced p outsideofMaryland.DesertFlowerisprecludedfromraisingthisargumentsincecorporations \ arenot citizensofastateforthepurposesofthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClause. H   #XXXXXp2G# -|)-  >  XXpXXX QUESTION6      A.  TheanswershouldaddressviolationsofthefollowingMarylandLawyersRulesof H ProfessionalConduct: 4   Rule1.3.Diligence!Alawyershallactwithreasonablediligenceandpromptnessinrepresentinga   client.(Agnesshouldhaveaddressedclientscasepriortotheimpendingstatuteoflimitation.)  t Rule1.4.Communication!Alawyershallkeepaclientreasonablyinformedaboutthestatusoftheir  L  matter.(AgnesshouldhavereturnedClientscallsandrespondedtoqueries.)  8  Rule1.5.Fees!Alawyersfeeshallbereasonableconsideringseveralfactorsincludingtime   involved,likelihoodthattheacceptanceofthecasewouldprecludetheattorneyfromother   employment,thefeecustomarilychargedforsuchcases,theamountinvolved,andthelawyers l  experience.Anyfeethatiscontingentupontheoutcomeofthecaseshallbeinwritingandshallstate X  themethodbywhichthefeeistobedetermined.(Agnesfeemayhavebeensteepforanewattorney D andhercontingentfeehadtobeinwriting) 0 Rule1.15.SafekeepingpropertyAlawyerisrequiredtoholdaclients'fundsinaseparateaccount  fromherown,pursuanttotherequirementssetforthinTitle16,Chapter600oftheMarylandRules. p Thelawyermustusuallydepositintoaclienttrustaccountanylegalfeesandexpensespaidin \ advance.(AgneshadadutytokeepClientsfundsseparatefromherfundsandtodepositClients H funds_in_Ԁaseparatetrustaccount.) 4 Rule1.16.DecliningorTerminatingRepresentation!Oncerepresentationisterminatedthelawyer   shalltakestepstotheextentreasonabletoprotecttheclientsinterestandshallsurrenderpapersand | propertytowhichtheclientisentitled,andrefundanyadvancepaymentoffeeorexpensethathasnot h beenearned.(AgneshadtosurrenderClientspropertyuponterminationofrepresentationandshould T haverefundedanymoneysthatwerenotearned.) @ Rule5.3.Responsibilitiesregarding_Nonlawyer_Ԁassistants!Alawyerhavingdirectsupervisory   authorityoverthe_nonlawyer_Ԁshallmakereasonableeffortstoensurethatthepersonsconductis !  compatiblewiththeprofessionalobligationsofthelawyerandthelawyerisresponsibleforthe !l! conductofthe_nonlawyer_ԀifsuchconductwouldbeaviolationoftheRulesofProfessionalConduct. "X" (AgneshadadutytomonitorParalegalandwasresponsibleforherfailuretomaintaintheoperating #D # accountandforParalegalsdepositsintotheimproperformofaccount.) $0!$ Rule7.1.CommunicationsconcerningaLawyersservicesAlawyershallnotmakeafalseor &#& misleadingcommunicationaboutthelawyerorherservices,norcreateanunjustifiedexpectation x'#' abouttheresultsshecanachieve. d($( Rule7.4.CommunicationofFieldsofPractice!Alawyershallnotholdhimselfoutasaspecialist. <*&* (Agnescouldnotstatethatsheisaspecialistinanyareaoflawotherthanpatentlaw,andcannot (+'+ createtheunjustifiedexpectationthatsheisanaccidentspecialist.) ,(,  -|)- B.  TheadmissibilityofthefollowingevidencehingesuponthestricturessetforthintheMaryland  RulesandMarylandCourtsandJudicialProceedingsCodeAnnotated: p   X1. ` TheCourtcouldallowthestatementfromthehusbandsinceitisastatementagainst H interestbyAgnes,andthereforeanexceptiontothehearsayrule.However,itisprivilegedasamarital 4 communicationandshouldbekeptoutonthatbasis.MarylandCourtsandJudicialProceedingsCode   Annotated,Section9105.    X X2. ` Thelawprofessorsstatementshouldbedisallowedfortworeasons.First,asan  ` opinionofalaywitness,itisonlyallowedifitis helpfultoaclearunderstandingofthewitnesss  L  testimonyorthedeterminationofafactinissue.MarylandRule5701.Similarly,testimonyis  8  permissibleonlytotheextentthatitisrelevant.MarylandRule5402.Thereappearstobenoneed  $  forthistestimonyanditshouldbekeptout.    X X3. ` Finally,evidenceofatheftconvictionmayarguablybethetypeofcrimethatcanbe l  usedtoimpeachAgnescredibility.However,Agnesrecordshouldbeprecludedbecauseitismore X  than15yearsold.MarylandRule5609. D  X >  #XXXXXp^[# -|)- Ї   XX  !    XX XXXX  !q  #XXXX䌪q# "(43XXXX  < XXQUESTION7!qIr݌  Ќ    <     #XX :s##XXXXs#< XX<  <#XX <>t##XXXX]t# X  XXXXThecausesofactionRufusmayhaveagainstCalebbasedonthegivenfactsrevolvearound  theadjustmentsforbonusesandtaxeswhichwereomittedfromthecomputerprintout.Ineachof n thefollowingcausesofactiontherecouldhavebeenothercontributingfactorswhichcausedRufus< XX Z #XX $ #  #XXXX䌄# B+ ` hp x ` ` ` XBXXXXforadviceandhelp.Therewasarelationshipoftrustandconfidenceandanequitabledutythat *%!$ CalebowedtoRufus.Calebbreachedthatduty.Noactualdishonestpurposeorintenttodeceive &"% isnecessary.Calebsconductdeceivedorviolatedthatrelationshipofconfidence.Rufussuffered '~#& damages. 'j$' #XXXX䌓#  <(` ` ` hp x X<XXXX4. ` CalebcanclaimRufuswas_contributorily_Ԁnegligent. (V%(  #XXXX䌲# B+ ` hp x ` ` ` XB< XX<  < #XX <Ȍ##XXXX# <(` ` ` hp x X<5. ` Reliefpossibleinthesecausesofactionincludecontractualmoneydamages *B'*   B+ ` hp x ` ` ` XBXXXXandpossiblyrescissionofthecontractbasedonfraudintheinducement.Ifso,itispossibletovoid +.(+ thecontract#XXXXq#XXXXabinitio#XXXXA#XXXXandrestoreRufusandCalebtothe#XXXX䌐#XXXXstatusquo.#XXXX#XXXXԀHowever,rescissionwouldnot ,), beappropriateasreliefinacauseofactiongroundedinnegligence.Arecoveryofpunitivedamages  maybepossibleundercausesofactionforintentionalmisrepresentation,negligent p misrepresentation,andconstructivefraud.Theremustbeevidenceofactualcompensatorydamages \ andanawardbasedonthatevidencetosupportanawardforpunitivedamages.Wherethetortis H onearisingoutofacontractualrelationship,actualmalicemustbeshowntorecoverpunitive 4 damages.   #XXXXH# X<( ` hp x X<< XX<  <#XX  t forfeiteditschartercannotfunctionasacorporation.See,CloverfieldsImpr.Assn.v. * ` SeabreezeProperties,Inc.,32Md.App.421,362A.2d675(1976),affd280Md.382,373  L  A.2d935,modified280Md.382,374A.2d906(1977).Onceacorporationforfeitsits  8  charter,itisunlawfulforanyonetocarryonbusinessinthenameofthecorporation,and  $  anyonewhodoessoisguiltyofamisdemeanor.Md.Corps.&AssnsCodeAnn.,3514.   K  F 4XX 4 WhenNewFrontierceasedtoexist,BudandLou,asitssoledirectors,became   trusteesofitsassetsforthepurposeofliquidatingthecorporation.Md.Corps.&Ass'ns   CodeAnn.,3515.Astrusteesofthecorporateassets,BudandLouwereempoweredto:  (1)carryoutthecontractsofNewFrontier;(2)selltheassetsofthecorporation;(3)sueor v besuedintheirownnamesastrusteesorinthenameofthecorporation;and(4)takeall b actionsconsistentwiththelawandthechartertoliquidateNewFrontierandwindupits N affairs.Md.Corps.&Ass'nsCodeAnn.,3515(b).TheCourtcould,inthealternative, :p appointareceiverorreceiverstowinduptheaffairsofNewFrontier.Anappointmentof &\ areceiverwouldterminatetheauthorityofBudandLouastrustees.Md.Corps.&Assns H CodeAnn.,3516. 4 $??.,??.,??.,??.,                 ????.,????.,  K 4 SinceBudandLouaretrusteesofNewFrontier,theHOAcanfilesuitagainstthem   intheircapacityastrusteesofNewFrontier'sassetstocompelthemtospecificallyperform  theoutstandingcontractsofthecorporation.SolongasBudandLoudidnotconveythe  propertytoabonafidepurchaserforvaluepriortosuit,theHOAshouldbesuccessful,  sinceitisdifficulttoconceiveofabonafidepurchaserinthissituation.CommonAreais  generallyidentifiableassuchbecauseofitsobviouslocationsanduseinacommunity, r whichwouldputanypurchaseroninquirynotice,andtheplatandcovenantsidentifyingthe ^  propertyasHOApropertywouldberecordedinthelocallandrecords,givingactualnotice J!  toanypurchaseroftheHOA'sownershipinterestintheproperty.TheCourtshouldcompel 6"l! BudandLouastrusteesofNewFrontiertoconveytherealpropertytotheHOA. "#X" ??.,??.,??.,??.,        K $D # _ 4 Itis_ԀclearthatBudandLoumayhaveauthorizedthedistributionofthebonusof $0!$ NewFrontierinviolationofMarylandLawbecausenodistributionmaybemadeif,after %"% givingeffecttothedistribution,thecorporationwouldnotbeabletopayindebtednessasit &#& becomesdueintheordinarycourseofbusiness.Md.Corps.&AssnsCodeAnn.,2311. '#' SincethefactsindicatethatHOAdidnotreceivetheassessments,BudandLou,asthe ($( soledirectorsofbothNewFrontierandHOAbreachedtheirrespectivedutiesofcareand )%) loyalty.TheCourtwillfindBudandLoupersonallyliabletotheextentofthe *&* distributionsunlawfullymadebyNewFrontier,andmayorderpaymentofthose n+'+ distributionstoHOAandallothercreditors.Md.Corps.&AssnsCodeAnn.,2212. Z,(, AssumingBudandLouhavesufficientassetstodisgorgethedistribution,HOAmay F-|)- recoverapartorallofitsassessments. 2.h*.    @ XXXXUS.,??., QUESTION12   =&   4 DuringhisrepresentationofMr.andMrs.Jones,CharlesCounselviolatedseveral  ofhisethicalobligationscontainedintheMarylandLawyersRulesofProfessional  Conduct( Ruleor Rules,asthecontextmayrequire)promulgatedbytheCourtof z AppealsandeffectiveJuly1,2005. f  R   4 CharlesCounselviolatedRule1.7(a)(1)becauseadirectconflictofinterestexisted > t betweenMr.andMrs.Jones.Sincethedivorceproceedingnecessarilyinvolvesthe * ` adverseassertionofclaimsbyMr.andMrs.Jones,theconflictofinterestcannotbe  L  _waived_Ԁbythem,andCharlesCounselcannotadequatelyrepresenttheinterestsofboth  8  parties.Inaddition,aconflictexistedasaresultofMr.Counselsrepresentationofthe  $  businessinterestsofMark.ItisevidentfromthefactsthatMr.Counselsrepresentationof   MarkscompanymateriallylimitedMr.CounselsrepresentationofMrs.Jonesin   violationofRule1.7(b).SheshouldhavebeenadvisedbyMr.Counseltoseektheadvice   ofindependentcounsel.      4 Mr.Counselbreachedhisobligationtoprovidecompetentrepresentationunder v Rule1.1sincehemaynothaveknown,butshouldhaveknown,thatthefinancial b statementusedbyhiminthedivorceproceedingwasnotaccurateandthatallassetsmay N notnecessarilyrequiredivisionunderMarylandlawonanequalbasis. :p  &\  4 Withregardtothepreparationandfilingofthefinancialstatements,Mr.Counsel H breachedhisethicaldutiesbyfailingtoadvisebothJaneJonesandtheCourtthatthe 4 financialstatementforMarkJoneswasnotaccurate.SinceMr.CounselassistedMark   Jonesinrecoveringthesubstantialdebtfromthedefensecontractor,heknewthatthe   financialstatementwasincorrect.PursuanttoRules1.2(d),3.3(a)(1),(2)and(4)and  4.1(a)(2),Mr.Counselwasrequired(i)todiscussthelegalconsequencesofthepossible  fraudulentbehaviorofMr.Jones;(ii)torevealtheinaccuraciesinthefinancialstatement  tothetribunalwhendisclosureisnecessarytoavoidMr.CounselassistingMarkJonesina  fraudulentactorinmakingfalsestatements;and(iii)todisclosetoMrs.Jonesthe r inaccuraciescontainedinthefinancialstatement,andadvisehertoseektheadviceof ^  independentcounsel. J!   6"l!  4 Generally,Mr.CounselmustcomplywiththerequirementsofRule1.6regarding "#X" theconfidentialityofinformation.However,Rules4.1(b)and3.3(b)requiredisclosureof $D # informationotherwiseprotectedbyRule1.6whenthatinformationmustbedisclosedto $0!$ assurecandortothetribunalandtruthfulnesstoothers.#XXXXU&#??US.,