ÿWPC¤ Ãì+%kû¦øz†Íߨø¦øn;[Þ_ÐÂŨükY«âLÓuJh ¡ÈLç~$R8)Úï±c;&éðP•/v4¨¥zG,Á¹%AÕŠë×Ln¨†(‚-f”•–ÒÀhò‡­’W(‰’Axx··YÖ“ùov52„ ¾8,u+L”¥¾Åg´"taûÌÌq¿Ã9†O«V0> ZaZ¬ªìŠ“ 3t‡°`œ¾-ž*m¡&Ãpq‰½ÉãÕbåbñçLµß33¦"rç– ±‹àÆÂ+"+!æÕÔAòÙW5wNË¡“á¤ed…{0ãÞŠ¡»UúdCÉ@|´2 jÿö×FÖ9ó9fûÈW›$O;öÇ÷)¦Û1øz"Éù£jk ØQï²)€px±Í/4z">÷÷R­¬¯ªzDýî–3‰¨±}Yo=ÄâÏ L¿{“MÏXJIõz\¸œ×³“³tÐ2øÌ¶ÄUòPñSÒfŽL\˪ª„Î5ÈögGL€lI‚`ü¦ÊTεÀ}z1åÌ/A£æLP Ô íí=8žùéŸ\­ùcŠïd#Yt• ^ÿñq»¬¿°E¤œöñaòÇïQˆhûKÖGîA T1U1Ë«ïtœÑ‘#U.ên­ %ÅšËe#Áu(6 0:^ N˜ ^ š w¦ 4ª ¾ mÀ 1× U@d 72¤ 1uÖ 72K 0c} } 0 Šà UBj ¬ U%@´ UBô "6 0¨X 0¨U>¨Òæ 0V¸UHUNV<þ6X9`(Courier«<þ6X9`(CourierXôxþ6X@ɹ`7ûX@X' Ñ2Barex14B 2Bar Exam Questions  0 .   3|x ˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL$,,,,$0!(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,ÔZq†+â m„Q+ogramsÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(¦ÙCEMU]emu}AutoList1(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman (1)3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  àH! ÿÿ4Body TextBody TextÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  Óô\  `*Times New RomanTT (ÖÃ9 Z(Times New Roman "ÞB è 0*Times New RomanTT Ñ H ÑÑ H ÑH0% ÿÿ4heading 2heading 2Ô&  ÔÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔòòóóÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'  ÔÓ  ÓH0% ÿÿ4heading 1heading 1Ô&  ÔÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'  ÔÓ  Óô\  `‹&Times New Roman ÈÝ ƒ ½þ)ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà@üüÊìàò òÔ€XüRXXXÔBoardððs€Analysis€Page€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó€ò òof€Ú  Ú16Ú  Úó ó(.3½þ$©©Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý  ‹0Times New Roman Bold Z6Times New Roman RegularÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  Óò òÔ€XcDXXXÔÖ€ÿÿÖó óà@ìàò òJULY€2001€BAR€EXAMINATIONˆÐ ° Ðà@"ìàBOARD'S€ANALYSISˆà È àÐ xÈ ÐÌà@%ìàQUESTION€1ó óˆÐ X ÐÌà  àAlthough€a€common„law€marriage€may€not€be€created€in€Maryland,€Maryland€does€recognizeÐ ˜è Ðcommon„law€marriages€that€are€valid€where€contracted.€€However,€proof€that€a€common„lawÐ ` ° Ðmarriage€existed€in€accordance€with€the€laws€of€the€jurisdiction€recognizing€that€type€of€marriageÐ ( x Ðis€necessary€before€the€marriage€can€be€given€legal€effect€in€this€state.€€Cases€considering€theÐ ð @ Ðelements€of€proof€necessary€to€establish€the€common„law€marriage€require€(a)€that€the€partiesÐ ¸   Ðintended€to€be€married;€(2)€that€they€agreed€to€be€married;€(3)€that€they€lived€together€for€aÐ € Ð  Ðsubstantial€period;€and€(4)€that€they€held€themselves€out€to€the€community€as€husband€and€wife.Ð H ˜  ÐÌà  àTherefore,€since€common„law€marriage€is€valid€in€Pennsylvania,€and€since€the€partiesÐ Ø(  Ðintended€to€be€married€and€agreed€that€they€were,€in€fact,€married,€and€held€themselves€out€to€theÐ  ð  Ðcommunity€as€husband€and€wife,€the€marriage€will€be€recognized€in€Maryland.Ð h¸  ÐÌà  àHaving€established€that€they€are€married€and€seeking€a€divorce,€Anne€should€be€advisedÐ øH  Ðconcerning€each€of€the€following€issues:Ð À Ðà  à(1)à ` àGrounds€for€divorce;Ð ˆØ Ðà  à(2)à ` àChild€Custody€and€visitation;Ð P  Ðà  à(3)à ` àChild€support;Ð h Ðà  à(4)€à ` àUse€and€possession€of€the€family€home€and€property;€Ð à0 ÐÓ€ (¦Ù83ÓØ! !ØÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£BÝÔ2¦ÙÔ(Ú  Ú5Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  ÝAlimony;€and݃3£B{݌Шø` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  Ýà  à(6)à ` àMarital€Property.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àBefore€she€may€take€the€children€with€her€to€Pennsylvania,€she€must€first€obtain€an€OrderÐ P Ðfrom€the€appropriate€Circuit€Court€giving€her€custody.€€And,€as€long€as€her€leaving€does€not€impairÐ È ÐBob's€rights€of€reasonable€visitation,€she€may€return€to€Pennsylvania€and€take€the€children€with€her.Ð à ÐÌà  àRegarding€the€issue€of€alimony,€she€may€obtain€it€whether€she€files€for€a€limited€or€anÐ  p Ðabsolute€divorce.€€If€she€files€for€a€limited€divorce,€the€factors€required€to€be€proven€are€her€need€forÐ è8 Ðalimony€and€Bob's€ability€to€pay.Ð °  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€since€she€is€unemployed,€and€since€Bob€makes€a€substantial€salary,€a€court€wouldÐ @" Ðaward€her€a€sum€sufficient€to€allow€her€to€continue€to€pay€her€current€expenses€until€the€matter€ofÐ  X# Ðthe€absolute€divorce€is€determined.€€The€purpose€of€such€alimony€is€to€maintain€the€status€quo.Ð Ð $ ÐÌà  àIn€determining€alimony€at€the€trial€of€a€Complaint€for€Absolute€Divorce,€the€courts€look€toÐ `"°& ÐSubsection€11„106€of€the€Family€Law€Article€of€the€Annotated€Code€of€Maryland€which€sets€out€aÐ (#x' Ðlist€of€factors€which€must€be€considered.Ð ð#@( ÐÌà  àThe€first€factor€is€the€ability€of€the€party€seeking€alimony€to€be€wholly€or€partly€selfÐ €%Ð * Ðsupporting.€€Although€Anne€has€a€college€degree,€she€has€never€held€a€job€and€is€currentlyÐ H&˜!+ Ðunemployed.€€In€addition,€she€may€not€have€the€necessary€qualifications€to€teach€in€Maryland.€€EvenÐ '`", Ðif€she€returns€to€Pennsylvania,€one€must€consider€the€parties'€agreement€to€home€school€the€childrenÐ Ø'(#- Ðin€making€this€determination.Ð  (ð#. ÐÌà  àSecond,€the€time€necessary€for€her€to€gain€sufficient€education€and€training€to€become€selfÐ 0*€%0 Ðsufficient€is€also€affected€by€her€need€to€care€for€and€home€school€the€children.Ð ø*H&1 ÐÐ À+'2 Їà  àThe€third€factor€is€the€duration€of€the€marriage.€€The€parties€have€been€married€about€twelveÐ ° Ðyears€during€which€Anne€made€significant€non„monetary€contributions€to€the€marriage€by€caring€forÐ xÈ Ðthe€children,€and€during€which€she€was€unable€to€pursue€a€career€of€her€own€which€is€the€fifth€factorÐ @ Ðto€be€considered.Ð X ÐÌà  àThe€sixth€factor€is€the€circumstances€that€contributed€to€the€estrangement€of€the€parties.€Ð ˜è ÐAnne€will€insist€that€Bob€was€having€an€affair€and€this€is€the€sole€cause€of€the€estrangement.Ð ` ° ÐÌà  àThe€seventh€factor,€the€age€of€the€parties,€is€not€significant€because€their€ages€were€notÐ ð @ Ðdisclosed€in€the€facts.Ð ¸   ÐÌà  àThe€eighth€factor,€the€physical€and€mental€condition€of€the€parties,€is€not€relevant€becauseÐ H ˜  Ðthe€facts€do€not€indicate€that€either€of€them€have€any€physical€or€mental€conditions€which€must€beÐ `  Ðconsidered.Ð Ø(  ÐÌà  àThe€ninth€factor,€Bob's€ability€to€pay,€is€significant.€€He€makes€a€substantial€salary,€and€it€isÐ h¸  Ðonly€fair€that€a€portion€of€it€be€used€to€maintain€Anne€and€her€standard€of€living.Ð 0€  ÐÌà  àThe€tenth€factor,€any€agreement€between€the€parties,€is€relevant€because€the€parties€apparentlyÐ À Ðagreed€that€Anne€would€not€work€and€would€stay€home€with€the€children.€€As€a€result€€of€thisÐ ˆØ Ðagreement,€she€is€not€able€to€be€partially€or€wholly€self€sufficient.Ð P  ÐÌà  àThe€eleventh,€and€most€important€factor€to€be€considered,€is€the€financial€needs€and€resourcesÐ à0 Ðof€the€parties.€€The€parties€will€be€required€to€provide€the€court€with€financial€statements€which€theÐ ¨ø Ðcourt€will€use€in€making€its€determination.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€order€to€get€full€credit€for€this€question,€it€is€not€necessary€that€the€applicant€address€allÐ P Ðof€the€factors€to€be€considered,€just€that€he€or€she€recognize€the€most€obvious€ones.Ð È ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ À+'2 Їò òà@%ìàQUESTION€2ó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àRule€1.15(b)€requires€that,€upon€receiving€funds€or€other€property€in€which€a€client€or€a€thirdÐ @ Ðperson€has€an€interest,€a€lawyer€shall€promptly€notify€the€client€or€third€person.€€Except€as€stated€inÐ X Ðthis€Rule€or€otherwise€permitted€by€law€or€the€agreement€with€the€client,€a€lawyer€shall€promptlyÐ Ð  Ðdeliver€to€the€client€or€third€person€any€funds€or€other€property€that€the€client€or€third€person€isÐ ˜è Ðentitled€to€receive€and,€upon€request€by€the€client€or€third€person,€shall€promptly€render€a€fullÐ ` ° Ðaccounting€regarding€such€property.Ð ( x ÐÌà  àTherefore,€you€are€required€to€notify€not€only€your€client,€but€also€the€medical€providers€toÐ ¸   Ðwhom€sums€are€owed,€that€you€have€the€funds€in€your€possession.Ð € Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€if€you€notify€the€medical€providers€and€they€insist€upon€payment,€you€must€payÐ `  Ðthem€or€risk€legal€action€against€your€client.€€They€are€the€beneficiaries€of€your€client's€contractÐ Ø(  Ðcontained€in€the€letters€of€protection€sent€to€them.Ð  ð  ÐÌà  àIn€a€personal€injury€matter,€if€the€client€has€signed€an€authorization€for€the€attorney€toÐ 0€  Ðwithhold€sums€from€the€settlement€to€pay€the€medical€providers,€the€attorney€has€a€duty€to€protectÐ øH  Ðsuch€third€party€claimants€against€wrongful€interference€by€the€client€and€may€refuse€to€surrenderÐ À Ðthe€property€to€the€client.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àRule€8.4€also€provides€that€it€is€misconduct€for€a€lawyer€to€engage€in€fraud€or€deceit.€€It€mayÐ h Ðbe€argued€that€the€payment€of€the€funds€received€from€the€personal€injury€protection€to€the€clientÐ à0 Ðwithout€paying€the€medical€bills€constitutes€such€fraud€or€deceit€as€to€subject€the€attorney€toÐ ¨ø Ðdiscipline€as€well€as€to€personal€liability.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àRule€1.2€of€the€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€places€the€attorney€in€the€untenable€positionÐ P Ðof€either€disobeying€the€directions€of€his€client€or€becoming€personally€liable€for€the€funds.€€In€suchÐ È Ða€situation,€if€the€attorney€cannot€get€the€parties€to€agree€upon€the€disposition€of€the€funds,€he€shouldÐ à Ðpay€the€funds€into€the€registry€of€the€court€for€the€court€to€decide€or€submit€the€matter€to€mediationÐ X¨ Ðor€arbitration.€Ð  p ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€"XüRXXXcDÔà@ìì*ìàò òˆÐ À+'2 Їà@!!%ìàÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔQuestion€3Ô#†"XüRXXXüR%#Ôó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔEven€though€ABC,€P.A.€is€a€professional€association,€the€general€rules€of€corporate€lawÐ @ Ðapply.€€Md.€Anno.€Code€Corp.€and€Assoc.€Article€(ð ðCodeðð)€ðð€5„134.€€As€a€shareholder€of€aÐ X Ðcorporation€alleged€harmed€by€the€failure€of€its€directors€and€officers€to€carry€out€their€duties€to€theÐ Ð  Ðcorporation,€Davis€has€no€cause€of€action€in€his€own€right.€€Instead,€the€cause€of€action€would€be€aÐ ˜è Ðderivative€one,Ô#†"XüRXXXüR%#Ô€òòDanielwicz€v.€Arnoldóó,€137€Md.€App.€601,€616,€769€A.2d€274€(2001).€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔUnder€mostÐ ` ° Ðcircumstances,€a€demand€to€the€Board€to€file€suit€must€be€made€prior€to€filing€a€derivative€action.€Ð ( x ÐThe€only€exception€is€where€such€a€demand€would€be€clearly€futile.€€Maryland€courts€haveÐ ð @ Ðinterpreted€this€exception€very€narrowly,€on€the€grounds€that,€if€nothing€more,€a€demand€will€giveÐ ¸   Ðthe€board€an€opportunity€to€reevaluate€its€position€prior€to€litigation.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR(#Ôòò€€See€€Werbowsky€v.€Collombóó,Ð € Ð  Ð362€Md.€581,€607,€766€A.€2d€123€(2001);€òòDanielwicz€v.€Arnoldóó,€137€Md.€App.€at€629.€€€Ð H ˜  ÐÌà  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔIn€Maryland€a€director€is€obligated€to€perform€his€or€her€duties€in€good€faith,€in€a€mannerÐ Ø(  Ðreasonably€believed€to€be€in€the€best€interests€of€the€corporation€and€with€the€care€that€an€ordinarilyÐ  ð  Ðprudent€person€in€a€like€position€would€use€under€similar€circumstances.€€Code€ðð€2„405.1(a).€€TheÐ h¸  Ðbusiness€judgment€rule€provides€presumption€that€directors€act€in€good€faith€and€in€best€interests€ofÐ 0€  Ðcorporation.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR¼*#Ô€€òòSee€e.g.€Black€v.€Fox€Hills€North€Community€Assocóó.,€90€Md.€App.€75,€82,€599€A.2dÐ øH  Ð1228€(1992):€òòsee€alsoóó€€Code€ðð2„405(e).€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔDavis€will€have€a€very€difficult€time€meeting€this€burdenÐ À Ðof€proof€under€these€facts.€€In€addition,€even€if€the€directors€had€breached€duty€to€the€corporation,Ð ˆØ Ðthe€fact€that€the€merger€was€ratified€by€the€shareholders€probably€bars€recovery.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR‡-#Ô€€òòCoffman€v.Ð P  ÐMaryland€Publishing€Co.óó,€167€Md.€275,€289,€173€A.€248€(1934).Ð h ÐÌà  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔThe€fact€that€Able€stood€to€be€named€to€Probity,€PAððs€board€of€directors€does€not€cause€thisÐ ¨ø Ðto€be€an€interested€director€transaction.Ô#†"XüRXXXüRh/#Ô€€òòWittman€v.€Crookeóó,€120€Md.€App.€369,€375,€707€A.€2d€422Ð pÀ Ð(1998).€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔEven€if€it€were€considered€to€be€an€interested€director€transaction,€Ableððs€disclosure€of€theÐ 8ˆ Ðagreement€to€the€other€Board€members€(as€well€as€to€Davis)€coupled€with€the€approval€of€theÐ P Ðdisinterested€directors€meets€one€of€the€Maryland€statutory€tests€for€interested€director€transactions.€Ð È ÐÔ#†"XüRXXXüR¤0#ÔòòSeeóó€Code€2„419.Ð à ÐÌà  àòòóóÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔAs€an€objecting€shareholder€to€a€merger,€Davis€has€the€right€to€demand,€and€receive€the€fairÐ  p Ðvalue€of€his€stock.€€Bus.€Assoc.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR…2#Ô€Article€ðð€3„201€òòet€seqóó.Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔ€€As€part€of€the€procedural€requirements€toÐ è8 Ðobtain€this€remedy,€the€objecting€shareholder€must€notify€the€corporation€in€writing€prior€to€the€dateÐ °  Ðof€the€shareholder's€meeting.€€Davis'€letter€to€the€shareholders€probably€constitutes€such€notice,Ð xÈ! Ðalthough€Maryland€courts€have€held€that€there€must€be€rigid€compliance€with€the€statute€in€order€toÐ @" Ðsuccessfully€invoke€the€remedy.Ô#†"XüRXXXüRy3#Ô€€òòE.g.€Pink€.v€Cambridge€Acquisition,€Inc.óó,€126€Md.€App.€61,€75,€727Ð  X# ÐA.2d€414€(1999).Ð Ð $ ÐÐ  ˜!è% ÐÑÀ°ÑÑÀ°ÑÑ€ƒAÑà@!!%ìàò òà@@!!%ìàÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔQuestion€4Ô#†"XüRXXXüRq6#ԈРÀ Ѐó óÐ ˆÈ Ðà  àòòThe€first€defense:€€accord€and€satisfactionóó:€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔUnless€the€note€specifically€provides€otherwise,Ð P Ða€co„maker's€liability€on€a€promissory€note€is€joint€and€several.€€Md.€Anno.€Ô#†"XüRXXXüR,7#ÔCode€Commercial€LawÐ X ÐArticle€ðð€3„116(a).€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔPartner's€agreement€with€Sonny€does€not€bind€the€Kettles;€so€his€partial€paymentÐ à  Ðconstitutes€accord€and€satisfaction€only€if€it€is€a€good€faith€compromise€of€a€disputed€claim.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR@8#Ô€€òòKimmelÐ ¨è Ðv.€SAFECO€Ins.€Co.óó,€116€Md.€App€346,€357,€696€A.2d€482€(1997);€Commercial€Law€Article€ðð€3„Ð p° Ð311.€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔA€claim€is€disputed€when€it€is€"reasonably€doubtful",Ô#†"XüRXXXüRà9#Ô€òòWickman€v.€Kaneóó,€136€Md.€App€554,€566,Ð 8 x Ð___A.€2d€___€(2001),€òòcert.€pendingóó.€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔThis€test€is€an€objective€one.€€The€unilateral€assertion€that€aÐ  @ Ðmaker's€liability€is€not€joint€and€several€does€not€meet€this€test.Ô#†"XüRXXXüRÄ:#Ô€€òòIdóó.€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔThus€even€if€Partner€genuinelyÐ È   Ðbelieved€that€his€payment€of€$50,000€plus€interest€discharged€his€liability,€it€does€not.Ð  Ð  ÐÌà  à2.€€The€fact€that€Partner€Section€3„206€Restrictive€endorsements€is€not€applicable€becauseÐ  `  Ðthe€writing€adjacent€to€the€€"memo"€section€of€the€check€is€not€an€indorsement.€€Ô#†"XüRXXXüRª;#ÔÐ è (  ÐÌà  àòòThe€second€defense:€fraud€in€the€inducementóó:€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔIngenuous€is€a€holder€in€due€course.€€She€tookÐ x¸  Ðthe€note€for€value,€in€good€faith,€without€notice€of€€default€or€a€defense.€€The€defense€of€fraudÐ @€  Ðadvanced€by€Partner€cannot€be€asserted€against€Ingenuous€because€it€is€fraud€in€the€inducement,€notÐ H  Ðfraud€in€the€factum,€Ô#†"XüRXXXüR°=#ÔCommercial€Law€Article€ðð3„305(b)€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔ(drawing€a€distinction€between€the€narrowÐ Ð Ðdefenses€which€can€be€asserted€against€a€holder€in€due€course€as€opposed€to€the€broader€class€ofÐ ˜Ø Ðdefenses€(including€any€defense€which€could€be€raised€in€a€contract€action)€which€can€be€assertedÐ `  Ðagainst€one€who€is€not€a€holder€in€due€course.Ô#†"XüRXXXüR\?#ÔÐ (h ÐÌà  àòòThe€third€defense:€partial€payment:óó€€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔAgain,€Ingenuous€is€a€holder€in€due€course.€€Only€certainÐ ¸ø Ðdefenses€can€be€asserted€by€an€obligor€against€an€HDC.€€Clearly,€partial€payment€is€generally€aÐ €À Ðdefense€in€a€collection€action€to€the€extent€payment€is€made.€€Ô#†"XüRXXXüRBA#ÔMd.€Anno.€Code€Commercial€LawÐ Hˆ ÐArticle€Section€3„602.€€Section€3„305€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔsets€out€the€rules€for€determining€which€defenses€can€beÐ P Ðasserted€against€a€holder€as€opposed€to€an€HDC:Ô#†"XüRXXXüRÝB#ÔÐ Ø Ðò òÌà8  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔDefenses€and€claims€in€recoupmentó ó.€Ô#†"XüRXXXüRÀC#ÔÐh¨Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔ(a)€Except€as€stated€in€subsection€(b),€the€right€to€enforce€the€obligation€of€a€party€toÐ ú: Ðpay€an€instrument€is€subject€to€the€following:€Ô#†"XüRXXXüRTD#ÔРРР ÐÌà8  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔ(1Ô#†"XüRXXXüR_E#ÔÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔ)€A€defense€of€the€obligor€based€on€(i)€infancy€of€the€obligor€to€the€extent€it€is€aÐ R’" Ðdefense€to€a€simple€contract,€(ii)€duress,€lack€of€legal€capacity,€or€illegality€of€theÐ Z# Ðtransaction€which,€under€other€law,€nullifies€the€obligation€of€the€obligor,€(iii)€fraudÐ â"$ Ðthat€induced€the€obligor€to€sign€the€instrument€with€neither€knowledge€nor€reasonableÐ ª ê% Ðopportunity€to€learn€of€its€character€or€its€essential€terms,€or€(iv)€discharge€of€theÐ r!²& Ðobligor€in€insolvency€proceedings;€Ô#†"XüRXXXüR£E#ÔÐ:"z'Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(2)€òòA€defense€of€the€obligor€stated€in€another€section€of€this€title€óóÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔor€a€defense€of€theÐ Ê# ) Ðobligor€that€would€be€available€if€the€person€entitled€to€enforce€the€instrument€wereÐ ’$Ò * Ðenforcing€a€right€to€payment€under€a€simple€contract€.€.€.€.€Ô#†"XüRXXXüR–H#ÔÐZ%š!+Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔThe€right€ofÔ#†"XüRXXXüR×I#Ô€a€òòholder€in€due€course€to€enforce€the€obligationóó€Ô‡XüRXX"XüRÔof€a€party€to€pay€theÐ ê&*#- ÐinstrumentÔ#†"XüRXXXüR]J#Ô€òòis€subject€to€defenses€of€the€obligor€stated€in€subsection€(a)€(1),€but€is€notÐ ²'ò#. Ðsubject€to€defenses€of€the€obligor€stated€in€subsection€(a)€(2)óó.€.€.€.€.Ðz(º$/Ð Ð  ÐÌÌÌÌà  àÔ‡XüRXX"XüRÔThe€UCC€provides€that€payment€is€a€defense€to€an€action€to€collect€upon€a€note,Ô#†"XüRXXXüR´K#ÔÔ€!XšþXX"XüRÔ€Section€3„Ð b,¢(4 Ð602.€€Ô‡XüRXX!XšþÔIt€is€thus€a€defense€"stated€in€another€section€of€this€title"€and€is€not€applicable€to€a€holder€inÐ ,-l)5 Ðdue€course€pursuant€to€Ô#†!XšþXXXüRŠL#ÔSection€3„305€(b).€€Ô‡XüRXX!XšþÔPartner's€defense€of€partial€payment€cannot€be€assertedÔ#†!XšþXXXüRoM#ÔÐ À ÐÔ‡XüRXX!XšþÔagainst€IngenuousÔ#†!XšþXXXüRýM#ÔÔ‡XüRXX!XšþÔ.Ð ŠÊ ÐÌÌÔ#†!XšþXXXüRPN#ÔÔ€XüRXX!XšþÔà@ ìàò òEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€4ó óÔ€!XšþXXXüRԈРâ" ÐÌAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€Commercial€Law€ArticleÐ r² ÐÌTitle€3.€€Negotiable€Instruments:€€ðð€3„116,€3„204,€3„206,€3„302,€3„305,€3„311,€3„601,€and€3„602.Ð  B ÐÌò òÔ‡XüRXX!XšþÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ *-j)5 Їà@!!%ìàà@@!!%ìàQuestion€5ó óˆÐ À ÐÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  Ýà  àHome€Renewalððs€chances€of€recovery€are€negligible€with€respect€to€the€breach€of€contractÐ P Ðclaim.€€Since€time€was€of€the€essence€under€the€agreement,€the€time€for€performance€must€beÐ X Ðstrictly€complied€with€by€Home€Renewal.€€Leslie€insisted€on€strict€compliance€and€did€not€waiveÐ à  Ðher€right€to€compliance€by€Home€Renewal€by€permitting€Home€Renewal€to€continue€to€performÐ ¨è Ðwork€on€the€house.€€Home€Renewalððs€requests€for€time€extensions€and€additional€compensationÐ p° Ðwere€not€sent€to€Leslie€in€a€timely€manner€as€required€by€the€contract.€€Similarly,€there€was€noÐ 8 x Ðjustification€given€for€Home€Renewalððs€labor€problem€which€caused€the€delay€in€construction,Ð  @ Ðand€for€the€substantial€additional€expenses€for€supplies.€€Consequently,€Leslieððs€decision€not€toÐ È   Ðpay€Home€Renewal€or€to€grant€time€extensions€to€Home€Renewal€are€justified€by€the€facts.€Ð  Ð  ÐAdditionally,€Leslie€had€to€hire€and€pay€another€contractor€to€finish€the€work.€€Accordingly,€theÐ X ˜  ÐCourt€should€enter€judgment€for€Leslie€on€the€breach€of€contract€claim.Ð  `  ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ¢PƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÌà  àLeslie€will€also€successfully€defend€against€the€quasi„contractual€claims€of€unjust€enrichmentÐ °ð  Ðand€quantum€meruit.€€A€party€cannot€prevail€on€quasi„contractual€theories€when€an€express€writtenÐ x¸  Ðcontract€exists€between€the€parties.€€There€is€an€express€written€contract€between€Leslie€and€HomeÐ @€  ÐRenewal.€€Therefore,€Home€Renewal€should€fail€under€its€quasi„contractual€claims.€€They€amountÐ H  Ðto€nothing€more€than€an€attempt€by€Home€Renewal€to€avoid€the€consequences€of€failing€to€file€timelyÐ Ð Ðrequests€for€extension€of€time€and€for€additional€payments,€and€to€complete€the€work€as€requiredÐ ˜Ø Ðunder€the€contract.€€Ð `  Ðà  àÌÌà  àIn€òòCounty€Commissioners€v.€J.€Roland€Dashiell€&€Sons,€Inc.óó,€358€Md.€83,€747€A.2d.€600Ð ¸ø Ð(2000),€the€Court€of€Appeals€analyzed€the€trial€courtððs€entry€of€summary€judgment€on€contractualÐ €À Ðand€quasi„contractual€claims€raised€by€a€contractor€against€Caroline€County,€Maryland.€€With€respectÐ Hˆ Ðto€raising€quasi„contractual€claims€in€a€case€where€there€is€an€express,€written€contract€between€theÐ P Ðparties,€the€Court€reviewed€relevant€provisions€of€the€Restatement€(Second)€of€Contracts€and€the€lawÐ Ø Ðof€other€jurisdictions€that€had€addressed€the€question,€and€it€confirmed€the€interpretation€employedÐ  à Ðby€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals,€as€follows:Ð h¨ Ðà0  àÐ (#(# Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àThe€general€rule€is€that€no€quasi„contractual€claim€can€arise€when€a€contract€existsÐ ø8 Ðbetween€the€parties€concerning€the€same€subject€matter€on€which€the€quasi„Ð À  Ðcontractual€claim€rests.€€(Citations€omitted.)€€The€reason€for€this€rule€is€not€difficultÐ ˆÈ! Ðto€discern.€€When€parties€enter€into€a€contract€they€assume€certain€risks€with€anÐ P" Ðexpectation€of€a€return.€€Sometimes,€their€expectations€are€not€realized,€but€theyÐ X# Ðdiscover€that€under€the€contract€they€have€assumed€the€risk€of€having€thoseÐ à $ Ðexpectations€defeated.€€In€desperation,€they€turn€to€quasi„contract€for€recovery.€€ThisÐ ¨ è% Ðthe€law€will€not€allow.€€Ðp!°&` (#` (# Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àÐ ` (#` (# ÐId.€at€96,747€A.2d€at€607.Ð #@( ÐÌò òÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ìì*ìàˆÌÐ (-h)5 Ðà@%ìàQUESTION€6ó óˆÐ À Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àÌà  àThe€Circuit€Court€ruled€correctly€on€objections€(a)€and€(d)€and€incorrectly€on€objections€(b)Ð P Ðand€(c),€and€the€reasons€for€the€rulings€are,€as€follows:Ð X ÐÌ(a)à  àNedððs€testimony€was€properly€allowed.€€The€statements€that€Pat€made€to€Ned€constitutesÐ ¨è Ðhearsay.€€However,€the€statement€falls€within€the€exception€of€statements€of€a€party€opponent.€€Pat'sÐ p° Ðstatement€is€admissible€under€Maryland€Rule€5„803(a)(1),€since€it€was€Pat's€own€statement,€and€itÐ 8 x Ðwas€offered€into€evidence€by€her€party€opponent,€the€State.€€The€Rule€does€not€require€theÐ  @ Ðunavailability€of€the€witness€to€permit€the€admission€of€a€party€opponent.€€Furthermore,€the€StateÐ È   Ðcould€argue€that€the€statement€was€admissible€as€a€statement€against€Pat's€interest€as€it€would€tendÐ  Ð  Ðto€subject€her€to€criminal€liability€under€Maryland€Rule€5„804(b)(3).€€If€Pat€asserted€her€FifthÐ X ˜  ÐAmendment€privilege€not€to€testify,€then€she€would€be€"unavailable"€for€purposes€of€the€Rule,€andÐ  `  Ðher€statement€to€Ned€could€be€admitted€through€Ned's€testimony€under€the€Rule.€€òòSee,€Kostelec€v.Ð è (  ÐStateóó,€112€Md.€App.€656,€685€A.2d€1222€(1996).€€See€Maryland€Rules€5„801(c)€and€5„802.Ð °ð  ÐÌ(b)à  àThe€Court€should€not€have€permitted€the€owner€of€the€tobacco€store€to€testify€about€theÐ @€  Ðclerkððs€statement.€€The€ownerððs€statement€is€inadmissible€hearsay€ð!ð€an€out€of€court€statement€offeredÐ H  Ðto€prove€the€truth€of€the€matter€asserted,€òòi.e.óó€that€Pat€bought€cigars.€€The€fact€that€Pat€bought€cigarsÐ Ð Ðand€that€a€partially€burned€cigar€was€found€near€the€burned€body€of€Tony,€a€nonsmoker,€wasÐ ˜Ø Ðimportant€circumstantial€evidence€that€Pat€caused€the€death€of€Tony.€€The€State€should€have€broughtÐ `  Ðthe€clerk€into€court€to€testify€about€the€sale€of€cigars.€€The€State€would€also€have€had€to€establish€thatÐ (h Ðthe€cigars€purchased€by€Pat€were€the€same€type€of€cigars€as€the€one€found€near€Tonyððs€body€to€makeÐ ð0 Ðthe€testimony€relevant.€€It€is€conceivable€that€the€Court€could€have€admitted€the€statement€under€theÐ ¸ø Ðð ðcatch„allðð€exception€to€the€hearsay€rule€found€in€Maryland€Rule€5„804(B)(5)€if€the€probative€valueÐ €À Ðof€the€statement€outweighed€its€prejudice€to€the€Defendant,€if€the€statement€was€evidence€of€aÐ Hˆ Ðmaterial€fact€in€the€case,€that€it€was€probative,€and€that€the€admission€of€the€statement€best€servedÐ P Ðthe€interests€of€justice.€€The€State€should€not€have€attempted€to€use€this€exception€unless€the€clerkÐ Ø Ðwas€unavailable€to€testify€through€no€fault€of€the€Stateððs.€€In€addition,€the€State€would€have€had€toÐ  à Ðadvise€Pat€prior€to€trial€that€the€statement€would€be€used€so€that€Pat€would€have€a€fair€opportunityÐ h¨ Ðto€respond.Ð 0p ÐÌ(c)à  àThe€Court€should€not€have€permitted€Trooper€Jones€to€testify€about€the€contents€of€theÐ À  Ðhospital€records€under€Maryland€Rule€5„803€(b)(6).€€Trooper€Jones€was€not€the€custodian€of€theÐ ˆÈ! Ðrecords€and€his€testimony€was€hearsay.€€Furthermore,€it€was€clear€from€the€Trooperððs€testimony€thatÐ P" Ðhe€had€no€personal€knowledge€of€the€contents€of€the€records.€€The€contents€of€the€records€could€haveÐ X# Ðbeen€admitted€either€through€the€testimony€of€the€custodian€of€the€records€under€Maryland€Rule€5„Ð à $ Ð803(b)(6),€or€as€a€self„authenticating€business€record€under€Maryland€Rule€5„902(a)(11).€€In€eitherÐ ¨ è% Ðcase,€the€contents€of€the€record€could€not€have€been€admitted€unless€a€proper€foundation€forÐ p!°& Ðadmission€of€the€record€was€first€established.Ð 8"x' ÐÌ(d)à  àThe€Court€properly€admitted€Dr.€Scheinerððs€expert€testimony.€€It€is€within€the€soundÐ È# ) Ðdiscretion€of€the€Court€to€determine€the€admissibility€of€expert€testimony.€€Maryland€Rule€5„702Ð $Ð * Ðpermits€the€Court€to€admit€expert€testimony€that€will€assist€the€trier€of€fact€to€understand€theÐ X%˜!+ Ðevidence€or€to€determine€a€fact€in€issue.€€In€reaching€the€decision,€the€Court€must€first€determine€thatÐ  &`", Ðthe€witness€is€qualified€as€an€expert€by€training€or€experience,€whether€the€expertððs€testimony€isÐ è&(#- Ðappropriate,€and€whether€a€sufficient€factual€basis€exists€to€admit€the€expertððs€testimony.€€In€thisÐ °'ð#. Ðcase,€Dr.€Scheiner€was€properly€qualified€as€an€expert€witness€by€both€training€and€experience.€€HeÐ x(¸$/ Ðis€the€local€medical€examiner,€he€is€a€doctor,€he€has€conducted€hundreds€of€autopsies,€and€he€hasÐ @)€%0 Ðbeen€accepted€by€the€Court€as€an€expert€in€over€one€hundred€other€cases.€€His€testimony€as€to€causeÐ *H&1 Ðof€death€is€appropriate.€€He€conducted€the€autopsy€and€ruled€out€asphyxiation€and€natural€causes.€Ð Ð*'2 ÐHis€opinion€as€to€cause€of€death€is€appropriate€because€it€assists€the€trier€of€fact,€in€this€case€a€jury,Ð ˜+Ø'3 Ðto€determine€whether€or€not€Pat€caused€the€death€of€Tony.€€Finally,€the€Court€properly€found€that€aÐ `, (4 Ðsufficient€factual€basis€existed€to€admit€the€evidence.€€Dr.€Scheiner€determined€during€the€autopsyÐ (-h)5 Ðthat€the€fire€did€not€cause€Tonyððs€death,€since€there€was€no€soot€in€his€lungs,€which€indicated€thatÐ À Ðhe€was€not€breathing€at€the€time€that€the€fire€was€burning€in€the€hotel€room.€€Dr.€Scheiner€also€ruledÐ ˆÈ Ðout€other€natural€causes.€€While€the€autopsy€did€not€reveal€any€poisons€in€Tonyððs€body,€the€medicalÐ P Ðexaminer€was€undoubtedly€made€aware€of€other€facts€in€the€case€since€he€participated€in€theÐ X Ðinvestigation€of€the€death.€€Maryland€Rule€5„703€permits€an€expert€to€base€his€expert€opinion€onÐ à  Ðfacts€perceived€by€him€or€made€known€to€him€by€others.€€The€facts€are€that€the€fire€was€set€afterÐ ¨è ÐTony€died€and€that€Pat€told€Ned€that€she€planned€to€kill€her€husband€with€an€untraceable€drug.€€EvenÐ p° Ðwithout€the€extrinsic€facts,€the€finding€of€a€òòpost€mortemóó€examination€were€consistent€with€death€byÐ 8 x Ðunnatural€causes€and€not€by€accident.€€òòSee€Sippio€v.€Stateóó,€350€Md.€633,€714€A.2d€864€(1998);Ð  @ ÐòòHricko€v.€Stateóó,€134€Md.€App.€218,€759€A.2d€1107€(1999),€cert.€denied,€362€Md.€188,€763€A.2d€735Ð È   Ð(2000).Ð  Ð  ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ#†!XšþXXXüRúO#ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ‡XœnXX!XšþÔà@ìì*ìàò òà@@pp#ìàˆÌÐ (-h)5 ÐуA Ñâ âÑHÀÑÑHÀÑâ âÑ  Ñà@!!%ìàQuestion€7ó óˆÐ H ÐÌà  àThis€question€presents€issues€related€to€the€creation€of€life€estates,€vested€remainders€subjectÐ Ø Ðto€divestment€in€real€estate.€€Also€raises€the€question€€of€whether€or€not€a€reservation€of€a€right€toÐ  X Ðdispose€of€real€estate€created€by€tenants€by€the€entireties€survives€the€death€of€one€tenant.€€Ð h  ÐÌà  àRules€of€construction€are€also€involved,€e.g.,€intention€of€the€parties;€reconciling€conflictingÐ ø° Ðgranting€and€Ô  ÔòòhabendumóóÔ  ÔÔ  Ô€clauses.€€Ð Àx ÐÌà  àThe€grantor€may€convey€a€life€estate€€in€real€property€and€at€the€same€time€convey€a€feeÐ P   Ðsimple€interest€to€a€third€party€to€be€effective€upon€termination€of€the€life€estate.€€€The€interest€of€theÐ  Ð  Ðgrantee€in€this€situation€is€that€of€remainderman;€that€is,€an€estate€limited€to€take€effect€in€possessionÐ à ˜  Ðimmediately€after€the€expiration€of€a€prior€estate€(the€life€estate)€created€at€the€same€time€and€by€theÐ ¨ `  Ðsame€instrument.€€A€grantor€may€reserve€to€himself€an€estate€out€of€the€land€granted€but€may€reserveÐ p (  Ða€power,€such€as€a€power€to€sell,€mortgage€or€otherwise€encumber€the€land€and€it€is€not€invalid€forÐ 8ð  Ðrepugnancy.€Ð ¸  ÐÌà  àA€particular€estate€may€be€given€to€a€first€taker€the€power€to€dispose€of€the€fee,€and€theÐ H  Ðremainder€to€a€second€taker,€subject€to€be€defeated€by€the€exercise€of€the€power€and€this€creates€aÐ X Ðvested€remainder€subject€to€divestment.€€Ð  Ø ÐÌà  àThe€granting€clause€in€the€deed€clearly€would€permit€Clyde€&€Wilma€to€jointly€exercise€theÐ °h Ðpower€to€sell.€€However,€the€power€was€not€exercised€before€Clydeððs€death.€€The€phrase€ð ðin€theirÐ x0 Ðlifetimeðð€which€is€in€the€granting€clause€raises€the€question€whether€or€not€the€power€to€sell€endsÐ @ø Ðwith€the€death€of€one€of€the€tenants€by€the€entireties.€€The€power€to€sell€is€not€expressly€conferredÐ À Ðon€the€survivor€of€Clyde€&€Wilma.€€€However,€the€power€to€sell€is€coupled€with€an€interest€and,РЈ Ðtherefore,€survives€unless€a€contrary€intent€can€be€found.€€The€life€estate€clearly€contemplated€ClydeÐ ˜P Ð&€Wilma€jointly€and€devolution€to€the€survivor.€€This€shows€evidence€of€intent€that€the€power€of€saleÐ ` Ðsurvive€also.Ð (à Ѐ€Ð ð¨ Ðà  àIssues€raised€by€conflicting€granting€and€habendum€clauses€are€resolved€in€favor€of€theÐ ¸p Ðgranting€clause€in€the€absence€of€a€clear€contrary€intent.€€Ð €8 ÐÌòòLiterski€v.€Literskióó,€166€Md.€641;€and€òòMadler€v.€Guntheróó,€155€MD€43.Ð È! ÐòòRoberts€v.€Robertsóó,€€€102€MD€131.€€òòóóÐ Ø" ÐÌÔ‡ôoÁòXXœnÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àÌÌÌÌò òÔ#†XœnXòôoÁÿ‡#Ôà@ìì*ìàˆÌÐ Î-†*: Ðà@!!%ìàQuestion€8ó óˆÐ H ÐÌStrict€liability€applies€to€abnormally€dangerous€activities.€€For€the€doctrine€to€apply,€the€activity€mustÐ Ø Ðbe€abnormally€dangerous€in€relation€to€the€land€on€which€it€occurs.€€It€must€satisfy€the€followingÐ  X Ðfactors:Ð h  ÐÌà  à1.à ` àA€high€degree€of€risk€of€harm€to€persons,€land,€or€chattels€of€others;Ð ø° Ðà  à2.à ` àThe€likelihood€the€harm€will€be€great;Ð Àx Ðà  à3.à ` àInability€to€eliminate€the€risk€by€the€exercise€of€reasonable€care;Ð ˆ @ Ðà  à4.à ` àExtent€to€which€the€activity€is€not€a€matter€of€common€usage;Ð P   Ðà  à5.à ` àInappropriateness€of€the€activity€to€the€place€where€the€activity€is€carried€on;Ð  Ð  Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àà  à6.à ` àExtent€to€which€its€value€to€the€community€is€outweighed€by€the€dangerous€attribute.Ðà ˜ ` (#` (# ÐÌà  àThe€Doctrine€applies€to€harm€to€the€person€or€property€of€another€resulting€from€theÐ p (  Ðabnormal€activity.€€Here€the€claim€of€Bart€is€that€his€own€property€or€at€least€that€being€leased€by€himÐ 8ð  Ðis€harmed€by€a€previous€occupier€of€the€same€property.Ð ¸  ÐÌà  àHere€also,€the€previous€activity€which€is€said€to€be€abnormally€dangerous€was€being€carriedÐ H  Ðon€in€an€appropriate€place.Ð X ÐÌà  àThe€Doctrine€of€Strict€Liability€places€a€heavy€burden€on€users€of€the€land.€€Thus,€it€has€neverÐ è  Ðbeen€extended€to€one€who€has€no€ownership€or€even€control€over€the€land€which€is€now€occupiedÐ °h Ðby€another.Ð x0 ÐÌà  àSubsequent€users€of€the€land€can€avoid€the€problem€by€taking€precautions€prior€to€purchasingÐ À Ðor€leasing€the€site.€€This€is€particularly€true€in€this€case€where€the€lease€placed€Bart€on€notice€that€theРЈ Ðproperty€was€being€leased€ð ðas€is,ðð€and€by€Bartððs€knowledge€that€it€had€been€previously€occupied€andÐ ˜P Ðused€as€a€service€station.Ð ` ÐÌà  àThe€application€of€the€Doctrine€of€Strict€Liability€requires€harm€to€person€or€property.€€SinceÐ ð¨ ÐBart€claims€only€economic€loss,€he€cannot€come€within€the€Doctrine.Ð ¸p ÐÌà  àA€different€outcome€could€result€in€Bartððs€claim€that€he€is€unable€to€occupy€his€residenceÐ H  Ðwhich€is€on€neighboring€land.€€However,€analysis€of€the€same€factors€would€be€involved.€€InÐ È! Ðdefending€Cheapgasco,€the€logical€arguments€would€include€that€the€activity€was€being€carried€onÐ Ø" Ðin€an€appropriate€place€and€that€the€activity€is€a€matter€of€ð ðcommon€usageðð€and€therefore€notÐ  X# Ðabnormally€dangerous.Ð h $ ÐÌà  àHowever,€a€stronger€argument€can€be€made€for€strict€liability€because€€(1)€the€injury€may€beÐ ø °& Ðbeyond€ð ðeconomic€loss;ðð€€and€(2)€€it€is€injury€to€property€of€another.Ð À!x' ÐÌNegligence€requires:Ð P# ) ÐÌà  à1.à ` àThe€Defendant€under€the€duty€to€protect€the€Plaintiff;Ð à$˜!+ Ðà  à2.à ` àA€breach€of€the€duty€by€the€Defendant;Ð ¨%`", Ðà  à3.à ` àPlaintiff€suffering€actual€injury€or€loss;Ð p&(#- Ðà  à4.à ` àThe€loss€must€proximately€result€from€Defendantððs€breach€of€duty.Ð 8'ð#. ÐÌà  àHere,€even€if€Bart€can€show€that€Cheapgasco€caused€the€problems€on€the€leased€land€and€thatÐ È(€%0 Ðhe€suffered€injury€therefrom,€he€cannot€state€a€cause€of€action€unless€he€can€show€that€CheapgascoÐ )H&1 Ðhad€a€duty€to€avoid€injury€to€Bart.Ð X*'2 ÐÌÌà  àHere,€there€is€no€relationship€between€the€parties€which€would€make€Bartððs€harm€foreseeableÐ °,h)5 Ðto€Cheapgasco.Ð x-0*6 Їà  àBart,€by€leasing€ð ðas€isðð€a€former€service€station€property,€knew€or€should€have€known€aboutÐ H Ðthe€possibility€of€contamination.€€Thus,€if€there€is€no€duty,€there€is€no€negligence.€€In€defendingÐ È ÐCheapgasco€with€regard€to€the€residence€Bart€purchased,€it€would€be€more€difficulty€to€argue€thatÐ Ø Ðthe€Defendant€had€no€duty€to€protect€the€Plaintiff.€€However,€Bart€would€have€to€prove€thatÐ  X ÐCheapgasco€breached€its€duty€to€him.€€Without€additional€facts€proving€the€cause€of€theÐ h  Ðcontamination€of€Bartððs€residential€property,€it€would€be€difficult€to€sustain€a€negligence€claimÐ 0è Ðagainst€Cheapgasco.Ô#†!XšþXXXœnŒ{#ÔÐ ø° ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ‡XüRXX!XšþÔà@ìì*ìàò òó óˆÌâ âÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& È ÔÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  ÝÝ‚ÿÿÿmœƒ Ýó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'Ȱ,}œÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝòòóóÐ °,h)5 ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ&  Ôâ âÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  ÝÔ  ÔQuestion€9Ô Ý ‹ÔÐ H ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ3ƒ Ýó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'HCÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& È ÔÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  ÝÝ‚ÿÿÿ(žƒ Ýó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'ÈØ8žÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýò ò(A)ó óà  àAl€burglarized€€the€house.€€He€did€not€strangle€Darla€or€shoot€Chris,€both€homicides€occurredÐ Ø Ðin€the€detached€garage.Ð ¢Z ÐÌà  àUnder€òòArticle€27,€Section€440óó€(statutory€felony€murder€rule)€the€fact€that€Al€was€committingÐ 2ê Ðthe€felony€of€burglary€creates€proof€of€malice€€and€premeditation€sufficient€to€sustain€a€convictionÐ ú² Ðfor€first€degree€murder€for€any€killing€consequent€to€the€felony.€€Each€person€engaged€in€theÐ Âz Ðcommission€of€the€criminal€act€bears€responsibility€for€all€consequences€which€naturally€andÐ Š B Ðnecessarily€flow€from€the€act€of€each€and€every€participant.€€It€has€long€been€established€that€underÐ R   Ðthe€felony€murder€doctrine€a€participating€felon€is€guilty€of€murder€when€a€homicide€has€beenÐ  Ò  Ðcommitted€by€a€co„felon€òòin€furtherance€of€the€underlying€felonyóó.Ð â š  ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÌà  àAlððs€response€should€be€that€there€should€be€no€criminal€liability€on€his€part€when€theÐ r *  Ðhomicides€were€the€fresh€and€independent€product€of€Bobððs€acts€outside€of€or€foreign€to€the€commonÐ :ò  Ðdesign€of€burglary.€€Al€would€assert€there€was€no€direct€casual€connection€between€the€twoÐ º  Ðhomicides€and€the€burglary€felony,€€mere€coincidence€of€€time€and€place€are€insufficient.€€Darla€diedÐ Ê‚  Ðfrom€strangulation€following€the€rape,€not€the€burglary.€€Ð ’J  ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ­¢ƒ ÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÌà  àAl€would€further€argue€that€neither€death€was€the€natural€probable€consequence€of€theÐ "Ú Ðburglary€and€he€could€not€have€foreseen€Bob€would€commit€rape.€Ð ê¢ ÐÌà  àLikewise,€Chris€was€an€accomplice€to€the€burglary.€€Al€would€argue€that€it€was€notÐ z2 Ðforeseeable€that€Bob€would€kill€Chris,€a€co„felon.€€Bobððs€killing€of€Chris€was€for€a€private€purposeÐ Bú Ð(no€witnesses€to€Bobððs€involvement€in€rape),€unrelated€to€the€burglary.€€€€Ð   ÐÌ€€à  àThe€key€to€Alððs€culpability€is€the€determination€of€a€nexus€between€each€killing€andÐ šR Ðunderlying€burglary€felony,€beyond€mere€coincidence€of€time€and€place.€€Ð b ÐÌà  àActual€foreseeability€is€not€the€test.€€There€is€a€range€of€conduct€that€the€law€regards€asÐ òª Ðimplicitly€foreseeable,€whether€or€not€the€prospect€of€the€conduct€was€ever€actually€anticipated.€€AlððsÐ ºr Ðculpability€would€be€a€jury€issue.€€òòSee€òòMunfordóó€vs.€òòStateóó,€19€Md.€App.€640,€313€A.2d€563€(1974),€òòStóó.Ð ‚: Ðvs.€òòWatkinsóó€357€Md.€258,€744€A2d€1€(2000)€2€W.€LaFave€&€A.€Scott,€Substantive€Criminal€Law€Sec.Ð J  Ð7.5€at€212.óóÐ Ê! ÐÌØ! !Øò ò(B)ó óà  àFile€a€Motion€to€Waive€Alððs€case€back€to€the€Juvenile€Court€pursuant€to€òòArt.€27,€Sec.€594€AóóÐ ¢Z# Ðrequiring€a€waiver€investigation.Ð  l$$ Ðò òÔ#†!XšþXXXüR*œ#Ôà@ïï%ìàà@@ïï%ìàQuestion€10ˆÐ H ÐÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& È ÔÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔòŒòòòÝ  ÝóŒóó óóóÝ‚ÿЫimitÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ'ÈØà«ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÔ€XüRXX!XšþÔà  àBaker€must€file€and€serve€an€answer€to€Abel's€complaint€within€30€days€after€service€of€theÐ Ø ÐComplaint€on€Baker.€€The€answer€may€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€but€must€assert€anyÐ  X Ðaffirmative€defense€such€as€contributory€negligence.€Baker€should€also€file€a€third„party€complaintÐ h  Ðagainst€Charlie,€asserting,€that€if€Baker€is€liable€to€Abel,€then€Charlie€is€liable€to€Baker€for€all€or€partÐ 0è Ðof€Abel's€damages.€€Baker€must€file€the€third„party€complaint€within€30€days€after€the€filing€ofÐ ø° ÐBaker's€answer€to€Abel's€complaint€and€must€serve€on€Charlie€the€third„party€complaint,€a€summonsÐ Àx Ðand€a€copy€of€all€pleadings,€papers€and€notices€filed€in€the€case.€€Baker€should€also€file€a€cross„claimÐ ˆ @ Ðagainst€Charlie€asserting€that€Charlie€is€liable€for€Baker's€injuries.€Baker€should€also€file€aÐ P   Ðcounterclaim€against€Abel€asserting€that€Abel€is€liable€for€Baker's€injuries.€€The€cross„claim€andÐ  Ð  Ðcounter€claim€must€also€be€filed€within€30€days€after€the€filing€of€Baker's€answer€to€Abel's€complaint.Ð à ˜  ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ„¬ƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÌà  àOnce€Baker's€third„party€complaint€against€Charlie€is€filed€and€served€on€Charlie,€AbelÐ p (  Ðshould€promptly€file€an€amended€complaint€adding€Charlie€as€a€defendant€and€asserting€any€claimÐ 8ð  Ðthat€Abel€has€against€Charlie€arising€out€of€the€occurrence,€specifically€Charlie's€liability€directly€toÐ ¸  ÐAbel€for€Abel's€injuries.РȀ  ÐÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  Ýà  àCharlie€must€file€an€answer€to€Baker's€third„party€complaint€within€30€days€after€service.€ThisÐ X Ðanswer€may€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€and€may€assert€any€defense€that€Baker€has€to€Abel'sÐ  Ø Ðclaim€and€must€assert€any€affirmative€defense€such€as€contributory€negligence€on€the€part€of€Abel.€Ð è  ÐCharlie€must€also€file€an€answer€to€Baker's€cross„claim€within€30€days€after€service.€€This€answerÐ °h Ðmay€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€but€must€assert€any€affirmative€defense€such€as€contributoryÐ x0 Ðnegligence.€€Charlie€must€also€file€an€answer€to€Abel's€amended€complaint€within€30€days€afterÐ @ø Ðservice.€€This€answer€may€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€but€must€assert€any€affirmative€defenseÐ À Ðsuch€as€contributory€negligence.€€Charlie€should€also€file€a€counterclaim€against€Abel€asserting,€thatРЈ Ðif€Charlie€is€liable€to€Baker€on€Baker's€cross„claim,€then€Abel€is€liable€to€Charlie€for€all€or€part€ofÐ ˜P ÐBaker's€damages.€€Charlie€must€file€this€counterclaim€within€30€days€after€the€filing€of€Charlie'sÐ ` Ðanswer€to€Baker's€cross„claim.Ð (à ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿy³ƒÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÌà  àAbel€must€file€an€answer€to€Baker's€counterclaim€within€30€days€after€service.€€This€answerÐ ¸p Ðmay€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€but€must€assert€any€affirmative€defense€such€as€contributoryÐ €8 Ðnegligence.€Abel€also€must€file€an€answer€to€Charlie's€counterclaim€within€30€days€after€service.€ThisÐ H  Ðanswer€may€contain€a€general€denial€of€liability€and€may€assert€any€defense€that€Charlie€has€toÐ È! ÐBaker's€cross„claim€and€must€assert€any€affirmative€defense€such€as€contributory€negligence€on€theÐ Ø" Ðpart€of€Baker.€Ð  X# ÐÌà  àWithin€15€days€after€service€of€the€last€pleading€filed€by€any€party,€any€party€may€file€aÐ 0 è% Ðwritten€demand€for€a€jury€trial.Ð ø °& ÐÌÌò òà@] ] ìàEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€10ó óˆÐ P# ) ÐÌò òAnnotate€Code€of€Maryland,€òòMaryland€Rulesóóó óÐ à$˜!+ ÐÌò òTitle€2.€€CIVIL€PROCEDURE€„€CIRCUIT€COURT:€Rules€2„301,€2„302,€2„303,€2„304,€2„305,Ð p&(#- Ð2„311,€2„321,€2„322,€2„323,€2„324,€2„325,€2„331,€2„332,€2„341,€and€2„342.ó óÐ 8'ð#. ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ x-0*6 Їò òÔ‡XcDXXXüRÔó óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àò òà@^^%ìàQUESTION€11ˆÐ H ÐÓ  Óó óÌà  àThe€answer€should€first€address€whether€the€attorney€may€represent€both€the€nationalÐ Ø Ðchain€and€Flynn.€€Their€positions€are€potentially€adverse€since€Harry€is€an€agent€for€the€nationalÐ  X Ðchain€and€may€have€argued€that€the€fine€and€any€resulting€imprisonment€should€have€beenÐ h  Ðimposed€on€the€national€chain.Ð 0è ÐÌà  àThe€answer€should€next€address€whether€each€has€standing€to€challenge€the€law,€theÐ Àx Ðimposition€of€the€fine€and€the€incarceration.€€From€the€facts€it€appears€that€each€may€haveÐ ˆ @ Ðstanding€to€challenge€the€law€and€fine,€but€Flynn€alone€may€challenge€his€period€of€incarceration.Ð P   ÐÌà  àThe€constitutionality€of€the€law€may€be€attacked€on€several€grounds.€€First,€the€definitionÐ à ˜  Ðof€adult€uses€is€vague€and€overbroad€and,€therefore,€violative€of€due€process€requirements.€€It€isÐ ¨ `  Ðnot€clear€what€material€falls€within€the€definition€and€arguably€a€lot€of€material€may€be€of€aÐ p (  Ðsexual€nature.€€Secondly,€such€material€may€be€considered€a€form€of€speech€under€the€FirstÐ 8ð  ÐAmendment.€€As€such,€the€Countyððs€law€must€be€a€reasonable€time,€place€or€manner€restrictionÐ ¸  Ðnot€directed€at€the€content€of€said€speech€in€order€for€it€to€be€upheld.€€On€its€face,€this€law€doesРȀ  Ðnot€appear€to€regulate€the€content€of€the€speech,€but€it€still€may€not€be€reasonable€if€it€isÐ H  Ðoverbroad€and€vague.€€It€may€also€be€unreasonable€to€limit€the€amount€of€acreage€on€which€suchÐ X Ðuses€may€be€located€or€to€allow€the€use€only€in€an€isolated€portion€of€the€County.€€It€may€beÐ  Ø Ðunreasonable€to€require€an€additional€permit€for€adult€uses,€and€unreasonable€to€review€theÐ è  Ðpermit€application€for€2€ðð€months€prior€to€issuance.€€Finally,€the€law€may€violate€the€equalÐ °h Ðprotection€guarantees€provided€in€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€since€adult€uses€are€required€toÐ x0 Ðobtain€special€permits€not€required€of€other€uses€and€there€does€not€appear€to€be€a€reasonableÐ @ø Ðbasis€for€the€requirement.Ð À ÐÌà  àFun€Stuff€and€Flynn€may€also€wish€to€challenge€the€Courtððs€decision€to€enjoin€operationÐ ˜P Ðof€the€store€and€fine€Flynn.€€The€injunction€may€not€have€been€reasonable€for€the€reasonsÐ ` Ðaddressed€above.€€The€Eighth€Amendment€precludes€the€state€from€imposing€cruel€and€unusualÐ (à Ðor€excessive€punishment.€€The€fine€in€question€may€be€considered€excessive.Ð ð¨ ÐÌà  àMoreover,€it€has€been€held€that€jailing€a€person€for€failure€to€pay€a€fine€is€violative€of€theÐ €8 ÐEighth€Amendment.€€Flynn€should€therefore€be€successful€in€challenging€the€Courtððs€decision€toÐ H  Ðincarcerate€him€until€the€fine€was€paid.Ð È! ÐÌÌÌÌÌÔ#†XüRXXXcD­½#ÔÔ‡XcDXXXüRÔÐ  À!x' ÐÔ#†XüRXXXcD[Ê#ÔÔ‡XcDXXXüRÔò òÓ  Óà @ àQUESTION€12Ð H Ðó óÓÔÊÓÌÓ XÓThe€question€was€intended€to€generate€brief€discussion€on€the€following€areas€ofÐ Ø Ðconstitutional€law:€€1)€the€Contract€Clause;€2)€the€Commerce€Clause;€3)€the€Equal€ProtectionÐ  X ÐClause;€4)€the€Takings€Clause.Ð h  ÐÓ XÓÌÓ XÓThe€analysis€may€also€address€the€issues€of€ripeness€and€standing.€€The€legislation€wasÐ ø° Ðeffective€August€1,€2001.€€Was€the€legislation€ripe€for€TCI€to€challenge?€€Since€TCI€was€in€theÐ Àx Ðmiddle€of€the€ten„year€contract€that€began€in€1994€it€would€arguably€suffer€an€immediate€threatÐ ˆ @ Ðof€harm,€making€the€action€ripe.€€Additionally,€since€TCI€has€a€contract€stake€in€the€outcome€ofÐ P   Ðthe€legislation€it€may€challenge€the€legislation.Ð  Ð  ÐÓ XÓÌòòò òContract€Clauseó óóóÐ ¨ `  ÐÌÓ XÓThe€Contract€Clause€of€the€Constitution€states€in€part€that€states€cannot€enact€laws€thatÐ 8ð  Ðretroactively€impair€contract€rights.€€If€the€contract€between€TCI€and€Montgomery€County€isÐ ¸  Ðconsidered€a€private€contract,€the€legislation€would€be€reviewed€under€the€intermediate€scrutinyРȀ  Ðstandard€and€would€be€an€invalid€impairment€upon€the€contract€clause€unless€it:€1)€serves€anÐ H  Ðimportant€and€legitimate€public€interest€and€2)€is€reasonably€and€narrowly€tailored€to€promote€theÐ X Ðspecific€public€interest.€€Did€the€Maryland€General€Assemblyððs€legislation€meet€these€criteria?€€IfÐ  Ø Ðthe€contract€is€considered€a€public€contract,€the€same€test€would€be€applied€but€strict€scrutinyÐ è  Ðwould€be€the€standard.Ð °h ÐÓ XÓÌòòò òCommerce€Clauseó óóóÐ @ø ÐÌÓ XÓThe€Commerce€Clause€of€the€Constitution€regulates€interstate€commerce,€and€althoughРЈ Ðthe€State€of€Maryland€is€permitted€to€enact€regulations€that€regulate€aspects€of€interstateÐ ˜P Ðcommerce€said€regulations€cannot€unduly€burden€interstate€commerce€nor€discriminate€againstÐ ` Ðcommerce€to€protect€local€interest.€€With€the€enactment€of€this€legislation,€no€trash€from€VirginiaÐ (à Ðor€any€other€state€could€enter€into€a€Maryland€landfill.€€However,€the€legislation€also€preventedÐ ð¨ ÐMaryland€trash€from€being€deposited€into€a€landfill€as€well.€€Thus,€the€legislation€may€not€be€theÐ ¸p Ðleast€restrictive€alternative€measure€that€could€have€been€enacted.Ð €8 ÐÓ XÓÌÓ XÓIn€utilizing€the€balancing€test€to€determine€if€the€State€is€discriminating€against€interstateÐ È! Ðcommerce€or€whether€the€state€is€protecting€a€legitimate€governmental€interest,€one€mustÐ Ø" Ðquestion€whether€the€state€and€local€entity€is€operating€as€a€market€participant€in€which€case€theÐ  X# Ðlocal€entity€may€be€able€to€discriminate€to€the€benefits€of€its€citizens.Ð h $ ÐÓ XÓÌòòò ò5òòthóó€Amendment€Takings€Clauseó óóóÐ ø °& ÐÌÓ XÓA€discussion€of€the€5òòthóó€Amendment€Takings€Clause€would€be€applicable€as€well.€€ThisÐ ˆ"@( Ðclause€is€applicable€to€State€action€via€the€14òòthóó€Amendment.€€The€legislation€may€constitute€aÐ P# ) Ðtaking€of€TCIððs€property€if€it€does€not€substantially€advance€a€legitimate€state€interest,€or€if€itÐ $Ð * Ðdenies€economically€viable€use€of€its€property.€Ð à$˜!+ ÐÓ XÓÌòòò òEqual€Protectionó óóó€Ð p&(#- ÐÌÓ XÓThe€Equal€Protection€Clause€of€the€14òòthóó€Amendment€is€designed€to€make€sure€that€the€lawÐ (º$/ Ðtreats€people€in€the€same€class€equally,€and€not€differently€from€each€other,€absent€someÐ Ê(‚%0 Ðimportant€governmental€reason€for€disparate€treatment.€€In€the€subject€case,€the€issues€areÐ ’)J&1 Ðwhether€there€is€any€basis€for€the€State€to€provide€owners€of€state„of„the„art€environmentallyÐ Z*'2 Ðsensitive€vehicles€an€unfair€or€discriminatory€advantage€over€those€that€do€not€own€such€aÐ "+Ú'3 Ðvehicle€or€to€treat€trash€emanating€outside€of€the€County€differently.Ô#†XüRXXXcD²Ê#Ô