ÿWPC… >"BáAÑÕÿÔ‹qDúåE|›!&Rf9¢-ÀÉÎ#JèíñG"ñí†6Þ¿>rY 5<‘Lß,Œ*GF}p>5O†9;}/fŒ%+É.Q ³°-|Q,ž’C±í´1‰%i¤bl¬“`v›‹Ô £C“Ä÷H²aõoCá´[ÑäïNÕ­¼~ÖÓòzk²Ù@¯1·3úìƪÓͤú RÐČ˵þ:«ƒ ¹Ý쳶,ÃZëÉd¹cÝ7HÞ[•c‹ ¥è–ì°‹Mþ$Ž¬oïï­iÊèUä{ w|§lœ9/÷ò…0A,Å«pIÚé³[ŽbìNj‚¯ Òße/ÒÝÁ‰¼6ú_˪³“¢Æy×ëÔ]Ë„Ál•Õæ å!šcÞ/âµ›ò3¯BàÒw™ d5®œL„—' 4E¡•ÁGùRkx’Т©€Øãi추r¿3Ûœ(%냨Y¹r¬dèyô/Qò]']t×cÝk†#x‘#†Â†%—»Ñ!(œyÝë±haÏ6ÁO,ÐÅÌ[Rsb|’þîéIšCC ”7É2Ö{ò„¨¸°Žš ]è ­R™§ÒhćÇ* ó,(©b¦÷’ᔓ½Éa?8öàýy‘FÔôFÿÅW+(U >0~n 0žì 0<Š 0 hÆ 0j.˜ 0š¨#ÁB UN %Q MW ([ Nƒ ^ … w‘ 4• © m«   0¶Ï … Æ 0eSƸ 0e~U0ãU @ 0S 1uS 72Èúúúúúúú 1uô\  `‹&Times New Roman' JULY 2002 BAR EXAMINATION Pat0Pat .   64 'ÿÿ4Heading 1Ô€XXXÔò òÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  Óó óÔ€XXXÔ<ÿÿ:Default Para6 ÿÿ4Body TextÓ  ÓÓÓÓ  ÓÓÓ< ÿÿ:Body Text InÓ X ÓÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÓ X Ó#|x(rÅ$¡¡Ô..ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÔ€ X`UXX XÔÔ€X`UXX X`UÔ˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL$,,,,$0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular XJ°—-â ïsU-ê:i¢×+00ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ý ƒÀF)ÝÔ..ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÔ€ XfiXX XÔÔ€XfiXX XfiÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà@üüÊìàò òBoardððs€Analysis€Page€Ú  Ú1Ú  Ú€of€Ú  Ú20Ú  Úó ó(Ž3ÀF$©©Ý ƒÅ!ÝÔ..ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÔ€ Xo½XX XÔÔ€Xo½XX Xo½ÔÝ  Ý A, B,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#'æ2Quick A.ÚƒÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€Û1, 2, 3,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#(v2Quick 1.ÚƒÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€Û2Ͼ¦ `‹CG Times(mK¢ Z‹(Times New Roman 2S+P ÿÿ0_level1Ó Ôþ ÓÓ , ÓÓ;1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#;ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ8.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#8ÓÓ Ôþ Ó3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i) Ñ ° Ñ(ÿÿ35=EMU]em1a.)a.)a.)a.)a.)a.)a.)a.)Ý ƒÅ!ÝÔ..ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÔ€ XfiXX XÔÔ€XfiXX XfiÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  Óò òÖ€ÿÿÖJULY€2002€BAR€EXAMINATIONÐ ° ÐÌBOARDððS€ANALYSISÐ |Ì ÐÌQUESTION€1Ð H˜ ÐÌÓ  Óó óA.€€Arguments€by€the€State€for€admissibility€of€cocaine€from€duffel€bag€against€Ace:Ð  d ÐÌà  à1.€€Ace€was€legitimately€stopped€for€an€observed€minor€motor€vehicle€violation€„€runningÐ à 0 Ðthe€stop€sign.€€Even€if€Charles'€true€reason€for€stopping€Ace€was€his€interest€in€investigating€whetherÐ Æ   ÐAce€was€involved€in€other€criminal€activity€in€the€area€of€the€open€air€drug€market,€this€stop€isÐ ¬ ü  Ðallowed€under€the€4th€Amendment.€€See€òòWhren€v.€U.S.óó,€517€U.S.€806,€116€S.€Ct.€1767€(1996).€€TheÐ ’â  Ðmotivation€or€purpose€of€the€officer€who€makes€the€valid€traffic€stop€is€immaterial.Ð xÈ  Ѐ€Ð ^®  Ðà  à2.€€During€the€period€of€permissible€detention€for€the€issuance€of€the€traffic€citation,€theÐ D”  Ðperimeter€search€of€Ace's€car€by€the€drug€dog€was€proper€and€timely,€occurring€before€theÐ *z  Ðprocessing€of€the€traffic€stop€had€been€completed.€€See€òòPryor€v.€Stateóó,€122€Md.App.€671€(1998)Ð ` Ð(footnote€6€at€Page€681);€òòState€v.€Funkhouseróó,€140€Md.App.€696,€782€A.2d€387€(2001).Ð öF ÐÌà  à3.€€Charles€needed€no€further€justification€beyond€a€valid€traffic€stop€to€order€Ace€and€BobÐ Â Ðout€of€the€car.€€See€òòPennsylvania€v.€Mimmsóó,€434€U.S.€106,€98€S.Ct.€330€(1997).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  à4.€€Continued€detention€of€Ace€and€Bob€was€justified€by€the€drug€alert.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  à5.€€The€smelling€of€the€exterior€surface€of€the€car€is€not€a€search€within€the€contemplationÐ @ Ðof€the€4th€Amendment€and€therefore€it€needs€no€legal€justification.€€See€òòU.S.€v.€Placeóó,€462€U.S.€696,Ð &v Ð707,€103€S.Ct.€2637€(1983).€€The€only€thing€that€needs€justification€is€the€detention€of€Ace's€car€forÐ  \ Ðenough€time€so€that€it€would€be€in€a€place€to€be€sniffed.€€See€òòGadson€v.€Stateóó,€341€Md.€1,€668€A.2dÐ òB Ð22€(1995).€€The€dog€was€on€the€scene€and€no€additional€detention€time€was€needed.Ð Ø( ÐÌà  à6.€€When€a€qualified€dog€signals€to€its€handler€that€narcotics€are€in€the€vehicle,€that€is€òòipsoÐ ¤ô Ðfactoóó€probable€cause€to€justify€a€Warrantless€Carroll€Doctrine€Search€of€the€vehicle.€€See€òòWalkesÐ Š Ú Ðv.€Stateóó,€364€Md.€354,€774€A.2d€420€(2001).Ð p!À  ÐÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÓÓÝ  ÝÓÓÝ‚ÿÿÿÛ ÝÝ  Ýà  à7.€€The€unconsented€to€search€of€the€car€by€Charles,€without€a€warrant,€and€the€seizure€of€theÐ <#Œ" Ðduffel€bag€with€Ace's€nametag€began€after€the€K„9€alert,€which€came€within€minutes€of€the€initialÐ "$r# Ðstop.€€The€processing€of€the€traffic€violation€justified€the€initial€detention€and€the€K„9€alert.€€ThereÐ %X $ Ðwas€probable€cause€to€justify€a€Warrantless€Carroll€Doctrine€Search.€€In€summary,€the€traffic€stopÐ î%>!% Ðwas€objectively€reasonable;€the€processing€of€the€traffic€violation€was€still€in€progress€when€the€dogÐ Ô&$"& Ðalerted€to€the€car;€subsequent€warrantless€search€of€the€vehicle€was€reasonable;€the€warrantlessÐ º' #' Ðsearch€produced€the€duffel€bag€with€contraband.݃ÿÿÛ & ݌Р (ð#( ÐŒÓ  ÓÓÓÝ  ÝÌà  à8.€€Police€officers€with€probable€cause€to€search€a€car€may€inspect€passenger's€belongingsÐ l*¼%* Ðfound€in€the€car€that€are€capable€of€concealing€the€object€of€the€search.€€See€òòWyoming€v.€Houghtonóó,Ð R+¢&+ Ð526€U.S.€295,€119€S.Ct.€1297€(1999).Ð 8,ˆ', Ðà  à9.€€Closed€containers€in€cars€can€be€searched€without€a€warrant€because€of€their€presenceÐ ° Ðwithin€the€vehicle.€€If€the€police€have€probable€cause€to€search€a€lawfully€stopped€car,€then€they€canÐ –æ Ðconduct€a€warrantless€search€of€any€container€found€inside€the€car€that€may€conceal€the€object€of€theÐ |Ì Ðsearch.€€See€generally€òòU.S.€v.€Rossóó,€456€U.S.€798,€102€S.Ct.€2157.€€The€drugs€in€the€duffel€bagÐ b² Ðshould€be€found€admissible€in€the€State's€case€against€Ace.Ð H˜ ÐÌB.€€Arguments€Bob's€Counsel€would€make€to€suppress€the€cocaine€recovered€from€the€"fanny€pack"Ð  d Ðtaken€from€Bobððs€waist:Ð ú J ÐÌà  à1.€€Bob€was€not€in€the€car€at€the€time€of€the€car's€search€under€the€Carroll€Doctrine.€€He€wasÐ Æ   Ðoutside€of€the€car.Ð ¬ ü  ÐÌà  à2.€€The€"fanny€pack"€strapped€around€Bob's€waist€was€a€part€of€his€outer€clothing€and€wasÐ xÈ  Ða€part€of€his€person.Ð ^®  ÐÌà  à3.€€The€search€of€Bob's€person€cannot€be€justified€under€the€Carroll€Doctrine€search€of€theÐ *z  Ðcar.€€The€"fanny€pack"€was€taken€during€an€unconsented€to€and€warrantless€search€of€and€seizureÐ ` Ðfrom€Bob's€person.€€While€it€is€arguable€that€the€dog€alert€gave€the€police€probable€cause€to€arrestÐ öF ÐBob,€he€was€a€passenger€in€the€vehicle€who€was€not€otherwise€identified€with€the€duffel€bag.€€AÐ Ü, Ðpositive€cocaine€alert€to€an€automobile€in€and€of€itself€does€not€provide€probable€cause€to€arrest€orÐ Â Ðsearch€a€passenger.€€See€òòWallace€v.€Stateóó,€#2393€September€Term€2001.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  à4.€€Bob's€winning€argument€is€that€he€had€not€been€arrested€when€the€search€occurred.€€AÐ tÄ Ðsearch€incident€to€a€lawful€arrest€is€an€exception€to€the€warrant€requirement.€€It€authorizes€a€full„Ð Zª Ðblown€search€of€the€person€for€the€purpose€of€discovery€of€evidence€(unlike€a€frisk€of€a€stop€andÐ @ Ðfrisk,€which€only€authorizes€a€pat„down€of€clothing€surface€for€a€limited€purpose€of€detecting€theÐ &v Ðpresence€of€a€weapon).€€It€is€arguable€that€Bob€had€never€been€arrested€prior€to€the€search.Ð  \ ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÓÓÝ  ÝÓÓÝ‚ÿÿÿ ÝÝ  Ý݃ÿÿ U݌̌Ó  ÓÓÓÝ  Ýà  à5.€€The€probable€cause€to€believe€that€a€person€was€carrying€evidence€does€not€justify€aÐ Ø( Ðwarrantless€search€of€a€person.€€Ð ¾ ÐÌ€à  à6.€€The€fact€that€the€police€had€probable€cause€for€a€lawful€arrest€of€a€person€does€not,€in€andÐ Š Ú Ðof€itself,€justify€a€warrantless€search€of€that€person.€€The€search,€again,€must€be€incident€to€the€arrestÐ p!À  Ðitself.Ð V"¦! ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÓÓÝ  ÝÓÓÝ‚ÿÿÿ„ÝÝ  Ý݃ÿÿ„Ï݌̌Ó  ÓÓÓÝ  Ýà  à7.€€Here€no€arrest€was€made€until€after€the€seizure€by€Charles€of€the€"fanny€pack"€with€theÐ "$r# Ðcocaine€in€it.Ð %X $ ÐÌÌà  à8.€€An€actual€arrest,€and€not€the€right€to€arrest,€is€the€indispensable€prerequisite€for€aÐ º' #' Ðwarrantless€search€incident€to€a€lawful€arrest.€€See€òòBoulder€v.€Stateóó,€276€Md.€511,€350€A.2d€130Ð  (ð#( Ð(1976).Ð †)Ö$) ÐÌà  à9.€€Bob's€attorney€can€successfully€argue€that€this€was€an€arrest€incident€to€a€search€andÐ R+¢&+ Ðtherefore€a€bad€search€and€seizure.€€The€search€and€arrest€were€not€sufficiently€or€essentiallyÐ 8,ˆ', Ðcontemporaneous.Ð ° ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÓÓÝ  ÝÓÓÝ‚ÿÿÿùÝÝ  Ý݃ÿÿùD݌̌Ó  ÓÓÓÝ  Ýà  à10.€€The€seizing€and€searching€of€the€"fanny€pack"€was€not€a€consequence€or€incident€of€aÐ |Ì Ðdecision€to€arrest€Bob.€€The€arrest€of€Bob€was€a€consequence€of€what€was€found€in€the€search€of€theÐ b² Ð"fanny€pack"€notwithstanding€that€Charles€may€have€had€an€alternative€and€independent€basis€forÐ H˜ Ðarresting€Bob.Ð . ~ ÐÌÔ‡ XfiXXXfiÔÐ  ú J Ðà@"ìàò òBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€2ó óˆÐ |Ì ÐÌà  àA.€€The€motion€in€limine€will€be€denied.€The€trial€judge€will€allow€Dr.€Floss€to€testify€as€anÐ H˜ Ðexpert€for€the€defense€at€trial€and€to€relate€the€information€received€from€Jane.Ð . ~ ÐÌà  à1.€€Jane€has€placed€her€dental/medical€condition€at€issue€in€this€civil€action.€€Any€right€toÐ ú J Ðprivacy€as€a€patient€as€to€this€condition€has€been€waived.Ð à 0 ÐÌà  à2.€€Although€he€had€been€originally€consulted€by€Jane€for€a€dental/medical€evaluation€andÐ ¬ ü  Ðpossible€treatment,€€Dr.€Floss€would€not€be€violating€any€physician„patient€relationship€by€testifyingÐ ’â  Ðas€an€expert€witness€for€the€defense€because€there€is€no€physician„patient€privilege€in€Maryland.€Ð xÈ  ÐòòòòButler„Tulio€v.€Scroggins,óóóó€139€Md.€App.€122,€135,€774€A.2d.€1209€(2001).Ð ^®  ÐÌà  à3.€€Inapplicable€on€these€facts€are€Marylandððs€limited€patient„psychiatrist€privilege€and€Ð *z  Ðpatient„psychologist€privilege€(Courts€and€Judicial€Proceedings€Article,€section€9„109).Ð ` ÐÌà  à4.€€Janeððs€statements€against€her€interest€to€Dr.€Floss€would€not€be€excluded€as€hearsay,Ð Ü, Ðwhether€or€not€Jane€is€at€trial,€because€defense€would€offer€them€as€statements€against€her.€€ForÐ Â Ðexample,€her€statements€of€only€occasional€difficulties€in€eating€and€speaking€normally€and€possiblyÐ ¨ø Ðher€apparent€search€for€an€expert€who€would€support€her€negligence€claim€against€Dr.€Brush€wouldÐ ŽÞ Ðbe€admissible€under€this€theory.€€Maryland€Rule€5„803€(a)€(1).Ð tÄ ÐÌà  à5.€€It€is€arguable€whether€Dr.€Floss€was€a€physician€treating€Jane€because€he€simply€madeÐ @ Ða€dental/medical€evaluation€and€left€open€the€possibilities€of€further€consultation€and€treatment.€€TheÐ &v Ðgiven€facts€only€discuss€one€visit€by€Jane.€€If€Dr.€Floss€were€a€treating€physician,€Maryland€Rule€5„Ð  \ Ð803€(b)€(4)€allows,€as€an€exception€to€the€hearsay€rule,€Janeððs€statements€for€the€purposes€ofÐ òB Ðdental/medical€diagnosis€or€treatment.Ð Ø( ÐÌà  à6.€€Dr.€Floss,€whether€or€not€the€treating€physician,€has€no€fiduciary€duty€to€Jane€to€refuseÐ ¤ô Ðto€testify€for€the€defense€about€the€medical€condition€raised€by€Jane€in€this€case.€òòòòScroggins,óóóó€139€Md.Ð Š Ú ÐApp.€at€138„139.Ð p!À  ÐÌà  àB.€€Even€with€the€additional€facts,€the€trial€judge€will€allow€Dr.€Floss€to€testify€atÐ <#Œ" Ðtrial€as€a€defense€expert€and€to€relate€the€information€received€from€Jane.Ð "$r# ÐÌà  à1.€€Jane€never€retained€or€designated€Dr.€Floss€as€an€expert€in€the€case.€€However,€JaneððsÐ î%>!% Ðcounsel€may€argue€that€Dr.€Flossðð€billing€for€research€done€on€specific€points€discussed€with€JaneððsÐ Ô&$"& Ðcounsel€was€a€retainer.€Ð º' #' Ðà  àÌà  à2.€€There€was€no€confidential€relationship€established€in€the€telephone€conversation€betweenÐ †)Ö$) ÐJaneððs€attorney€and€Dr.€Floss.Ð l*¼%* ЀÌà  à3.€€The€facts€do€not€state€whether€any€confidential€information€was€provided€by€JaneððsÐ 8,ˆ', Ðattorney€to€Dr.€Floss.€€If€confidential€information€had€been€provided,€there€still€was€no€establishmentÐ ° Ðof€a€confidential€relationship€with€Dr.€Floss.Ð –æ ÐÌà  à4.€€There€is€no€òòex€parte€óóprohibition€against€defense€counsel€discussing€the€case€with€Dr.Ð b² ÐFloss.€€Jane€placed€her€dental/medical€condition€at€issue.€€Maryland€Rule€of€Professional€ConductÐ H˜ Ð4.2€bars€only€such€òòex€parteóó€communication€between€a€lawyer€and€a€party€represented€by€anotherÐ . ~ Ðlawyer€without€the€consent€of€the€other€lawyer€or€without€authorization€by€law€or€court€order€forÐ  d Ðsuch€communication.Ð ú J ÐÌà@ññìàà@@€€ìàPOINTS€AND€AUTHORITIESˆÐ Æ   Ðà  àòòòòButler„Tulio€v.€Scroggins,óóóó€139€Md.€App.€122,€135,€138„139,€(and€generally),€774€A.2d.€1209Ð ¬ ü  Ð(2001).Ð ’â  Ðà  àCourts€and€Judicial€Proceedings€Article,€section€9„109.Ð xÈ  Ðà  àMaryland€Rule€5„803€(a)€(1).Ð ^®  Ðà  àMaryland€Rule€5„803€(b)€(4).Ð D”  Ðà  àMaryland€Rule€of€Professional€Conduct€4.2.Ô#†XfiXX Xfi0!#ÔÐ *z  ÐÓ9%° °ßÀpÈ xÐ (#°œX9ÓÌÌò òÔ€XfiXXXfiÔÐ  Ü, Ðà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€3ˆÐ |Ì ÐÌà  àó óThis€question€raises€issues€of€the€attorneyððs€responsibility€under€the€Maryland€Rules€ofÐ H˜ ÐProfessional€Conduct€when,€after€accepting€employment,€subsequent€events€raise€potential€conflictsÐ . ~ Ðof€interest.Ð  d ÐÌà  àAt€the€time€Doris€retained€you,€the€information€made€available€to€you€did€not€suggest€thatÐ à 0 Ðyou€could€not€represent€Doris€as€personal€representative€and€as€a€beneficiary€in€Tomððs€will.€€RuleÐ Æ   Ð1.7€permits€such€representation€if€the€attorney€reasonably€believes€that€it€will€not€adversely€affectÐ ¬ ü  Ðthe€relationship€with€other€clients.€€The€interest€of€the€estate€and€that€of€Doris€and€her€siblings€areÐ ’â  Ðnot€in€conflict.€€Ð xÈ  ÐÌà  àThe€farm€would€pass€to€the€named€devisees€in€Tomððs€will€as€tenants€in€common,€or€theÐ D”  Ðoriginal€deed€could€be€recorded€with€the€same€result.€€Based€on€Dorisðð€information,€ð ðDoris,€Ella€andÐ *z  ÐFredðð€and€ð ðthose€of€my€children€who€survive€meðð€are€the€same.€€You€could€represent€the€estate€andÐ ` ÐTomððs€children€after€consultation€and€consent.Ð öF ÐÌà  àThe€discovery€of€Sam€as€a€possible€child€of€Tom€creates€a€clear€conflict€of€interest€for€youÐ Â Ðunder€Rule€1.7,€both€with€respect€to€your€representation€of€the€estate€and€of€Doris,€Ella€and€Fred.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àDorisðð€expressed€objective€that€Sam€not€take€an€interest€in€the€farm€and€that€the€deed€be€Ð tÄ Ðrecorded€in€view€of€Samððs€claims€are€not€proper€objectives€for€you€to€pursue€as€attorney€for€TomððsÐ Zª Ðestate.€€As€such€you€must€carry€out€the€directives€of€Tomððs€will,€including,€in€this€case,€a€€judicialÐ @ Ðdetermination€as€to€whether€or€not€Sam€€is€one€of€Tomððs€children.€€Recording€the€deed€after€beingÐ &v Ðcontacted€by€Sam€appears€to€violate€RPC€1.2(d)€which€prohibits€assisting€a€client€in€conduct€whichÐ  \ Ðthe€attorney€reasonably€believes€would€be€fraudulent.€€If€Doris€persists€in€this€course,€Rule€1.16Ð òB Ðwould€require€you€to€withdraw€from€representing€the€estate€and€of€Doris,€Ella€and€Fred,Ð Ø( Ðindividually.€€Ð ¾ ÐÌà  àYour€responsibility€at€this€stage€is€to€advise€all€parties€to€retain€separate€counsel€to€representÐ Š Ú Ðtheir€respective€interests.€€Rule€4.3.€€Sam€is€entitled€to€a€copy€of€the€will€and€he€should€be€advisedÐ p!À  Ðof€the€existence€of€the€unrecorded€deed€under€Rule€1.6(a)€&€(b).Ð V"¦! ÐÌà  àThe€interests€of€Doris,€Ella€and€Fred,€individually,€are€not€in€conflict.€€Dorisðð€obligation€asÐ "$r# Ða€personal€representative€appears€to€be€in€conflict€with€her€personal€interest€in€establishing€the€deedÐ %X $ Ðas€a€valid€transfer€of€title€so€that€the€farm€is€not€an€asset€of€Tomððs€estate€in€which€Sam€wouldÐ î%>!% Ðpotentially€share.€€Ð Ô&$"& ÐÌà  àCounsel€for€Doris,€Ella€and€Fred€would€argue€that€Tomððs€intention€was€to€exclude€Sam€fromÐ  (ð#( Ðany€interest€in€the€farm.€€He€had€acknowledged€Sam€as€his€child€12€years€before€making€his€will€andÐ †)Ö$) Ðhad€given€a€copy€of€the€deed€and€his€will€to€Doris€a€week€prior€to€his€death;€that€the€fair€inferencesÐ l*¼%* Ðto€be€drawn€from€these€facts€are€€(1)€€that€Tom€intended€to€exclude€Sam€by€executing€a€deed€withÐ R+¢&+ Ðknowledge€of€Samððs€relationship,€and€(2)€that€by€delivery€of€a€copy€of€the€deed€to€Doris€with€theÐ 8,ˆ', Ðwill€shortly€before€his€death,€Tom€intended€by€that€act€to€deliver€the€deed€to€Doris€for€the€benefitÐ ° Ðof€the€named€grantees.€€Further,€that€had€Tom€intended€to€give€Sam€an€interest€by€will,€he€would€notÐ –æ Ðhave€performed€a€meaningless€act€ð!ð€giving€the€copy€of€the€deed€to€Doris.Ð |Ì ÐÌà  àDetermination€of€issues€surrounding€the€effectiveness€of€delivery€of€a€copy€of€the€deed;Ð H˜ ÐTomððs€intentions;€proof€of€paternity;€and€interpretation€of€the€will€are€beyond€the€authority€of€aÐ . ~ Ðpersonal€representative€and€would€be€resolved€by€an€appropriate€judicial€proceeding.Ð  d ÐÌà  àAn€applicant€received€equal€credit€whether€he/she€advocated€for€Dorisðð€position€individuallyÐ à 0 Ðor€as€personal€representative.Ð Æ   ÐÌò òà@ìì*ìàÔ_ԈР ’â  ÐÑX°ÑÑ€ OaÑà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSIS€ˆÐ ° ÐÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€4ˆÐ |Ì ÐÌà  àó óA.€€Interrogatories€to€parties€are€controlled€by€Rule€2„421€of€the€Maryland€Rules€ofÐ H˜ ÐProcedure.€€Maryland€Rule€2„432(b)(1)(D)€provides€that€a€discovering€party,€upon€reasonable€noticeÐ . ~ Ðto€other€parties€and€all€persons€affected,€may€move€for€an€order€compelling€discovery€if€a€party€failsÐ  d Ðto€answer€an€interrogatory€submitted€under€Rule€2„421.€€Maryland€Rule€2„431€provides€that€aÐ ú J Ðdispute€pertaining€to€discovery€need€not€be€considered€by€the€Court€unless€the€attorney€seekingÐ à 0 Ðaction€has€filed€a€certificate€describing€good€faith€attempts€to€discuss€a€resolution€of€the€dispute€withÐ Æ   Ðthe€opposing€attorney.€€Thus,€the€conditions€of€2„432€including€the€date,€time€and€circumstances€ofÐ ¬ ü  Ðeach€discussion€or€attempted€discussion€should€be€included€in€the€certificateÐ ’â  ÐÌà  àRule€2„433€provides€the€sanctions€available€for€the€refusal€to€respond.Ð ^®  ÐÌà  àB.€€Rule€2„401(e)€states€that,€except€in€case€of€a€deposition,€a€party€who€has€responded€toÐ *z  Ða€request€or€order€for€discovery€and€obtains€further€material€information€before€trial€mustÐ ` Ðsupplement€the€response€promptly.€€Thus,€if€the€information€obtained€by€Doug€is€ð ðmaterialðð€Ô_ÔHCAÔ_ÔÐ öF Ðmust€promptly€supplement€its€response€to€Interrogatory€No.€1.€€This€is€so€irrespective€of€whetherÐ Ü, Ðthe€answers€are€expressly€made€continuing€by€provision€added€to€them.€€òòÔ_ÔParreÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔRodriqueÔ_Ôóó,€€€€€€256Ð Â ÐMd.€204€(1969).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àC.€€Chuck€cannot€be€required€to€attend€a€deposition€in€Maryland€unless€he€is€served€aÐ tÄ Ðsubpoena€in€Maryland.€€€Rule€2„413(a)(1).€€Maryland€Rules€authorize€you€to€require€Chuck€to€attendÐ Zª Ða€deposition€in€another€state€in€accordance€with€the€law€of€the€place€where€the€deposition€is€held.€Ð @ ÐConsequently,€you€would€have€to€refer€to€New€Jersey€for€the€procedures€to€require€Chuck€to€appearÐ &v Ðfor€a€deposition€in€that€state.€€Rule€2„413(a)(2).€€The€deposition€will€be€taken€in€accordance€with€theÐ  \ Ðprocedures€prescribed€by€Maryland€Rule€2„415.Ð òB ÐÌà  àD.€€If€the€opposing€party€was€present€when€Chuckððs€deposition€was€taken€or€had€due€noticeÐ ¾ Ðthereof,€Chuckððs€deposition€may€be€used€for€any€purpose€against€the€Defendant€if€the€Court€findsÐ ¤ô Ðthat€Chuck€is€out€of€state.€€Rule€2„419(3)(B).€€Since€these€conditions€are€met€the€trial€judge€shouldÐ Š Ú Ðoverrule€the€objection€of€defense€counsel.Ð p!À  ÐÌà  àE.€€Under€Maryland€Rule€2„403€a€party€may€file€a€motion€and€for€good€cause€shown€theÐ <#Œ" ÐCourt€may€enter€any€order€that€justice€requires€to€protect€a€party€or€person€from€annoyance€orÐ "$r# Ðembarrassment.€€If€the€purpose€of€calling€Darrell€to€testify€is€simply€to€annoy€or€embarrass€Anna,Ð %X $ Ða€protective€order€would€be€appropriate.€€Should€the€Court€believe€that€Darrell€has€relevantÐ î%>!% Ðinformation€or€rule€that€deposing€counsel€is€permitted€to€pursue€relevant€information,€the€CourtÐ Ô&$"& Ðcould€under€Rule€2„403(a)(5)€provide€that€certain€matters€not€be€inquired€into€or€that€the€scope€ofÐ º' #' Ðdiscovery€be€limited€to€certain€matters€or€that€(6)€the€discovery€be€conducted€with€no€one€presentÐ  (ð#( Ðexcept€the€persons€designated€by€the€Court.€Ð †)Ö$) ÐÌò òà@z z ìàEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€4ó ó€ˆÐ R+¢&+ ÐÌò òTITLE€2.€CIVIL€PROCEDURE€ð!ð€CIRCUIT€COURT:€€Rule€2„401;€Rule€2„402;€Rule€2„403;Ð -n(- ÐRule€2„413;€Rule€2„415;€Rule€2„419;€Rule€2„421;€Rule€2„431;€Rule€2„432;€Rule€2„433Ð .T). ÐÑ Oa Ñâ  âÑ°XÑâ  âÑ  Ñó óÌò òà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISó óˆÐ –æ ÐÌà@’’%ìàò òQUESTION€5ó óˆÐ b² ÐÌà  àQuestion€5€asks€for€the€applicant€to€identify€and€analyze€constitutional€law€issues€arising€outÐ . ~ Ðof€the€operation€of€a€youth€sports€league€with€some€affiliation€to€a€local€government.€€The€primaryÐ  d Ðemphasis€in€grading€is€on€issue€identification.Ð ú J ÐÌà  àAs€a€preliminary€matter,€both€Lenny€and€Allan€have€standing€to€file€suit€against€the€HowardÐ Æ   ÐYouth€Hockey€Club,€Inc.€(the€ð ðClubðð).€€Each€has€suffered€a€direct€injury€arising€out€of€theÐ ¬ ü  Ðenforcement€of€the€Clubððs€rules.€€As€a€minor,€Allanððs€suit€will€have€to€be€brought€by€his€parents€orÐ ’â  Ðguardian.Ð xÈ  ÐÌà  àThe€Constitution€is€not€applicable€to€private€organizations.€€Thus,€one€issue€is€whether€theÐ D”  ÐClub€is€a€state€agent€as€that€doctrine€has€been€developed€in€a€long€line€of€Supreme€Court€decisionsÐ *z  Ðbeginning€with€òòBurton€v.€Wilmington€Parking€Authorityóó,€365€U.S.€715€(1961).€€Ð ` Ðà  àÌà  àThe€test€has€been€articulated€by€the€Court€as€follows:Ð Ü, ÐÌà8  àConduct€allegedly€causing€the€deprivation€of€a€constitutional€right€protected€againstÐ ¨ø Ðinfringement€by€a€State€must€be€fairly€attributable€to€the€State.€In€determining€theÐ ŽÞ Ðquestion€of€"fair€attribution,"€(a)€the€deprivation€must€be€caused€by€the€exercise€ofÐ tÄ Ðsome€right€or€privilege€created€by€the€State€or€by€a€rule€of€conduct€imposed€by€it€orÐ Zª Ðby€a€person€for€whom€it€is€responsible,€and€(b)€the€party€charged€with€the€deprivationÐ @ Ðmust€be€a€person€who€may€fairly€be€said€to€be€a€state€actor,€either€because€he€is€aÐ &v Ðstate€official,€because€he€has€acted€together€with€or€has€obtained€significant€aid€fromÐ  \ Ðstate€officials,€or€because€his€conduct€is€otherwise€chargeable€to€the€State.€€òòÔ_ÔLugarÔ_Ô€v.Ð òB ÐÔ_ÔEdmondsonÔ_Ô€Oil€Co.óó,€457€U.S.€922€(1982).ÐØ(Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIt€is€clear€that€the€mere€use€of€the€County€recreational€facility€does€not€òòper€se€óórender€the€ClubÐ ¤ô Ða€state€agent.€€òòGilmore€v.€City€of€Montgomeryóó,€417€U.S.€556€(1974).€Ð Š Ú ÐÌà  àFactors€raised€by€these€facts€bear€on€whether€the€Club€is€a€state€agent€are:€the€reduced€rinkÐ V"¦! Ðrentals;€the€fact€that€the€County€allows€the€Club€to€use€its€snack€bar€facilities€to€raise€money;€and,Ð <#Œ" Ðmost€importantly,€that€the€County€Parks€director€banned€Lout€from€the€skating€facility€at€the€ClubððsÐ "$r# Ðrequest€for€a€violation€of€a€Club€rule.€Ð %X $ ÐÌà  àIf€the€Club€is€deemed€to€be€a€state€agent,€the€provisions€of€the€Constitution€apply€to€it.òò€Ð Ô&$"& ÐBurton€v.€Wilmington€Parking€Authority,€supra.óó€€The€mandatory€prayer€before€each€game€violatesÐ º' #' Ðthe€Establishment€Clause€of€the€First€Amendment,€even€if€its€purpose€is€to€reduce€violence€asÐ  (ð#( Ðopposed€to€inculcating€religion.€€òòLee€v.€Ô_ÔWeismanÔ_Ô,óó€505€U.S.€577€(1992).€€The€Supreme€Court€appliesÐ †)Ö$) Ða€three€part€test€to€determine€whether€a€law€violates€the€Establishment€Clauseòòóó:€€Ð l*¼%* ÐÌà0  à1.€€the€regulation€must€serve€a€secular€legislative€purpose;€€Ð8,ˆ',(#(# Їà0  à2.€€the€regulationððs€primary€effect€must€be€one€that€neither€advances€nor€inhibits€religion;Ð ° Ðand€Ð–æ(#(# ÐÌà0  à3.€€the€regulation€must€not€foster€an€excessive€government€entanglement€with€religion.€Ð b² ÐòòLemon€v.€Ô_ÔKurtzmanÔ_Ôóó,€403€U.S.€602€(1971òò).€€€óóÐH˜(#(# ÐÌà  àHere,€the€prayer€requirement€serves€a€secular€purpose,€i.e.€minimizing€violence,€but€its€callÐ  d Ðto€ð ðAlmighty€Godðð€clearly€advances€religion.€€Thus€the€rule€would€fail€the€òòLemonóó€test€if€the€ClubÐ ú J Ðwere€deemed€to€be€a€state€actor.Ð à 0 ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€Allan€can€argue€that€requiring€him€to€recite€a€prayer€at€odds€with€his€ownÐ ¬ ü  Ðreligious€beliefs€violates€his€rights€under€the€Free€Exercise€Clause€of€the€First€Amendment.€€òòSeeÐ ’â  ÐÔ_ÔCantwellÔ_Ô€v.€Connecticutóó,€310€U.S.€296,€303€(1940):Ð xÈ  ÐÌà8  àThe€constitutional€inhibition€of€legislation€on€the€subject€of€religion€.€.€.€forestallsÐ D”  Ðcompulsion€by€law€of€the€acceptance€of€any€creed€or€the€practice€of€any€form€ofÐ *z  Ðworship.€€Freedom€of€conscience€and€freedom€to€adhere€to€such€religiousÐ ` Ðorganization€or€form€of€worship€as€the€individual€may€choose€cannot€be€restrictedÐ öF Ðby€law.€ÐÜ,Ð Ð  ÐÌÓN.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ßÀ†X(#NÓà  àLenny€should€raise€the€argument€that€the€Club€rule€against€ð ðverbal€confrontationsðð€is€vagueÐ ¨ø Ðand€Ô_ÔoverbroadÔ_Ô.€€The€two€doctrines€are€related.€€First,€the€Ô_ÔoverbreadthÔ_Ô€doctrine€permits€the€facialÐ ŽÞ Ðinvalidation€of€laws€that€inhibit€the€exercise€of€First€Amendment€rights€if€the€impermissibleÐ tÄ Ðapplications€of€the€law€are€substantial€when€"judged€in€relation€to€the€statute's€plainly€legitimateÐ Zª Ðsweep."€€òòChicago€v.€Morales,€óó527€U.S.€41,€52€(1999)€quotingòò€Ô_ÔBroadrickÔ_Ôóó€v.€òòOklahoma,óó€413€U.S.€601,Ð @ Ð612„615€(1973).€€A€regulation€is€vague€when€it€is€not€worded€precisely€enough€to€give€fair€warningÐ &v Ðthat€contemplated€action€would€violate€the€regulation.€€òòSee€e.g.€Ô_ÔLanzettaÔ_Ô€v.€New€Jerseyóó,€306€U.S.€451Ð  \ Ð(1939).Ð òB ÐÌà  àWhile€a€local€government€agency€clearly€has€an€interest€in€maintaining€decorum€and€order,Ð ¾ Ðespecially€at€public€facilities,€and€avoiding€violence€at€youth€recreational€activities,€a€ban€on€ð ðverbalÐ ¤ô Ðconfrontationsðð€would€cover€a€broad€variety€of€interactions€between€adults,€many€of€which€wouldÐ Š Ú Ðnot€normally€be€likely€to€lead€to€violence.€€Thus€the€rule€is€Ô_ÔoverbroadÔ_Ô.€€The€regulation€is€also€vagueÐ p!À  Ðbecause€it€gives€no€real€indication€of€what€is,€and€is€not,€prohibited.Ð V"¦! ÐÌà  àLenny€also€can€argue€that€the€Boardððs€action€in€banning€him€from€the€ice€rink€for€the€seasonÐ "$r# Ðwithout€affording€him€an€opportunity€to€present€his€version€of€events€violates€the€Due€ProcessÐ %X $ ÐClause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€Lenny€has€a€liberty€interest€in€watching€his€child€participateÐ î%>!% Ðin€sporting€events.€€Courts€employ€a€balancing€test€to€determine€whether€a€hearing€should€be€heldÐ Ô&$"& Ðand€the€extent€and€formality€of€the€hearing.€€òòMathews€v.€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ôóó,€424€U.S.€319€(1976).€€Ð º' #' ÐÌÌÌÌÐ 8,ˆ', Ðà@"ìàò òBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€6ó óˆÐ |Ì ÐÌà  àQuestion€6€asks€for€the€applicant€to€identify€and€analyze€principles€of€corporate€law€arisingÐ H˜ Ðout€of€a€fact€pattern€involving€gross€misconduct€by€corporate€officials.€€The€facts€raise€two€separateÐ . ~ Ðgroups€of€issues:€€first,€are€Able€and€the€other€individuals€liable€and,€second,€does€First€Bank€haveÐ  d Ðthe€standing€to€enforce€the€liabilities?€€The€emphasis€in€grading€was€on€issue€identification.€Ð ú J Ðà  àÌà  àThe€note€to€First€Bank€is€in€the€name€of€the€corporation.€€Although€Able€signed€the€note,€heÐ Æ   Ðdid€so€in€his€capacity€as€president€of€the€corporation.€€He€is€not€personally€liable€on€the€note€becauseÐ ¬ ü  Ðof€his€signature.€€Neither€Baker€nor€Carla€have€any€liability€arising€out€of€the€note€itself.€€TheirÐ ’â  Ðliability,€if€it€exists€at€all,€arises€out€of€their€conduct€pertaining€to€the€dividend€in€2002.Ð xÈ  ÐÌà  àNo€dividend€was€properly€authorized.€€Dividends€may€be€declared€only€by€action€of€theÐ D”  Ðboard€of€directors.€€Md.€Anno.€Code€Corporations€and€Associations€Article€(hereafter€ð ðCodeðð)€ðð€2„Ð *z  Ð309(a).€€On€a€board€of€directors,€each€director€has€one€vote€and€the€affirmative€vote€of€the€directorsÐ ` Ðpresent€is€necessary€to€carry€an€action.€€Code€ðð€2„408.€€In€this€case,€Able€voted€for€the€dividend,Ð öF ÐBaker€voted€against€it€and€Carla€abstained.€€The€dividend€was€thus€not€validly€authorized.€€AbleððsÐ Ü, Ðinstructions€to€the€bookkeeper€to€issue€the€dividends€was€unauthorized€and€improperòò.€€€€óóAs€such,€theÐ Â Ðthree€directors€are€jointly€and€severally€liable€unless€they€have€a€defense.€€Code€2„312(a).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€defense€which€might€be€available€to€the€directors€is€the€business€judgment€rule,€codifiedÐ tÄ Ðin€Maryland€in€Code€2„405.1€which€reads€in€pertinent€part:Ð Zª ÐÌà8  à(a)€òòIn€general.óó€ð"ðð"ð€A€director€shall€perform€his€duties€as€a€director,€including€hisÐ &v Ðduties€as€a€member€of€a€committee€of€the€board€on€which€he€serves:€(1)€In€goodÐ  \ Ðfaith;€(2)€In€a€manner€he€reasonably€believes€to€be€in€the€best€interests€of€theÐ òB Ðcorporation;€and€(3)€With€the€care€that€an€ordinarily€prudent€person€in€a€like€positionÐ Ø( Ðwould€use€under€similar€circumstances.€Ð¾Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€òòReliance€on€information€from€others.óó€ð"ðð"ð€(1)€In€performing€his€duties,€a€directorÐ Š Ú Ðis€entitled€to€rely€on€any€information,€opinion,€report,€or€statement,€including€anyÐ p!À  Ðfinancial€statement€or€other€financial€data,€prepared€or€presented€by:€(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€An€officerÐ V"¦! Ðor€employee€of€the€corporation€whom€the€director€reasonably€believes€to€be€reliableÐ <#Œ" Ðand€competent€in€the€matters€presented;€(ii)€A€lawyer,€certified€public€accountant,Ð "$r# Ðor€other€person,€as€to€a€matter€which€the€director€reasonably€believes€to€be€within€theÐ %X $ Ðperson's€professional€or€expert€competence;€or€(iii)€A€committee€of€the€board€onÐ î%>!% Ðwhich€the€director€does€not€serve,€as€to€a€matter€within€its€designated€authority,€if€theÐ Ô&$"& Ðdirector€reasonably€believes€the€committee€to€merit€confidence.€(2)€A€director€is€notÐ º' #' Ðacting€in€good€faith€if€he€has€any€knowledge€concerning€the€matter€in€question€whichÐ  (ð#( Ðwould€cause€such€reliance€to€be€unwarranted.€Ð†)Ö$)Ð Ð  ÐÌÓB.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°XBÓà  àDid€Able,€Baker€and€Carla€act€ð ð[Ô_Ôw]ithÔ_Ô€the€care€that€an€ordinarily€prudent€person€in€a€likeÐ R+¢&+ Ðposition€would€use€under€similar€circumstancesðð?Ð 8,ˆ', Їà  àAble€clearly€did€not.€€It€is€not€prudent€to€authorize€a€dividend€which€would€cause€theÐ ° Ðcorporation€to€violate€the€terms€of€a€multi„million€dollar€loan.€€It€is€clearly€a€violation€of€AbleððsÐ –æ Ðduties€to€order€the€dividend€paid€despite€the€fact€that€the€Board€never€approved€it.€€Even€if€AbleÐ |Ì Ðbelieved€his€majority€stock€interest€gave€him€the€right€to€dictate€to€the€Board,€it€was€not€prudent€ofÐ b² Ðhim€to€act€on€this€assumption€without€checking€with€the€corporationððs€legal€counsel.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àBaker€and€Carla€also€did€not€meet€the€required€standard€of€care€for€directors.€€They€shouldÐ  d Ðhave€known€that€declaring€a€dividend€would€constitute€a€breach€of€the€Corporationððs€agreement€withÐ ú J ÐFirst€Bank.€€Even€though€they€did€not€personally€review€the€loan€documents€prior€to€approvingÐ à 0 Ðthem,€knowledge€of€the€terms€would€be€imputed€to€them€as€directors.€€Similarly,€their€failure€to€doÐ Æ   Ðanything€about€Ableððs€actions€in€having€the€dividend€checks€issued€despite€the€Boardððs€refusal€toÐ ¬ ü  Ðauthorize€the€dividend€constitutes€a€failure€on€their€part€to€discharge€their€duties€as€directors.Ð ’â  ÐÌà  àMaryland€law€prohibits€a€corporation€from€making€a€distribution€when€the€distribution€wouldÐ ^®  Ðresult€in€the€corporationððs€not€being€able€to€pay€its€indebtedness€in€the€normal€course€of€business.€Ð D”  ЀCode€ðð2„311(a).€€The€Code€specifically€provides€that€a€director€who€approves€a€distribution€inÐ *z  Ðviolation€of€the€standard€of€care€set€out€in€ðð3„405.1€is€personally€liable€to€the€corporation€for€theÐ ` Ðamount€of€the€excessive€distribution.€€The€actions,€and€failures€to€act,€by€Able,€Baker€and€CarlaÐ öF Ðindicate€that€they€will€not€be€afforded€the€protection€of€the€business€judgment€rule.Ð Ü, ÐÌà  àAs€a€shareholder,€Davis€is€not€liable€for€the€repayment€of€his€portion€of€the€dividend€unlessÐ ¨ø Ðhe€knew€that€the€dividend€was€illegally€issued.€€Code€ðð2„312(b).Ð ŽÞ ÐÌà  àThe€liability€of€the€directors€for€misconduct€is€to€the€corporation,€not€its€creditors,€òòLernerÐ Zª Ðv.€Lerner€Corpóó.,€122€Md.€1,€711,€A.2d€233€(1998).€€Since€ABC,€Inc.€is€now€insolvent,€First€BankÐ @ Ðshould€petition€a€court€to€dissolve€the€corporation.€€Code€3„413.€€If€the€petition€is€successful,€theÐ &v Ðcourt€would€appoint€a€receiver€who€could€enforce€the€corporationððs€rights€against€the€directors€onÐ  \ Ðbehalf€of€the€creditors.Ð òB ÐÌà  àFirst€Bank€could€attempt€to€ð ðpierce€the€corporate€veilðð€to€hold€the€shareholders€directly€liableÐ ¾ Ðfor€the€corporationððs€obligation.€€This€is€allowed€to€prevent€fraud€or€to€enforce€a€paramount€equity.Ð ¤ô ÐThis€is€a€very€difficult€task€in€Maryland.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔDamazoÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWahbyÔ_Ôóó,€259€Md.€627€(1971).€€The€facts€ofÐ Š Ú Ðthis€case€do€not€suggest€fraud;€arguably€the€gross€dereliction€by€the€directors€could€give€rise€to€aÐ p!À  Ðð ðparamount€equity.ðð€€òòSeeóó€J.€Hanks€òòMaryland€Corporation€Lawóó€ðð4.18€(1995).Ð V"¦! ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ 8,ˆ', Ðò òÔ‡XfiXXXfiÔà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSIS€ˆÐ ° ÐÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€7ˆÐ |Ì Ðó óÌà  àEach€riparian€owner€is€entitled€to€the€reasonable€use€the€waters€of€Ô_ÔWagnersÔ_Ô€Run€forÐ H˜ Ðdomestic,€agricultural€and€manufacturing€purposes.€€Normally,€in€a€contest€between€an€upperÐ . ~ Ðriparian€landowner€(Bart)€and€a€lower€riparian€landowner€(Charlie),€the€test€of€the€reasonablenessÐ  d Ðof€the€upper€riparian€landownerððs€use€is€whether€or€not€his€use€results€in€denying€an€equallyÐ ú J Ðbeneficial€use€to€the€lower€owner.€€However,€the€use€of€both€the€upper€and€lower€owners€must€beÐ à 0 Ðfor€the€riparian€land.€€Here,€the€cattle€raising€efforts€of€Charlie€on€his€riparian€land€are€not€affectedÐ Æ   Ðby€Bartððs€change€in€his€operation€and€the€creation€of€the€dam.€€The€effect€on€Charlie€is€on€his€useÐ ¬ ü  Ðof€the€water€on€non„riparian€land.€€Thus,€Charlie€has€no€cause€of€action€against€Bart.Ð ’â  ÐÌà  àAn€underground€stream€flowing€in€a€permanent€and€defined€channel€is€governed€by€the€rulesÐ ^®  Ðof€riparian€rights.€€òòFinley€v.€Ô_ÔTeeterstoneÔ_Ô,€Inc.€óó€251€Md.€128,€248A.3d€1061€(1968).€€When€theÐ D”  Ðunderground€water€does€not€flow€in€well„defined€channels,€it€is€ð ðpercolating€watersðð,€which€mayÐ *z  Ðbe€diverted€or€capped€without€legal€liability€to€downstream€owners.€€In€this€case,€the€waters€areÐ ` Ðstated€to€be€a€ð ðlarge€underground€limestone€springðð,€and€is€subject€to€riparian€rights.€€Ð öF ÐÌà  àDavis€may€well€have€a€cause€of€action€against€Bart€for€altering€the€quality€of€the€water€ofÐ Â Ðthe€underground€spring.€€The€owner€of€land,€which€is€the€situs€of€a€spring,€is€entitled€to€its€use€forÐ ¨ø Ðhousehold,€agriculture€or€manufacturing€purposes€as€any€riparian€owner.Ð ŽÞ ÐÌà  àHowever,€as€here,€where€the€underground€spring€flowed€off€of€his€land€via€Ô_ÔWagnersÔ_Ô€Run,Ð Zª Ðby€capping€the€spring,€he€has€changed€the€quality€of€the€water€available€to€the€lower€riparian€ownerÐ @ Ðon€land€bordering€Ô_ÔWagnersÔ_Ô€Run.€€The€lower€owner€is€not€only€entitled€to€have€the€undergroundÐ &v Ðstream€to€continue€to€flow€in€its€well„defined€direction,€but€to€have€it€remain€unchanged€as€toÐ  \ Ðquality.€€òòÔ_ÔJessupÔ_Ô€&€Moore€Paper€Co.€v.€Ô_ÔZeiterÔ_Ô,€óó€180€Md.€395,€24A2d€788€(1942).€€Again,€inÐ òB Ðmeasuring€the€change,€it€is€a€question€of€reasonableness€and€where€Davisðð€reasonable€use€of€theÐ Ø( Ðwater€has€been€materially€affected€by€Bartððs€capping€of€the€spring,€he€may€seek€damages€and€anÐ ¾ Ðinjunction€to€return€the€underground€spring€waters€to€their€normal€flow€into€Ô_ÔWagnersÔ_Ô€Run.€€òòKellyÐ ¤ô Ðv.€Nagle,óó€150€Md.€125.€Ð Š Ú ÐÌò òNOTE:€€Substantial€credit€was€given€to€Answers€which€concluded€that€the€underground€Ð V"¦! Ðà  à€€à ` à€€€stream€is€percolating€waters.Ð  <#Œ" Ðà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ЀÌà@’’%ìàQUESTION€8ˆÐ |Ì Ðó óÌ(a)à  àSection€ðð2„703€of€Commercial€Law€Article€sets€forth€an€index€of€Sellerððs€remedies€forÐ H˜ ÐBuyerððs€breach.Ð . ~ ÐÌà  à(1)à ` àClearly,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€has€a€right€to€bring€an€action€for€the€price€of€the€1,000Ð ú J Ðbatteries€which€were€delivered€and€accepted€by€Auto€Supplies.€€ðð2„709.Ð à 0 ÐÌà  à(2)à ` àIn€addition,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€may€recover€incidental€damages€under€ðð2„710,€but€at€thisÐ ¬ ü  Ðpoint€no€incidental€damages€have€been€incurred,€based€on€the€stated€facts.Ð ’â  ÐÌà  à(3)à ` àÔ_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€also€has€a€right€to€demand€adequate€assurance€of€due€performance€byÐ ^®  ÐAuto€Supplies€and€withhold€further€delivery€of€batteries€until€such€assurance€is€received.€€ðð2„609.Ð D”  ÐBetween€Merchants,€ð ðadequate€assuranceðð€is€determined€according€to€commercial€standardsÐ *z  Ððð2„609(2).€€Under€this€standard,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€would€be€justified€in€not€only€requiring€payment€forÐ ` Ðgoods€delivered,€but€also€insisting€on€C.O.D.€or€similar€terms€for€future€deliveries€under€theÐ öF Ðcontract.Ð Ü, ÐÌà  à(4)à ` àIf€Auto€Supplies,€after€receiving€the€demand€for€adequate€assurance€of€its€futureÐ ¨ø Ðperformance€(i.e.€payment),€fails€to€supply€adequate€assurance,€it€will€be€deemed€to€have€repudiatedÐ ŽÞ Ðthe€entire€contract.€€ðð2„609(4).€€€At€that€point,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€can€exercise€its€rights€for€a€repudiation.€Ð tÄ Ððð2„708.€€Those€rights€include€cancellation€of€the€balance€of€the€contract,€ðð2„703(f)€or€identifyingÐ Zª Ðthe€remaining€11,000€batteries€to€the€contract,€(ðð2„704),€and€then€seeking€damages€from€AutoÐ @ ÐSupplies€based€on€the€difference€between€the€prevailing€price€at€the€time€of€repudiation€and€theÐ &v Ðcontract€price,€together€with€any€incidental€damages€ðð2„708,€2„723.€€If€the€prevailing€market€priceÐ  \ Ðof€the€batteries€is€higher€than€the€contract€prices,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€may€recover€the€profit€it€would€haveÐ òB Ðmade€had€Auto€Supplies€fully€performed€ðð2„708(2).Ð Ø( ÐÌ(b)à  àAt€this€time,€I€would€advise€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€to€demand€in€writing€adequate€assurance€ofÐ ¤ô Ðperformance€by€Auto€Supplies,€and€to€suspend€delivery€of€future€batteries.€€If€adequate€assuranceÐ Š Ú Ðis€not€provided,€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€would€then€decide€to€either;€(1)€cancel€the€balance€of€the€contract€andÐ p!À  Ðsue€Auto€Supplies€for€the€1,000€batteries€already€delivered;€or€(2)€identify€the€11,000€remainingÐ V"¦! Ðbatteries€to€the€contract,€and€sue€for€the€profit€which€Ô_ÔBatterymasterÔ_Ô€would€have€made€on€the€entireÐ <#Œ" Ðcontract.Ð "$r# ÐÌò òà@“ “ ìàEXTRACT€SECTIONS€FOR€QUESTION€8ˆÐ î%>!% ÐÌAnnotated€Code€of€Maryland,€Commercial€Law€ArticleÐ º' #' ÐÌTitle€2.€SALES:€€ðð2„106;€ðð2„609;€ðð2„610ó ó;€ò òðð€2„612;€ðð2„703;€ðð2„704;€ðð2„708;€ðð2„709;€ðð2„710;€ðð2„Ð †)Ö$) Ð723Ð  l*¼%* ÐÔ#†XfiXXXfi`“#Ôó óÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ€XfiXXXfiÔò òÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÓB.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°XBÓÝ‚ÿÿÿ;¯ÝÝ  ÝÔ‡XfiXXXfiÔBOARD'S€ANALYSIS€Ýƒÿÿ;¯Ó¯ÝÔ eny¯ÔŒÐ ° ÐŒÓ  Óó óÔ€XfiXXXfiÔÝ  ÝÌà@’’%ìàò òQUESTION€9ó óˆÐ |Ì ÐÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà  àThe€parents€of€Rita€may€file€a€wrongful€death€action€under€Ô_ÔCrtsÔ_Ô.€&€Ô_ÔJudÔ_Ô.€Proc.€ðð€3„901€to€3„Ð H˜ Ð904,€against€Jim€individually.€€Jim,€as€the€driver€of€a€motor€vehicle,€owed€a€duty€of€reasonable€careÐ . ~ Ðto€Rita€in€the€operation€of€his€vehicle.€€Operating€his€vehicle€at€an€excessive€speed€(speed€overÐ  d Ðposted€limit)€and€not€paying€attention€to€the€events€at€hand€due€to€the€use€of€his€cell€phone,Ð ú J Ðconstitutes€a€breach€of€his€duty€of€care.€€Although€not€per€se€negligence,€violation€of€the€postedÐ à 0 Ðspeed€limit€is€also€prima€facie€evidence€of€the€breach€of€Jim's€duty€of€care,€as€well€as€his€failure€toÐ Æ   Ðnote€the€existence€of€young€children€waiting€for€a€school€bus€during€school€hours.€€Jim's€haste€andÐ ¬ ü  Ðcarelessness€were€the€proximate€cause€of€Rita's€death.Ð ’â  ÐÌà  àJim€will€defend€by€asserting€the€defense€of€contributory€negligence.€€In€Maryland,Ð ^®  Ðcontributory€negligence€is€a€complete€bar€to€a€plaintiff's€recovery.€€As€a€minor€child,€Rita€wouldÐ D”  Ðhave€a€duty€of€care€to€walk€the€streets€as€an€ordinary€pedestrian€child€of€like€age,€education€andÐ *z  Ðintelligence.€€Applying€the€rules€of€negligence,€but€to€that€of€a€pedestrian€child€of€Rita's€age,€Jim€willÐ ` Ðargue€that€Rita's€failure€to€use€the€crosswalk€and€suddenly€running€into€the€street€without€payingÐ öF Ðattention€to€traffic€was€negligence€on€her€part€and€that€such€negligence€contributed€to€the€accidentÐ Ü, Ðand€her€death.€€Rita's€parents€will€attempt€to€counter€Jim's€contributory€negligence€defense€byÐ Â Ðarguing€that€Jim€had€€the€last€clear€chance€to€avoid€the€accident€if€he€were€paying€attention.€€TheÐ ¨ø Ðstandard€"last€clear€chance"€instruction€suggested€by€the€Maryland€Civil€Pattern€Jury€Instructions,Ð ŽÞ Ðis€that€"[a]€plaintiff€who€is€Ô_ÔcontributorilyÔ_Ô€negligent€may€nevertheless€recover€if€he€[or€she]€is€in€aÐ tÄ Ðsituation€of€helpless€peril€and€thereafter€the€defendant€had€a€fresh€opportunity€of€which€he€[or€she]Ð Zª Ðwas€aware€to€avoid€injury€to€the€plaintiff€and€failed€to€do€so."€Ð @ ÐÌà  àRita's€parents€may€also€file€a€wrongful€death€action€against€Jim's€employer€for€its€vicariousÐ  \ Ðliability€of€the€acts€of€its€agent,€Jim.€€Jim€was€driving€the€company€vehicle,€during€business€hours,Ð òB Ðas€indicated€by€the€fact€that€he€left€his€office€in€an€effort€to€meet€his€date€for€breakfast.€€In€addition,Ð Ø( ÐSmith€was€conducting€his€employer's€business€by€using€his€cell€phone€to€speak€with€Cecil,€a€clientÐ ¾ Ðof€his€employer.€Ð ¤ô ÐÌà  àBecause€Rita's€parents'€wrongful€death€claim€against€Jim's€employer€is€based€on€its€vicariousÐ p!À  Ðliability,€both€Jim's€employer€and€Rita's€parents'€will€have€the€same€defenses€and€counter„argumentsÐ V"¦! Ðas€between€Rita's€parents€and€Jim€individually.€€In€addition€to€those€defenses€raised€by€Jim,€Jim'sÐ <#Œ" Ðemployer€will€argue€that€even€if€Rita€was€not€Ô_ÔcontributorilyÔ_Ô€negligent,€Jim€was€not€acting€within€theÐ "$r# Ðscope€of€his€employment€at€the€time€of€the€accident€because€he€was€on€his€way€to€meet€his€girlfriendÐ %X $ Ðfor€breakfast.€€Rita's€parents,€however,€will€most€likely€counter€this€by€arguing€that€although€Jim€wasÐ î%>!% Ðmeeting€his€girlfriend,€he€was€on€the€phone€doing€company€business€in€the€company€car.€€Jim'sÐ Ô&$"& Ðemployer€can€bring€a€cross„claim€against€Jim€for€indemnification€or€contribution.Ð º' #' ÐÌà  àMaryland,€also€recognizes€the€tort€of€negligent€entrustment.€€The€tort€of€negligentÐ †)Ö$) Ðentrustment€imposes€liability€on€a€party€that€negligently€entrusts€chattel,€such€as€an€automobile,€toÐ l*¼%* Ðanother€party.€€The€key€element€of€the€Ô_ÔentrusterÔ_Ô's€negligence€is€his€or€her€knowledge€about€theÐ R+¢&+ ÐÔ_ÔentrusteeÔ_Ô's€lack€of€abilities€or€propensities€that€pose€a€foreseeable€harm.€€Thus,€Rita's€parents€couldÐ 8,ˆ', Ðalso€argue€that€Jim's€employer€was€itself€negligent€in€entrusting€Jim€to€drive€the€company€vehicle,Ð ° Ðwhen€they€should€have€known€that€Jim's€license€was€suspended€for€six€months.€€Therefore,€as€aÐ –æ Ðresult€of€Jim's€employer's€negligence€in€entrusting€Jim€with€the€use€of€its€company€vehicle,€Rita€wasÐ |Ì Ðfatally€injured.Ð b² ÐÌà  àIn€terms€of€the€negligent€entrustment€claim,€Jim's€employer€will€argue€that€it€was€unawareÐ . ~ Ðof€the€fact€that€Jim's€license€had€been€suspended€for€six€months€and€thus€cannot€be€held€toÐ  d Ðnegligently€have€entrusted€him€with€the€use€of€the€company€vehicle.€€Rita's€parents€will€counter€thisÐ ú J Ðby€arguing€that€the€employer's€failure€to€check€Jim's€driving€record€for€six€months,€is€evidence€ofÐ à 0 Ðthe€employer's€negligence€in€learning€about€Jim's€inability€to€drive€without€posing€a€risk€to€othersÐ Æ   Ðlike€Rita.Ð ¬ ü  ÐÌà  àThe€issues€regarding€Jim,€his€employer€and€Rita's€negligence€are€questions€for€the€trier€ofÐ xÈ  Ðfact€to€determine.€€Ð ^®  ÐÓ  ÓÔ#†XfiXXXfiò¯#ÔÔ‡XÙXXXfiÔÌÐ  3ƒ  ÐÑX°ÑÓ  ÓÔ#†XfiXXXÙFÇ#ÔÔ‡XfiXXXfiÔò òBOARD'S€ANALYSIS€Ð ° ÐÌQUESTION€10Ð |Ì Ðó óÌÓ  Óà  àIn€order€to€have€subject€matter€jurisdiction€over€an€action€for€divorce,€either€the€grounds€forÐ H˜ Ðdivorce€must€have€occurred€in€Maryland€or€one€of€the€parties€must€have€lived€in€Maryland€for€oneÐ . ~ Ðyear.€€Md.€Code€Ann.,€Fam.€Law€7„101(a).€€Maryland€would€have€subject€Ô_ÔmatterjurisdictionÔ_Ô€overÐ  d ÐÔ_ÔJeriÔ_Ô's€divorce€from€Tom€because€Tom€resides€in€Maryland€and€because€one€or€more€of€the€possibleÐ ú J Ðgrounds€for€the€divorce€occurred€in€Maryland.Ð à 0 ÐÌà  àCounsel€should€advise€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€of€the€difference€between€a€limited€divorce€(legal€separation)€andÐ ¬ ü  Ðan€absolute€divorce.€€Because€Tom€and€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€have€not€voluntarily€lived€separate€and€apart€for€a€year,Ð ’â  Ðyou€should€discuss€the€grounds€for€divorce€to€determine€whether€other€grounds€exists€for€either€anÐ xÈ  Ðabsolute€or€limited€divorce.€€In€terms€of€a€limited€divorce,€counsel€should€determine€whether€thereÐ ^®  Ðis€sufficient€evidence€of€cruelty€of€treatment,€excessive€vicious€conduct€or€desertion.€€In€additionÐ D”  Ðto€cruelty€and€excessive€vicious€conduct,€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€may€attempt€to€pursue€adultery€as€a€grounds€for€anÐ *z  Ðabsolute€divorce.€€She€will€have€to€prove€that€Tom€had€both€the€disposition€and€opportunity€toÐ ` Ðcommit€adultery€by€remaining€at€his€secretary€Roxanne's€home€until€4:00€a.m.€€Without€any€displaysÐ öF Ðof€affection€between€Tom€and€Roxanne,€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô's€limited€observations€on€June€13,€2002,€standing€alone,Ð Ü, Ðmay€be€insufficient€evidence€to€prove€adultery.€€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€may€also€claim€that€Tom€constructivelyÐ Â Ðdeserted€her€as€he€refused€to€have€marital€relations€with€her€for€a€year.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àCounsel€should€discuss€the€issues€regarding€child€custody,€visitation€and€child€support.€Ð tÄ ÐCounsel€should€explain€to€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€the€difference€between€legal€custody€and€physical€custody.€BecauseÐ Zª ÐÔ_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€has€been€supporting€her€daughter€by€herself,€she€should€be€advised€that€the€court€may€award€herÐ @ ÐòòÔ_ÔpendenteÔ_Ô€liteóó€child€support€during€the€proceedings€until€permanent€child€support€can€be€awarded.€Ð &v ÐSince€the€decisions€are€based€upon€the€best€interests€of€the€child,€the€determination€of€these€issuesÐ  \ Ðis€the€same€whether€she€is€pursuing€a€limited€divorce€or€an€absolute€divorce.€€Counsel€should€adviseÐ òB ÐÔ_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€of€the€likelihood€that€the€court€will€award€her€and€her€daughter€use€and€possession€of€the€maritalÐ Ø( Ðhome€and€family€use€personal€property€for€a€period€of€up€to€three€years€following€the€date€of€aÐ ¾ Ðlimited€or€absolute€divorce.Ð ¤ô ÐÌà  àDue€to€the€disparity€in€their€income€and€the€fact€that€the€Ô#†XfiXXXfi¸Ç#ÔÔ‡XÙXXXfiÔcouple€agreed€that€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€would€stayÐ p!À  Ðhome€and€care€for€their€daughter,Ô#†XfiXXXÙÕ#ÔÔ‡XfiXXXfiÔ€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€should€be€advised€about€support€for€herself.€€This€may€be€inÐ _"¯! Ðthe€form€of€temporary€(òòÔ_ÔpendenteÔ_Ô€liteóó)€alimony,€rehabilitative€alimony€or€permanent€alimony.€Ð N#ž" ÐCounsel€should€discuss€what€the€court€will€consider€in€determining€each.Ð 4$„# ÐÌà  àMd.€Code€Ann.,€Fam.€Law€ðð€8„201(e)€defines€"marital€property,"€as€property€regardless€ofÐ &P!% Ðhow€it€is€titled,€which€is€acquired€by€both€or€either€of€the€parties€during€the€marriage.€€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€shouldÐ æ&6"& Ðbe€advised€as€to€what€property€will€be€considered€marital€property€subject€to€division€by€the€courtÐ Ì'#' Ðand€the€value€of€the€marital€property.€€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€should€also€be€advised€about€the€factors€which€the€courtÐ ²($( Ðwill€consider€in€determining€the€amount,€if€any,€of€a€marital€award€to€either€party.€€The€parties€willÐ ˜)è$) Ðhave€to€file€a€statement€listing€all€property€owned€by€one€or€both€of€them.€€The€value€of€theÐ ~*Î%* ÐÔ_ÔMegabucksÔ_Ô€stock€although€titled€solely€in€Tom's€name,€may€be€part€of€€a€monetary€award.€€IfÐ d+´&+ Ðpossible,€counsel€should€attempt€to€get€Ô_ÔJeriÔ_Ô€and€Tom,€through€his€counsel,€to€enter€into€a€separationÐ J,š', Ðand€property€settlement€agreement€as€to€all€of€the€issues€in€order€to€save€money€and€decrease€anyÐ 0-€(- Ðacrimony€which€may€exist€between€them.Ð  .f). ÐÑ°XÑò òà@"ìàBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@``%ìàQUESTION€11ˆÐ |Ì Ðó óÌÓ‡ '(ÿÿ83ÓÝ"‚ÿÿ"ÝÓ ÔþÓÓ ,ÓÓH1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ŒX(#HÓÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÓK.ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÝ‚ÿÿUÝÝÔ2ÿÿÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.)Ô3  Ôà Ü àÝ  ÝòòBetty€v.€Dudleyóó݃ÿÿUÝ=Þ݌РH˜ ÐŒÓ ,ÓÓ' °°ŒX(#ÜÜ‹X(#'ÓÓ ÔþÓÝ  ÝÌÓ ,ÓÓH1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ŒX(#HÓBetty€can€sue€Dudleyððs€Dance€Studio,€Inc.€for€rescission€of€the€contract€she€made€with€theÐ  d ÐStudio€for€swing€dance€lessons.€€Betty€should€be€successful;€she€should€be€able€to€recover€theÐ ú J Ðentire€$300.00€that€she€paid€to€the€studio.€€Betty€formed€a€contract€with€Newman,€the€agentÐ à 0 Ðfor€the€fully€disclosed€principal,€Dudleyððs€Dance€Studio,€Inc.€for€swing€dance€lessons€to€beÐ Æ   Ðtaught€to€her€by€Dudley,€a€prominent€dance€instructor.€€Newman€knew€at€the€time€that€heÐ ¬ ü  Ðsold€the€dance€lesson€package€to€Betty€that€Dudley€could€no€longer€teach,€but€he€stated€thatÐ ’â  ÐDudley€would€have€her€dancing€like€a€professional€by€the€time€of€her€wedding€more€than€twoÐ xÈ  Ðyears€later.€€Betty€had€no€way€of€knowing€at€that€time€that€Dudley€would€not€be€her€teacher.€Ð ^®  ÐBetty€paid€a€deposit€for€lessons,€took€two€free€lessons€that€were€offered€to€her€by€Newman€asÐ D”  Ðpart€of€the€package€for€the€dance€lessons,€and€promptly€stated€her€position€that€there€was€noÐ *z  Ðvalid€contract€in€place€and€demanded€return€of€the€consideration€that€she€paid€for€danceÐ ` Ðlessons€with€Dudley€as€soon€as€she€was€informed€that€Dudley€would€not€be€teaching€anyÐ öF Ðclasses.€€There€was€never€any€meeting€of€the€minds,€since€Betty€believed€until€immediatelyÐ Ü, Ðafter€the€third€lesson€that€Dudley€himself€would€be€her€teacher,€and€the€facts€indicate€that€theÐ Â Ðfact€that€Dudley€himself€would€teach€her€was€a€significant€inducement€to€her€to€take€theÐ ¨ø Ðlessons.€€Newmanððs€pointed€representation€that€Dudley€would€have€her€dancing€like€aÐ ŽÞ Ðprofessional,€and€Bettyððs€prompt€renunciation€of€the€contract€when€she€learned€the€true€factsÐ tÄ Ðdemonstrate€that€the€parties€never€successfully€formed€a€valid€contract,€and€Betty€is€entitledÐ Zª Ðto€a€return€of€the€money€she€paid€for€lessons€with€Dudley€himself.Ð @ ÐÌÝ"‚ÿÿ"ÝÓ ÔþÓÓ ,,ÓÓN1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#NÓÝ  ÝÓK.ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÝ‚ÿÿ¾çÝÔ2ÿÿÔÚ  ÚbÚ  Ú.)Ô3  Ôà Ü àÝ  ÝòòDudley€v.€Bettyóó݃ÿÿ¾ç è݌Р \ ÐŒÓ ,,ÓÓ-ÜÜÜ‹X(#ÜÜ‹X(#-ÓÓ ÔþÓÝ  ÝÓ ,ÓÓK.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÌÓ ,ÓÓH1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ŒX(#HÓDudley€could€sue€Betty€for€breach€of€contract€because€she€refused€to€perform€under€theÐ Ø( Ðcontract€for€48€swing€dance€lessons€over€a€two„year€period€by€paying€for€the€remainingÐ ¾ Ðlessons.€€Dudley€could€seek€specific€performance€to€compel€Betty€to€complete€their€contract,Ð ¤ô Ðor€sue€for€damages€for€the€remaining€$1,140€due€under€the€contract.€€Dudley€would€attemptÐ Š Ú Ðto€prove€to€the€Court€that€he€changed€his€position€to€his€detriment€by€providing€classroomsÐ p!À  Ðand€instructors€for€the€classes€that€Betty€was€to€take€under€the€terms€of€the€contract€she€madeÐ V"¦! Ðwith€Newman.€€Dudley€will€not€succeed€in€either€claim€against€Betty.Ð <#Œ" ÐÌA€court€would€not€grant€specific€performance,€since€it€cannot€compel€Betty€to€take€danceÐ %X $ Ðlessons.€€Furthermore,€Betty€could€raise€the€defense€of€unclean€hands,€since€Dudleyððs€agentÐ î%>!% Ðactively€misrepresented€facts€to€her€to€induce€her€to€enter€into€the€contract.€€Similarly,Ð Ô&$"& ÐDudley€will€not€be€successful€in€his€attempt€to€recover€damages€from€Betty€because€BettyÐ º' #' Ðwill€argue€that€her€oral€contract€with€Dudley€is€unenforceable€because€it€was€a€contract€thatÐ  (ð#( Ðcould€not€be€performed€within€one€year.€€Bettyððs€statute€of€frauds€defense€pursuant€toÐ †)Ö$) ÐSection€5„901,€Courts€and€Judicial€Proceedings,€Annotated€Code€of€Maryland,€will€beÐ l*¼%* Ðsuccessful,€and€Dudley€neither€will€be€able€to€collect€the€balance€due€under€the€contract,€norÐ R+¢&+ Ðwill€he€also€be€entitled€to€retain€the€deposit€of€$300.Ð 8,ˆ', ЇÝ"‚ÿÿ"ÝÓ ÔþÓÓ ,,ÓÓN1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#NÓÝ  ÝÓK.ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÝ‚ÿÿùðÝÔ2ÿÿÔÚ  ÚcÚ  Ú.)Ô3  Ôà Ü àÝ  ÝÔ& ² ÔòòDudley€v.€Newmanóó݃ÿÿùðÛñ݌Р° ÐŒÓ ,,ÓÓ-ÜÜÜ‹X(#ÜÜ‹X(#-ÓÓ ÔþÓÝ  ÝÓ ,ÓÓK.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÌÓ ,ÓÓH1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ŒX(#HÓDudley€will€sue€Newman€for€indemnification€for€any€damages€that€Betty€is€able€to€collectÔ'²°6òÔÐ |Ì Ðagainst€Dudleyððs€Dance€Studio,€Inc.€€Bettyððs€claims€against€Dudleyððs€Dance€Studio€andÐ b² ÐDudley€are€based€on€Newmanððs€misrepresentations€to€Betty€at€the€time€that€he€approachedÐ H˜ Ðher€in€the€post€office€and€convinced€her€to€take€swing€dance€lessons.€€Dudley€fully€disclosedÐ . ~ Ðto€Newman€his€inability€to€teach€at€the€time€that€he€hired€Newman;€Newman€wrongfullyÐ  d Ðrepresented€to€Betty€that€Dudley€would€be€her€teacher.€€Newman€never€tried€to€market€theÐ ú J ÐStudio€to€Betty€on€its€own€merits,€and€Betty€was€disappointed€when€the€facts€that€NewmanÐ à 0 Ðrepresented€to€her€did€not€come€to€pass.€€Any€claims€that€Betty€has€against€Dudley€and€theÐ Æ   ÐStudio€are€based€on€Newmanððs€wrongful€acts€and€his€abuse€of€his€agency€authority.€€DudleyÐ ¬ ü  Ðis€entitled€to€compensation€from€Newman€for€any€damages€that€he€or€the€Studio€incur€in€anyÐ ’â  Ðof€Bettyððs€actions€against€the€Studio€for€breach€of€the€contract€for€dance€lessons.Ð xÈ  ÐÌÝ"‚ÿÿ"ÝÓ ÔþÓÓ ,,ÓÓN1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#NÓÝ  ÝÓK.ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÝ‚ÿÿ\øÝÔ2ÿÿÔÚ  ÚdÚ  Ú.)Ô3  Ôà Ü àÝ  ÝòòNewman€v.€Dudleyóó݃ÿÿ\ø>ù݌РD”  ÐŒÓ ,,ÓÓ-ÜÜÜ‹X(#ÜÜ‹X(#-ÓÓ ÔþÓÝ  ÝÓ ,ÓÓK.°°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÜÜÜ‹X(#KÓÌÓ ,ÓÓH1ÜÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°°ŒX(#HÓNewman€is€not€entitled€to€the€payment€of€any€commissions€under€his€contract€with€DudleyððsÐ ` ÐDance€Studio,€Inc.€The€contract€states€that€Newman€will€be€paid€a€commission€for€any€danceÐ öF Ðlessons€for€which€students€òòregister€and€payóó.€€Arguably,€Betty€neither€registered€nor€paid€forÐ Ü, Ðdance€lessons,€since€she€never€signed€an€application€or€a€contract€for€dance€lessons€and€sheÐ Â Ðpaid€a€deposit,€which€will€most€likely€be€returned€to€her.€€If€the€deposit€she€paid€is€returnedÐ ¨ø Ðto€her€with€no€further€obligation€for€her€to€pay€for€dance€lessons,€then€Newman€will€not€beÐ ŽÞ Ðentitled€to€the€payment€of€commission.€€Newmanððs€claims€for€phantom€commissions€will€notÐ tÄ Ðsucceed.Ð Zª ÐÓ…† (#38'ÔÜ…ÓÔ#†XfiXXXfiÔÕ#ÔÔ‡XfiXXXfiÔÐ  @ Ðò òà@¯¯#‚àBOARDððS€ANALYSISˆÐ ° ÐÌà@öö&‚àQUESTION€12ˆÐ |Ì ÐÌÓ XÓó óÔ_ÔICIÔ_Ô€entered€into€a€written€agreement€with€Chad€for€the€purpose€of€creating€an€agencyÐ H˜ Ðrelationship€between€them.€€Under€the€terms€of€the€agreement,€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€had€actual€authority€toÐ . ~ Ðenter€into€contracts€with€the€restaurant€and€the€band€on€behalf€of€Chad.€€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€was€expresslyÐ  d Ðauthorized€to€apply€the€$1,500€given€by€Chad€to€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€for€use€as€a€deposit€on€those€contracts.€Ð ú J ÐTherefore,€Chad€will€not€obtain€reimbursement€from€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€for€the€$1,500€deposit€unless€it€isÐ à 0 Ðdetermined€by€a€court€that€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€exceeded€the€scope€of€its€authority.€€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€will€contend€that€itÐ Æ   Ðacted€within€the€scope€of€its€authority€because€€it€requested€that€Chad€review€and€approve€theÐ ¬ ü  Ðcontracts€before€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€signed€them€and€that€Chadððs€failure€to€do€so€was€evidence€of€ChadððsÐ ’â  Ðacquiescence€or€ratification.€€However,€Chad€will€maintain€that€he€did€not€ratify€the€contractsÐ xÈ  Ðbecause€those€contracts€contained€prices€that€were€greater€than€$15,000€in€the€aggregate.€Ð ^®  ÐConsequently,€Chad€will€maintain€that€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€did€not€follow€Chadððs€instructions,€and€that€ChadÐ D”  Ðis€not€liable€for€the€damages€that€the€band€and€restaurant€sustained€as€a€result€of€theÐ *z  Ðcancellation€of€the€event.€€€€€Ð ` ÐÐ öF ÐThe€band€and€the€restaurant€were€each€advised€by€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€that€it€was€makingÐ Ü, Ðarrangements€for€the€August€17th€event€on€behalf€of€a€prominent€individual€who€did€notÐ Â Ðwant€his€identity€disclosed.€€Chad€had€given€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€actual€authority€to€enter€into€the€contracts.€Ð ¨ø ÐChad€as€either€an€undisclosed€or€a€partially€disclosed€principal€is€liable€to€third€parties€onÐ ŽÞ Ðsimple€executory€contracts€entered€into€on€his€behalf€by€his€agent€where€the€agent€is€actingÐ tÄ Ðwith€actual€or€apparent€authority.€€òòÔ_ÔHospelhornÔ_Ô€v.€Poeóó,€174€Md.€242,€198€A.€582(1938).€Ð Zª ÐTherefore,€the€restaurant€and€the€band€may€pursue€their€respective€claims€and€proceed€toÐ @ Ðjudgment€against€the€agent,€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô,€and€the€undisclosed€or€partially€disclosed€principal,€Chad.Ð &v ÐHowever,€each€claimant€is€entitled€to€only€one€satisfaction.€€òò€Grinder,€et€al.€v.€Ô_ÔBryansÔ_Ô€RoadÐ  \ ÐBuilding€and€Supply€Co.,€Inc.óó€,€€290€Md.€687,€432€A2d€453€(1981).€Ð òB ÐÐ Ø( ЀIf€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€is€found€liable€to€the€restaurant€and€the€band,€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€may€seek€exoneration€fromÐ ¾ ÐChad€for€any€amounts€that€it€pays€to€the€band€and€the€restaurant.€€In€addition,€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€has€theÐ ¤ô Ðright€to€pursue€its€remedies€under€its€agreement€with€Chad€for€reimbursement€of€all€costsÐ Š Ú Ðadvanced€on€Chadððs€behalf€and€for€the€payment€of€any€fee€earned€under€the€agreement.€€Ð p!À  ÐÓ XÓÌÓ XÓ€If€the€band€and€the€restaurant€are€successful€in€their€respective€claims€against€Chad,Ð <#Œ" ÐChad,€as€principal,€may€seek€indemnification€from€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô,€its€agent.€€The€court€will€determineÐ "$r# Ðwhether€the€actions€of€the€agent€were€within€the€scope€of€its€authority€and€whether€any€of€theÐ %X $ Ðagentððs€actions€were€ratified€by€the€principal.€€To€the€extent€that€the€agent€exceeded€theÐ î%>!% Ðscope€of€its€authority,€it€will€be€responsible€for€indemnification€of€the€principal.€Ð Ô&$"& ÐÔ#†XfiXXXfiÃþ#Ô