WPC" HjNӜ`0{ s#CFQ'DjVt#1 ŇIm\uF7'p5YQdTI"3{I/î} uMk=Tg2Υg*ʴ>YWW7B_ O=`H5g;E}fm&1;> Ztrqu:`[V͹⠀ @J59[Dkl{pIA*phX\%27b;!ME746uв:3\H_T;R<3я?C+:Y& &^M3, V%#qa&ϙR3ΌOxrSY/Ӣ+}ސb%8Z<uIIb @{b,Ǟ~cx&o1R{P (rZB(PBNE0s].7Q_m !G7#UKN % 0:U>Q^ w4 mUQ@ 04 0:OU**e 0@H 0- N 1u 72{  b :         0 0 -P 0U} 0* 0' 0$# 0!G 0h 0 0 0 - 0* 0* 0': 0$a 0! 0 0 0 1g!! 1g^"HP LaserJet 4000 Series PS0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,\  `&Times New Romanڙ~5s SzZ3:i+003|xU(A Z(Times New Roman .,term1 <cw:envelope ret  ?%2A`Arial?S\  `&Times New RomanS  %2A`Arial64Body Text  XXX?%2A`Arial?S\  `&Times New RomanS  <`+f :Outline001_2   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)  Page of & 0#Xd#   #)USUS.,  _   Page  1  ڀof  17  0;;.footer   !XXX   !<`+f :Outline001_1   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  (-2$ !USUS.,  <]+f :Outline001_3 j 4 ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Z+f :Outline001_4   &hhDL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <W+f :Outline001_5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <T+f :Outline001_6 j <  DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Q+f :Outline001_7   ppL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <N+f :Outline001_8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <K+f :Outline001_9 j D    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <`+f :Outline002_1   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <]+f :Outline002_2   ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <]+f :Outline002_3 j 4 ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Z+f :Outline002_4   &hhDL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <W+f :Outline002_5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <T+f :Outline002_6 j <  DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Q+f :Outline002_7   ppL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <N+f :Outline002_8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <K+f :Outline002_9 j D    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j "$%&'() 35=CIOU[a1(a)a.i.1.a.i.1.a.+,-./012 35=CIOU[a2(a)1.i.1.a.i.1.a. !USUS.,  _    X XXXOYbJULY2006BAREXAMINATION  BOARDSANALYSIS    QUESTION1 ` #X XXX |#X XXX #X XXX x#  X XXX  #X XXX #X XXX PaymentofTrafficFineforSpeeding $ t     ThecourtshouldnotallowtheintroductionofevidencethatWhitepaidthefineforthe  L  speedingticket.Thepaymentofthefineforspeedingisnotadmissibleintheciviltrialthatarose  8  fromthesameoccurrence.Itisneitheraguiltypleanoranexpressacknowledgmentofguiltand, $  therefore,notrelevant.PaymentofthefinebyWhiteisachoicetoexerciseastatutoryrighttopay   thefinewithoutappearingincourtandisnotequivalenttoaguiltypleaandnotanadmission.   #X XXX #X XXX _Briggeman_Ԁv.Albert#X XXX #X XXX ,322Md.133(1977).     GuiltypleaforNegligentDriving p     Whitesguiltypleatothenegligentdrivingchargeisadmissibleasanadmission.Theguilty H pleatoatrafficoffenseinopencourtaspartofapleabargain,compromiseorasamatterof 4 convenienceisanadmissionofapartyopponent.Theevidenceoftheguiltypleaisadmissiblein  p theciviltrialoccurringoutofthesameoccurrenceasthetrafficoffenseunlessitisdeterminedon  \ therecordthattheprejudicialeffectoftheevidenceoutweighsitsprobativevalue.MarylandRule H 5403.Underthesefactstheevidencewouldbeallowed.Ananswerthatfindsthattheprejudicial 4 effectofadmittingtheevidenceofthepleaoutweighsitsprobativevaluewillgetpartialcredit.The   partyagainstwhomtheevidenceisofferedisfreetoexplainthecircumstancesunderwhichtheplea   wasentered.#X XXX l#X XXX Cranev.Dunn#X XXX  #X XXX ,382Md.83(2003).        Theadmissiondoesnotconclusivelyestablishliabilityandmayberebuttedorexplainedin  thesubsequentcivilcase.#X XXX Y #X XXX Nicholsonv.Snyder#X XXX x #X XXX ,97Md.415(1903). l         #X XXX #X XXX NoloContendere#X XXX o #X XXX ԀPleatoDrivingWhileImpairedbyAlcohol D!       Whitespleaof#X XXX #X XXX nolocontendere#X XXX  #X XXX Ԁtothechargeofdrivingwhileimpairedbyalcoholis #l! inadmissibleinthecivilcasebroughtby_Foxworthy_.Apleaof#X XXX #X XXX nolocontendere#X XXX #X XXX Ԁisneitheran $X" admissionofconductnoraconviction.#X XXX #X XXX McCallv.State#X XXX #X XXX Ԁ9_Md.App_.191(1970). $D #   #X XXX #   h+&* Ї   QUESTION2    Analysis :RuleofProfessionalConduct1.6ConfidentialityofClientCommunicationsandthe t Crime/fraudexception.Newmanv.Maryland384Md.285,863A.2d321(2004). d  XAtissueistherelationshipbetweentheconfidentialityrequirementsofRule1.6andthe <  evidentiaryattorneyclientprivilege. ( x   d Theevidentiaryprivilegeappliesonlyinproceedingsinwhichtheattorneymaybecalledas  P  awitnessorproduceevidenceadversetohisclient.Rule1.6expandsthistoallinformationrelated  <  toaclientsubjecttoseveralexceptionssuchas crime/fraud. (     Therearetwodifferentstatements.Thosemadeinhisofficepriortothecrimebeing   committedandduringthecourseofrepresentationandthestatementmadeafterthecrimeandnot   inconnectionwithrepresentationinwhichyouareaskedtoconcealcriminalconductonbehalfof   aclientseekingyourassistance. t  ` ThestatementinhisofficewithMercedespresentisalsoconfidentialcommunicationsas L theywereconductedaspartofhisrepresentation.Themerepresenceofathirdpartynonclientdoes 8 notnecessarilywaivetheprivilege;atissueistheintentionofthesecrecy.Itisclearthese $t communicationsweremadeinthescopeofrepresentationandnot ontheoutside. `  L Thestatementsregardingthefoundswordsanddisposingofthemareclearlywithinthe 8 crimefraudexceptionasheisbeingaskedtopossiblyassisthisclientindestroyingevidenceofa $ crime.Thecasualstatementsmadeinhisofficearelikelynotadmissibleunlesstheattorneyhada  reasonablebeliefatthetimethathewasassistingtheminengaginginacriminalact.    HisdisclosureofthestatementspriortothecrimewereproperlymadetotheDivorceCourt  Rule1.6,however.TheMay1,2006statementisinadmissibleintheCriminaltrialbutthe p statementsofMay5,2006areadmissibleunderthecrimefraudexception.Rule1.6providesthat \  alawyershallnotrevealinformationrelatingtotherepresentationofaclientwithouttheclients H! consent.UnderRule1.6theattorneysdisclosurestothedivorcecourtareappropriateastheywere 4"  demandedbytheCourt.  #p!   X  O l+&,    QUESTION3   (A)  $  Asapreliminarymatter,RexisanemployeeofthePostGazette.Hisvisittothenursing t homewasspecificallyauthorizedbyhiseditorandwasinthecourseofhisbusinessasa ` newspaperreporter.Thus,thePostGazetteisliableforanytortcommittedbyRexunderthe L  doctrineof_respondeat_Ԁsuperior.Henleyv.PrinceGeorge'sCounty,60Md.App.24(1984) 8      Trespass.Acauseofactionliesintrespass.Trespassisatortinvolving anintentional  ` ornegligentintrusionuponortothe_possessory_Ԁinterestinpropertyofanother.Mitchellv.  L  BaltimoreSun,164Md.App.497(2005)(quotingFordv.BaltimoreCitySheriffsOffice,149  8  Md.App.107(2002).Consent,eitherexpressedorimplied,constitutesacompletedefensetoa $  trespassclaim.Mitchellat508.Frank_Bigman_sprivateroomwashishome.WhileRexs   entranceintothecommonareasofthenursingfacilitywaspermittedandhecompliedwith   visitorregulationsestablishedbythatfacility,hisunannouncedentranceintoMr._Bigman_s   privateroomwasatrespass.Id.at511.EvenifyoubelievethatRexdidnotcommitatrespass   whenheenteredtheroombecausehavingthedoor slightlyajarcreatedanimpliedconsentto p enter,continuingtostayafterbeingaskedtoleaveexceededthescopeofanyconsentthatmay \ havebeenimplied.Id.at516.Thusasuccessfulcauseofactionfortrespassislikely. H     InvasionofPrivacy.Thetortofinvasionofprivacyincludesfourdifferenttypesof  p invasions.Oneformofinvasionisintrusionupontheseclusionofanother.Id.at522(quoting  \ McCauleyv._Suls_,123Md.App.179(1998).Intrusionupontheseclusionofanotheristhe H intentionalintrusionuponthesolitudeorseclusionofanotherorhisprivateaffairsorconcerns 4 thatwouldbehighlyoffensivetoareasonableperson.Mitchellat522(quoting_Furman_Ԁv.   _Sheppard_,130Md.App.67(2000).RexsrefusaltoleaveFranksroomafterseveralrequests   andhiscontinuedquestioningindicatesRexsintenttointrudeuponFrankssolitudeandprivate  affairs,andcouldbeseenashighlyoffensive.Mitchellat522.Thusasuccessfulcauseofaction  forinvasionofprivacyislikely.      IntentionalInflictionofEmotionalDistress.Inordertoprevailonaclaimofintentional X  inflictionofemotionaldistress,theconductmustbe(1)intentionalorreckless;(2)theconduct D! mustbeextremeoroutrageous;(3)theremustbeacausalconnectionbetweenthewrongful 0"  conductandtheemotionaldistress;(4)theemotionaldistressmustbesevere.Mitchellat525; #l! Carterv._Armarak_ԀSportsand_Entmt_ԀServs,Inc.,153Md.App.210(2003)(quoting_Manikhi_Ԁv. $X" MassTransitAdmin.,360Md.333(2000).Tosatisfytheelementofextremeandoutrageous $D # conduct,theconduct mustbesoextremeindegree,astogobeyondallpossibleboundsof %0!$ decency,andtoberegardedasatrocious,andutterlyintolerableinacivilizedsociety.Mitchell &"% at525;_Batson_Ԁv._Shiflett_,325Md.684(1992)(quotingHarrisv.Jones,281Md.560(1977).To '#& satisfythedegreeofemotionaldistressbeingsevere,itmustbesoseverethat noreasonable (#' mancouldbeexpectedtoendureit8tofunction[or]toattendtonecessarymatters.Mitchellat )$( 525;Harrisat571.ItisdifficulttoconcludethatRexstrespassintoFranksroomandhis |*%) attempttoquestionFrankabouthissonssteroidusewasatrociousorutterlyintolerableina h+&* _civilizedsociety.Norcanonereadilyconcludethatshortnessofbreathandafewnightsof  restlesssleepissoseverethatnoreasonablemancouldbeexpectedtoendureit,tofunction,or  attendtonecessarymatters.Thusasuccessfulcauseofactionforintentionalinflectionof  emotionaldistressisnotlikelytobesuccessful. t @*  (B) L  L1    Theinvolvementoffamilymembersinthelegalaffairsofpersonswithdiminished $ t capacitiesraisesdifficultissues.First,thelawyer'sclientinthismatterisFrank.MarylandRule  ` ofProfessionalConduct1.14setsoutgroundrules.Totheextentpossible,alawyershall  L  maintainanormalattorneyclientrelationshipwithaclientwithdiminishedcapacities.The  8  lawyermayconsultwithfamilymembers,likeBuddy,but,ultimately,decisionsregardingthe $  legalmatteraretobemadebytheclient.Thelawyerisunderaparticularobligationtotreatsuch   clientswithdignityandrespect.       Buddy'sstatementabouthisfather'smedicalconditionappearstobewellmeaningandin   goodfaith.Buddydidnotattempttoinstructthelawyerhowtofulfillthelawyer'sprofessional p obligations.Instead,Buddybroughttothelawyer'sattentionhisconcernsabouthisfather's \ conditionandthepossiblenegativeeffectsofatrial.Thesearematerialfactorsthatalawyer H shouldconsiderinadvisingaclient.Atthispoint,inthepreliminarystagesofrepresentation,the 4 lawyershoulddiscussFrank'shealthconditiondirectlywithhim.Thelawyerisnotundera  p professionalobligationtodisclosethecommunicationfromBuddytohisfather.  \ 0 *B&0 Ї X XXX   QUESTION4   8    A.Adeclaratoryjudgmentisanappropriatevehicletodeterminewhetherornottheoral  agreementbetweenAlbertandFredisenforceableagainstFred'sEstate.MarylandAnnotatedCode t Courts&JudicialProceedingsArticle3407.Dan,asabeneficiaryofFred'sEstate,hasstanding ` tobringsuchanaction. Courts&JudicialProceedingsArticle3408.  L      B. MarylandRule2211requiresjoinderofanypersonif,intheperson'sabsence,complete $ t reliefcannotbeaccordedamongthosealreadypartiesordispositionofthematterwillimpairthe  ` person'sabilitytoprotectaclaimedinterestintheproperty.Unlikesomedefenses,thefailuretojoin  L  anecessarypartymayberaisedatanytimethroughtrial.MarylandRule2324.Failuretojoina  8  necessarypartymayberaisedforthefirsttimeonappeal.Bodnarv.Brinsfield,60Md.App.524 $  (1984).Thus,thisdefensemayberaisedinposttrialmotions,eitheraMotionforaNewTrialunder   MarylandRule2533oraMotionforaNewTrialpursuanttoMarylandRule2534.Themotions   weretimelyfiledandtheCourtclearlyhastheauthoritytogranteitherorbothmotionsontheir   merits.     Courts&JudicialProceedingsArticle3405statesthatanypersonwho"hasorclaimsany p interestwhichwouldbeaffectedbythedeclaration,shallbemadeaparty."Istheresuchaperson? \ TheonlypersonmentionedinthefactsotherthanAlbertandDanisBeth.Determiningwhetheror H noteitherofthemotionsshouldbegrantedinvolvesanalyzingthenatureofBeth'sownershipinterest 4 asitrelatestothelitigation.Bethcertainlyhasaninterestinthefarmassheisanownerofan  p undividedinterestasatenantincommon.ButthedeclaratoryjudgmentactionconcernsonlyFred's  \ interestinBlackacre.TheresolutionofthisdisputewillhavenoeffectuponBeth'sinterest.She H willcontinuetoownherinterestasatenantincommonregardlessoftheoutcomeofthelitigation. 4 Thus,theCurtshoulddenybothmotions.     C.Filingofthenoticeofappealdoesnotdivestthetrialcourtofjurisdictionoverthepost  trialmotions.MarylandRules8202(c);Edsallv.AnneArundelCo.,332Md.502(1993).#X XX X 7#     _ h+&* QUESTION5   xC ANSWERTOA:     Bigmayappealthejudgesrefusaltodismissanyportionoftheindictmentongroundsthat ` theindictmentforpossessionanddistributionofcocaineafterhissentencinginDistrictCourtfor L  possessionviolatestheFifthAmendmentrighttobefreeofdoublejeopardy,applicabletothestates 8  viatheFourteenthAmendment.TheFifthandFourteenthamendmentstotheUnitedStates $ t ConstitutionprohibittheStatefromplacingapersoninjeopardytwiceforthesameoffenseinthe  ` samesovereign.Thequestionthusbecomeswhetherthelatterindictmentwasforthesameoffense  L  asthathandledbytheDistrictCourt.Thetestiswhethertwoormoreoffenseschargedarosefrom  8  thesameincidentorcourseofconduct,or,iftherelationshipbetweentheoffensesissuchthatthey $  arethesameinlawfordoublejeopardypurposes.Jonesv.State,357Md.141(1999)Anothertest   wasprofferedbytheSupremeCourtin_Blockburger_Ԁv.UnitedStates,284U.S.299(1932),namely   the requiredevidencetest.Inthistestif eachoffenserequiresproofoffactwhichtheotherdoes   not,theoffensesarenotthesamefordoublejeopardypurposes[_but]where_Ԁonlyoneoffenserequires   proofofanadditionalfact,sothatallelementsofoneoffensearepresentintheother,theoffenses p aredeemedtobethesamefordoublejeopardypurposes. \   Underthefacts,Bigwasfoundguiltyofpossessionofthedrugshesoldtothetwoofficers 4 andlaterindictedforpossessionanddistributionofthosesamedrugs.Clearlyitisdoublejeopardy  p tofindhimguiltyofpossessiontwice,anditisalsodoublejeopardytofindhimguiltyofdistribution  \ sincepossessionisalesserincludedcrimeofdistribution,therebeingnoelementinthecrimeof H possessionthatisnotcontainedinthecrimeofdistribution.Statev.Woodson,338Md.749(1990). 4 Additionally,allchargeswerebroughtinStateCourtforAnne_Arundel_ԀCounty,thus,thereisno   separatesovereigntonegatedoublejeopardy.       ANSWERTOB:     Again,BigmayappealthesentenceongroundsthatthesentencinghearingviolatedhisFifth l AmendmentDueProcessrighttoafairtrial,applicabletothestatesviatheFourteenthAmendment. X  First,sentencingisa criticalstageofacriminalproceeding,andundertheSixthAmendment,a D! defendanthastherighttocounselatallcriticalstagesofaprosecution.Here,itappearsthatBig 0"  hurriedlyattemptedtowaivehisrighttocounselbyrequestingtoproceedwithoutcounsel,saying #l!  Well,Iwantthisoverwith.However,tobeaneffectivewaiver,thewaivermustbeknowingand $X" intelligent.Here,thereisnoindicationthatthewaiverisknowingandintelligentbecauseBigonly $D # learnedofhisattorneysabsenceuponarrivinginthecourtroomthedayofsentencing,soBigdidnt %0!$ appeartohavemuchtimetoassesshisdecisionoritsconsequences.Andsincehisattorneywas &"% unexpectedlyhospitalizedontheverymorningofsentencing,Bigwasclearlyunpreparedtopresent '#& witnessesormitigatingevidence,ashewasentitledtodoatsentencing.Indeathpenaltycases,a (#' defendantisgivenevenwiderlatitudetoconfrontwitnesses.Moreover,thereisnoindicationthat )$( theCourtquestionedBiginanywaytodetermineifheunderstoodtheconsequencesofhisdecision |*%) orwhetherthewaiverwas knowingandintelligent.Thejudgeshouldhavecarefullyquestioned h+&* Bigandscrutinizedhiswaiver,asrequired.Whethertherehasbeenanintelligentwaiveroftheright  tocounseldependsupontheparticularfactsandcircumstancessurroundingeachcase,includingthe  background,experienceandconductofthedefendant.Insuchcases,anappellatecourtwillconsider  thetotalityofthecircumstancestodeterminewhetherthewaiverwasknowingandintelligent.State t v._Wischhusen_,342Md.530,677A.2d595(1996)Here,thetotalityofthecircumstancesdoesnot ` seemtoindicatethatthewaiverwasknowingandintelligent. L        Additionally,Bigmayappealongroundsthatbeingbroughtintothecourtroominhandcuffs $ t andlegironswasundulyprejudicial,particularlyinacapitalcase,adverselyaffectingthejurys  ` perceptionofhimandinviolationoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendments.Deckv.Missouri,125  L  _S.Ct_.2007(2005)AlthoughthefactsindicatethatcorrectionalofficersclaimedBigwasa flight  8  risk,thereisnoindicationofashowingofneedand,inanycase,therewereother,lessprejudicial $  meanstoaddressthisconcern.       Finally,MarylandRule8306providesforanautomaticappealtotheCourtofAppealsof   boththedeterminationofguiltandthesentencewheneverasentenceofdeathisimposed.   Ѐ       h+&* QUESTION6   [  Thecourtorderedthat(1)Briancontinuealimonypaymentsforanadditionaltwoyears;(2)  thatsolecustodybegrantedtoPattiandthentoBrianinfouryears;and,(3)thatBrianbejailedfor t contemptandthatthepurgeamountbethesameashisarrears. ` Briancanmakethefollowingargumentsonappeal(andcanexpectthefollowingresponsesfrom L  Patti): 8  Alimony/ChildSupport  `   Theseparationagreementarguablyaddressedtheamountanddurationofthealimony  8  payments.SinceitwasincorporatedandmergedintotheabsolutedivorceawardedinApril,2005, $  Briancanarguethatthecourtcouldnotmodifythealimonyarrangementiftherewasnoprovision   toextendthetimeforanadditionaltwoyears,unlessitwaspreparedtorevisittheentireaward.       Briancanargue,inthealternative,thattherehasbeenamaterialchangeofcircumstances   sinceheisnolongeremployedwithasalaryof$150,000,andthischangeshouldresultina p reductionordiscontinuanceofhissupportobligations.PattiwillcounterthatBrianvoluntarily \ impoverishedhimselfbydeliberatelyquittinghisjob,therebychoosingtoreducehisincome.Moore H _v.Tseronis_Ԁ,106Md.App.275,664A.2d427(1995)Pattiwillaskthatthecourtassesshis potential 4 income(i.e.,hisearningcapacity)._Sczudlo_Ԁv.Berry,129Md.App.529,743A.2d268(1999)Patti  p mayalsoarguethatanymoneysreceivedfromNicole_Michie_ԀshouldbefactoredintoBrians  \ income.Shemaynotbesuccessfulwiththisargumentsinceithasbeenheldthatathirdpartys H paymentsofhouseholdexpenses,etc.,shouldnotbeconsideredindeterminingchildsupport 4 payments._Allred_Ԁv._Allred_,130Md.App.13,744A.2d70(2000)     Custody      Anawardofcustodyisalwayssubjecttomodificationbythecourt.MarylandFamilyLaw  CodeAnnotated,Section51038;Taylorv.Taylor,246Md.616(1967)Thus,thefactthatthe l couplesseparationagreementandfinalorderofdivorceweremergedwillnotpreclude X  considerationofBriansrequesttoamendanypriorcustodyaward. D!       TheCourtmustassesswhatwouldbeinthebestinterestsofthechildinitsreviewofBryans #l! appealofthecustodyaward.TheawardofsolecustodytoPattiforaperiodoftime,andthento $X" Brian,doesnotappeartobeinKylesbestinterests.Asaparentisgenerallyaccorded $D # visitation/custodyrightsevenwherethereisevidenceofmaritalmisconduct.Moreover,oneneed %0!$ notbeinlocoparentistobegivensuchrights.Accordingly,BriansrelationshipwithNicoleand &"% thefactthatheisnotthebiologicalparentdoesnotbarhisrighttobeawardedcustodyofKyle.The '#& courtischargedwithassessingwhatispresentlyinthebestinterestofthechild.Thecourtisnot (#' clairvoyantandcannotknowthatitwouldbeinKylesbestintereststobesenttoBrianfouryears )$( fromthedateoftheorder. |*%)     PattiwilllikelyagreethatitwouldnotbeinKylesbestinteresttobesenttolivewithBrian h+&* infouryears.ShemayalsoarguethatshehasalwayssharedjointcustodywithBrianandthat  arrangementisthebestforKyleifBrianalsocontinueshissupportpayments.  Contempt/Arrears `     Thecourtmaynotmakeafindingofcontemptforfailuretopay_spousal_Ԁorchildsupport 8  withoutallowingBriananopportunitytoprovebyapreponderanceoftheevidencethathehadthe $ t meanstodoso.MarylandRules,Rule15207.Ifthecourthasmadeafindingofcontemptit may  ` specifyimprisonmentasthesanctionifthe_contemnor_Ԁhasthepresentabilitytopurgethecontempt.  L  MarylandRules,Rule15207.ItwouldbeaviolationoftheFourteenthAmendmentsdueprocess  8  safeguardstoholdotherwise.Wilsonv.Holiday,et.al.,364Md.589,774A.2d1123(2001)Under $  thefactsitdoesnotappearthatthecourtallowedBriantheopportunitytoshowwhetherhewasable   topurgethecontempt,anditshouldbereversedonappeal.     PattihasnosuccessfulcountertothisargumentunlessshecanshowthatBriandoeshavethe   abilitytopaythepurgeamount. p  h+&* Ї  QUESTION7   q  BusinessAssociations   r  X_Dreamview_ `  L  Onthegivenfacts,Cartercouldnotsuccessfullyattach_Dreamview_Ԁtosatisfyitsjudgment 8  against_Greenacre_. $ t     ` Separatecorporateidentities._Greenacre_,Inc.andDirtCheap,Inc.areseparateMaryland  L  corporationsandthereforehaveseparatecorporateidentities.  8   $  Instrumentalityrule.DirtCheap,Inc.mayhavebeenacontrolledcorporationanditsaffairs   soorganizedandconductedastomakeitaninstrumentality,agency,oradjunctof_Greenacre_Ԁwith   suchdominationthatDirtCheap,Inc.wasabusinessconduitfor_Greenacre_.However,thatisnot   enoughtopiercethecorporateveilsof_Greenacre_ԀandDirtCheapwithoutfraudortheenforcement   ofaparamountequity. p  \ Fraud.Fraudisenoughtopiercethecorporateveilsof_Greenacre_ԀandDirtCheap,iffraud H occurred.ThegivenfactsstatethatRyanhadprovideddocumentationtoCarterwhichidentified 4 DirtCheap,Inc.andnotGreenfieldastheownerof_Dreamview_.Thisdocumentationhadbeen  p providedpriortoRyansstatementthat weown_Dreamview_Ԁanditwouldgenerateenoughcashfor  \ therepurchasewithintheoneyearperiod.TheissueofduediligenceofCarterindeterminingtitle H to_Dreamview_ԀifCarterconsideredthatimportantisalsopresent. 4   X XParamountequity.Inthegivenfacts,thereisnoidentificationofanequitywhichrequires   enforcementandwhichisparamounttotheordinaryexpectationsofalanddevelopmenttransaction.    Estoppel.EquitableestoppelwouldbearguablyprecludedbecauseofthefailureofCarter  toexercisereasonablediligencetoprotecthisposition.Hereceivedthedocumentation,priorto l fundingthetransaction,that_Dreamview_ԀwastitledinthenameofDirtCheap,Inc. X     D! Ryan 0"   #l! Ryanwasthesolestockholderofbothcorporations.However,stockholdersarenotgenerally $X" individuallyliableforcorporatedebtsorobligationsexcepttopreventfraudortoenforcea $D # paramountequity. %0!$  &"% Theanalysisoffraudandparamountequityasappliedto_Greenacre_Ԁand_Dreamview_Ԁdoesnot '#& changeastoRyan.Thetitleownershipof_Dreamview_ԀbyDirtCheap,Inc.wasmadeknownto (#' CarterpriortothesigningofthepromissorynotebetweentheCarterand_Greenacre_. )$(    |*%)  h+&* _ԇIfRyanpurposefullyallowedGreenacretobecomedormant,Cartermayhaveanaction  againsthimfortortiousinterferencewiththeCarter/Greenacrenoteobjection. x Constructive  fraud.Probablynot.InformationontitletoDreamviewwasmadeavailabletoCarter.   t  XDixonv.ProcessCorporation,38Md.App.644,382A.2d893(1978) ` BartArconti&Sons,Inc.v.AmesEnnis,Inc.,275Md.295,340A.2d225(1975) L  StarfishCondominiumAssociationv.YorkridgeServiceCorporation,Inc., 8  295Md.693,458A.2d805(1983) $ t     _ h+&* Ї  QUESTION8      Abelmayraisethedefensesofentrapmentandnecessity.      Entrapmentoccurswhenapoliceofficerorgovernmentagentinducesthecommissionof ` acrimebyone,who,exceptforthegovernmentsenticement,solicitationorpersuasion,would L  nothavecommittedthecrime.Therearetwoelementstothedefense:presenceofaninducement 8  bythegovernmentandtheabsencepfapredispositiononthepartofthedefendant.Authorities $ t differastheessentialnatureofthedefense.Thosecasesthatfocusontheinducementturnonthe  ` questionofimproprietyperse.Marylandfocusesontheelementofpredisposition.  L    Inthiscase,BakerhasclearlyinducedAbeltocommittheoffense,bothbypersuading $  AbelandbyphysicallyplacingthehandguninAbelspossession.Theevidencealsoindicates   thatAbelisindisposedtowardpossessingahandgun,andwouldnothavecommittedtheoffense   butforthespeechandconductofBaker.Abelstraffickinginstolengoodsisirrelevant.Sparks   v.State,91Md.App.35,603A.2d1258,cert.den.,327Md.524,610A.2d797(1992).     Thedefenseofnecessityisincludedwithinselfdefense.Inasuddenemergencyaperson \ mayavailhimselforherselfofaweaponintheimmediatevicinitybutnototherwisebeing H lawfullycarried.Thedefensedoesnotnegatemens_rea_,butisbasedonacomparisonoftwo 4 evils.Circumstancescompellingthecommissionofacrimemaketheoffenseexcusable.The  p defensedoesnotexcusethecarryingofahandgunbecauseofastrongbeliefthatanattackupon  \ thepersonisastrongpossibilityorisotherwiseapprehended. H   XX XXX Therearefiveelements:(1)thedefendantorothersmustbe,orreasonablyappeartobe,   inimmediatedangerofdeathorbodilyinjury;(2)thedefendantmustnothaveintentionallyor   recklesslyplacedhimselforherselfinthesituation;(3)thedefendantmustnothaveareasonable  legalalternative;(4)thehandgunmustbemadeavailablewithoutpreconceiveddesign;(5)the  defendantmustrelinquishpossessionofthehandgunassoonasthenecessityends.  #X XXX +#X XXX  l Inthiscase,althoughAbelhadastrongbeliefthatanattackonhispersonwasastrong X  possibility,animmediatedangerisnotreasonablyapparent.NordidAbelrelinquishpossession D! assoonasAbelwasawayfromCharlie. 0"     #l! Thedefenseofentrapmentwillprobablysucceed,butthedefenseofnecessitywill $X" probablyfail.Crawfordv.State,61Md.App.620,487A.2d1214(1985),_affd_,Statev. $D # Crawford,308Md.683,521A.2d1193(1987). %0!$   X#X XXX #,,,XX ,,,,,,#X X,,,##X XXX #X XXX ,,,XX   #X X,,,/##X XXX # h+&+ Ї   QUESTION9  XX    #X X# ,  Banksdonothavetoacceptacheck.Banksarenotliableforrefusingtopaychecks,unless J thecheckisaccepted.Banksmayonlyacceptacheckinwriting,butacceptanceneedonlyconsist 6 ofasignatureofabankofficialorastampmarkthatindicatesthatthecheckiscertified.Under3 " r 409,acceptance/certificationbecomeseffectiveuponnotificationbythebank.  ^   J   Itisunlikelythattheaccountprintoutonthecheckwouldconstituteacceptance,becauseit  6 isnotasignaturethatindicatesthecheckiscertified.Moreover,TessanevernotifiedHarrythatthe  "  Bankhadacceptedthecheckasrequiredforacceptancetobecomeeffective.BecauseABCisnot    requiredtocashacheckoracceptacheck,ABCcanrefusetocashanoncustomerscheckifthat   individualrefusestoprovideadequateidentification.Ifthebankhadacceptedthecheck,thenABC   wouldhavebeenobligatedtopaythecheck,and_Noll_sobligationtoHarrywouldhavebeen   discharged.BecauseABCdidnotacceptthecheck,Holdermusteithercashcheckathisownbank n  orget_Noll_ԀtocashitatABC,since_Noll_ԀisnotdischargedofhisobligationstoHarry. Z   F  2  n   Z  F  2         , *,z'+   QUESTION10   J  Initialstop/seizureofMr._Meanor_ԀonMainStreet.Mr._Meanor_scounselwillarguethatthe  initialstopandseizureofMr._Meanor_Ԁbypolicewasnotsupportedbyprobablecauseand,therefore, t unreasonable.Mr._Meanor_sattorneywillarguethatanyevidencerecoveredfromthatpointforward ` shouldbesuppressedasfruitsofthepoisonoustree.Violationofatrafficlawprovidesprobable L  causeforthestopofanautomobile.Thus,Officersmayhavebeenabletostopthevanforfailure 8  touseaturnsignal.Itisimmaterialthatthestopforfailuretouseaturnsignalwasprobablya $ t pretexttostoppingMr._Meanor_Ԁsothattheofficerscouldsearchthevan.  `     Initialsearchofthevanwasunreasonablebecausetheofficershadnoreasonablesuspicion  8  thatcriminalactivitywasafoot.Officershadnoprobablecausetosearchthevan.Nonetheless,Mr. $  _Meanor_Ԁhasnoreasonableexpectationofprivacyinastolenvehicle(nostanding)andcannotassert   aviolationofhis4thamendmentrights.Thekeytoassessingtherighttoassertan    expectationof   _privacy agnin_  challengetoanimpropersearchdependsupontherelationshipoftheindividualclaiming   standingtotheownerofthevehicle.Athiefdoesnothavestandingtochallengetheconstitutionality   ofasearchofthestolenautomobile.GordonColin&OrvilleHeathv.StateofMaryland,101Md. t App.395;646A.2d1095(1994). `     Therecoveryofmarijuanawasokayandthemarijuanawillbeallowedintoevidencebecause 8 Mr._Meanor_Ԁhadnostandingtoobjecttothesearch.ThearrestofMr._Meanor_Ԁwasbaseduponthe $t marijuanaandthereforethehandgunwillbeallowedinevidenceasaresultofasearchincidentto ` alawfularrest.Recoveryofcocaineisalsoproperundertheinventorysearchexceptiontothe L warrantrequirement. 8     TheidentificationofMr._Meanor_ԀbyAngelina,however,wasunreasonablysuggestivebased  onthetotalityofthecircumstances(onlyMr._Meanor_Ԁwasintheoffice,hewasatthepolicestation,  hewashandcuffed,andofficerswalkedAngelinapasthim,etc.).     l+&* Ї X XXX    X X       ¼ f'¼  #f'#     # X X Ӧ# QUESTION11 X X ݌  Ќ                   ¼ f'¼  #f'#   # X X 3#݌̌ X X              ¼ f'¼  #f'#      X X   # X X ݫ# X X Thesefactsraiseissuesrelatingtotheeffectontitletorealestateofspouseswhoholdtitle  torealproperty,eitherastenantsbytheentiretyorasjointtenantswiththerightofsurvivorship.݌ t Ќ X X                  ¼ f'¼  #f'#   #  .# X X ޮ݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'#   #   # X X   Thesetenanciesaresimilarinthatbothrequiretheunityoftime,title,interestand L  possession.Anynumberofpersonsmayholdtitleasjointtenantswiththerightofsurvivorship. 8  Atenancybytheentiretyislimitedtomarriedcouples.Uponthedeathofajointtenant,oraspouse $ t inthecaseofatenancybytheentirety,titleremainsvestedinthesurvivingtenantsorspouse.Ѱ݌  ` Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'# ó  #  # X X ó݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'#   #  # X X   Destructionofanyoftheunitieswillconvertajointtenancytoatenancyincommon.Only  8  dissolutionofmarriagewillconvertatenancybytheentiretyintoatenancyincommon.݌ $  Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'|#   #  ݶ# X X y݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'Z#   #  Ȼ# X X   Agranttospousesintheabsenceofspecificlanguagethattheyholdastenantsbythe   entirety,createsa_rebuttable_Ԁpresumptionthatthegrantorintendedthattheyholdastenantsbythe   entirety.l݌   Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'M#   #  Ȯ# X X ݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'q#   #  Ҿ# X X   Thereisnolegalprohibitionagainstspousesholdingtitletorealpropertyasjointtenants \ withtherightofsurvivorshipifthatistheintentionofthegrantor.݌ H Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'd# k  #  # X X kP݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'1# ^  #  Ȓ# X X   Onthesefacts,theintentionofthedecedent,Amos,wascontrollingdespitethefactthathis  p personalrepresentativeconveyedthepropertytoBethandClemas# X X # X X  husbandandwife# X X # X X .Whilethis  \ designationaccuratelydescribestheirrelationship,itisinsufficienttoovercometheprecisedirective H ofAmos# X X # X X willthatBethandClemweretoholdtitleas# X X # X X  jointtenantswiththerightofsurvivorship.# X X @# X X  4 Underthesefactstheintentofthetestatorrebutsthepresumption.^C݌   Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'$#   #  ȳ# X X ݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'#   #  # X X   Anoptiongrantedbyonetenantbytheentirety,whetherornotexercised,willnotaffectthe  tenancy.Anoptiongrantedbyajointtenantwilldestroytheunityoftitleifitisexercisedbythe  _optionee_.Unityoftitlewasnotalteredonthesefacts.݌  Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'# E  #  # X X E*݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f' # 8  #  l# X X   Clem# X X _# X X spersonalloanfromPennyBankdidnotinvolvetherealproperty.Standingalone, X  itwouldnothavedestroyedeitheratenancybytheentiretyorajointtenancy.8݌ D! Ќ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'# N  #  ȱ# X X N3݌̌ X X                ¼ f'¼  #f'# A  #  u# X X   ThedivorceonMay15,2005wouldhaveseveredatenancybytheentiretyresultingina #l! tenancyincommonbetweenBethandClem.Thedivorcehadnoeffectonajointtenancywhichis $X" notdependentuponthemarriagerelationship.A&݌ $D # Ќ X X            #  h#   X X     Ajudgmentandrecordedlienagainstonlyonetenantbytheentiretycannoteffecta &"% severanceofthetenancy.Itwouldhaveseveredthejointtenancyifthebankhadexecutedonthe '#& judgmentandleviedonthepropertypriortoClem# X X # X X sdeath.Itsfailuretodosoresultedinaloss (#' ofthelienontheproperty.Bethbecamethesoleownerofthefarmassurvivingjointtenant )$( whenClemdiedonJuly2,2005.# X X ## # |*%)  ,,|'+ OY    X X X XXX  4"$%&'()*(03   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX   {  QUESTION12{݌ t Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X          X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XXe# X XXX   ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X      @      X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX     ThecentralissueiswhetherornotBobsrepresentationsconcerningthepavingandcurbingofthe L roadwayareadmissibleintoevidenceinthesuitfiledbyPaulagainstDon.Paulsattorneyshould 8 anticipatethefollowingdefensesassertedbyDontobaradmission:݌ $ t Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X          X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX `  `{݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X      6+,-./0123(004"$%&'()*/ /"+"  6" <DLX6    +2(  a  )3   `   Thetestimonyofstatementsmadepriortotheexecutionofacontractforthesaleof  L aninterestinlandisbarredbytheStatuteofFraudswhichprovidesthatnointerest  8 inlandmaybegrantedunlessinwritingsignedbythepartygrantingitorhis/her  $  authorizedagent.+݌    Ќ  X  X   <( 4 <DLX<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XXJ# X XXX H  Hc݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX2# X XXX  6" <DLX6S  Donwillarguethatneitherthecontractnorthedeedintowhichthecontractmerged   madeanyreferenceforpavingandcurbingtheroadway;and,thatadmittingthe   testimonywouldviolatetheStatuteofFrauds.S݌ p  Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     <( 4 <DL  X<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX=# X XXX   ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     "+"  6" <DLX6  +2(  b  )3   `   ThatBobsrepresentationisinadmissiblebecauseitwouldviolatetheParole 4 EvidenceRulewhichprecludesadmissionofextrinsicevidencetovaryorcontradict  p thetermsofawrittencontract;thatupondeliveryandacceptanceofthedeedallprior  \ negotiationsmergedintothedeed,eliminatinganycontractualrightsnotincludedin H thedeed.+݌ 4 Ќ  X  X   <( 4 <DLX<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX   ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     "+"  6" <DLX6  +2(  c  )3   `   Intheeventthecourtallowedthetestimony,PaulshouldalsoanticipatethatDonwill  claimthatBobwasnothisagentinthistransactionbutactedasanindependent  contractor,or,alternatively,thatifBobwasanagent,heactedbeyondthescopeof  hisemploymentandhisrepresentationscannotbeattributedtoDon,asprincipal.+5݌ l Ќ  X  X   <( 4 <DLX<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XXp# X XXX    ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX  X9%4 4 <DLX9  CourtsRulings:]݌ D Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X          X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX   ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X      4"$%&'()*(006+,-./0123/ /"""  X6" <DL44X6    ">2(  a  )3   `   StatuteofFraudsdefense!Anoralagreementtopaveandcurbtheroadwayis !l independentoforcollateraltoandnotinconsistentwiththecontractordeed.">݌ "X  Ќ X 44X  X      X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XXm# X XXX 9%4 4 <DL44X9  ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX~# X XXX  X6" <DL44X6  Itisanundertakingor taskwhichcouldreasonablybecompletedwithinoneyear. $ # Ѐ8 ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X          X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX      ݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX # X XXX    AnoralargumenttopaveandcurbaroadwayisnotwithinthepurviewoftheStatute '"& ofFrauds.Itisnotagrant(sale)ofrealtyoraninterestinland.  ݌ |(#' Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX # X XXX ~  ~݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     """  6" <DL  X6    "2(  b  )3   `   ParoleEvidenceRule"8݌ T*%)     X  X   <( 4 <DL  X<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XXh# X XXX   ݌ @+&* b 8 XXdd8   ь X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX  6" <DLX67  Paroleevidenceruledoesnotprecludetestimonybypurchaser(Paul)concerning   developers(Don)oralpromisetopaveandcurbtheroadwaysincethepromiseor  agreementdidnotcontradict,alterorvarythetermsofthecontractordeed.  Admissibletoproveacollateralagreement.7݌ t Ќ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     <( 4 <DL  X<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX!# X XXX J  Je݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X     """  6" <DLX6  "V2(  c  )3   `   Agency"V݌ 8  Ќ  X  X   <( 4 <DLX<   X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX4# X XXX 4  4O݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X        X XX X  X XX X X% XX X X X XX%  #X X XX# X XXX  6" <DLX6@   TherearenofactsthatindicatethatBobwasdirectedorotherwisecontrolledbyDon  L  withregardtohisagreementtosellthelots.Bob,ataminimum,hadapparent  8  authoritytomakethecontestedstatement.IfPaulreasonablyreliedonBobs $  representationstohisdetriment,Donisboundbytherepresentationsofhisagent.   PaulsreliancewouldbeunreasonableifheshouldhaveknownthatBobwasacting   outsidethescopeofhisemployment.ThefactsindicatethatPaulreasonablyrelied   onBobsrepresentationsandthatpavingandcurbingoftheroadwaywere   contributingfactorsinPaulsdecisiontoenterintothecontractforthebuildinglot. p @ !݌̌ X XX X  X XX X  X XX X  X XX X         #X XX X *!##XX #