WPC =ۮ3-kPf':HdJ }b&J=_+:#f+ @6޸Uȫ~(4$)R -,"lz q@)޵f#5GRl |+"tZ>D7{Pڕ?Br$͋dEa&<_ 0{uCBC3*Iѯ_KtK|V528KAj)8q7:DnOWo)#b$x:-Y ?9 ȱs{!@{qymD п%y)֣P:wZ e5 7? <h;9Ƿ|g3oBŠ^n(#0UBN %? 0:EU>^ w4 m N 0+h D+{ 0V9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1u 72O 0+4U. 0p 72S 0c 1e 0pM 0HP LaserJet 4250 PCL 60(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,\  `&Times New Roman7s SzZ3~7Backup3|xU 6 4Body TextXXX'dxd )USUS.,  _   Page  2  ڀof  15  (.3$ !USUS.,  (5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.2S+P 0_level1  , ;1` hp x (#;23  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2P+P 0_level2  X 8.` hp x (#823  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2P+P 0_level3   8.444` hp x (#823  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2M+P 0_level4   5+` ` ` hp x (#523  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2M+P 0_level5   5+ hp x (#523  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2J+P 0_level6   2( hp x (#223  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2J+P 0_level7  4 2( hp x (#223  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2G+P 0_level8  ` /% hp x (#/23  ..  8.` hp x (#8  2G+P 0_level9   /%< <<hp x (#/23  ..  8.` hp x (#8  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i).,term1 $Verdana($$&t1  XXX  XXXa.(;3$2#  0  .3  0   35;AGMSY_11.a.i.1.a.i.1.a.($$&t5  XXX  XXX(nq&p6   ^ 2(  hp x 2XXX  5+ ` hp x 5   XXX !USUS.,  _rXXXX       XX  BOARDSANALYSIS  r  @ QUESTION1  J   Rescission!Asageneralrule,anexecutorycontractmaybeunilaterallyrescindedbyaparty   wheretherehasbeenasubstantialandmaterialbreach,sufficienttodefeattheobjectofthe   contract.Vincentv.Palmer,179Md.365,19A.2d183(1941).  t     Here,theexistenceofrecordedrestrictionsandcovenantsissubstantialandrelatedtothe L  objectofthecontract.However,theSellerdidnotbreachthesalescontractbecauseitstatedthat 8  titlewas subjecttoallrestrictionsofrecord.TherightsoftheassigneeCommercial $  Developers( CD)arenogreaterthanthoseoftheassignor( Buyer).Consequently,CDwill   notbesuccessfulinseekingtorescindthecontract. n  RightsAgainstSwift󀄀CDwouldnotbesuccessfulinanactionagainstSwift. F      InMaryland,thegeneralruleisthattheliabilityofanattorneytoexamineandpassupon  atitletolandisfoundedoncontractratherthantort,andtherefore,doesnotextendbeyondthe   personbywhomtheywereemployed.      A downstreamtitleholderorcontractassigneelacksprivitywiththeattorneyand, \ therefore,hasnocauseofactionincontract.Wlodarnkv.Thrift,178Md.453,13A.2d774 H (1940). 4     Underthestatedfacts,SwiftpreparedtheContractAssignmentandknewthatCDwould ~  bethepurchaser.However,SwiftstitleopinionwasnotincludedinthatassignmentandSwift j didnotknowtheBuyerhadsenthistitleopiniontoCD. V     [AnAnswerwhichdiscussesthefactsandconcludesthatSwiftisliablebasedontort .! becauseheshouldhaveknownCDwouldrelyonhistitleopinionwillreceivesubstantialcredit]. "   #XXXXK#   `     $l! BOARDSANALYSIS r  QUESTION2  J  "  XXXX  B.A$` hp x XB"   " 9 ݌̌  XXXX  -Jx A$` X-E+ ` hp x JxXE'   ^<(  hp x X<XXXX   ^  E+ ` hp x  XE'!   a.  TheCourtshouldoverruletheobjections.Bothofthecommonlawrulesassertedbythe   objectingattorneyhavebeenmodifiedbytheMarylandRulesofEvidence.MRE5607provides   thatthecredibilityofawitnessmaybechallengedbyanyparty,includingthepartywhocalled  t thewitness.MRE5613statesthatawitnessmaybequestionedaboutapriorinconsistent  ` statementwithoutdisclosureofthepriorstatementscontentsifpriortotheendofthe L  examinationdisclosureismadeandthewitnessgivenanopportunitytoexplainordenymaking 8  thestatement.'! , ݌ $  Ќ   XXXX      &  XXXX    &  b.  TheCourtshouldsustaintheobjection.Astotheissueofcharacter,evidenceofprior n  crimesisinadmissibletoprovethecharacteroftheperson.MRE5404(b).MRE5609setsout Z  aseveralpartanalysisregardingtheadmissibilityofpriorcrimestoattackcredibility.First,the F  crimemustbeaninfamousoneor [an]othercrimerelevanttothewitnessescredibilityandthe 2 Courtmustdeterminethattheprobativevalueoutweighsthedangerofunfairprejudicetothe  witnessorobjectingparty.MRE5609(a).Second,theconvictionmusthaveoccurredwithin15   years.MRE5609(b).&݌  Ќ  XXXX  &  XXXX  B.A$` hp x XB&V  AA A&V݌̌  XXXX  &  XXXX  &`  AA A $ InMaryland,infamouscrimesaretreason,felony,perjury,forgeryandthesocalled \ crimenfalsi,i.e.misdemeanorsinvolvingdishonesty.Neithermaliciousdestructionofproperty H northeillegalpossessionofaweaponinvolvesdishonestyand,sincetheyaremisdemeanors, 4 theyarenotinfamouscrimes.Whiletheftisaninfamouscrime,Blifillwasconvictedin1990,   outsideofthe15yearlimitsetoutinMRE5609(b).&`݌ ~  Ќ  XXXX  &  XXXX  &F  &F݌̌  XXXX  &  XXXX  &  c. $ BlifillcannotbecompelledtotestifyifhehasinvokedtheFifthAmendment.Unlikea V criminalcase,thereisnowaiverofawitnessFifthAmendmentrightsinacivilcaseifthat B  witnesstestifiestoothermatters.Thewitnessmayinvoketherightastoeachquestionthatmay .! beincriminating.Theopposition,however,isentitledtoanegativeinferencefromsuch " invocationtotheextentitisrelevanttothecase.&A݌ # Ќ  XXXX   $l! @% QUESTION3 r @"BOARDSANALYSIS  J   AA A $ AA A $ TheLLCshouldnotbeliableforeithertherentorthedamagestotheSpaceclaimedby   theLandlord.TheLLCwasformedaftertheclaimsforrentandthedamagestotheSpacearose.   TheclaimsarosepriortothedateonwhichtheLLCwasformed,TheArticlesofOrganization  t wereacceptedbytheMarylandStateDepartmentofAssessmentsandTaxationonSeptember1,  ` 2006.See,Md.Corps.&AssnsCodeAnn.4A202(b).UnlesstheArticlesofOrganizationor L  theOperatingAgreementamongthemembersprovidethattheLLCwillassumetheliabilityfor 8  claimsagainsttheindividualmemberspriortothedateofformation,orunlessthereisa $  successfulargumentthattheLLCratifiedtheactionsofindividualmembers,theLLCshouldnot   beliableforanyclaimsmadebyLandlord. n  AA A $ StevesignedtheleaseonbehalfoftheLLCpriortoitsformationandwithoutauthority F  todosoasstatedintheArticlesofOrganization.TheArticlesprovidedthatnomemberwas 2 authorizedtoactasanagentoftheLLC.Therefore,Stevecannotavoidliabilitybyassertingthe  shieldprovidedtomembersofanLLCassetforthinMd.Corps.&AssnsCodeAnn.4A301.   Stevewillbepersonallyliableforboththerentdueundertheleaseaswellasforthedamages  thathecausedtotheSpace.HewillseekcontributionfortherentanddamagesfromCarlaand p theLLC;however,itisunlikelythatCarlaortheLLCwillbeliablefortheindemnification \ unlessSteveissuccessfulinarguingratificationbytheLLCand/orCarlaortheoral H understandingandagreementwithCarla. 4 AA A $ TheLandlordwillseektherentanddamagessimultaneouslyfromCarlabecausethe ~  LandlordwillclaimthatsheratifiedtheleaseenteredintobyStevebecauseshepaidtherent j undertheleaseorthattheywerepartnersunderanoralunderstanding.Shewillclaimthatshe V advancedtherentandthatsheisnotpersonallyliabletotheLandlordassheneithersignednor B  ratifiedtheleaseasherpersonalobligation.Instead,shewillarguethatsheshouldreceive .! indemnificationfromallliabilitiesfromStevesincehesignedthatleaseindividuallyand " personallycausedthefiretotheSpace.Inaddition,shewillarguethathercontributionof # $50,000totheLLCshouldnotbeusedtopayanyrentordamagestotheLandlordbecausethe #  contributionwouldbeanassetoftheLLCuponitsformation. $l!   %X" @" BOARD'SANALYSIS  r  @%QUESTION4  J AA A Aa.Dealer'sstatementstoBuyerastothesimilaritybetweenthe2003and2006models "  representsanexpresswarrantyastotheconditionofthe2006vehicleunder2-313ofthe   UniformCommercialCode("UCC"),codifiedinMarylandasCommercialLawArticle2101et   seq.WhenBuyerrealizedthatthe2006modelwassubstantiallydifferentfromthe2003model,  t hewasentitledtorevokehisacceptance.Mercedes-Benzv.Garten,94Md.App.547(1993).  ` Becausethevehicleoperatednormally,albeitnottoBuyer'sexpectationthatitwouldbeidentical L  tothe2003model,thereisnotabreachoftheimpliedwarrantyforfitnessfortheusestowhich 8  thegoodsarecustomarilyused,(UCC2314). $  AA A Ab.Dealer'sprimarydefenseisthatBuyer'srevocationwasdefective.Buyerinitiallyaccepted n  thevehiclebypayingforit.UCC2-606.ThefirstissueiswhetherBuyerrevokedhis Z  acceptancewithinareasonabletime.UCC2-607.ThefactsindicatethatBuyerreturnedthe F  vehicleassoonashelearnedthatthereweremorethancosmeticdifferencesbetweenthetwo 2 models.However,Buyerthenatleastarguablyrescindedhisrecessionbytakingbackpossession  ofthevehicleanddisposingofit.However,theCourtofSpecialAppealsinGartenheldthat   Buyer'sactionswerereasonableinlightoftheDealer'sobduraterefusaltoattempttoresolvethe  matter.  p    BOARDANALYSIS r /  QUESTION5 J )0XXXX  d0  d00݌̌XXXX  XXXX    1  1M1݌̌XXXX  XXXX    1  AA A $ SamSpadecouldbringanactionintortagainstJohnBucksTractorCompanyandits   agent,SecurityOfficer,forthebatterythatoccurredwhenSecurityOfficergrabbedSamsarm   andforciblyescortedhimfromtheproperty.Abatteryisanonconsensualtouchinganditclearly  t occurredunderthesefacts.SecurityOfficerwasactingatthedirectionoftheCompanys  ` employee.Thus,undergeneralprinciplesofagency,boththeofficerandtheCompanywouldbe L  liable.11݌ 8  ЌXXXX  XXXX  4  45݌̌XXXX  XXXX  x5   $ Similarly,theCompany,itsemployee(SalesPerson)anditsagent(TommyTowem)   wouldbesubjecttoadefamationclaimfortheslanderthatoccurredwhenTowemandSales n  PersoncalledSamathief.Slanderisdefinedas thespeakingofbaseanddefamatorywords Z  whichtendtotheprejudiceofthereputation,office,trade,businessormeansofgettingaliving F  offanother.Cantv.Bartlett,292Md.611,622(1982)citing53C.J.S.LibelandSlanderSection 2 1(b)(1948).ThecommentsmeetthedefinitionandwereoverheardbyNeighborandanyoneelse  intheareawhentheyweremade.x55݌   ЌXXXX  XXXX   9   9D9݌̌XXXX  XXXX  9   $ TheCompanymaybeliablefortheintentionaltortofconversionwhenit,throughthe p actionsofitsagentsTowem,repossessedthetractorandkeptthefarmtools.Asnotedbythe \ CourtofAppealsinMerchantsNationalBankv.Williams,110Md.334,35152(1909):99݌ H ЌXXXX  XXXX  ;  ;;݌̌XXXX  XXXX  X XH+ ` hp x A$` XHQ<   ` Conversion8consistseitherintheappropriationofthepropertyof   another,orinitsdestruction,orinexercisingdominionoveritindefianceofthe ~  ownersrights,orinwithholdingthepossessionfromhimunderanadverseclaim j oftitle,andallwhoaid,command,assist,orparticipateinthecommissionofsuch V unlawfulactsareliable.Q<<݌ B  ЌXXXX  XXXX  XE+ ` hp x X E&?  &??݌̌XXXX  XXXX  X@    Thereisarguablynoconversionofthefundssincemoneyisnotrecoverableinactionfor " conversionunlessidentifiableorspecificfundsareatissue(i.e.,rarecoins,etc.).InAllied # InvestmentCorp.&AlliedVenturePartnershipv.Jasen,354MD.547(1999).InCarcars #  MotorsofSilverSpring,Inc.v.Borzym,379MD249(2004),theCourtofAppealssuggested $l! (underfactssimilartothoseatissue)thattheproperactionforrecoveringthefundswouldliein %X" contractsincetheCompanyowedSamSpadeonceitrepossessedhistractorandmonies.@d@݌ &D # ЌXXXX  XXXX  C  CC݌̌XXXX  XXXX  &D    JohnBuckanditsagentsmaybeliableforthetortoftrespasstochattelsforits ("% repossessionofthetractor.Samhadarighttopossessthetractor.Ifhecanshowthatdamages z)#& resultedfromtherepossession,itmayalsobeliablefortheconversionforthetoolsrepossessed f*#' alongwiththetractor.Aconversionoccurswhentherehasbeenawrongfuldetentionof R+$( anotherschattel,andarefusaltoreturnitand/oraresultingloss.Thetoolsweretakenalong >,%) withthetractorandwerenotreturned.&D`D݌  *-&* ЌXXXX  XXXX  JG  1  BOARDSANALYSIS JGG݌ r ЌXXXX   @  @ QUESTION6  J G  Themotionstosuppressshouldbegranted,andevidenceseizedfrombothbedrooms "  shouldbesuppressed.       TheFourthAmendmentoftheU.S.Constitutionguardsagainstunreasonablesearches  t andseizures,andrequiresthatsearchwarrantsbeissuedonlyafterafindingofprobablecause.  ` @*a.ReasonableExpectationofPrivacy. 8      Inorderfortheretobeasearch,anindividualmusthaveareasonableexpectationof   privacy.Katzv.UnitedStates,386U.S.954(1967).Inthiscase,thereisnoquestionthat n  Husbandhasareasonableexpectationofprivacyinhishome.Paytonv.NewYork,445U.S. Z  573,586(1980)(holdingthatwarrantlessentryofaperson'shouseisunreasonableperse.) F  HowevertheSupremeCourthasheldthatBrother,asanover-nighthouseguest,alsohasa 2 reasonableexpectationofprivacyinhistemporaryquarters.Minnesotav.Olson,495U.S.91  (1990).   @*b.Consent. p   Anexceptiontothegeneralprohibitionagainstawarrantlesssearchofaperson'shomeis H thevoluntaryconsentofanindividualwithauthoritytoconsenttothesearch.Jonesv.United 4 States,357U.S.499(1958);Illinoisv.Rodriguez,497U.S.177(1990).Inthiscase,both   HusbandandWifeclaimedownershipofthehouse,withneitherpartydisputingtheother's ~  claimofownership.Moreover,WifeinformedtheofficersthatHusbandwasherhusband. j Thereforeitwasreasonablefortheofficerstoconcludethateachpartywasaco-occupantofthe V house.TheSupremeCourthasheldthataphysicallypresentco-occupant'sstatedrefusalto B  permitentryrendersawarrantlessentryandsearchunreasonableandinvalidastohim.Georgia .! v.Randolph,547U.S.103(2006).Husbandrefusedtoconsenttothesearchofthehouse,and " thereforetheOfficer'sentryandsearchwasunreasonableandinvalidastohim. #     EventhoughBrotherdidnothavethelegalauthoritytodeterminewhomayormaynot $l! enterthehouse,hehadareasonableexpectationofprivacyinthehouse.Olson,supra.Thus,the %X" officers'warrantlessentryandsearchwasunreasonableandinvalidastoBrother.Olson,supra. &D # 8        "IftheuntrammeledpowertoadmitandexcludewereessentialtoFourthAmendment ("% protection,anadultdaughtertemporarilylivinginthehomeofherparentswouldhaveno z)#& legitimateexpectationofprivacybecauseherrighttoadmitorexcludewouldbesubjecttoher f*#' parentsveto."Id. R+$(    `     h  *-&* &  c.ExigentCircumstances. r     Anotherexceptiontoawarrantlesssearchisaclaimofapressingorurgentlaw'rqU J enforcementneed,i.e.,exigentcircumstances.Illinoisv.McArthur,531U.S.326(2001);United 6  Statesv.Place,462U.S.696(1983).Here,HusbandandBrotherknewthattheofficershadbeen "  madeawareoftheillegaldrugs.Therefore,theOfficerscouldreasonablyconcludethatthe   illegaldrugswouldbedestroyedbeforetheyreturnedwithasearchwarrant.TheSupremeCourt   hasheldthattheimminentdestructionofevidencemayconstituteanexigentcircumstance.  t Welshv.Wisconsin,466U.S.740(1984).However,theprivacyconcernsandlawrelated  ` concernsmustbebalancedtodetermineiftheintrusionwasreasonable.McArthur,supra; L  Delawarev.Prouse,440U.S.648(1979).Inthiscase,theofficerscouldhaveactedinaless 8  intrusivemannerwhilestillprotectingtheevidencefrombeingdestroyed.Oneofficercould $  havelefttoobtainawarrantwhiletheotherofficerremainedbehindtopreventre-entryintothe   house.TheSupremeCourthasheldthatwhenpolicehavereliableinformationthataresidence n  containsillegaldrugs,theymaysealtheapartmentfromtheoutsideandrestrictentryintothe Z  residencewhilewaitingforthewarrant.Segurav.UnitedStates,468U.S.814(1984). F  McArthur,supra,heldthatthetemporaryrestraintofre-entryintoahousesupportedbyprobable 2 causetopreventdestructionofevidenceisreasonable.Seealso,UnitedStatesv.Jeffers,342  U.S.48(1951).Giventheofficer'sabilitytosealre-entrytothehouse,exigentcircumstancesdid   notexist.  d.ExclusionaryRule. \     Evidenceseizedunlawfullyisnotadmissibleincourt.Weeksv.UnitedStates,232U.S. 4 383(1914).Therefore,theillegaldrugsseizedfromthehouseshouldbeexcludedfromevidence   bytheCourt.  ~  X K(XrK  BOARDANALYSIS r QUESTION7 J  o_  Onbehalfoftheminorityshareholder,BarristershouldmovetodisqualifyHoracefrom, "  representingmorethanoneofthedefendants.IfitisdeterminedthatHoraceobtained   informationfromRalphrelativetotheactivitiesofDataMoandPreMa,Horacemayhaveplaced   himselfinapositionwhichwoulddisqualifyhimtorepresentanyoneofthem.Itislikelythathe  t couldrepresentonlyRalph.However,ifhehasobtainedconfidentialinformationfromRalph  ` andfromeitherorbothoftheotherdefendants,thecourtwoulddisqualifyhimfromrepresenting L  anyofthedefendants. 8      Representationofacorporationasanentityaswellasitscontrollingdirectors,   individually,createsalikelyconflictofinterestfortheattorney,particularlywhenthe n  corporationsinterestsareadversetothoseofthedirectors.Rule1.7oftheMarylandRulesof Z  ProfessionalConductmakesitclearthatwhenasuitisfiledagainstacorporationandits F  directorsindividually,apossibleconflictofinterestimmediatelyarises.Thetestfordetermining 2 wherethereisanimpairingconflictisprobability,notcertainty.Oncethereisaprobabilityof  conflictthecourtmayrestrainconductwhichhasthepotentialtoevolveintoabreachofethics   evenbeforesuchconductbecomesripefordisciplinaryaction.Itisclearonthesefactsthatthe  threepartieshaveintereststhatmaybemateriallyadversetoeachother,andthatHoracecould p notdiligentlyadvancetheinterestsofallthree. \   ThecourtshouldgrantthemotiontodisqualifyHoracefromrepresentingmorethanone 4 oftheparties.DependingontheextentofHoracesinvolvementinobtainingconfidential   information,thecourtcoulddisqualifyhimfromrepresentinganyoneofthem. ~    Inorderfortheminoritystockholdertomaintainaderivativesuit,thestockholdermust V firstmakedemandonthecorporatedirectorstotakeactionunlessdemandwouldbefutile.Here, B  Barristershouldfileamotionwiththecourtrequestingwaiverofthisrequirementontheground .! thatsuchactionwouldbefutile.Giventheknownfacts,itisprobablethatthecourtwouldgrant " themotion. #   IftheminoritystockholderproducesevidencethatRalphwasusingDataMoandPreMa $l! forhisownpurposestothedetrimentofDataMosstockholders,andthatthecorporationswere %X" beingusedasshellsintheconductofRalphspersonalbusiness,thecourtwillimposepersonal &D # liabilityonotherwiseimmunecorporateofficialsforwrongfulactsdoneinthenameofthe '0!$ corporation.Thisiscommonlyreferredtoas piercingthecorporateveil. ("%  XMarylandRuleofProfessionalConduct4.2prohibitsalawyerfromcommunicatingwith f*#'  apersonrepresentedbycounselunlesssuchcontactisauthorizedbytheotherattorneyor R+$( permittedbycourtorder.Thisprohibitionextendstocontactswithofficersandemployeesofan r organizationaswell. ^   J MRPC4.2(b).Here,BarristerscommunicationswithFredviolateRule4.2.Inaddition 6  toprofessionalsanctions,Barristersactionsaregroundforbeingdisqualifiedfromfurther "  participationinthependingactionbetweentheseparties.    X     XXXX  QUESTION8 r #XXXXo#XXXXBOARDANALYSIS J  #XXXX2p#oXXXX#XXXXp#XXXX  Dickwaschargedandconvictedoftwocrimesresultingfromthesameincident.An "  #XXXXp#XXXXanalysisoftheelementsofthesecrimesisnecessarytodeterminetherequiredevidencefor   convictionofthesecrimes.   #XXXXq# XXXXXThesecrimescontaindifferentelements.Theyareseparateanddistinct.Dickwasnot  ` convictedtwiceforthesameoffense.Therefore,thereisnomergerandthereisnodouble L  jeopardyissueinDickscase. 8   X#XXXXr#XXXX X#XXXXs#XXXXArsonisaspecificintentcrime.Arsonrequiresthedefendanttoact willfullyand   maliciously.Defendantmustintentionally,knowinglyandpurposefullydotheactwithintent n  toharmproperty.CriminalLawArticle,6102(a)and6101(c)and(e)(2002).Also,the Z  factthatDickcoownedthepropertythatheattemptedtoburndoesnotprohibithissuccessful F  prosecution. 2  X#XXXXNt#XXXX X#XXXXv#XXXXIntentofthedefendantisnotanelementofrecklessendangerment.Thiscrimeaddresses   theconductofthedefendantevenwherehehascausednoinjury.Itisadeterrent.Arecklessact  constitutinga grossdeparturefromthestandardofconductthatalawabidingpersonwould p observeisrequiredforconviction.Itisageneralintentcrimewhichcreatesasubstantialriskof \ deathorseriousphysicalinjurytopersonsinconsciousdisregardandindifferenceofthe H consequencestotheotherpersons.CriminalLawArticle,3204(a)(1)(2005Supplement). 4  X#XXXXv#XXXX X#XXXXy#XXXXArsonisacrimeagainsthabitation.Dickcausedcharmarksonthesideentrancedoor ~  anditsthresholdandcausedsmokethroughoutthehouseasaresultofleavingaburningbagof j charcoalbrickettesagainstthesideentrancedoor.Itwasintentionallydoneto getevenand V Dicksubsequentlyadmittedhewassatisfied. B   X#XXXX