WPC7 Il*EtXJm ҭXmMGj{/tgIBKpwHˑ>~g J$w.QqLw~pp&EPQ>~=<#X9=CWL I`_UTv|gb-*di| i\ifώ v3)_~FzoKƌ, 7لB5Md5='l,3+4'R%dT-&!(/B't!"N%NkHܢ:R,ۋj.~L_L|LE<"6`b3%Ly]U`v(Uk*AEq; +|| q*w$4&!epZXPjHn\sLI?8}L˷T#UNY % 0: 0 0 0 0 0 0o 0N 0* 0 0 0 0 0d 07 0 0 0 0e 0) 0 0 0 0 0R 0 0 0 0<pU >^ w4  m N6 068 0 gn 0g 0g+J 0_level4  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2;+J 0_level5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  28+J 0_level6    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  25+J 0_level7  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  22+J 0_level8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2/+J 0_level9    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levsl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levsl2   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levsl3   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levsl4  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levsl5   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levsl6    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levsl7  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levsl8   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levsl9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levnl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23   2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levnl2   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levnl3   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levnl4  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levnl5   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levnl6    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levnl7  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levnl8   L23   2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levnl9    L23   2( 4 <DL2  <:Default Para\  `&Times New Roman}:s *>8hared3|xU0.Strong <+ :Outline002_123  ..<+ :Outline002_223  ..<+ :Outline002_323  ..<+ :Outline002_423  ..<+ :Outline002_523  ..<+ :Outline002_623  ..<+ :Outline002_723  ..<+ :Outline002_823  ..<+ :Outline002_923  ..*+,-./01 359=AEIMQ1........42Emphasis3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)5i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0  \  `Calisto MT86Hyperlink6 clsccl13 R)USUS.,  _  AnalysisPage  2  ڀof  18   B'USUS.,  _  FEBRUARY2009MARYLANDBAREXAMINATION  BOARDSANALYSIS 7?ALMNOPhG/CEIMQUY]aAutoList1i)1)a)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#     (b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(.3$ !USUS.,  <>+> :Outline001_1 X 2( ` hp x 223  ..2( ` hp x 2 X <G+M :Outline001_2   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  <5+M :Outline001_9 j  wwY!23  ..  5+ A IQY!5 j <D+M :Outline001_3 j  ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5 j <A+M :Outline001_4  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  <>+M :Outline001_5   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  <;+M :Outline001_6 j  #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5 j <8+M :Outline001_7  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  <5+M :Outline001_8   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  (xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(# (.3$ !USUS.,  (9 Z(Times New Roman !USUS.,  _   !XpXXX=  QUESTION1  l   Ӏ GroundsforDivorce `    XPursuanttoFamilyLawsection7103(a)(3),Alwayscanfileforanabsolutedivorceifthe T  partieshavelivedseparateandapartwithoutcohabitationforatleast12monthsorbymutual N  agreement.Here,NevarandAlwayshavebeenapartsinceJanuary2007,whichismorethanayear H  priortothedatethatAlwaysfiledforabsolutedivorce. B    < SinceNevaropposesthedivorce,Marylandlawrequiresthatthecouplemustbeseparatedfor 6  atleasttwoyearstogetanabsolutedivorce.However,Alwayscouldbeentitledtoanimmediate 0  absolutedivorceifsheabletoprovethatNevarcommittedadulteryand/ordesertionpursuantto *  FamilyLawsections7103(a)(1)and(2). $       TheCourtshaverecognizedthatevidenceofadulteryisdifficulttoobtain.Therefore,the   accusingspousemustonlyshowthattheadulterousspousehadtheopportunityanddispositionto  commitadultery.Blankenshipv.Blankenship,239Md.498(1965).       Inordertobegrantedanabsolutedivorceonthegroundofconstructiveoractualdesertionone  mustshowthatthedesertionwascontinuousforaperiodof12monthsormorepriortofilingforan  absolutedivorceandthedesertionwasdeliberateandfinalwithnoexpectationofreconciliation.(7  103(a)(2)).   | Here,sinceNevarmovedinwithhisloverwhilestillbeingmarriedmorethan12monthsprior v tothefilingofthedivorcecomplaint,Alwaysmaybeabletomeettheburdensforprovingadultery p and/ordesertion. j   X Custody !^   XWhendeterminingchildcustodytheCourtusesthe bestinterestofthechildstandard. #R MontgomeryCountyv.Sanders,38Md.App.406(1978),settingoutalist,albeitnotnecessarily $L exhaustive,ofatleasttenfactors,suchasfitnessoftheparents,characterandreputation,desiresofthe %F parents,lengthofseparationoftheparents,thatshouldbeweighedinmakingsuchadetermination.In &@  thiscase,thecourtwouldconsiderthefactthatNevarwastheprimarycaregiverforthefirst5yearsof ': ! themarriage.However,Alwayscanarguethatshequitherjob,atNevarsrequest,tobecomethe (4!" childrensprimarycaregiver.Shecanstatethatovertheyears,andcertainlyduringperiodsoftime )."# whenNevarwaslivingwithRebecca,shehadtheprimarycustodyofthechildren. *(#$    _ +"$% <Accordingly,Alwaysshouldarguethatitisinthechildrensbestinteresttocontinuetolivewith l herastheprimarycaregiver.Becauseof_Nevar_sinvolvementwiththechildren,Alwaysshould f probablyagreetojointlegalcustodyandvisitation,whichwillallow_Nevar_Ԁtospendqualitytimewith `  thechildrenandtobeinvolvedinthemajorparentingdecisions.Thereisnothinginthefactstosupport Z  astrongargumentforfullcustodyforAlwaysor_Nevar_. T    X ChildSupport H     3*+,-./01E(035"*"    *2.3      PrivateSchool*݌ < Ќ  X ?+k k s #{+3!X?Indeterminingwhetherchildhas particulareducationalneedtoattendprivateschoolthat 6  shouldbeincludedindetermining_noncustodial_Ԁparent'schildsupportobligation,courtsshouldconsider 0  followingnonexhaustivelistoffactors:(1)child'seducationalhistory,includingnumberofyearschild *  hasbeeninattendanceatparticularschool;(2)child'sperformancewhileinprivateschool;(3)whether $  familyhastraditionofattendingparticularschool;(4)whetherparentshadmadechoicetosendchildto   particularschoolpriortotheirdivorce;(5)anyparticularfactorthatmayexistinspecificcasethatmight   impactuponchild'sbestinterests;and(6)parents'abilitytopayforschooling.Code,FamilyLaw,  12204(_i_)(1)._Witt_Ԁv._Ristaino_,118Md.App.155(_Md.App_.,1997).HereAlwaysshouldarguethat   allofthefactorsof_Witt_aremetandtherefore,thechildrenshouldremaininprivateschool.   X"*"  *2.3      ChildSupport*݌  Ќ  X Contraryto_Nevar_sthreattowithholdchildsupportifAlwaysrequestedchildsupport,Always  cannotnegotiatethechildrensrighttochildsupport.InMarylandaparentcannotagreetoprecludea  childsrighttosupportbytheotherparent.Liebermanv.Lieberman,81Md.App.575(1990). |  X Alimony p   XAlimonyisanamountofmoneypaidbyonespouseforthemaintenanceoftheotherspouse  d pursuanttoacomplaintforalimonyoraspartofadecreeforannulmentorlimitedorabsolutedivorce !^ pursuanttoMd.Fam.LawCodeAnn.11101.AlimonycantaketheformofAlimony_Pendente_ "X Lite,whichismoneypaidtoallowtheawardedspousetosustainthemselvesduringthecourseofthe #R litigation,permanentorindefinitealimony,whichrequiresperiodicpaymentsofmoneyatpredetermined $L intervalsforanindefiniteperiodoftimeorpermanentlywhichusuallyterminatesupontheremarriageor %F therecipientorthedeathofeitherparty,and/orrehabilitative,whichconsistsofpaymentsorderedfora &@  definiteperiodtoallowaneconomicallydependentspousetodevelopincomeearningskillsand ': ! qualification. (4!"    )."#   InthiscaseAlwayscanarguethatsheshouldbegranted_Pendente_ԀLitesinceshewas *(#$ unemployed,at_Nevar_srequest,when_Nevar_Ԁmovedoutofthehouseandshewillneedmoneyto +"$% sustainherselfduringthelitigation.Shecanalsomakeaclaimforrehabilitativealimonyinordertohave l anopportunitytofindajoborreturntoschooltoenhanceherearningpotential. f  X Propertydivision N       Here,theCourtwillfindthattheColumbiahomeandtheVacationhomeinMexicoaremarital B propertysincethehomeswereacquiredduringtheirmarriage.Inaddition,Alwaysshouldrequestuse < andpossessionofthefamilyhomeforthestatutorylimitof3years,pursuanttoMd.Fam.LawCode 6  Ann.8210. 0     *    Businessandprofessionalpracticeshavebeenheldtobemaritalpropertysubjecttoequitable $  distribution.Alwayscanclaimaninterestin_Nevar_smedicalpracticesinceshesupported_Nevar_Ԁand   thehouseholdwhileheattendedmedicalschool.However,thecourtin_Prahinski_Ԁv._Prahinski_,321   Md.227(1990),heldthatgoodwillmustbeanassethavingaseparatevaluefromthereputationofthe  practitionertobedeterminedmaritalproperty.     Asageneralrule,eachspousecantakeoutofthemarriageseparatepropertythatheorshe  ownedpriortothemarriage,anyappreciationsuchpropertyhasearned,plusanyadditionalseparate  propertyacquiredthroughgiftorinheritancefromathirdparty.Accordingly,theRollsRoyceandthe  Corvettebelongexclusivelyto_Nevar_.  #XpXX!Xpp#  |  v  p  j   d  !^  "X  #R  $L  %F  &@   ': !  (4!"  )."#  *(#$  +"$% _ԇ l  f  `   Z   T   N    QUESTION2  H  (!XpXXXp  B   PetersclaimforBatteryagainstScrewdriversemployeeswas,bythedoctrineofRespondeat < Superior,imputedtotheemployer.Petershouldsucceedonallcountsandthedecisionofthetrialcourt 6  shouldbeupheld.See,MarketTavern,Inc.vBowen,92Md.App.622,610A2d295(1992).(The 0  HammerjacksCase) *       (1)Standardofappellatereviewiswhether,inthelightmostfavorabletoPeter,   thereissufficientevidencetosupportthejurysverdict.       (2)PeterdidnotproveScrewdriversemployeescommittedtheattack.        Itisuptothefactfindertojudgethecredibilityofwitnesses.Thefactfinderbelievedthe  witnessesthattheassailantswereScrewdriversemployees.Evenifspecificidentificationofthe  employeesinvolvedwasarequirementtoestablishvicariousliabilityforpunitivedamagesonthepartof  theemployer,thatrequirementwasmetthroughtheevidencepresentedattrial.      (3)IftheassailantswereScrewdriversemployees,itcannotbeheldliablefor v intentionaltortsofemployeescommittedoutsidethescopeoftheiremployment. p      Toholdtheemployerresponsibleforintentionaltorts,fourfactorsshouldbetakeninto  d consideration:(1) theconductmustbeofthekindtheservantisemployedtoperform;(2)theconduct !^  mustoccurduringaperiodnotunreasonablydisconnectedfromtheauthorizedperiodofemployment; "X (3)theconductmustoccurinaplace notunreasonablydistantfromtheauthorizedarea;and(4)the #R conductmustbe,atleastinpart,toservethemaster.Sawyerv.Humphries,322Md247,587A.2d $L 467(1991). %F  &@    Furthermore,anactmaybewithinthescopeofemployment,eventhough forbiddenor ': ! consciouslycriminalortortiousSawyerv.Humphries,322Md.247,587 (4!" A2d467(1991),322Md.at255,587A2d467(quotingWoodonMasterandServant )."#  279(1877)(andnumerouscasescitedwithin)).CoxvPrinceGeorgesCounty,296Md.at170, *(#$ 460A2d1038(quotingA&PCov.Noppenberger,171Md378,391,189A434(1937)(and l casescitedtherein). f      Atrieroffactreasonablycouldfindthatispreciselywhathappenedhere.Screwdrivers Z  benefittedfromitssecuritypersonnelsworkkeepingthebarsafeforpatrons.SeeWilsonAmusement T  Co.vSpangler,143Md.98.121A.851(1923)(doorkeeperformovietheaterwhoforciblyejected N  andthenassaulteddrunkencustomerwhosoughtentranceactedinfurtheranceofhismastersservice H  withinhisdutytoejectundesirables). B   (4)Screwdriversshouldnotbeheldvicariouslyliableforpunitivedamagesfor < thewillfultortsofemployeeswhentheydidnotauthorize,participatein,orratifythe 6  employeesconduct. 0       Anemployermaybeheldvicariouslyliableforpunitivedamagesforthewillfultortsofan $  employeecommittedinthescopeofemploymentevenwheretheemployerdoesnotauthorize,   participatein,orratifytheemployeesconduct.EmbreyvHolly,293Md.128,442A.2d966(1982)   Specifically,Screwdriversbenefittedbytheworkofthesecurityemployees.  Anawardofpunitivedamagesforanintentionaltortmaybeimposedandwouldnotbeheldclearly   erroneousonappeal:        (1)onlywherethereis outrageousconduct;      (2)maybeawardedonlyuponashowingof actualmaliceonthepartofthe  defendant,  i.e., theperformanceofanactwithoutlegaljustificationorexcuse,but ? withanevilorrancorous | motiveinfluencedbyhate,thepurposebeingtodeliberately  andwillfullyinjuretheplaintiffor, implied v malice,i.e., conductofanextraordinarynaturecharacterizedbyawantonorrecklessdisregard p fortherightsofothers; j     (3) aretopunishthewrongdoertoteachhimnottorepeathiswrongfulconduct,andto !^ deterothersfromengaginginthesameconduct; "X     (4) mustrelatetothedegreeofculpabilityexhibitedbyaparticulardefendantand $L  ' thatpartysabilitytopay; %F     (5) representacivilfine,andassuch,shouldbeimposedonanindividualbasis;and ': !       (6)maybeawardedonlyuponproofofactuallossandthusmaynotbeawarded )."#  ' unlessthereisalsoanawardofcompensatorydamages. *(#$    +"$%   See,PacificMut.LifeInsCovHaslip,U.S.,111S.Ct.1032,113L.Ed.2d1 l (1991),andAlexanderv.Evander88Md.App.672,596A.2d687(1991). f     Thus,PetermayalsosucceedinhisclaimforpunitivedamagesagainstScrewdrivers. Z  Althoughingeneral,toreceivepunitivedamages,onemustshowactualmalice,thisisnotsoforintentional T  torts. N      Thiscaseclearlymeetsallthosestandardsandthejudgmentwillstand. B  < O  #XpXX!Xp(# 6   *     QUESTION3    ;C  Daisy󀄀ThefactsstateDaisyhasbeenconvictedofperjury.Apersonconvictedofperjurymaynot   testify.CJ9104      Applicantswillreceivepartialcreditfordiscussingmaritalprivilege.    ReverendJoe󄀀Aministerofanestablishedchurchofanydenominationmaynotbecompelledto  testifyonanymatterinrelationtoanycommunicationmadetohimbyapersonseekingspiritualadviceor | consolationaslongasTheChapelofLoveisan establishedchurchofanydenomination.Theprivilege v belongstotheclergyman,nottothecongregant.Therefore,Donaldsobjectionwouldbeoverruledif p MinisterJoeiswillingtotestify.Privilegecanbeexecutedbytheminister(notDonald).Arguably,thereis j noprivilegetothecommunicationsbetweenDonaldandReverendJoebecauseDaisywaspresent.  d  !^ FamilyDoctor󄀀maytestifyasthereisnodoctorpatientprivilege. "X    #R Psychologist󄀀Apatienthasaprivilegetorefusetodiscloseandtopreventawitnessfromdisclosing $L communicationsrelatingtodiagnosisortreatmentofthepatientoranyrecordthatwould,byitsnature,show %F theexistenceofamedicalrecordofthediagnosisortreatment.Therefore,thelicensedpsychologistwillnot &@  beabletotestifyoverDonaldsobjectionunlessDonaldwaivestheprivilege. ': ! CJ9109 (4!"     TheaboveAnalysisisbasedonMarylandlaw.CreditwillalsobegivenforAnswersbased *(#$ onfederalevidentiaryrules. +"$%    l  yC f  Z   N   B  6   *       QUESTION 4         Ameshasseveraldefensesagainsttheconfessedjudgment.      First,shehasadefenseonthemeritsoftheunderlyingcontract,namely,thatCreativedid  notperformandthatsheistherefornotobligatedtopayCreativesfee.Inordertoraisethisdefense,she  mustfileamotiontoopen,modifyorvacatethejudgmentpursuanttoMarylandRule3611(c).This  pleadingmustbefiledwithin30daysofserviceuponher.Ifthecourtdeterminesthatthereisasubstantial | basisforanactualcontroversy,itwillvacatetheconfessedjudgmentandpermitthedefendanttofilea v responsivepleading,inthiscaseaNoticeofIntentiontoDefendpursuanttoMarylandRule3307. p  j   Amescanalsoraisethedefenseoffailureofserviceofprocess.TheClerksnoticeofthe  d defaultjudgmentisissuedinlieuofasummons,Rule3611(b).Therulespertainingtoserviceofprocess !^ applytoserviceofthenotice.MarylandRule3123prohibitsapartyfromservingprocess.Smithisthe "X presidentandsoleowneroftheplaintiff;arguably,Rule3123prohibitshimfromattemptingtoeffect #R service.ButseePalmisanov.BaltimoreCountyWelfareBd.,249Md.94,102,A.2d251(1968) $L (Employeeofapartynotprohibitedfromservingprocess). %F  &@    SmithsleavingthenoticewithBillafterdeterminingthatAmesnolongerlivedather ': ! formerresidencewasclearlyimproperaswasSmithsfailuretonotethatAmesnolongerlivedatthe (4!" addressinhisreturnofservice. )."#  *(#$   AmesreceivedactualnoticeofthecaseagainstheronAugust6.Ifshecangettothe +"$% courthousebeforethirtydaysexpire,shecanfileamotiontovacatethejudgmentoramotionpursuantto l MarylandRule3311todismissthecaseforfailureofserviceofprocess.Themotiontovacatethe f confessedjudgmentmustcontainthelegalandfactualbasisforanydefensetotheplaintiffsclaim.The `  defensehereisthattheplaintiffdidnotperformthecontract.ifshecannotgettothecourthousewithin Z  thirtydaysofactualnotice,shecanfileamotiontorevisethejudgmentpursuanttoMarylandRule3535. T  Thefailureofprocessanderroneousreturnofprocessconstitutefraudorirregularity.Amesactual N  knowledgeofthelitigationdoesnotconstituteawaiverofherrighttoobjecttotheservice.Cf.Oxendine H  v.SLM,172Md.App.478,491,492,915A.2d1030(2007)  B  <  6   0   *   $                @  @m  @  @  @u  @  @% QUESTION5         Asageneralrule,shareholdersofacorporationarenotliableforobligationsofa  corporation.Md.AnnotatedcodeCorporationsandAssociationsArticle2215;Starfish  CondominiumAssnv.YorkridgeServiceCorp.,295Md.693,458A.2d805(1983).Acorporation  becomesaneffectiveandvalidentityuponacceptanceofitsarticlesofincorporationbytheState. | CorporationsandAssociationsArticle2102(b).Bakersfailuretofilethearticlesmeansthattheusual v defenseofshareholderstoaclaimbyacreditorofthecorporation,namely,thatthecorporationactsto p shieldshareholdersfromliability,doesnotapply.However,twocloselyrelateddefensesmaybeof j assistance,atleasttoAbleandCarr.  d  !^   Marylandrecognizethedoctrinesofdefactocorporationsandincorporationbyestoppel. "X Thetwodoctrineshavethesameeffectinthattheypermitashareholdertoraisethedefenseof #R incorporationeventhoughthecorporationdoesnotvalidlyexist.Thedoctrineofdefactocorporation $L focusesonthebehaviorandexpectationsoftheshareholders;theapplicabilityofthedefenseof %F incorporationbyestoppelisbasedupontheactionsofthecreditors. &@   ': !   Therearethreeelementstothedefenseofdefactoincorporation: (4!"     /      7      ?      >7?ALMNOPQ(G/x03*+,-./01E"73"     73`2G/3  0 /   theremustbeavalidlawpermittingincorporation;73`'a݌*(#$/ (#/ (# Ќ   +"$% "73"     73a2G/3  0 /   theremusthavebeenagoodfaithattempttoincorporate;73a=b݌l/ (#/ (# Ќ   f "73"     73c2G/3  0 /   thecorporatepowersmusthavebeenexercised.73cYc݌` / (#/ (# Ќ   Z    Inthiscase,thefirstandthirdelementsareclearlysatisfiedbuttherewasnoattemptto T  actuallyfilethearticles,thusthedefenseofdefactoincorporationisnotavailable.Cransonv. N  InternationalBusinessMachinesCorp.,234Md.477,479480,200A.2d33(1964). H   B   Thedoctrineofincorporationbyestoppeloperateswhenthecreditorhasrecognizedthe < corporateexistenceofanassociation.underthosecircumstances,thecreditormaybeestoppedfrom 6  assertingthatthereisnotavalidcorporation.Cranson,supraat489;Turnerv.Turner,147Md.App. 0  350,428,889A.2d18,63(2002).Underthesefacts,NorthernStatesaccountrepresentativereviewed *  thebusinessplan,knewthattheventurewascapitalizedasifitwasacorporationandsentinvoicesinthe $  nameofthecorporation,manyofwhichwerepaid.Underthecircumstances,NortherStateswillbe   estoppedfromclaimingthatthedebtorwasnotacorporation.Thus,NorthernStateswillnotbe   successfulagainstAbleandBaker.Carr,howeverisadifferentstory.       Carrhasnotpaid$15,000ofthe$25,000heagreedtopayforstockasoutlinedinthe  businessplan.Ifthebusinessplanisconsideredtobeasubscriptionagreement,itcanbeenforced.A  subscriptionagreementisanundertakingbyapotentialinvestortopurchasestockinanexistingorfuture  corporation.Therearenoformalrequirementsforsubscriptionagreementsand,infacttheyneednoteven  beinwriting.Wrightv.Lewis,161Md.674,158A.704(1932).   | Clearly,bothBakerandAblereliedonthebusinessplaninenteringintotheventure. v CorporationsandAssociationsArticle2202providesthatasubscriptionagreementcanbeenforcedby p theboardofdirectorsafternoticetothesubscriber.Inaddition,suchagreementscanbeenforcedby j creditorstothecorporation,evenwithoutboardformalities.CorporationsandAssociationsArticle2  d 215;D.HanksMarylandCorporationLaw4.2(2006);Goldsteinv.Leitch,142Md.184,120A.369 !^ (1923).ThusNorthernstateshastherighttocollectCarrsunpaidsubscriptioncommitmentonbehalfof "X thecorporationsothatitwillhaveassetstosatisfyitsobligationtoNorthernStates.  #R  $L  %F  &@   ': !  (4!"  )."#  *(#$  +"$% Ї l  f  `   Z   T   N   H   B  <  6   0   *   $                       QUESTION6   {q   @aD Answershouldaddress: |  v 1. 4 ImpairmentofContracts:ArticleISection10oftheUnitedStates p Constitutionprohibitstheenactmentofalawthatimpairsthe j obligationofcontracts:  d   !^ Ѐ0 4 TheSupremeCourthas8madeitclearthattheContractClausedoesimpose "X somelimitsuponthepowerofa8Statetoabridgeexistingcontractual #R relationships,evenintheexerciseofitsotherwiselegitimatepolicepower.88. $L Considerationofaclaimthatparticulargovernmentalactioninvalidlyimpairs %F contractualobligationsinvolvesseveralsteps.First,itmustbedetermined &@  whetheracontractexisted.Ifthathurdleissuccessfullyclearedbytheclaimant,a ': ! courtnextmustdecidewhetheranobligationunderthecontractwas (4!" changed.Finally,ifthesecondquestionisansweredintheaffirmative,theissue )."# becomeswhetherthechangeunconstitutionallyimpairscontractobligation,forit *(#$ isnoteverymodificationofacontractualpromisethatimpairstheobligationofa +"$% contract88.See,RobertT.FoleyCompany,etal.v.WashingtonSuburban l SanitaryCommission,283,Md.140,389A.2d350(1978)f4: 4:   `    4 Themortgagecompanieshaveexistingcontractswiththehomeownersandmayalso Z  havecontractswithentitieswhorepurchasemortgagesontheopenmarket.TheStatelawclearly T  altersthesecontractsbydiminishingthehomeownersdutytopaythemortgage.Accordingly,the N  statutemaybefoundtoviolatetheContractsClause.See,UnitedStatesTrustCo.ofNewYorkv. H  NewJersey,431U.S.1,97S.Ct.1505(1977) B   <   6   2. 4 SubstantiveDueProcessClauseof14thAmendment:Lawssuchastheoneat 0  issuearesubjecttotheDueProcessClauseandmust,therefore,berationallyrelatedtolegitimate *  governmentalinterestsinfurtheranceofthepublichealth,safety,moralsandgeneralwelfare.The $  lawwasenactedinfurtheranceofwhatappearstobealegitimategovernmentalinterestin   furtheranceofthepublichealthandwelfaresavinghomeownersfromlosingtheirhomes.    4  4 However,dueprocessalsorequiresthatthelawbedraftedinawaythatis   reasonableandsubstantiallyfurtherssaidinterest.See,RobertT.FoleyCompany,etal.v.  WashingtonSuburbanSanitaryCommission,283,Md.140,389A.2d350(1978)Underthe  factsitisunreasonabletoallowamoratoriumonforeclosuresforallhomeownersregardlessof  financialstatus(abilitytopaytheirmortgage)andtostartthisassistanceforthosewhose  mortgagesincreasedby2%whentheresidentsappeartohavetroubleonlywhentheincrease  was5percentagepoints. |   v 3. 4 CommerceClause: p   j  4 TheCommerceClauseoftheUnitedStatesConstitution(Art.1,Section8,cl.3)gives  d Congressthepowertoregulatecommerceamongtheseveralstates.Ifthereisnoexpressfederalstatute !^ onpoint,thedormantcommerceclausemayactasarestraintontheStateorlocallegislation.TheSupreme "X CourthassuppliedatestindeterminingwhetherthelawviolatestheCommerceClause: #R  $L  3*+,-./012(0x>7?ALMNOPQ 4 Whetherthelawdiscriminatesonitsfaceagainstinterstatecommerceisthere differential %F treatmentofinstateandoutofstateeconomicintereststhatbenefitstheformerandburdensthe &@  latter.OregonWasteSystemv.Dept.ofEnvironmentalQuality,511U.S.93,99(1994);and ': !  (4!"  4 Ifthelawregulates evenhandedlytoeffectuatealegitimatelocalpublicinterest,andits )."# effectsoninterstatecommerceareonlyincidental,itwillbeupheldunlesstheburdenimposedonsuch *(#$ commerceisclearlyexcessiveinrelationtotheputativelocalbenefits.Pikev.BruceChurch,397U.S. +"$% 137,142(1970)andHuronCementCo.v.Detroit,362U.S.440,443(1960) l  f  4 Thelawatissueisevenhanded.However,acourtwouldlikelyfindthatmortgagelending `  hassuchabroadimpactoninterstatecommercethattheinfringementsupersedesanypossiblebenefittothe Z  Stateshomeowners. T    N    8Xk4XXXp  B  0            |   j   X   F  #XpXX8Xk49#K    QUESTION7  p {  )   )̈  )   )  )   )n  )   X)   4  )   )6  )   )  )   8Xk4XXXp  <   )؊  #XpXX8Xk4#SXpXXXpIwouldadviseLucyandEthelthattheyprobablywillnotbesuccessfulintheirattempttotaketitle X  totheentire2acresandthechocolatefactory. R!  X̀  ThefactsindicatethatWillie,LucyandEthelenteredintoacontracttopurchase the F# property.ThiscontractforthesaleoflandwouldbegovernedbytheStatuteofFrauds.Torendera @$ contractenforceableundertheStatuteofFrauds,therequiredmemorandummustbe(1)awriting(formal :% orinformal);(2)signedbythepartytobechargedorbyhisagent;(3)namingeachpartytothecontract 4&  withsufficientdefinitenesstoidentifyhimorhisagent;(4)describingthelandorotherpropertytowhichthe .'! contractrelates;and(5)settingforththetermsandconditionsofallthepromisesconstitutingthecontract (( " madebetweentheparties. ")!#  X *"$  X  WillieandRuthwillarguethatthecontractdidnotsufficientlydescribethepropertybeingconveyed +#% andis,therefore,unenforceable. ,$&  X l Assuming,arguendo,thecontractisvalid,WillieandRuthwillarguethatWilliecouldnot f unilaterallysellHersheyAcres(atleastthatportionlocatedonthetwoacrespurchasedin1950)sinceit `  wasownedastenantsbytheentiretyandcouldnotbeconveyedexceptbythejointactionof Z  both.ResthavenMemorialGardens,Inc.v.Snyder,248Md.710(1968). T     N  LucyandEthelmaybeabletorequestspecificperformanceforthesaleoftheacre,sincethis H  landis,indeed,Williesproperty. B  < Ifallargumentsfail,LucyandEthelwillbeentitledtobereimbursedforthedownpaymentgivento 6  Willie. 0    X)   )  Abatementofprice $  Ё   Dependingontheworthoftheacreparkinglot,LucyandEthelmaysimplywanttheirmoney   back,oranadjustmentinthecontractprice(abatementofprice)thatmoreadequatelyreflectstheworthof  theacre.Thecontractappearstohaveeffectuatedasaleingrosssincenoparticularacreagewas   specifiedtherein,norwasthereanywarranty,expressorimplied,astothequantityoflandsold.Ifso,the  Courtmayholdthatthey'renotentitledtoanyabatement.4  See4ܖ  ,Jenkinsv.Bolgiano,53Md.407,420  (1880)("Intheabsenceoffraud,orfalserepresentations,inducinghimtoenterintothecontract,the  complainantisboundbythetermsofhisleaseanddeed,andcannotcomplainifthelothasturnedouttobe  smallerthanhesupposed.");Brodskyv.Hull,196Md.509,514(1950)("Itisafirmlyestablishedrulein  thisStatethatwhereitappearsbydefiniteboundaries,orbywordsofqualification,suchas'moreorless', | inacontractofsalethatthestatementofthequantityoflandismereestimationanddescription,andnotof v theessenceofthecontract,thebuyertakestheriskofquantity,andisnotentitledtoanabatementofprice p onaccountofadeficiency,intheabsenceoffraud.") j Ё   IfLucyandEthelcanshowthatthe"essenceofthecontract"wastopurchasethechocolate !^ factory,thatthepriceofferedwasfairforthechocolatefactoryandparkinglot,andthatWillieknewor "X shouldhaveknownthathecouldnotconveythefull2acres,theymayconvincethecourtthatfraud #R occurred.Ifso,theywouldbeabletoseekspecificperformanceoradeclaratoryjudgmentproclaiming $L themtothebetheownersoftheacreandgetareductioninthecontractamountcommensuratewiththe %F fairpriceoftheacre.)    &@    )]       +"$% @aD @ @    XXW  #XpXXSXp݃#QUESTION8 ?R=XXp  ^ #XpX=?R#  X  ThequestionpresentedbyJohntohismanagingpartnerrequiresanalysisundertheMarylandLawyers y"R RulesofProfessionalConduct( Rules)indeterminingthemannerinwhichalawyershouldrespondupon s#L receiptofinformationthatmaybebeneficialtotheinterestsofoneclient(Freebee)andsimultaneouslyadverse m$F totheinterestsofanotherclient(DebitandCredit). g%@   a&: ! PursuanttoRule1.16(a)(1),alawyershallnotrepresentaclient,orwheretherepresentationhas ['4!" commenced,shallwithdrawfromtherepresentation,iftherepresentationwillresultinaviolationoftheRules U(."# orotherlaw.WithdrawalismandatoryonlyifJohnconcludesthataviolationoftheRulesorotherlawexists. O)(#$  I*"$% Intheinstantmatter,Johnrepresentstwoclients,DebitandCreditasitsgeneralcounsel,andFreebee C+%& inataxplanningandsalestransaction.Inaddition,theotheremployees/partnersofDebitandCreditregularly ' referclientstoJohnforlegalservices.Asaresultofthevariousrelationshipsamongtheparties,Johnnowfinds ! himselfintheunenviablepositionofpossessingcertaininformationthatifrevealedtoFreebeemaysubjecthis  client,DebitandCredit,topotentialliability.   ЀComment(1)toRule1.7provides ...loyaltyandindependentjudgmentareessentialelementstothe   lawyersrelationshiptoaclient.Intheconductofallrepresentations,thelawyerwillpossessclient   confidencesandsecrets.JohnpossessescertainconfidencesandsecretsaboutDebitandCreditandabout   Freebee.Inthiscase,Johnsloyaltyisdivided,andthereisadirectlyadverseconflictofinterestbetween   FreebeeandDebitandCredit.Inaddition,Johnsactionsmaybemateriallylimitedbyhisresponsibilitiesto   eitherFreebeeorDebitandCreditandbyhisownpersonalinterestsinwantingtoencourageDebitandCredit   tocontinuetoreferitsclientstoJohnforlegaladvice.Consequently,representationofFreebeeandofDebit   andCreditcancontinueonlyifthefirmobtainsinformedconsentofeachaffectedclient,andifJohnreasonably   believesthathewillbeabletoprovidecompetentanddiligentrepresentationtoeachoftheparties.      Theremainingquestioniswhetheritisappropriateforinformedconsenttotheconflictofinteresttobe  requestedbyJohn.Aconflictisnonconsentableifthelawyerinvolvedcannotreasonablyconcludethatthe  lawyerwillbeabletoprovidetherequestedrepresentationcompetentlyanddiligently.Ifthematerialrisks  andadvantagesareclearlydescribedintherequestedconsent,thenJohnshouldbeabletocontinuehis  representationofFreebee.However,ifJohnbecomesamaterialwitnessinanylitigationagainstDebitand  Credit,thenhemustwithdrawfromtherepresentation.SeeRule3.7.    ЀWithregardtotheattorneyclientprivilegedmatterrevealedtoJohnbyDoris,Johnmustobtainthe | consentofDebitandCreditwithrespecttoJohnsrevelationofDorisadmissionregardingtheinadvertent v deliveryofthememotothepurchasersattorney.InobtainingDebitandCreditsconsent,Johnmust p encourageittoobtaintheadviceofindependentcounsel.SeeRule1.6.IfDebitandCreditdoesnotgive j informedconsenttotherevelationoftheattorneyclientprivilegedinformationtoFreebee,thenJohnmust d withdrawfromrepresentingbothFreebeeandDebitandCredit.  ^   QUESTION9  !X ۯ  !XpXXXp y"R #XpXX!Xp(#  !XpXXXpTheBankwillobtainasecurityinterestinthecollateralthroughattachment.Attachmentoccurswhen s#L theBankmakestheloantoIan,thedebtorwhoalreadyownsandhasrightsinthecollaterallistedinitemsA m$F throughF,andeitherasecurityagreementisenteredintobyIanortheBankhasbeengivenpossessionor g%@  controlofthecollateral.ItshouldbenotedthatwhilepossessionbytheBankoftheequipmentandinventory a&: ! willperfectitssecurityinterests,thismannerofperfectionwillbeimpracticalbecauseIanwillhavedifficulty ['4!" operatinghisbusiness.Therefore,theBankshouldperfectitssecurityinterestsasfollows: U(."#  X#XpXX!Xp݋# 3CDFGHIJKE(003*+,-./012"C" X  CY2  A  .3   4   !XpXXXpToobtainasecurityinterestintheland,Bankmustrecordamortgageordeedoftrustamong I*"$% thelandrecordsofBaltimoreCity,Marylandaccordingtothelawsaffectinginterestsinrealproperty.See C+%& UCC9102(a)(56)and9109(d)(11).Thebuilding,ovens,signage,refrigerators,HVAC,andbuiltin ' displaycasesarefixtures.SeeUCC9102(a)(41).Bankcansecureitsinterestinfixturesbyfilingafixture ! filingamongtheBaltimoreCityLandRecordsorbyfilingafinancingstatementfiledamongtherecordsofthe  MarylandStateDepartmentofAssessmentsandTaxation("SDAT").SeeUCC9501(a)(1)(B)and(a)(2).   AdeedoftrustormortgagemayconstituteafixturefilingprovideditisrecordedamongtheBaltimoreCity   LandRecordsandcontainssufficientinformationtoidentifytherealpropertyandfixturesthatareservingas   collateraltoputothercreditorsonnoticeofBank'ssecurityinterestinboththerealpropertyandthefixtures   securingitsnoteorloan,asthecasemaybe.CY݌   Ќ X  #XpXX!Xp#!XpXXXp   4   #XpXX!Xp/#!XpXXXp"C" X  C2  B  .3   4   #XpXX!Xpݢ#Therollingbaker'sracks,handmixers,cakepans,spatulas,andcashregistersareequipment   ofthebusiness.SeeUCC9102(a)(33).Asecurityinterestisperfectedinequipmentbyfilingafinancing   statementelectronicallyorinwritingwithSDAT.SeeUCC9501(a)(2).C݌   Ќ X  "C" X  C2  C  .3   4   Thecontractsforallordersbookedthroughcalendaryear2010forwhichdepositshavebeen   received,areaccountsunderUCC9102(a)(2)(ii).Asecurityinterestisperfectedinaccountsbyrecording   afinancingstatementwithSDAT.SeeUCC9501(a)(2).ThepaymentsreceivedbyCakesupon  completionofthecontractsareproceedsoftheaccounts.Asecurityinterestintheproceedsisperfected  automaticallywhenthesecurityinterestintheaccountisperfected.SeeUCC9203(f)and9315(c).C?݌  Ќ X     4 "C" X  CR2  D  .3   4   Theflour,butter,chocolate,sugar,milk,eggs,lemoncurd,caketoppers,extracts,flavorings,  fruits,nuts,andanyalreadybakedandfrozencakesandcookiesfortastingsandsaletoshowroomcustomers  areinventory.SeeUCC9102(a)(48)(D).Bankshouldperfectitssecurityinterestintheinventory(andin  afteracquiredinventorynotsubjecttoaPurchaseMoneySecurityInterest)byfilingafinancingstatementwith | SDAT.SeeUCC9501(a)(2).CR݌ v Ќ X  !XpXXXp#XpXX!XpO#"C" X  C2  E  .3   4   Themoneyinthecashregisters($200eachintworegisters)canonlybeperfectedbyBank j ifBanktakespossessionofit.SeeUCC9312(b)(3).C݌ d Ќ X  !XpXXXp"C" X  C72  F  .3   4   #XpXX!Xp#TheSirCakesALotdeliveryvanisavehicle,theownershipofwhichisevidencedbya !X certificateoftitle.SeeUCC9102(a)(10).Toperfectitssecurityinterestintheequipmentcoveredbya y"R certificateoftitle,Bankmustfileanapplicationtogetherwiththepaymentofthefeesforthesecurityinterest s#L inthevehicletobeindicatedonthecertificateoftitleforthevehicle.SeeUCC9311(a)(2). C7r݌ m$F Ќ X   C+%& Ї  QUESTION10  y"R P  HallscounselwillarguethattheStateviolatedHallsFourthandFifthAmendmentrightsbytakinghis m$F DNAsamplewithouthisconsent.TheState,however,wasnotactuallysearchingforevidenceofacrime. g%@  Thelawdoesnotconstitutethegatheringofdirectevidenceofacrime.TheDNAevidenceofthecrime a&: ! alreadyexistspriortothematchofanyDNAprofileinthedatabank.Thelawdoesnotcreatedirectevidence; ['4!" thedirectevidenceisthehairandbloodsamplesacquiredatthescenefromthevictim.TheActmerelyserves U(."# toidentifytheperpetratorsimilartothewayinvestigatorshaveusedfingerprintsformanyyears.Balancing O)(#$ thesefactorsillustratesthereasonablenessoftheminimalintrusionofabloodtestinlightof% ; %;theprofoundpublic I*"$% interestinidentifyingtheperpetratorsofcrimes. C+%& Ї  TheonlyinformationobtainedfromtheDNAlinkedtotheindividualpursuanttothelawistheDNA ' identityofthepersonbeingtested.TheDNAprofilethusservesthepurposeofincreasingtheefficiencyand ! accuracyinidentifyingindividualswithinacertainclassofconvictedcriminals.Thepurposeisakintothatof  afingerprint.Assuch,Hallandothertargetedconvictedpersonshavelittle,ifany,expectationofprivacyin   theiridentity.Therefore,asearchliketheoneauthorizedbythelawinthiscase,whoseprimarypurposeisto   identifyindividualswithlessenedexpectationsofprivacy,istotallydistinguishablefromsearchofordinary   individualsforthepurposeofgatheringevidenceagainsttheminordertoprosecutethemfortheverycrimes   thatthesearchreveals,andisnotviolativeoftheFourthorFifthAmendments.       HallscounselwillprobablyarguethatGriffinunlawfullyinterrogatedhimwithoutadvisinghimofhis   MirandawarningsandinviolationofhisFifthandSixthAmendmentrights.Griffin,however,isnota   governmentlawenforcementofficial.Moreover,underthefactshere,itisunlikelythathewouldbeconsidered   tohaveinterrogatedHall.   HallscounselwillprobablyalsoarguethatthecollectionofDNAsamplesfromallpersonsconvictedofa   qualifyingcrime,whenthequalifyingcrimewascommittedpriortotheeffectivedateoftheAct,violatesthe  relevantexpostfactoclausesbecausetheprimarypurposeoftheMarylandDNACollectionLawispunitive  innature,makingthestatuteretributive.    ArticleI,10,clause1oftheUnitedStatesConstitutionprohibitstheStatesfrompassinganyexpost  factolaw,stating, NoStateshall...passany...expostfactoLaw.TheMarylandDeclarationofRights,  Article17,providessimilarprotections,asitstates thatretrospectiveLaws,punishingactscommittedbefore  theexistenceofsuchLaws,andbythemonlydeclaredcriminal,areoppressive,unjustandincompatiblewith | liberty;wherefore,noexpostfactoLawoughttobemade;noranyretrospectiveoathorrestrictionbe v imposed,orrequired. p   TheprovisionsoftheDNALaw,however,donotmakeapriornoncriminalactcriminal.Theydo d notmakeapriorcriminalactamoreseriouscrime.Theydonotchangethepunishmentforanycrime.They  ^ donotaltertherulesofevidenceorrequirelessevidenceinordertosupportaconviction,thanthelevelof !X evidencerequiredbeforetheLaw.ThetakingofDNAdatadoesnotincreasethepunishmentforanycrime. y"R Itmerelyprovidesinformation.Ifnocrimesexisttowhichthedataismatched,nothinghappens.Byitself,the s#L DNAdataisdataandnothingmore.TheLawwasintendednottoelicitapunishmentforactsalready m$F committed,buttocreateasensibleregulativeschemeinordertoprotectthepublicbyidentifyingindividuals g%@  involvedwithcrimes. a&: !     &R=XXp!&R==&R#!XpX=!&R##XpXX!Xp#!XpXXXp $,%' #XpXX!Xp`#