WPCF b\3[e{!\[]:KʺΌ^ߵ,oFդPrE/ l4U}1KFunq\A3c21yuZ{ϯio9K=|bQ`O%Z+A5x#-<y& Fu}̾}N8>*|$gdۨ˪37ww0; Tס4]u`+vw6{K ,dC"_\^#kfMNG>z'cC=fʽm';6墫NAtf<yɩ._YCll𐵲7Y`^9l*e +䟀`R޸X#=ߙ_IEBKH>(B]08XRhLark"cFۨha]1@U)> 0D 0> 05 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0f 0H 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0m 0N 0/ 0  0 0 0 0<H! 0! 0: " 0nF" 0%B"" 0$U>% B% 0 C&Q&S,~I/14j7|9|; > 0:%B_C 0 oC#%DUNE %4FM:F(>FNfF^ hFwtF4xFF mF\  `&Times New Roman'  Court0Court .   2P+M 0_level1  , 8. 0 8@H!#823  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2M+M 0_level2  X 5+ 0 8@H!#523  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2M+M 0_level3   5+   0 8@H!#523  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2J+M 0_level4   2(0 0 0 8@H!#223  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2J+M 0_level5   2(\ \ \ 8@H!#223  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2G+M 0_level6   /% 8@H!#/23  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2G+M 0_level7  4 /% 8@H!#/23  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2D+M 0_level8  ` ," 8@H!#,23  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2D+M 0_level9   ,"   8@H!#,23  ..  5+  0 8@H!#5  2PM 0_levsl1  , 8. 0 8@H!#823  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2MM 0_levsl2  X 5+ 0 8@H!#523  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2MM 0_levsl3   5+   0 8@H!#523  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2JM 0_levsl4   2(0 0 0 8@H!#223  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2JM 0_levsl5   2(\ \ \ 8@H!#223  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2GM 0_levsl6   /% 8@H!#/23  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2GM 0_levsl7  4 /% 8@H!#/23  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2DM 0_levsl8  ` ," 8@H!#,23  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2DM 0_levsl9   ,"   8@H!#,23  Ԁ  5+  0 8@H!#5  2PM 0_levnl1  , 8. 0 8@H!#823   5+  0 8@H!#5  2MM 0_levnl2  X 5+ 0 8@H!#523   5+  0 8@H!#5  2MM 0_levnl3   5+   0 8@H!#523   5+  0 8@H!#5  2JM 0_levnl4   2(0 0 0 8@H!#223   5+  0 8@H!#5  2JM 0_levnl5   2(\ \ \ 8@H!#223   5+  0 8@H!#5  2GM 0_levnl6   /% 8@H!#/23   5+  0 8@H!#5  2GM 0_levnl7  4 /% 8@H!#/23   5+  0 8@H!#5  2DM 0_levnl8  ` ," 8@H!#,23   5+  0 8@H!#5  2DM 0_levnl9   ,"   8@H!#,23   5+  0 8@H!#5  6: *4Heading 1XXX       XXX<:Default Para0A .Footer #A7( 0 8@H!#A:8Page Number< :Footnote TexXXX<:Footnote Ref  %)..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ! #X!!  \XX~X~X\&X~XXX~ $ ##$   B  !%  X~XX&X~(2$ 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  \  `&Times New Roman d($      4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  "\XX~  "  #    1  #4  ݀IncomputingthetotalamountoffeestheCourtfindstobereasonable,undertheinitiallodestarcalculation,the  CourtmadeextensiveuseofDefendants1and2.Almostwithoutexception,iftheDefendantagreedthecharge o wasreasonableasindicatedontheexhibit,theCourtincludeditinitsinitialcomputation.Concerningthosethat .~ werecontested,iftheCourtadoptedMr.Murphysposition,theitemwasdeleted,orotherwisemodified.Ifthe = CourtrejectedtheitemforreasonsotherthanthosegivenbyMr.Murphy,theCourtnoteditsreasononthe  exhibitusingthesamecodesasMr.Murphy.Ifnocodeisshownonadeletedline,theCourtdeleteditforthe k reasonassignedbyMr.Murphy.IftheCourtrejectedMr.Murphysobjection,theitemwasincludedinwhole * z orpart.Forpurposesofappellatereview,Defendants1and2withtheCourtsalterationshasbeenfiled  9 contemporaneouslywiththisopinionandorder.Thedeleteditemsarerepresentedbyblanklinesoppositethe   itemnumber.Thealtereditemsappearinboldprint.TheexhibitwillbedesignatedCourts1.X~X\ I 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  "\XX~  "  #    2  #4  ݀AlthoughtheDefendantdidnotcontesttothecosts,uponreviewbytheCourt,thefigurerequestedwas  reducedduetoduplicityinthebillingstatements.SeeCourtExhibit3.X~X\ t 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  "\XX~  "  #    3  #4  ݀Generally,theattorneytimewasbilledatarateof$250/hour,excepttimeforCourtneyAbbottandKenneth  Fails(timechargedbyMr.FailsiscontestedbyDefendantasexplainedlater),whichwasbilledat$175/hour.X~X\  4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    4  #A4  ݀InlightofMr.KayestestimonyaboutthepracticeofothercourtsandtheCommissionandanticipatingthatan  appellatecourtmaydistinguishFrioloforreasonsnottothisCourtapparent,theCourtwillinthealternative o proceedtoanalyzethesechargesunderthelodestaranalysis.X~X\ } 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    5  #A4  ݀PlaintiffsReplytoDefendantsOppositiontoPlaintiffsPetitionForAwardofAttorneysFees,Costsand  Expenses.Ex.1,Aff.ofDavidMartin,Esquire.X~X\  4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    6  #A4  ݀PlaintiffsReplytoDefendantsOpposition,Page13,SectionXI.X~X\  4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    7  #A4  ݀AgreementisfiledhereinundersealatCourts4.X~X\  4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    8  #A4  ݀Presumablythereferenceto mytimeinparagraph2(B)includesallattorneysinthefirm,notjustMr.  Oswald.Mr.Oswaldsignedtheagreementonbehalfofhisfirm.X~X\  4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ?+  0 8@H!#X?"\XX~  "  #    9  #A4  ݀Thefirmmaintainsitisowed$560,408.10infeesfortheworkdoneinthiscase.Mr.Kayehastestifiedthose  feesarereasonable.TheCourthasopinedtheymaybereasonableunderaprivatefeearrangementanalysis, o eventhoughnotreasonableunderafeeshiftingstatuteanalysis.Usingthesenumbers,iftheCourtwereto .~ awardthefeesdeterminedreasonableundertheinitiallodestaranalysis,thePlaintiffwouldendupowingMr. = Oswaldsfirm$256,345.10.($560,408.10$304,063.00=$256,345.10)X~X\(2$ 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  ~XXX~  0  #|x(?$..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~HP LaserJet 5M,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman Regular6Xm2 lb2yweb0U 4?!..      6X~XX6XX~XX6X~  _       XX8~XXdd8$  @..INTHECIRCUITCOURTFORMONTGOMERYCOUNTY,MARYLAND    GAILSTERLING,     8   * b  Plaintiff,     8   * . ~ vs.  0      8   *  CivilActionNo.235718  J ATLANTICAUTOMOTIVECORP.,  *     Defendant.     8   *   X~XXX~      &    OPINIONANDORDER  Ԍ D  Ќ  X~XXX~  'D ThismattercomesbeforetheCourtonthePlaintiffsPetitionforAttorneysFees, F CostsandExpenses,theSupplementalPetition,theSecondSupplementalPetition,the  DefendantsOpposition,andthePlaintiffsReplythereto.Followinganevidentiaryhearing  onJanuary7,2005,theCourttookthematterunderadvisementtoconsiderthetestimonyand Z exhibitspresentedatthehearingaswellastheargumentsofcounsel.Forreasonssetforth &v hereinafter,theCourtshalldeferentryofafinalorderonthepetitionforaperiodof15days B fromthedateofthisOrder.  X~XXX~      &    FACTS4  Ԍ p!  Ќ  X~XXX~  'p!( BecausethePlaintiffwasonlypartiallysuccessful,ageneralunderstandingofthe "$r# underlyingfactsandclaimsisnecessarytoaddressthePetition. %>!%  OnJuly17,2000,thePlaintiff,GailSterling(hereinafter:PlaintifforSterling)began ' #' workforTischerSubaruasaserviceadvisor.TischerSubaruwasownedbyDefendant, )$) AtlanticAutomotiveCorp.(hereinafter:DefendantorAtlantic).Whenapplyingforherjob, R+&+ sheconcealedherpriorhistoryofcriminalconvictions. -n(-  AccordingtothePlaintiff,sometimearoundMayof2001,JaySponsellor,  DefendantsDirectorofOperations,beganmakinginappropriatecommentstoherofasexual | nature.Forexample,ononeormoreoccasionsheaskedherthecolorofherunderwear.On H another,hesaidhewouldliketolickherfromheadtotoe.Onnumerousoccasions,heasked  d hertohavesexwithhim.InlateAugustof2001,shereportedhisconducttoherimmediate  0 supervisor,GregYancey.Herespondedbytellingher everyoneherewantstofuckyou.    Followingthatconversation,shecalledMr.Yanceyandtoldhimshewasquittingbecauseof x  Sponsellorsconduct.Mr.YanceyagreedtotalktoSponsellor.Afewdayslater,Mr. D  YanceytoldMs.SterlingthatMr.Sponsellorhadofferedtopromotehertoaserviceadvisor ` positionatTischerAudi.Becauseofthewayhercompensationwasdetermined,the , promotionwouldhavemeantmoremoney.Ms.Sterlingagreedtoaccepttheofferbutonlyif  Sponsellorwouldstophisharassment. t  Ms.SterlingsubsequentlyhadaconversationwithMr.ToddVanHouten,theGeneral @ ManageratTischer,whowasMr.Sponsellorssupervisor.Duringthatconversation,she  \ repeatedherallegationsaboutSponselloranddescribedYanceysinitialreactiontoher ( complaint.PlaintiffallegesthatasaresultofreportingthisconducttoVanHoutenand  refusingSponsellorssexualadvances,shewasdeniedthepromotion. p!   XInMarch2002,PlaintiffwastransferredtooneofDefendantsnearbydealerships, <#" HerbGordonDodgeSubaru.InMayof2002,ScottRiverback,aDodgeservicewriter,told %X $ oneofPlaintiffscoworkersthatheshouldavoidanysexualrelationshipwithherbecause &$"& shehadasexuallytransmitteddisease.Ms.Sterlinglearnedoftheremarks.Shecomplained (#(  tohersupervisoraboutMr.Riverbacksconduct/comments.NoactionwastakenagainstMr. l*%* Riverback.Approximatelytwoweekslater,Plaintiffwasfired.Shewastoldshewasnot  workingout. |  X Asaresultofthoseacts,onAugust28,2002Plaintiffbroughtsuitagainstthe H Defendantalleging:  d  CountI:QuidProQuo/SexualHarassment;  0  CountII:HostileWorkEnvironment/SexualHarassment;     CountIII:Retaliation; x   CountIV:Defamation D  Exceptforthedefamationclaim,allclaimswerebroughtunderMd.Ann.Codeof1957,Art. ` 49BandMontgomeryCountyCode,2719.Forrelief,Ms.Sterlingsoughtcompensatory , damages,includingpastlostwages,futurelostwagesandpainandsuffering.Aswell,she  soughtpunitivedamages. t  Priortotrial,thePlaintiffvoluntarilydismissedCountIV,theclaimfordefamation. @ ShelateramendedhercomplainttoaddanewCountIV,aclaimforfailuretopaywages.On  \ October20,2003,theCourtdismissedthatclaimonDefendantsmotion.OnJune18,2004, ( approximatelyfiveweeksbeforetrial,asaresultofwhattheCourtfoundtobewillfuland  egregiousmisconductbythePlaintiffduringthediscoveryprocess,theCourtdismissedthe p!  Plaintiffsclaimforpunitivedamages. <#"  Inadditiontotheabove,thePlaintiffabandonedportionsofherclaimforemotional %X $ distressdamages.Initially,sheidentifiedanexpertsheintendedtocalltopresentmedical &$"& testimonyastothefullnatureandextentofheremotionaldistress.However,duringthe (#( courseofdiscovery,counselfortheDefendantlearnedthatthePlaintiffhadconcealedher l*%* pasthistoryofmentalhealthtreatmentfromherexpert.FacedwiththeDefendants 8,', discovery,thePlaintiffreluctantlyagreedtowithdrawtheexpertandpresentnomedical  testimonyonthatissue.Bystipulation,Plaintiffagreedtolimithertestimonyabouther | emotionaldistresstotellingthejuryshesuffered humiliation,shame,shock,moodinessand H upset.Inlightofthestipulation,theDefendantagreednottocallanexpertorotherwise  d inquireintoPlaintiffsmedicalhistory.  0  ThetrialofthismattercommencedonJuly26,2004andcontinuedthroughJuly30,    2004.ThePlaintiffcalledeightwitnesses.TheDefendantalsocalledeightwitnesses.Three x  ofthemhadalreadytestifiedduringthePlaintiffsportionofthecase.Followingthetrial,the D  juryawardedthePlaintiff$195,000fortheemotionaldistressdamagesonCountII,her ` hostileworkenvironmentclaim.Theydeniedherclaimforbackpayfindingthathadher , employerbeenawareofherpriorconvictions,theywouldnothavehiredher.(Shortlybefore  trial,shewithdrewherclaimforfuturewagesor frontpay.)Thejuryalsofoundagainsther t onCountsIandIII,herretaliationandquidproquoclaims. @  Atlanticfiledanumberofposttrialmotions,includingamotionfornewtrial.Among  \ otherarguments,theyassertedthattheamountawardedforthePlaintiffsemotionaldistress ( wassoexcessive,it shockedtheconscienceandshouldbesetaside.Theypointedtothe  factthatthePlaintiffhadpresentednoexperttestimonyabouttheextentofherinjury.Apart p!  fromtestifyingthatshelostsomesleepandwantedtoquitatonepoint,hertestimonyabout <#" herdistresswaslimitedtotellingthejuryshesuffered humiliation,shame,shock,moodiness %X $ andupset.Afterconductingahearingonthemotion,theCourtfoundthattheamountof &$"& damagesborelittlerelationtotheevidenceofthenatureandextentofthePlaintiffsinjury (#( andwasalmostcertainlymotivatedbythejurysdesiretopunishtheDefendant.Since l*%* compensatorydamagescannotbeawardedaspunishment,theCourtofferedthePlaintiffthe 8,', opportunitytoacceptaremittiturto$100,000inlieuofanewtrialondamages.After  consultingwithherattorney,thePlaintiffacceptedtheremittitur. |  Followingthetrial,Plaintiff,throughherattorneys,alsofiledapetitionforfeesand H costs.TheCourtallowedbothpartiestodesignateexpertsandtakeadditionaldiscoveryon  d theissueofthereasonablenessofthefees.ThePlaintiffdesignatedLawrenceKaye,Esquire  0 asitsexpertandtheDefendantdesignatedThomasMurphy,Esquire.     InordertoassisttheCourtinitsreview,theCourtdirectedthePlaintifftopreparea x  compilationexhibitshowingforallhoursbilled:theworkdone,thepersondoingthework, D  theratecharged,andthehoursclaimed.Uponreceiptoftheexhibit,theDefendantwas ` directedtoidentifyeachitemtowhichtheyhadanobjectionandthereasonfortheobjection. , Iftheobjectionwasbaseduponexcessivetimeorrate,theyweretosetoutonthelineforthat  itemtherateortimetheyagreedwasreasonable. t  ThecompilationexhibitwasintroducedatthehearingonJanuary7thdesignated @ Defendants1,Defendants2Amended,andDefendants2A(hereinaftercollectively:  \ Defendants1and2).Defendants1listedallchargesthroughtheconclusionofthetrial. ( Defendants2Amendedcoveredtheperiodofposttrialproceedingsupthrough  ' l<` December13,2004.Defendants2Abroughtthosefigurescurrenttothedateofthehearing p!  onJanuary7,2005.Defendants1and2combinedincluded2,927separateentries,eachhas <#" beenreviewedbytheCourt.#  ) (  1     #K/4   %X $  TheCourtconductedadaylonghearingonthePetition.ThePlaintiffpresentedthe  testimonyofitsexpert,LawrenceKaye,Esq.TheDefendantpresentedthetestimonyof | FrankLaws,Esq.,trialcounselfortheDefendant,anditsexpert,ThomasMurphy,Esq. H WhiletherewasgeneralagreementbetweentheexpertsthatthePlaintiffwasentitledto  d recoverreasonableattorneysfees,therewaswidedisagreementastothevalueofthose  0 services.ThePlaintiffsought$560,408.10inattorneysfeesand$46,080.71incosts,atotal    of$606,488.81.TheDefendantdidnotcontesttheclaimforcosts,#  * (  2     #2heD  ݀butmaintainedthat x  $211,998.50werethereasonablefees.Alternatively,iftheCourtfoundthatchargesfor D   legalassistantswerecompensableasamatteroflaw,$227,884.60werethereasonable ` attorneysfees.Thedisagreementscenteredprimarilyaroundthereasonablenessofthework , claimed.Thehourlyratefortheattorneys,withoneexception,wasnotcontested.#  +. (  3     #N5heD      ANALYSIS Z    ThepartiesareingeneralagreementastothemethodologythattheCourtmust  \ employindetermininganappropriateawardoffees.InFriolov.Frankel,373Md.501 ( (2003),theCourtofAppealsdiscussedtheissueatlength.Theyheldthatthe lodestar  approachwithitsadjustmentsistobeusedbythecourtsinfeeshiftingcases.Thereafter, p!  theydescribedtheprocessingreatdetail. <#"  Initially,theFriolocourtobservedthattheawardofsuchfeesisdiscretionary.The %X $ AnnotatedCodeofMaryland1957,Article49B,42(c)provides: Inacivilactionunder &$"& thissection,thecourtinitsdiscretion,mayallowtheprevailingpartyreasonableattorneys (#( fees,expertwitnessfeesandcosts.MontgomeryCountyCode,279(a)hassimilar  language. Apersonwhosubstantiallyprevailsinacivilactionmayrecovercostsand | reasonableattorneysfees.Althoughdiscretionary,theFriolocourtmakesclearthatwhere, H ashere,thestatuteisaremedialone,discretionshouldbe exercisedliberallyinfavorof  d awardingfees8.Friolo,at515.Similarly,theSupremeCourtopinedinHensleyv.  0 Eckerhardt,461U.S.424(1983),citedatlengthinFriolo,thatincivilrightscases a    prevailingplaintiffshouldordinarilyrecoverattorneysfeesunlessspecialcircumstances x  existwhichwouldrendersuchanawardunjust.Hensley,at429. D   Thelodestaranalysisinvolvesatwostepprocess,makinganinitialcalculationof ` reasonableattorneyfeesandthendeterminingifanadjustmenttothosefeesiswarranted. , Thestartingpointforcalculatingthereasonableattorneysfeeisdeterminingtheproductof   8thenumberofhoursreasonablyexpendedonlitigationmultipliedbyareasonablehourly t rate.Thatcalculation8provide(s)anobjectivebasisonwhichtomakeaninitialestimate @ ofthevalueofthelawyersservices.Friolo,at52324. Excessive,redundant[and]8  \ unnecessaryhoursmustbeexcluded.Id. (  XApartfromexcludingsuchhours,inmakingtheinitialcalculation,theCourtmust  considerwhetherthePlaintiffsucceededonalloronlysomeoftheirclaims.Aplaintiffneed p!  notsucceedonallclaimstobeentitledtorecoverreasonableattorneysfees.Itissufficient <#"  8iftheplaintiffsucceedsonanysignificantissuethatachievessomeofthebenefitsought %X $ inbringingtheaction.Id.However,incaseswheretheplaintiffisonlypartiallysuccessful, &$"& thecourtmustundertakeadditionalsteps.First,thecourtmustdetermineiftheunsuccessful (#( claimsarerelatedtotheclaimsonwhichtheplaintiffsucceeded.Iftheyareunrelated,then l*%* theworkdoneonthoseclaimsmaynotbecompensated.Thetestfordeterminingrelatedness 8,', iswhethertheclaimsinvolve acommoncoreoffactsorrelatedlegaltheories.Inthose  situations,counselstimewillusuallybedevotedtotheoveralllitigation,makingitdifficult | todecidethehoursexpendedonaclaimbyclaimbasis,andtheclaimsshouldthereforebe H regardedasrelated.Hensley,at435.  d  X ThenextquestionwhichtheCourtmustaddressinpartialsuccesscasesis whether  0 theplaintiffachievedalevelofsuccessthatmakesthehoursreasonablyexpendeda    satisfactorybasisforafeeaward.Id.,at434.TheFriolocourtcitingHensleystatesthat x  wherethecourtdeterminesthattheplaintiffachieved excellentresults,theattorneyshould D  receivea fullycompensatoryfee.Frioloat52425.Suchanawardwouldencompassall ` hourswithoutreductionbecausetheplaintifffailedtosucceedononeormoreclaims.Ifthe , plaintiffhasachievedan exceptionalsuccess,anincreasedadjustmentofthefeemightbe  warranted.Alternatively,iftheplaintiffhasachievedonly limitedsuccess,thenareduction t mightbewarrantedeveniftheclaimswere interrelated,nonfrivolousandmadeingood @ faith.Id.TheCourtofAppealsfurtherobservedthat thereisnopreciseruleorformula  \ formakingthesedeterminations!thatthetrialcourtmay,initsdiscretion,eliminatespecific ( hoursorsimplyreducetheawardtoaccountforthelimitedsuccess.Id.   OncetheCourthascompletedtheinitialcalculation,itproceedstothesecondstepof p!  thelodestaranalysis.TheretheCourtmustconsiderwhetherthatcalculationshouldbe <#" adjustedupwardordownwardbyaconsiderationofotherfactorssuchasthosesetforthin %X $ Johnsonv.GeorgiaHighwayExpress,Inc.,488F.2d714(5thCir.1974).Aneditedversion &$"& ofthosefactorsisfoundinfootnote2oftheCourtofAppealsopinioninFriolo: (#(    6"\ \ \ 8@X61.Thetimeandlaborrequired(thejudgeshouldweighthe l*%* Ѐhoursclaimedagainsthisorherownknowledge, R+&+ experienceandexpertiseand,ifmorethanoneattorney 8,', isinvolved,scrutinizethepossibilityofduplication); -n(- 2.Thenoveltyanddifficultyofthequestion(casesoffirst  impressiongenerallyrequiremoretimeandeffort);  3.Theskillrequiredtoperformthelegalserviceproperly; | 4.Thepreclusionofotheremploymentbytheattorneydue b toacceptanceofthecase; H 5.Thecustomaryfeeforsimilarworkinthecommunity; . ~ 6.Whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent(feeagreedtoby  d clientishelpfulindemonstratingattorneysfee  J expectations,litigantshouldnotbeawardedfeegreater  0 thanthatheiscontractuallyboundtopay);    7.Timelimitationsimposedbytheclientorcircumstances    (whetherthiswasprioritywork);   8.Theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained(Court x  shouldconsideramountofdamagesawarded,butalso ^  whetherdecisioncorrectsacrosstheboard D  discriminationaffectinglargeclassofemployees); *z  9.Experience,reputationandabilityoftheattorneys; ` 10.Undesirabilityofthecase(effectonthelawyerinthe F communityforhavingagreedtotakeanunpopular , case);  11.Natureandlengthofprofessionalrelationshipwiththe  client;and  12.Awardsinsimilarcases. t  P ?"0 0 0 8@\ \ \ X? Z  P  E+  0 8@H!#0 0 0 XE ThesefactorsarealmostidenticaltothosefoundinRule1.5oftheMarylandRulesof @ ProfessionalConductwhichmandatesthatalawyersfeemustalwaysbereasonable.  \ Therefore,manyoftheJohnsonfactorsarenecessarily subsumedintheinitiallodestar ( calculation.Friolo,at524.WheretheCourtfindsafeeadjustmentiswarranted,itmust  makespecificfindingsandarticulatethereasonforitsdecisiontoallowformeaningful p!  reviewofthatdecision.Flaav.ManorCountryClub,158Md.App.483(2004). <#"  Becausethemeasureofreasonablenessisrelative,itisimportantfortheCourttokeep %X $ inmindthelegislativeintentbehindthesefeeshiftingstatutes.Frioloaddressesthisissue &$"& andmakesclearthatafeewhichmaybereasonableunderaprivatefeearrangementmay (#( neverthelessbeunreasonableunderafeeshiftingstatute.CitingPennsylvaniav.Del.Valley l*%* CitizenCouncil,478U.S.546(1986),theFriolocourtstates: feeshiftingstatuteswerenot 8,', 8intendedtoreplicateexactlythefeeanattorneycouldearnthroughaprivatefee  arrangementwithhisclient.Rather8theaimofsuchstatuteswastoenableprivateparties | toobtainlegalhelpinseekingredressforinjuriesresultingfromtheactualorthreatened H violationofspecificfederallawsandifplaintiffsareabletoengagealawyerbasedonthe  d statutoryassurancethathewillbepaidareasonablefee,thepurposebehindthefeeshifting  0 statutehasbeensatisfied.Friolo,at526.     XAsimilarsentimentisexpressedinJohnsonv.GeorgiaHighwayExpress,Inc.also x  citedinFriolo.Johnsonwasaclassactionlawsuitthatinvolvedaclaimformoneydamages D  andinjunctivereliefonbehalfoftheplaintiffandothermembersoftheclassforactsof ` allegedemploymentdiscriminationinviolationofTitle7oftheCivilRightsActof1964. , Aftersettingoutthetwelvefactorslistedpreviouslyherein,thecourtstated:   X   0 0 X Toputtheseguidelinesintoperspectiveandasacaveatto t theirapplication,courtsmustrememberthattheydonot Z haveamandateunder706(k)tomaketheprevailing @ counselrich.Concomitantly,theSectionshouldnotbe &v implementedinamannertomaketheprivateattorney  \ generalspositionsolucrativeastoridiculethepublic B attorneygeneral.Thestatutewasnotpassedforthebenefit ( ofattorneysbuttoenablelitigantstoobtaincompetent  counselworthyofacontestwiththecaliberofcounsel  availabletotheiroppositionandtofairlyplacethe   economicalburdenoftheTitle7litigation.Adequate p!  compensationisnecessary,however,toenableanattorney V"! toservehisclienteffectivelyandtopreservetheintegrity <#" andindependenceoftheprofession.Theguidelinesherein "$r# aremerelyanattempttoassistinthisbalancingprocess. %X $ Johnson,at71920. &$"&  X X ?+ 0 8@H!#0 0 ? ' #'  X XB+  0 8@H!#  XB Finally,asistrueinallotheraspectsofthecase, (#(   0 8thefeeapplicantbearstheburdenofestablishing l*%*   0 entitlementtoanawardanddocumentingthe R+&+   0 appropriatehoursexpendedandhourlyrates.The 8,',   0 applicantshouldexercisebillingjudgmentwith -n(-   0 respecttohoursworked,8,andshouldmaintain    0 billingtimerecordsinamannerthatwillenablea    0 reviewingcourttoidentifydistinctclaims.[FN12]. |   0 FN128Plaintiffscounsel,ofcourse,isnotrequired H   0 torecordingreatdetailhoweachminuteofhistime . ~   0 wasexpended.Butatleastcounselshouldidentify  d   0 thegeneralsubjectmatterofhistimeexpenditures.8  J   0 Hensley,at437.      0  Havingsetforththeframeworkforitsanalysis,theCourtwillnowturntoa x  considerationofthePlaintiffspetitionforattorneysfees.Consistentwiththeabove D  discussion,theCourtwillfirstmaketheinitiallodestarcalculation.Thereafter,theCourtwill ` determineifadjustmentstothatcalculationarewarranted. ,  Ӏ 1. 0 Theinitiallodestarcalculation(reasonablehoursxreasonablerate).   X Thedichotomybetweenreasonablenessinthemarketplaceandreasonablenessundera @ feeshiftingstatutehasparticularrelevanceinthiscase.ThePlaintiffsexpert,Lawrence  \ Kaye,testifiedthatevenifthetasksclaimedhererepresentedaveryhighlevelofeffortor ( veryunusualwork,theyshouldneverthelessbedeemedreasonableandcompensablesolong  astheeffortprovidedsomethingofvaluetothecase. p!  InMr.Kayesopinion,allbutoneortwooftheentriesinDefendants1and2 <#" representedreasonablework.Hebelievestheevaluationmustbeguidedbytherecognition %X $ ofcounselsobligationtozealouslyrepresentaclient.Iftheclientcanafforditandthework &$"& hassomebenefit,itispersereasonable.Bywayofexample,hepointedtothePlaintiffsuse (#( of focusgroups,evenformotionshearings.Whileheacknowledgedthatbecauseoftheir l*%* expenseitwasunusualtousesuchgroups,particularlyformotions,hefelttheyprovided 8,', valuableinformation.Therefore,althoughunusual,theywerereasonable.Whilesuchatest  mightbevalidforassessingreasonablenessunderaprivatefeearrangement,itcannotbe | reconciledwiththeholdingsofFrioloandJohnson. H Mr.Murphyclearlyhadamuchmorerestrictiveviewofwhatwasreasonable.He  d generallydescribeditwithreferencetoapassagefromHensleyv.Eckerhardt,461U.S.424,  0 434(1983).     0 Counselfortheprevailingpartyshouldmakeagoodfaith x   0 efforttoexcludefromafeerequesthoursthatareexcessive, ^   0 redundantorotherwiseunnecessary,justasalawyerin D   0 privatepracticeethicallyisobligatedtoexcludesuchhours *z   0 fromhisfeesubmission....Hoursthatarenotproperly `  X?+ 0 8@H!#X?billedtoonesclientalsoarenotproperlybilledtoones F adversarypursuanttostatutoryauthority. ,  X XB+  0 8@H!#  XB Whileeventhattestmightbeappliedtooliberallygiventheprivatefee  arrangement/feeshiftingstatutedistinctiondiscussedinFriolo,asisapparentfromareview t ofDefendants1and2,Mr.Murphyappliedthetestwithacriticaleye. @    0 a.  intraofficemeetings. B   Mr.MurphyfeltthehoursreflectedinDefendants1and2wereclearlyexcessive,  particularlyforatrialofthislength.Inhisopinion,therewerenumerousinstanceswhere p!  attorneysbilledforintraofficemeetingsofdubiousvalue.Thenumberofattorneysandlegal <#" assistantswho touchedthecasewasveryhigh.Hefeltthiswasaveryinefficientuseof %X $ attorneytime.Accordingly,heeliminatedmanyofthehoursasunnecessary.Heseemed &$"& particularlycriticalofthesometimesweeklyEmploymentLawGroup(ELG)meetings. (#(  XInMr.Kayesopinion,thesemeetingswerevaluable.TheypermittedMr.Oswaldas l*%* leadcounseltokeepabreastofdevelopmentsinthecaseanddelegatetaskstolegalassistants 8,', orotherattorneyswhowerethenabletoperformnecessaryworkwithlittlesupervisionat  lessexpensetotheclient.Absentsuchmeetings,thelegalassistantsandotherattorneys | wouldhaverequiredahigherdegreeofsupervisionbyMr.Oswald. H  X TheCourthasreviewedDefendants1and2indetailandfoundfewinstanceswhere  d morethanonepartyatanintraofficemeetingbilledhistime.Rarelydidthemeetingsoccur  0 morethanweekly.Intheearlystagesofthecase,theyoccurredlessfrequently.Normally,    thetimebilledforthosemeetingswas30minutesorless.Fromareviewoftheexhibitsand x  thetestimony,theCourtconcludesthatthemeetingswereinthemajorityofinstances D  reasonable.Thereweresomeinstanceswheretheyappearedtooccurwithafrequencythat ` seemedunnecessarygiventhestageoflitigation.Inthoseinstances,theCourtdisallowedthe , charge.(SeeCourtsEx.1).     0 b.  multipleattorneysformotions/trial. Z   Mr.Murphyalsotestifiedthat,fromhisreview,itappearedthatPlaintiffscounsel  \ frequentlyassignedmultipleattorneystoattendahearingordeposition.Attrial,theyhad ( threeattorneyspresentforthePlaintiff:Mr.Oswald,Mr.CarterandMs.Abbott.Inmost  instances,hefeltthismultiplerepresentationwasunreasonableandunnecessary. p!   Mr.Kayenotedthattherewerefew,ifany,instanceswheremorethanoneattorney <#" attendedadeposition.Occasionally,Ms.Abbott,whograduatedlawschoolduringthe %X $ lifespanofthecase,attendedwithanotherattorney.However,asherecalled,onthose &$"& occasionshertimewasbilledasalegalassistant,notanattorney.Intheinstanceswhere (#( morethanoneattorneyattendedamotion,itwasbecausemultiplesignificantmotionswere l*%* beingheardatthesametimeanddifferentattorneyswerearguingdifferentmotions.Asfor 8,', trial,hethoughtitwasappropriategiventhevolumeofmaterialandthecomplexityofthe  casetohavebothMr.CarterandMr.Oswaldattrial.Henotedthatthethirdattorney, | CourtneyAbbott,waspresentbecausetheparalegalwhootherwisewouldhaveattendedhad H justgoneonmaternityleave.Ms.Abbottwasveryfamiliarwiththecaseanditmadesense  d forhertoattendasopposedtotryingtobringinanewlegalassistantwhoknewlittleabout  0 thecase.HealsonotedthatMs.Abbottconductedtheexaminationofoneormorewitnesses.     Uponitsreview,theCourtfoundfewinstanceswheretwoattorneyschargedfor x  attendingadepositionormotion.Inmostinstances,themotionordepositionwasofsuch D  importthattheCourtfeltthatthepresenceofasecondattorneywasreasonable.Attrial,the ` CourtalsofeelsthatthepresenceofbothMr.OswaldandMr.Carterwasreasonable. , However,intheCourtsview,whileMs.Abbottspresenceattrialnodoubtwasofvalueto  Mr.OswaldandMr.Carter,herpresencewasmorealuxurythananecessity.Accordingly, t thatexpenseshouldnotfairlyorreasonablybebornebytotheDefendantasattorneytime. @ However,intheCourtsview,hertimemayproperlybebilledasthatofalegalassistant,to  \ theextentsuchtimeiscompensableasdiscussedbelow,excepttotheextentdeemed ( excessivebytheCourt.Inarrivingatitsconclusion,theCourtnotesthattheDefendant  appearedattrialandfrequentlyatmotionswithtwoattorneys.Whilenotdispositive,inthe p!  Courtsview,thisprovidessomeevidenceofreasonablenessandnecessity. <#"   c. 0 legalassistants. %>!%  X X?+ 0 8@H!#X?(1)compensabilitygenerally. (#(  X XB+  0 8@H!#  XB  Apreliminaryissueinvolving legalassistantsiswhetherArticle49B,42ofthe R+&+ MarylandAnnotatedCodeauthorizesreimbursementoffeesfornonattorneys.The -n(- Defendant,citingFriolov.Frankel,373Md.501(2003),arguesthata legalassistantstime  isnotcompensable: Becausethestatutesallowonlyreasonablecounselfees,thecourt | mustexcludeanyfeesofnonlawyers.Chargesforparalegalsandlegalinternsaresubsumed H withinattorneysfees.Id.,at530.  d  XMr.KayearguesthatFrioloisawageclaimcaseandthestatuteconstruedthereinis  0 morerestrictivethantheinstantone.HepointstothepracticeofthefederalcourtsinTitle7    cases,afterwhichArticle49Bismodeled,aswellasthepracticeoftheMontgomeryCounty x  HumanRightsCommission.Accordingtohim,suchfeesareroutinelyawardedbythe D  federalcourtsandtheCommission.Hesuggestssuchabroadviewisnecessaryifastatuteis ` goingtoservethepurposeofencouragingattorneystotakemeritoriouscases. , Mr.Murphyraisedthequestionbutofferednoexpertopiniononwhetherlegal  assistantswerecovered.Inhisview,itisaquestionoflawfortheCourttodetermine.While t thecourtfindsMr.Kayestestimonyandlogiccompelling,theCourtbelievesthatFriolo @ controlsthedecisioninthiscase.Therefore,legalassistanttimemaynotbecompensated.#  , (  4     #trsl  ݀   \   (  0 (2)rate.      X  Mr.Kayetestifiedthattheratechargedfor legalassistants,$115perhour,was p!  appropriate.Inarrivingatthatconclusion,henotedthatPlaintiffscounselwasbasedinthe <#" DistrictofColumbia.RatestheretendtobehigherthantheyareinMontgomeryCounty. %X $ GiventhedearthofemploymentlawyerspracticinginMontgomeryCounty,hebelievedit &$"&  wasentirelyreasonableforPlaintifftohiresomeonefromtheDistrictofColumbia. (#(  XIndeterminingtheappropriatenessoftherate,helookedatwhatlawfirmsinthe   DistrictofColumbiabilledforlegalassistants.Hisinvestigationrevealedthattheratefor | legalassistantswithzerototwoyearsexperiencewasanaverageof$120perhour.Hedid H notfeelthattheratewasdependentupontheassistanthavingaparalegalcertificate.He  d believedthatthelegalassistantsusedherewhoweresecondand/orthirdyearlawstudentsor  0 hadotheradvanceddegreesqualifiedforthatrate.     X X?+ 0 8@H!#X?Mr.Murphyhadamuchmorerestrictiveviewofwhoqualifiedasa legalassistant. x   XB+  0 8@H!#  XBInhisview,thetermshouldgenerallybeusedonlyforsomeonewhohasaparalegaldegree. D  Legalassistantswithsuchadegree,hefeltshouldbebilledattherateof$90to$100per ` hour.Withoutsuchadegree,theassistantsshouldbebilledas lawclerksatarateof$75to , $80.Becausetherewasnoevidencethatanyofthese legalassistantshadparalegal  degrees,thechargeof$115wastoohigh. t  XInsupportofthisposition,DefendantdirectedtheCourtsattentiontotheRuleofthe @ UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMarylandAppendixB.RulesandGuidelines  \ forDeterminingLodestarAttorneysFeesinCivilRightsandDiscriminationCases.The ( guidelinerateforparalegalsandlawclerksestablishedthereinis$90.Whilenotcontrolling  pursuanttoFriolo,thedefensesuggeststhisisrelevantevidenceofwhatisareasonablefee. p!  Uponaconsiderationoftheevidence,inparticularMr.Kayestestimony,theCourt <#" findsthechargeof$115forlegalassistanttimeisreasonable.TheCourtalsonoteswith %X $ referencetoDefendants1and2,inthoseinstanceswhereMr.Murphydidnotdisputethe &$"& reasonablenessofthelegalassistantshours,heallowedthechargebaseduponarateof$115 (#( perhour. l*%*  X?+ 0 8@H!#X? (3)tasks. 8,',  X XB+  0 8@H!#  XB  Mr.Murphyreservedmostofhiscriticismofthelegalassistantsforthetasksthey  wereassigned.HefeltitwasparticularlysignificantthathisinvestigationrevealedPlaintiffs | counselhadnosecretarialstaff.Hebelievedthatthisfactrepresentedaneffortontheirpart H totryandincreaseprofitsbyseekingfeesforroutinetasksthathistoricallyarepartofan  d attorneysoverheadandnoncompensable.Thisoverheadisalreadybuiltintotheattorneys  0 hourlyrate.Henotedthatmanytasksperformedbythelegalassistantswereclericaland    requirednolegaltraining.Bywayofexample,hepointedtochargesforcopying,organizing x  filesandfilingpleadings.Healsofeltitwasinappropriatetouse legalassistantsforsuch D  tasksasservingsummonsesorotherpleadings.Typically,counselemploythirdpartiestodo ` thosetasksforarelativelyminorflatfee.Henotedthatonoccasioninthiscasethelegal , assistantscharged$500ormoretoservesummonseswhichprobablycouldhavebeenserved  for$50orless. t  Mr.KayewasuntroubledbythefactthatPlaintiffhadnosecretarialstaff.Hetestified @ thatfirmsintheDistrictofColumbiawereincreasinglyusinglegalassistantstodotasks  \ formerlydonebysecretaries.Thepracticewas,nodoubt,inpartanefforttopassthat ( expenseontotheclients.Healsosuggestedthepracticeallowedforahigherlevelofreview  whichappealedtosomemalpracticecarriers.Heacknowledgedthatclericaljobswereatthe p!  lowendofwhatlegalassistantsdo,butneverthelessfoundthatanappropriateuseofthem. <#"  XHedisputedwhethersomeofthetasksaboutwhichMr.Murphycomplainedwerein %X $ fact clerical,forexample,enteringdocumentsintothefirms Casemapsystem.Mr. &$"& Murphyfeltthiswasaclericaltask.Mr.Kayepointedoutthatthiswasacomputersoftware (#( programthatrequiredanunderstandingofthelegalissuesinvolvedinthecase.Only l*%* someonewithlegalknowledgecouldproperlyenterdocumentsintothesystem. 8,',  X WhiletheCourtagreesthatMr.Murphysviewofclericaltaskshereisoverbroad,  theCourtshareshisviewthattasksnotrequiringlegaltrainingshouldnotbebilledtoaclient | becausea legalassistantperformsthem.TheCourthasconductedanindependentreview H ofthechargesanddisallowedthosewhichinitsviewdidnotrequirelegaltrainingor  d experience.(SeeCourtsEx.1).  0   0 d.  KennethFails.     ! #X!  B+  0 8@H!##B J   JȲ݌̌ XX   Aseparatebutrelatedissueinvolvesthequestionofhow,ifatall,KennethFailstime D  shouldbecompensated.Mr.FailswasanattorneyadmittedtopracticeinVirginiaand ` Pennsylvania,butnotMaryland.OnMarch22,2002,soonaftercounselbegantheir , representationofMrs.Sterling,theVirginiaStateDisciplinaryBoardrevokedMr.Fails  licensetopracticelawinVirginia.OnJanuary10,2003,theSupremeCourtofVirginia t affirmedtheBoardsdecision.Nevertheless,heretainedhislicensetopracticein @ Pennsylvania.Neartheendofthelitigation,PennsylvaniadisbarredhiminlightofVirginias  \ earlieraction.UpuntilthetimePennsylvaniaacted,thePlaintiffbilledMr.Failstimeatan ( attorneyrateof$175perhour.AfterPennsylvaniaacted,theybilledhistimeasalegal  assistantat$115perhour. p!   InMr.Murphysview,becauseMr.FailscouldnothavebeenadmittedinMaryland <#" prohacviceonceVirginiahaddisbarredhim,histimeshouldnothavebeenbilledasattorney %X $ time.Totheextentthatanyofhistimeisbillable,itshouldhavebeenbilledaslegalassistant &$"& time.Mr.Kayetakestheoppositeview.HefeelsthatitisentirelyappropriatetobillMr. (#( FailstimeasattorneytimeupuntilthetimePennsylvaniaacted.Untilthen,asMr.Kaye l*%* seesit,Mr.Failswasstillanattorney. 8,',  TheCourtadoptsMr.Murphysview.OnceMr.FailswasdisbarredinVirginia,to  theextentanyofhisserviceswerereasonable,theyshouldnothavebeenbilledasattorney | time.Ifbillable,theyshouldhavebeenas legalassistanttime. H   0 e.  maximumhoursperday.  J   Mr.Murphywasalsooftheviewthatthereisalimittothenumberofhoursthatan    attorneycanreasonablychargetoaclientinagivenday.Henotedthattherewereanumber x  ofinstanceswhereMr.Oswaldand/orMr.Carterbilledformorethan18hoursinoneday. D  (SeeDefendants1and2,July26!30th.)InMr.Kayesview,thereisnosuchlimit.While ` theCourtrecognizesthatthehoursinquestionwerebilledduringthetrialandthattrialdays , canbelongandgrueling,theCourtneverthelessbelievesthatitisunreasonabletobillfor18  plushoursroutinelywhileintrial.Whiletheremightbesomeexceptionalcircumstances t whichwouldjustifybillingthatnumberofhoursinagivenday,theCourtfindsthePlaintiff @ hasnotmettheirburdentodemonstratesuchacircumstancehere.  \  XDuringtrial,theCourtgenerallyconvenedataround9:30a.m.andmostoften ( recessedby5:00p.m.WhiletheCourtrecognizesthattherewasworktobedonebeforeand  afterthetrial,thatfactalonedoesnotjustifyachargefor18plushours.TheCourtalsonotes p!  thatonanumberofthosedatesPlaintiffscounselsoughtreimbursementfortimespentby <#" yetanotherattorney,NicholasWoodfield.WhileinmostinstancestheCourtdisallowed %X $ thosecharges,inatleasttwoinstances,theCourtapprovedtheminpart. &$"&  (#(  X?+ 0 8@H!#X? f.  vagueentries. )$)  X  XB+  0 8@H!#  XB R+&+  X?+ 0 8@H!#X?TheDefendantassertsthatbecausethePlaintiffhastheburdenofproofto   demonstrate |  XB+  0 8@H!#  XBthereasonablenessoffees,theworkdonemustbedescribedwithparticularity.Theyargue H thatmanyoftheentriesinDefendants1and2aresovaguethatthereasonablenessofthe  d workcannotbedetermined.Therefore,thePlaintiffcannotmeetitsburdenofestablishing  0 thereasonablenessofthefees.Arelatedcomplaintisthatcounsellumpedmultipletasks    togetherasasingleitem blockbilling.Thismakesitimpossibletodeterminehowmuchof x  thetimewasspentonaparticulartask.Therefore,itcannotbedeterminedwhetherthetime D  spentonaspecifictaskwasreasonable. `  Mr.Kayerespondsthatthechargesevidencedbythecompositeexhibitaresufficient , underHensleytoenabletheCourttodeterminewhichclaimtheyrelatetoandwhetherthey  arereasonable.(SeeHensley,461U.S.424,437.)Hesuggeststhatitisincumbentuponthe t Defendanttoaskforadditionalinformationiftheyhavequestionsaboutaparticularcharge. @ Hesubmitsthatsupportingdocumentsforeachofthechargescouldbeproducedwhich  \ wouldenablePlaintiffscounsel,asnecessary,togiveamoredetaileddescriptionofthework ( thatwasdoneandhowmuchtimewasdevotedtoaparticulartask.Despiteample  opportunitytotakediscoveryonthereasonablenessofthefees,theDefendantmadeno p!  specificrequestsformoredetailedinformation.Inhisview,thelevelofdetailrequiredby <#" Mr.Murphydoesnotneedtobesetforthinthebillabsentsomespecificrequest. %X $  TheCourthavingreviewedtheapproximate3,000entriesfindsthattheoverwhelming &$"& majorityofthemprovidesufficientdetail.TheCourtfurthernotesthattheDefendantwas (#( giventheopportunitytoconductdiscoveryofPlaintiffscounselwithrespecttoanyandallof l*%* thesecharges.TheCourtfindsthatitwasreasonableinalmostallinstancestolistmultiple 8,', taskstogetherasasinglecharge.Generally,thetasksontheirfaceappearedsubstantially  related.Additionally,insomeinstances,theadditionaltasksweresominorastoalmost | certainlyrepresentonlyasmallfractionofthetimebeingcharged.Accordingly,theCourt H findsthat,ingeneral,thePlaintiffhasprovidedsufficientinformationtomeettheirburden  d underHensley.  0  X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? g.unnecessarymotions.    X XB+  0 8@H!#  XB  DefendantarguesthatmanyofthePlaintiffsmotionswereunnecessary.Therefore, D  thetimespentonthemshouldnotbecompensable.Mr.Lawstestifiedthattherewasnoneed ` tofileamotiontoamendtheComplaintasPlaintiffhaddone.Byrule,theyhadarightto , amend.Also,amotionforspecialassignmentwasunnecessary.UnderMontgomery  CountysDifferentiatedCaseManagementsystem,allcasessuchasthis,estimatedtotake t fourormoredaystotry,arespeciallyassigned.Further,thereweremultiplemotionsto @ compeldiscoveryoralternativelyforprotectiveordersthatwereunnecessarybecause  \ Defendantswereneverconsultedaboutreliefsought.Hadtheybeenconsulted,theywould ( haveconsented.Finally,manymotionswerecausedbyPlaintiffsmisconductduring  discovery.Plaintiffshouldnotbecompensatedfortimespentonthose.Mr.Murphyshared p!  Mr.Lawsopinioninlargepart,asisevidentfromhistestimonyandthechargeshe <#" disallowedonDefendants1and2. %X $  Mr.Kayedidnotaddresseachmotionspecifically.Hedidlookattheoutcomeof &$"& most.ItappearedtohimPlaintiffwonaboutasmanyasshelost.Hedoesnotbelieve (#( successisapropertestforreasonableness.Withverylimitedexception,heopinedthatallthe l*%* workwasreasonable.Reasonablenessisnottobejudgedinhindsight. 8,',  TheCourtagreesthatsomemotionswereunnecessaryasamatteroflaw,toamend  andforspecificassignment.Thoseshouldnotbecompensated.Concerningthemotionsto | compel,neithersideappearedtoowillingtocooperatewiththeother.Therefore,theCourt H allowedmostofthemotionsrelatedtodiscoveryissues.Concerningthosecausedby  d Plaintiffsdiscoveryviolations,mostwereinitiatedbyDefendantandPlaintiffresponded.  0 Theresponseswerenecessary.Plaintiffhasalreadybeensanctionedforhermisconduct.The    Courtstruckherpunitivedamagesclaim.TheCourtdoesnotbelieveitshoulddisallow x  attorneysfeesasafurthersanction.AlthoughtheCourtallowedfeesformostofthe D  motions,wheretheCourtviewedthetimespentonthemasexcessive,itreducedthetime ` accordingly.(SeeCourtsExhibit1). ,  X?+ 0 8@H!#X? 0 h.  mediationefforts.   XB+  0 8@H!#  XB X?+ 0 8@H!#X?DefendantscounselallegesthatPlaintiffscounselunnecessarilyprolongedthe @  XB+  0 8@H!#  XBlitigationinanefforttoincreasehislegalfees.Specifically,Plaintiffscounselrefusedto  \ participateinsettlementdiscussionsingoodfaith.Asevidence,thedefensepresentedthe ( testimonyoftrialcounsel,Mr.Laws.Accordingtohim,fromtheoutsetPlaintiffscounsel  wasmakingunreasonabledemandsforattorneysfeesaspartofanypossiblesettlementinthe p!  case.InMr.Lawsview,itwastheunreasonabledemandsforfeesthatmadeitimpossibleto <#" haveanymeaningfulsettlementdiscussions. %X $  XThePlaintiffrespondedbywayofaffidavitfromMr.DavidMartin,Esquire.#  - (  5     #nven  ݀They &$"& argueitwasappropriatetomakeDefendantawarethataspartofanysettlementtheywould (#( seekreasonableattorneysfees.Moreimportantly,theypointoutthatdespiterepeated l*%* requeststheonlysettlementoffertheDefendantevermadecamelateinthecaseandwasfor  $2,500.Fromthisevidence,theCourtconcludesthatitwasnotthePlaintiffsactionsalone | thatmadesettlementimpossible.Ifthereisblametobeassignedforunnecessarily H prolongingthelitigation,itwouldappeartobeequallysharedbytheparties.Morelikely,  d however,thefactsherearesuchthatsettlementwasanunlikelyoutcomefromthebeginning.  0  X X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? i.  federalcourtfees.    XB+  0 8@H!#  XB ^   X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? Duringthecourseofthelitigation,theDefendantsoughttoremovethecasetofederal D   XB+  0 8@H!#  XBcourt.Followingremoval,thePlaintifffiledamotionforremand.Baseduponthearguments ` presentedbycounselforthePlaintiff,thefederalcourtremandedthecasetotheMontgomery , CountyCircuitCourtfortrial.Followingthegrantofthemotionforremand,Plaintiffs  counselsoughtandwasawardedattorneysfeesbythefederalcourt.Thefederalcourt t awardedPlaintiff$500foritseffortsinconnectionwiththemotion.ThePlaintifffileda @ motionforreconsiderationseekinganincreaseintheamountoffees,whichmotionwas  \ denied.ThePlaintiffnowseekstorecoveradditionalfeesinthisCourtforthesame ( activities.TheDefendantarguesthatonlythefederalcourthastheauthoritytoawardsuch  feesrelatingtotheremovalissue. p!   Mr.KayetestifiedthatinhisviewthetimewascompensableunderArticle49B.He <#" notedthattheDefendantremovedthecaseandthePlaintiffwasforcedtorespond.Whilethe %X $ federalcourtcanawardfeestoapartyfortheireffortstohavethematterremandedtostate &$"& court,thepurposeoftheaward,unlikeArticle49B,isnottoencourageattorneystotakecases (#(  wheretheplaintiffshavemeritoriousclaims.Therefore,anawardofadditionalfeesunder l*%* Article49Bisproper.Inhisexperience,suchfeesareroutinelyawardedbyothercourts  construingthisstatute. |   IntheCourtsopinion,thefederalcourtisinthebestpositiontojudgethe H reasonablenessofthefeesassociatedwithproceedingsbeforetheircourt.Inthiscase,they  d determinedanawardbaseduponthePlaintiffspetition.Notwithstandingamotionto  0 reconsider,theydeclinedtoaltertheamountofthataward.Underthecircumstances,this    Courtwillnotawardadditionalfeesforworkdoneinconnectionwiththatmatter. x   X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? j.  relatedclaims. *z   XB+  0 8@H!#  XB F  X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? Thecomputationofreasonablehoursinthiscaseiscomplicatedbythefactthatthe ,  XB+  0 8@H!#  XBPlaintiffsucceededonlyinpart.OfthefiveclaimsbroughtbythePlaintiff,defamation,  hostileworkenvironment,quidproquo,retaliation,andfailuretopaywages,shesucceeded t onlyonone,herclaimforhostileworkenvironment.Further,althoughsuccessfulonthat @ claim,shewasunsuccessfulonherclaimforbackpay,frontpayandpunitivedamages.  \  XAspreviouslydiscussed,theCourtinHensleyheldthatwheretheunsuccessfulclaims ( areunrelatedtothecoresetoffactsunderlyingthesuccessfulclaims,thetimespentonthose  claimsisnormallynotcompensable.Alternatively,ifthefactsaresointerrelatedasto p!  contributetothePlaintiffsultimatesuccess,theyarecompensable.TheCourtfurtherstated <#" thatwherethePlaintiffhasachieved excellentresults,theattorneystimeshouldbefully %X $ compensatedeventhoughheorshewasnotsuccessfulonalloftheclaims. &$"& Mr.Kayetestifiedthatthequidproquo,retaliationandhostileworkenvironment (#( claimsweresimplyalternatetheoriesofrecoverybaseduponacommonsetofcorefacts. l*%* Accordingly,alltimespentonthoseclaimsiscompensable.Healsoopinedthatthe 8,', defamationclaimwasbasedonthesamesetofcorefacts.Alternatively,iftheclaimsare  unrelated,thePlaintiffachievedan excellentresult,whichevenMr.Murphyconceded. | Therefore,exceptforthewageclaim,whichMr.Kayeconcedesisunrelated,Plaintiffs H counselshouldbefullycompensatedfortheirtime.ThewageclaimchargesPlaintiff  d voluntarilywithdrew.  0  X InMr.Murphysview,theunsuccessfulclaimswereunrelated.Therefore,thetime    spentonthoseshouldbeexcluded.Hebelievedthatthisisparticularlytrueforthe x  defamationandwageclaims.TheCourt,however,havingpresidedoverthetrialandwell D  familiarwiththeevidencepresented,findsthatexceptforthewageclaim,theclaimsareso ` interrelatedthattheyshouldbetreatedasoneforpurposesofdetermininganawardof , reasonableattorneysfees.   k. 0 thecalculation. Z   Afterconsideringtheabovearguments,theCourt,uponareviewofDefendants  \ Exhibits1and2,findsthatPlaintiffscounselreasonablydevoted1253.43hoursinthe ( prosecutionofthePlaintiffsclaims.Assuming legalassistanttimewerecompensable,the  Courtfinds537.03hoursoflegalassistanttimewerereasonablydevotedtothecase. p!  Therefore,theinitialcalculationofreasonableattorneysfeesis$304,063.00.(SeeCourt <#" Exhibit2).Reasonablefeesforlegalassistantswouldadd$61,758.45(537.03hoursx$115). %X $ (SeeCourtExhibit2). &$"&  XTheCourtshallnowconsiderwhetheranupwardordownwarddepartureis (#(  appropriateuponaconsiderationofthefactorssetforthinJohnsonv.GeorgiaHighway l*%* Express,Inc.,488F.2d714(5thCir.1974)aslateradoptedbytheSupremeCourtinHensley  vs.Eckerhardt,461U.S.424(1984). |   H  X X?+ 0 8@H!#X? 2.Theadjustments/Hensley/Johnsonfactors. . ~  TheCourtofAppealsinFriolocitingHensleynotedthat 8manyof[theJohnson]  0  XB+  0 8@H!#  XBfactorsaresubsumedwithintheinitiallodestarcalculation.(Friolo,at524).Totheextent    subsumedintheCourtsinitialcalculation,theCourtwillnotagainaddressthosefactors. x  TheCourtshallfurtherlimititsdiscussionoftheremainingfactorstothosewhichtheparties D  suggestortheCourtbelievesrequireanupwardordownwardadjustmentofthecalculation. ` Absenteithercircumstance,theCourtdoesnotbelieveitisnecessaryorproductivetodiscuss , anyparticularfactorsetoutinJohnson.   <(0 0 0 8@H!#X< a.Thenoveltyanddifficultyofthequestionsinvolvedinthecase. Z  X B+  0 8@H!#0 0 0 XB Casesofthisnatureofnecessityraisesomedifficultandunsettledquestionsoflaw,  \ particularlytheinterplaybetweenthebodyofcaselawdevelopedatthestateandfederal ( levels.However,thesearenotnovelissues.Nodoubtbothcounselhavehadtoconfront  themrepeatedlysincetheyhaveextensiveexperienceinthisarea.Becausethereisnothing p!  novelorunusuallydifficultabouttheinstantcase,theDefendantarguesthereshouldbea <#" downwarddeparturefromtheinitialfeecomputation. %X $ ThePlaintifftakesanoppositeapproach.Hesubmitsthatsincethecasedidnot &$"& presentanynovelorunusuallydifficultissues,noupwardadjustmentiswarranted.However, (#( casesofthisnatureareinherentlydifficulttoprosecute,soadownwarddepartureis l*%* unwarranted. 8,',  X TheCourtispersuadedthatPlaintiffiscorrect.Adownwarddepartureisnot  warranted.Whilethelegalandfactualissuespresentedwerenotnovel,theyweresufficiently | complexthatadownwarddepartureinthiscaseisunwarranted.Plaintiffsalternate H suggestionthat theuniquenatureandcomplexityofthiscaseisthatitwasanalloutwar  d betweencounsel#  . (  6     #  <  ݀iswithoutmerit.Regrettably,such warsarefarfrom unique.  0  X  0 b.Whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.    ^   X  Theparaphrasedexplanationforthisfactorasitappearsinfootnote2ofFriolois fee D  agreedtobyclientishelpfulindemonstratingattorneysfeesexpectations, litigantshould ` notbeawardedfeegreaterthanheiscontractuallyboundtopay .Friolo,373Md.501, , 522,n2.(emphasisadded).   SincetheFriolocourtissimplyparaphrasingtheJohnsoncourt,itisinstructiveto t lookatthecompleteexplanationoftherelevanceofthisfactorassetforthinJohnson: @   0 (6)Whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.Thefeequotedto  \   0 theclientorthepercentageoftherecoveryagreedtoishelpful B   0 indemonstratingtheattorneysfeeexpectationswhenhe (   0 acceptedthecase.ButaspointedoutinClarkv.American    0 Marine,supra,    0   [t]hestatutedoesnotprescribethepaymentof p!    0   feestothelawyers.Itallowstheawardtobe V"!   0   madetotheprevailingparty. Whetherornothe <#"   0   agreedtopayafeeandinwhatamountisnot "$r#   0   decisive.Conceivably,alitigantmightagreeto %X $   0   payhiscounselafixeddollarfee.Thismightbe %>!%   0   evenmorethanthefeeeventuallyallowedbythe &$"&   0   court.Orhemightagreetopayhislawyera ' #'   0   percentagecontingentfeethatwouldbegreater (#(   0   thanthefeethecourtmightultimatelyset.Such )$)   0   arrangementsshouldnotdeterminethecourts l*%*   0   decision.Thecriterionforthecourtisnotwhat R+&+   0   thepartiesagreedbutwhatisreasonable. 8,',    0 320F.Supp.at711. Innoevent ,however, shouldthelitigant    0 beawardedafeegreaterthanheiscontractuallyboundtopay , |   0 ifindeedtheattorneyshavecontractedastoamount. b    0 Johnson,488F.2dat718(emphasisadded). . ~  X Mindfulthatitisthe litigant whoisseekingtheaward,andthatthereforetheaward  0 shouldinnoeventexceedthefeessheislegallyobligatedtopay,theCourtsoughttoreview    thefeeagreemententeredintohere.Although,therewerenumerousreferencestothe x  arrangementasacontingencyfee,theagreementwasnotpartoftherecord.Upon D  discoveringthis,withnoticetotheDefendant,theCourtsuaspontecontactedPlaintiffs ` counselandaskedforacopyoftheagreement.OnFebruary3,2005,Plaintiffscounsel , providedtheagreement(subjecttoaprotectiveorder)toopposingcounselandtheCourt.#  / (  7     #> <     X Iftheagreementherewassolelyacontingentfeearrangement,itwouldsignificantly t limitthefeesMs.Sterlingwasobligatedtopayherattorney.Bywayofexample,ifMs. @ Sterlingsonlyobligationundertheagreementwastopayherattorneys40percentofher  \ recovery,$100,000,hermaximumliabilityforfeeswouldbe$40,000(40%x$100,000). ( Therefore,underFriolo,eventhoughthe initial lodestarcalculationofreasonableattorneys  feeswas$304,063.00,theCourtsawardwouldbelimitedto$40,000.IftheCourtawarded p!  additionalfees,thelitigantcouldpotentiallyrealizeawindfallbecauseshewouldbeunderno <#" legalobligationtopaythemtotheattorney.Presumably,incaseslikethis,mostagreements %X $ forthisreasonprovideforanalternatemethodofdeterminingthefeealitigantwouldbe &$"&  obligedtopayifthecourtawardsfees. (#(  ThefeeagreemententeredbetweencounselandMs.Sterlingissuchanagreement.  TheCourtsetsforthbelowonlythoseportionsoftheagreementrelevanttoadiscussionof | thisfactor: H    0 2.DeterminationofFeesforServices.  d   0 (A)  Iwillrepresentyouonacontingencyfeebasis,in  0   0   whichyouagreetopaymeafee!notcovering      0   costs!of840%ofthegrossamountrecovered      0   aftertrialhasbegun,45%ifanyjudgmentis     0   appealed8 x    0 (B)  ShouldtheCourtawardattorneysfeesinthiscase, D    0   youagreetopaymethehigherofeitherthepercentage *z    0   assetforthinParagraph2(A)herein,or$250perhour `   0   formytimeand$115perhourforlegalassistanttime F   0   excludingcosts.#  0 (  8     #' <   ,  Significantly,thefeesthattheclientbecomesobligatedtopayunder2(B)arenot  limitedtothefeesawardedbytheCourt.Thatfactcreatesanenormousprobleminthiscase. t Ѐ XIftheCourtdeniesthefeepetition,andawardscostsonly,Plaintiffisonlyobligedto  \ paycounsel$40,000underParagraph2(A).Thiswouldleaveherwith$60,000ofthe ( $100,000judgment.IfontheotherhandtheCourtawardsfeesintheamountoftheinitial  calculations,$304,063.00,undertheagreementPlaintiffwillowethefirm$256,345.10,the p!  differencebetweenthatawardandtheamountbilled.#  1. (  9     #b+ <  ݀Evenifsheassignsherentire <#"  judgmenttothefirm,shewillstillowethem$156,345.10.Accordingly,itisdirectlycontrary %X $ toMs.Sterlingsbestintereststopursuethispetitionforattorneysfees.Counselhasadirect  andopenconflictwithhisclient. |  X Unlesstheconflictisremedied,theCourtshouldandmustdeclinetoawardattorneys H fees.Counselwillstillrecover$40,000underthefeeagreement.Whilethatisfarlessthan  d theinitiallodestarcalculationofreasonablefees,todootherwisewouldrewardcounselat  0 enormousexpensetohisclient.Sucharesultmustbeavoided.TheCourt,however,    hesitatestotakesuchdrasticaction.Therefore,ifPlaintiffscounselremediesthedirect x  conflictbywaivinganyclaimagainstPlaintiffformonies(feesand/orcosts)overandabove D  thosethatmightbeawardedbytheCourt,thentheCourtshallawardreasonableattorneys ` feesascomputedherein.Ifcounseldesirestodoso,heshallfilewiththeCourtwithin15 , daysofthedateofthisOpinionandOrderawaivertothateffectsignedbycounseland  acknowledgedbythePlaintiff.Ifcounselchoosesnottodoso,oriftheCourtshallnot t receivethewaiverwithin15daysofthisOrder,thenitshalldeclinetoawardanyattorneys @ feesandawardcostsonly.  \  TheCourtdoesnotbelieveitsdecisioninthiscaseunderminesthegoalofthefee ( shiftingstatutestoensurecompetentcounselremainwillingtotakesuchcases.Suchcounsel  willcontinuetohavetheassurancethat reasonablefeeswillbeavailableforsuccessful p!  litigantssolongascounselagreestoacceptsuch reasonablefeesasfullpayment(orinthe <#" alternative,acontingency,whicheverishigher). %X $   CONCLUSION ' #'     Forreasonssetforthhereinabove,undertheinitiallodestaranalysis,theCourt l*%* determinesthattheamountofreasonableattorneysfeesinthiscaseis$304,063.00.If legal 8,', assistantfeeswerecompensable,thenforthereasonssetoutearlier,theCourtwouldhold  theinitialcalculationofreasonableattorneysfeesis$365,878.95($304,063.00+$61,815.95 | =$365,878.95). H  Uponaconsiderationoftherelevantfactors,totheextenttheywerenotsubsumedin  d theinitialcalculation,exceptforthefeearrangementbetweenPlaintiffandcounsel,theCourt  0 wouldadjustthefeesneitherupwardnordownward.However,thepursuitofCourtawarded    attorneysfeeshereinplacesPlaintiffscounselinadirectandopenconflictwithhisclient. x  Underthepresentfeearrangement,anawardofreasonableattorneyfees(forcounsel)would D  beatenormousexpensetothelitigant,thepartywhosufferedtheoriginalinjury.Thisthe ` Courtwillnotpermit.Unlesstheconflictisremedied,theCourtshallawardnofees.If , within15dayscounselwaivesaclaimtoanymoniesfromtheclientasdiscussedherein,the  Courtshallawardfeesof$304,063andcostsintheamountof$46,437. t  ITISSOORDEREDthis_______dayofFebruary,2005. @   0      8   _______________________________________    0      8   MICHAELD.MASON,JUDGE    0      8   CircuitCourtforMontgomeryCounty,MD.