

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-JV-23-000276

UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*

No. 248

September Term, 2024

IN RE: C.B.

Graeff,
Ripken,
Meredith, Timothy E.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Meredith, J.

Filed: November 26, 2024

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

This appeal arises from a decision by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile court, terminating the parental rights of Ms. B. to her daughter C.B. and granting guardianship of C.B. to the Anne Arundel County Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”). On appeal, Ms. B. presents the following questions:

1. Did the juvenile court clearly err in finding that the Department made reasonable efforts towards reunification with [her]?
2. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in finding clear and convincing evidence that there were exceptional circumstances to terminate [her] parental rights?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

C.B. was born in December of 2020. At the time of C.B.’s birth, Ms. B. was herself a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) who had been in the custody of the Department since June of 2013.¹ C.B.’s father, Mr. B., was incarcerated, serving five years of a ten-year sentence. Mr. B. had pled guilty to first-degree assault of Ms. B., stemming from an incident that occurred while she was pregnant with C.B. in October of 2020. Mr. B. signed a conditional consent to the termination of his parental rights on December 19, 2023, which was filed on or about January 3, 2024.

¹ A “child in need of assistance” (“CINA”) is one who requires court intervention because the child has been abused or neglected, or has a developmental disability or mental disorder, and his or her “parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs.” Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

Ms. B. suffers from developmental challenges and mental health issues. The Department offered Ms. B. services during her pregnancy to assist her with preparing for the birth of C.B. Specifically, the Department offered Ms. B. access to Storks Nest, a county program that supports new mothers and babies and provides them needed supplies. The Department also offered Ms. B. a foster care placement through the Mother/Baby program, which provides housing for new mothers to reside with their babies. Ms. B. declined to participate in that foster program, electing instead to move to her mother's home with C.B.

At the time of her hospital discharge, Ms. B. agreed to a safety plan with the Department that required her to follow safe sleeping practices, ensure that C.B. was supervised at all times by an appropriate, sober adult, and allow the Department access to C.B. for safety checks. The Department provided Ms. B. with resources for the care of C.B., including a portable crib, Walmart and Target gift cards, as well as baby supplies and a laptop computer provided by the Blue Ribbon Project for Ms. B. to attend online treatment classes. The Department referred Ms. B. to a nursing specialist, a Family Support Center in-home interventionist, Helping Hand Pantry, and Healthy Start for nutritional needs.

Following Ms. B.'s discharge from the hospital, she initially maintained contact with the Department, and the Department visited her and C.B. weekly. But beginning in February of 2021, Ms. B. missed home visits from the Department as well as C.B.'s pediatric appointments, including follow-up orthopedic appointments that were scheduled

to treat a shoulder injury that C.B. had sustained at birth. The Department learned that Ms. B. was not staying at her mother's residence where she had planned to live with C.B. following discharge from the hospital, and the Department had difficulty locating Ms. B. to assess C.B.'s safety. During the week of March 25, 2021, Ms. B. missed a pediatrician appointment for C.B. and a home visit with the Department.

On April 8, 2021, Ms. B. attended a virtual Family Team Decision Making Meeting at which the Department learned that she was living with C.B. in a hotel in Carroll County. Later that same day, the Department removed C.B. from Ms. B.'s care upon locating Ms. B. and C.B. at the hotel, and finding that C.B. was hungry and dirty, with matted hair and soiled clothing.

Following C.B.'s removal, the Circuit Court for Carroll County, sitting as the juvenile court, ordered that C.B. remain in shelter care, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for CINA proceedings. At the CINA adjudication and disposition hearing on March 11, 2022, based on the parties' agreement, the juvenile court sustained the facts in the CINA petition. The court found that Ms. B. had acknowledged that her mother's home in Glen Burnie was unsafe and unsuitable for C.B. due to the presence of excessive debris and clutter, bug infestation, and poor basic cleanliness throughout the home. The court accepted the Department's statement that Ms. B. had not exercised sufficient good judgment and parenting to allow her to safely parent C.B. without significant support and constant reminders about safety issues. The juvenile

court determined C.B. to be a CINA, and committed her to the care and custody of the Department for placement in foster care.

Following C.B.’s removal, the Department facilitated weekly visitation between C.B. and Ms. B. The Department paid for Ms. B.’s transportation to her visitation sessions and C.B.’s pediatric appointments. The Department provided Ms. B. one-on-one parent coaching with Vera Montgomery during her visitation sessions at Harmony House from November of 2021 until December 1, 2023. Ms. Montgomery had experience working with parents with cognitive delays and developmental disabilities. When working with parents with cognitive or developmental challenges, Ms. Montgomery typically provides information in simple steps, often utilizing visual aids, such as charts and sequencing cards. Ms. Montgomery also models parenting behaviors and gives prompts or re-directives for parents to follow by asking leading questions to jog their memories, such as “[w]hy do you think [your] baby [is] crying right now” or “[w]hat are the reasons a baby would cry?”

Ms. Montgomery recalled that Ms. B. had difficulty focusing her attention on C.B. and was easily distracted by her thoughts or her phone during visitation. Ms. B. was often preoccupied with her own personal issues and needed prompting for her to interact with C.B. during visitation. In December of 2021, Ms. Montgomery developed a coaching plan with a goal that Ms. B. only use her phone during the last fifteen minutes of the visits for pictures. Initially, Ms. B. followed the plan of limiting her phone use, but she eventually required additional reminders to put her phone away, and, according to Ms. Montgomery, the phone remained a “constant” issue.

In July of 2023, Ms. B. gave birth to a second child, K.B. Ms. B. had two visits at which both C.B. and K.B. were present. Ms. Montgomery noted that during these visits, Ms. B. had difficulty attending to both children at the same time, and she was not very interactive with C.B. Ms. B. also required coaching on safety issues. Once C.B. became mobile, Ms. B. required reminders to supervise C.B. and keep the child from crawling to another room out of her sight.

Although Ms. B.'s parenting behaviors improved somewhat with coaching, the safety concerns regarding Ms. B.'s parenting of C.B. did not resolve. Due to Ms. B.'s failure to progress with her parenting skills, she was never considered ready to move to unsupervised visitation with C.B.

In February of 2022, the Department referred Ms. B. to Project Chesapeake for substance use treatment. Ms. B. was discharged from the program after two months due to lack of attendance. Ms. B. was re-enrolled in the substance abuse program on May 24, 2022, and discharged on July 28, 2022, due to noncompliance with drug testing requirements. Ms. B. was admitted to the Project Chesapeake mental counseling program on May 24, 2022, and discharged after she failed to attend or reschedule two consecutive mental health appointments.

Meanwhile, in March of 2022, Natalie Johnson, Ms. B.'s assigned case worker for the Department, assisted her with applying for affordable housing and obtaining a housing voucher through the Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County. The processing of Ms. B.'s housing application was delayed because she had initially reported that she was

employed in a hospital doing work in security, but she was unable to provide any paystubs or other verification of employment.

In the summer of 2022, Ms. B. told Ms. Johnson that she was no longer working, and she wanted to supplement her housing application to report that she had zero income. In September of 2022, Ms. Johnson accompanied Ms. B. to her bank to help her obtain copies of her bank statements to verify that she had zero income. The Housing Commission found that there were CashApp transfers on her bank statements, and that fact caused additional delays and required additional verification. Ms. Johnson assisted Ms. B. with obtaining that documentation. Ms. B.'s housing voucher was approved in February of 2023, and her apartment unit was approved in July of 2023. Ms. Johnson assisted Ms. B. with obtaining furniture for her apartment from Hope for All, an organization that provided home furnishings.

Ms. Johnson also submitted a referral for Ms. B. to the Department of Rehabilitation Services (“DORS”), an organization that helps individuals with social, emotional, or cognitive limitations in obtaining and maintaining employment. Ms. Johnson transported Ms. B. to her intake meeting with DORS and attended the meeting with her. At that meeting, Ms. B. was assigned a job coach, and as of January of 2024, Ms. B. had met with her job coach.

In September of 2022, Ms. Johnson assisted Ms. B. with her application to the Development Disabilities Administration (“DDA”) for additional services. Ms. B.'s application was approved, and she became eligible for services in February of 2023. Ms.

Johnson contacted Arc of Anne Arundel County (“Arc”), a program that works with people with intellectual, cognitive, and developmental disabilities. In April of 2023, Ms. Johnson transported Ms. B. to her intake appointment with Arc and attended the meeting with her. At the initial meeting, the team thought that in-home services such as cleaning, laundry, and meal preparation would be beneficial to Ms. B., but Ms. B. insisted that she did not want anyone coming into her home, and she did not seem interested in the community support services offered. At the conclusion of the meeting Ms. B. had not reached an agreement to receive any in-home or community support services. Arc followed up with the Department and Ms. B., and Ms. Johnson encouraged Ms. B. to try the program, but Ms. B. was not interested.

Dr. Eric Lane conducted a court-ordered psychological evaluation of Ms. B. on July 11, 2022, and a re-evaluation on December 12, 2023. Dr. Lane diagnosed Ms. B. with an unspecified neurodevelopmental disorder. The disorder impedes her ability to complete educational goals without assistance, limits her ability to maintain employment without training and support, and impacts her ability to process information in a therapeutic setting, especially a group setting. Dr. Lane noted that Ms. B. suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and unspecified depressive disorder. Dr. Lane also noted that Ms. B. has sub-average intellectual functioning and various cognitive limitations of unknown etiology, as well as severe marijuana use disorder. Ms. B. reported to Dr. Lane that she had begun drinking alcohol at age fourteen and had been using marijuana almost daily since the age of nine.

In May of 2023, the Department referred Ms. B. to Dr. Carol Hamblin, a parenting education expert, who worked with Ms. B. during her visits with C.B. at Harmony House. After eight sessions, Dr. Hamblin assessed Ms. B.'s ability to independently initiate safe or appropriate parenting behavior at a level "3" on a 10-point scale. Dr. Hamblin indicated concern about Ms. B.'s ability to parent C.B. in an environment less controlled than Harmony House.

Following the June 21, 2023 permanency planning hearing, the court changed C.B.'s permanency plan from reunification to adoption by a non-relative.

On August 18, 2023, the Department filed a petition for guardianship with right to consent to adoption and/or long-term care short of adoption. The juvenile court held the guardianship hearings on January 30, January 31, February 1, February 2, March 4, March 19, March 21, March 22, March 26, and April 3, 2024. Ms. B. attended the hearings, testified, and was represented by counsel. Counsel for C.B. supported the Department's guardianship petition.

Ms. B. testified that she does not believe that she needs substance abuse or mental health treatment. Ms. B. stated that she had recently been treated at a mental health facility that she referred to as "M & M," but she "got discharged from there because of health problems. Well, not intending [sic], but I was having health problems." She said she had suffered a back injury from an epidural injection during the birth of her second child, and as a result of the injury, she could not tolerate sitting for long periods of time and could not hold C.B. very long during visitation.

Ms. B. testified that she had a difficult pregnancy with her second child, K.B., who was born in July of 2023. Beginning when Ms. B. was fifteen weeks pregnant with K.B., she experienced constant pain and had to sit frequently. During this time, she struggled with diapering C.B. and playing with her during visits.

After giving birth to C.B., Ms. B. continued using marijuana daily or every other day “as soon as [C.B. was] asleep[.]” Ms. B. testified that “once it started being stressful,” her marijuana use “picked up to morning and night, but [C.B.] would be still asleep” and the marijuana “would be out of [Ms. B.’s] system by the time [C.B.] would wake up or it [was] feeding time.” Ms. B. submitted six urine samples for drug testing between May of 2022 and May of 2023, and five of those six samples tested positive for marijuana.

As of the time of the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing, Ms. B. had not yet completed the court-ordered parenting assignments.

C.B.’s foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. L., testified at the hearing. Mrs. L. testified that C.B. has lived with her and her husband, Mr. L., since April of 2021, when C.B. was four months old. Mr. and Mrs. L. have a ten-year-old son, and C.B.’s half-sister, K.B., also lives with them. Mrs. L. described C.B. as a spunky, lively, sweet, and loving child. C.B. is doing well, growing and learning, and she has reached the appropriate milestones for her age. She attends a preschool co-op program and a church preschool program where she has friends and participates in various activities.

On April 3, 2024, the juvenile court delivered its bench ruling on the TPR petition. After hearing arguments and considering the factors under Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl.

Vol.), § 5-323(d) of the Family Law Article (“FL”), the juvenile court ruled that “continuing the parental relationship is not in the best interest of [C.B.,]” and the court terminated Ms. B.’s parental rights to C.B.

Ms. B. noted a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review TPR decisions under three interrelated standards of review:

When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 8-131(c) applies. Second, if it appears that the court erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the court founded upon some legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the court’s decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.E., 464 Md. 26, 47 (2019) (cleaned up) (quoting *In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C.*, 417 Md. 90, 100 (2010)).

To warrant reversal, the trial court’s ultimate decision must “be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” *In re Shirley B.*, 419 Md. 1, 19 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I.

Ms. B. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Department made reasonable efforts at reunification before terminating her parental rights. She argues that the services offered did not specifically address her particularized needs, that the case

workers assigned to her lacked the requisite experience or education needed to fully support her, and that the services needed from DORS and DDA were not offered in a timely manner.

The Department asserts that the juvenile court did not err in finding that the services offered by the Department were appropriately tailored to her needs, and that Ms. B.'s failure to follow through in fully availing herself of those services contributed to the court's finding of her unfitness. The Department asserts that the evidence supported the court's findings that the Department offered appropriate services in a timely manner and made a good faith effort to fulfill its obligations under the service agreements.

Under Maryland law, parents have a constitutionally protected interest in raising their children without undue State interference, grounded in the presumption "that it is in the best interest of children to remain in the care and custody of their parents." *In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H.*, 402 Md. 477, 495 (2007). In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must balance the fundamental rights of parents with the State's responsibility to protect children from abuse and neglect. *Id.* at 497. The court's paramount consideration is the best interest of the child. *Id.* at 496.

The presumption that it is in the best interest of a child to remain in the care and custody of his or her parent "may be rebutted upon a showing *either* that the parent is 'unfit' *or* that 'exceptional circumstances' exist which would make continued custody with the parent detrimental to the best interest of the child." *Id.* at 495 (emphasis added). In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest, the

juvenile court must give careful consideration to the factors set forth in FL § 5-323(d). *Id.* at 499.

With respect to reunification efforts, FL § 5-323(d)(1)(ii) requires that the juvenile court consider—along with numerous other factors listed in FL § 5-323(d)—“the extent, nature, and timeliness of services offered by a local department to facilitate reunion of the child and parent[.]” FL § 5-323(d)(2)(iv) provides that the juvenile court must also consider “whether additional services would be likely to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the parent within an ascertainable time not to exceed 18 months from the date of placement[.]” The Department is required “to make ‘reasonable efforts’ to ‘preserve and reunify families’ and ‘to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.’” *Rashawn H.*, 402 Md. at 500 (quoting FL § 5-525(d)). The Department’s efforts, however, “need not be perfect to be reasonable[.]” *In re James G.*, 178 Md. App. 543, 601 (2008).

Indeed, the Maryland Supreme Court has recognized that there are limits to what the Department is expected to do. *Rashawn H.*, 402 Md. at 500. The Department “is not obliged to find employment for the parent, to find and pay for permanent and suitable housing for the family, to bring the parent out of poverty, or to cure or ameliorate any disability that prevents the parent from being able to care for the child.” *Id.* The Department must “provide reasonable assistance” to the parent to try to achieve these goals, but the

Department is not at fault “if the parent, despite that assistance, remains unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care.” *Id.* at 500-01.

In C.B.’s case, the juvenile court found that the Department had made “a good faith effort to fulfill their obligations under any agreements, including efforts to re-engage Ms. B. with services.” The court specifically referenced the Department’s referrals to various support services, including parent coaching and visitation assistance, placement with an interventionist through the family support center, referrals for substance abuse, and mental health care. The court also found that the Department had assisted Ms. B. with applying for and obtaining a housing voucher, obtaining her GED, and obtaining a Maryland State Identification card. And the Department had provided assistance with banking affairs and referrals to DORS and DDA. Although Ms. B. had not succeeded in finding consistent employment, the Department had referred her to a job coach.

The court determined that, overall, the Department had provided services in a timely manner. The court noted that some things could have been done more promptly, such as obtaining DDA approval and transitioning to finding a different organization once it became known that Arc was not a viable option. But the court also pointed out that some of the delay “lies at the feet of both Ms. B. and the Department.” The court found that Ms. B often “seemed to be resistive of assistance” and that her efforts in fulfilling her service agreement obligations were “somewhat kind of lukewarm.” She did not complete the mental health counseling programs at Project Chesapeake and insisted that she did not need mental health or substance abuse treatment.

Ms. B. does not specify the nature of the services that she believes she required from the Department, and the record does not support her contention that the services she received were unreasonable. The record demonstrates that the Department offered services designed to support Ms. B.'s cognitive limitations and assist her with daily activities, such as the Arc program, but that Ms. B. declined to participate in that program. Ms. Montgomery, the parenting coach referred by the Department, was experienced in coaching parents with cognitive and developmental limitations, and she worked closely with Ms. B. to address her specific challenges and model appropriate parenting skills. The record shows that the Department made numerous efforts to provide services tailored to Ms. B.'s intellectual challenges, and she generally resisted their efforts.

We agree with the Department that the record does not support an appellate finding that the juvenile court erred by failing to comply with the requirements of FL § 5-323(d).

II.

Ms. B. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that exceptional circumstances warranted termination of her parental rights. She argues that, in reaching its conclusion, the juvenile court erred by relying almost exclusively on C.B.'s relationship with her foster parents, and failing to find that a continued relationship with C.B. would be detrimental to C.B.

The Department argues that the juvenile court properly found that Ms. B. was unfit to remain in a parental relationship with C.B., and that exceptional circumstances existed warranting the termination of Ms. B.'s parental rights, even though the court was not

required to find *both* unfitness *and* exceptional circumstances. The Department contends that the juvenile court properly considered the required statutory factors in assessing C.B.’s best interest. And the Department asserts that C.B.’s bond with her foster parents was only one of the many factors relied on by the court in reaching its determination that guardianship was in C.B.’s best interest. We agree with the Department’s arguments.

A juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon a determination that *either* the parent is unfit *or* that exceptional circumstances exist to warrant termination. *Rashawn H.*, 402 Md. at 495; FL § 5-323(b). If the court decides that a parent is unfit, “it [does] not need to make any findings with respect to ‘exceptional circumstances’ requiring the termination of parental rights.” *In re Adoption/Guardianship of Amber R.*, 417 Md. 701, 718 n.13 (2011). In this case, because the juvenile court found that Ms. B. was unfit, it was not required to address whether exceptional circumstances also existed. *See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jasmine D.*, 217 Md. App. 718, 736 (2014) (explaining that, once the juvenile court determined that the parent was unfit, the parent’s arguments regarding exceptional circumstances were “beside the point”). Accordingly, Ms. B.’s argument that the juvenile court erred in granting the guardianship petition because the record did not support a finding of exceptional circumstances is without merit.

In this case, the court explained in detail the basis for its finding that Ms. B. was unfit to maintain a parental relationship with C.B.:

Ms. B., in this case, is unfit because she has failed to comply with the terms of the [c]ourt’s orders and service agreements[.] . . . Ms. B. has not availed

herself fully of the services [offered] in order to remedy the reasons that required [C.B.'s] placement in the Department's care. And there is [no] indication of any predictable time period within which Ms. B. could rehabilitate and remedy these deficiencies.

In particular, I speak to . . . those deficiencies [in] parenting skills to be able to safely and substantially care for [C.B.] in the future, or if Ms. B. would ever be able to safely and effectively parent [C.B.] on her own.

I further find Ms. B. has been provided sufficient opportunity by the Department to address mental health issues raised at her psychological evaluation. And she has been resistive or uncooperative with the programs that were arranged to help her resolve issues as well as resistive and sometimes dismissive of the need to correct and rehabilitate anything in her behavior. Ms. B. has been inconsistent at times in visitation with [C.B.], especially more recently, and continues to need supervision to support and manage [C.B.'s] needs. Ms. B. has a history of making neglectful decisions about [C.B.] that have caused [C.B.'s] life and safety to be jeopardized while [C.B.] was – and certainly, initially living with Ms. B. for the first three, three and a half months.

* * *

Ms. B. did not re-engage in mental health and substance abuse treatment possibilities until recently and suggested that she does not need any help or assistance with anything to improve herself. That came at the very end of the case . . . testimony.

Under the totality of the circumstances as well as [the] speculative nature of any future corrective action on Ms. B.'s part, this [c]ourt also finds by clear and convincing evidence, exceptional circumstances exist to cause this [c]ourt to conclude, by the evidence presented, it is no longer in [C.B.'s] best interest to continue in the maternal relationship. It is not in [C.B.'s] best interest to continue to wait for the Department to make additional attempts to remedy Ms. B.'s circumstances and to keep [C.B.] in the limbo of foster care for an indeterminate period of time.

In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., 412 Md. 442 (2010), on which Ms. B. relies, is factually distinguishable. In that case, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the juvenile court's findings that exceptional circumstances existed based on the children's

six-year placement in foster care and their apparent bond with their foster parent, in the absence of any finding that a continued relationship with the father would be detrimental to the children. 412 Md. at 460. The circuit court found no evidence in that case suggesting that the father was an unfit parent. *Id.* at 451. To the contrary, the court noted that the evidence showed that there was no question that the father had “the emotional, physical, mental ability to be a parent for [the children].” *Id.* at 452.

Here, the juvenile court did not improperly give undue consideration to C.B.’s bond with her foster family and adjustment to her placement. Under FL § 5-323(d)(4)(i), the juvenile court was required to consider “the child’s emotional ties with . . . others who may affect the child’s best interests significantly[,]” and under FL § 5-323(d)(4)(ii), the court was also required to consider the child’s adjustment to her placement. *See also In re Adoption of Jayden G.*, 433 Md. 50, 102 (2013) (explaining that a court must consider the “reality of a child’s life” (cleaned up)).

With regard to placement, the court found that C.B. had lived with her foster family since April of 2021, and she was “in a happy, loving, and positive relationship with [her] foster family.” The court noted that C.B. was enjoying a good relationship with her foster brother, foster parents, foster grandparents, and the family dog. She was also engaging with neighborhood children and having playdates with children in the church community and preschool. Although the evidence indicated that C.B. had adjusted well to her placement, the court did not indicate that C.B.’s bond with her foster parents was the controlling factor in the court’s decision.

It appears to us that the juvenile court placed greatest weight on its finding that Ms. B.’s unfitness resulted from her inability to safely and effectively parent C.B. on her own, and her repeated displays of resistance to obtaining the services she needed to remedy the deficiencies in her parenting skills. The court found that, due to Ms. B.’s lack of progress and the unlikely prospect that she would take appropriate corrective action within a predictable period of time, it was detrimental to C.B. to continue to maintain a maternal relationship with Ms. B.² See *Jayden G.*, 433 Md. at 103 (concluding that it was no longer in the child’s best interest to continue the parental relationship “in the face of the [m]other’s persistent inability to take charge of her life”).

We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that Ms. B. was unfit to maintain a parental relationship with C.B., and that the termination of Ms. B.’s parental rights was in C.B.’s best interest.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.**

² The court found “[T]here is not [an] indication of any predictable time period within which Ms. B. could rehabilitate and remedy these deficiencies.”