

UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND

No. 521

September Term, 2024

DELONTA ALONZO SNOWDEN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Arthur,
Friedman,
Kenney, James A., III
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

PER CURIAM

Filed: December 10, 2024

*This is a per curiam opinion. Consistent with Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the rule of stare decisis nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.

Following a 2016 guilty plea in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Delonta Alonzo Snowden, appellant, was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, home invasion, and use of a firearm in a crime of violence. The court sentenced him to a total term of 30 years' imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended. In 2024, appellant filed a motion for a substance abuse evaluation, and commitment for substance abuse treatment, pursuant to Health-General Article, §§ 8-505 and 507. The court denied the motion without a hearing, stating only that the motion was “denied.” This appeal followed. On appeal, appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition. The State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as not allowed by law. For the reasons that follow, we shall grant the motion to dismiss.

Health-General §§ 8-505(a)(1)(i) and 8-507(a)(1) provide that a court, pursuant to certain conditions, “may” order an evaluation for substance abuse and “may” commit a defendant for treatment. As such, whether to grant relief is left to the court’s discretion.

The State maintains that the court’s denial of appellant’s motion is not an appealable order and moves to dismiss the appeal for that reason. The State points out that neither Health-General § 8-505 nor § 8-507 provide for appellate review of a decision to deny a request for substance abuse evaluation or commitment for treatment. Moreover, the State, relying on *Fuller v. State*, 397 Md. 372, 394-95 (2007), asserts that a motion for commitment for treatment pursuant to Health-General § 8-507 is not a final order or an appealable collateral order because there is no limit on the number of motions a defendant may file. The State further maintains that this Court’s decision in *Hill v. State*, 247 Md. App. 377 (2020), which addressed a decision denying relief under Health-General § 8-507,

is distinguishable. The State points out that here, unlike in *Hill*, the record does not reflect that the circuit court believed it lacked authority to grant appellant’s motion.

We agree with the State that *Hill* is distinguishable from the matter presently before us. In *Hill*, we held that there was appellate jurisdiction to consider the denial of an inmate’s Health-General § 8-507 request where the circuit court ruled that it was precluded from authorizing treatment because the petitioner had been convicted of a crime of violence and was not yet parole eligible. *Id.* at 389. Although Hill had previously qualified for treatment and the court had indicated its willingness to authorize it, *id.* at 380-81, in 2018 the legislature amended the statute and disallowed commitment for drug treatment for prisoners convicted of crimes of violence until they became eligible for parole. *Id.* at 381-82. The circuit court rejected Hill’s contention that applying those amendments to him violated the *Ex Post Facto* Clause found in Article 1 of the United States Constitution and Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the statutory amendments were enacted after his 2011 conviction. *Id.* at 382. When Hill appealed, the State argued that, pursuant to *Fuller*, this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. *Id.* at 383. We disagreed. In short, we noted that “the court’s express determination that application of the 2018 amendments to Hill do not violate the *Ex Post Facto* Clause is final in that it denies Hill any possibility of being granted an HG § 8-507 commitment until after he reaches parole eligibility.” *Id.* at 389. Hence, we concluded that the ruling in Hill’s case constituted a final judgment and, therefore, this Court had jurisdiction to consider his appeal. *Id.*

In contrast, there is nothing in the record in the instant case to indicate that the court believed that it was prohibited from granting relief. Moreover, as the State points out, the Supreme Court of Maryland has long recognized “[t]he presumption that trial judges know the law and apply it properly[.]” *State v. Chaney*, 375 Md. 168, 181 (2003).

Finally, we note that Health-General § 8-505(a)(1)(i) and § 8-507(a)(1) provide that a court, pursuant to certain conditions, “may” order an evaluation for substance abuse and “may” commit a defendant for treatment. As such, whether to grant relief is left to the court’s discretion. Neither statute requires a court to set forth its reasons for denying a request for an evaluation or commitment for treatment, and neither statute provides the right to an appeal from an adverse decision. In sum, we hold that the court’s order denying appellant’s request for substance abuse evaluation is not appealable. Therefore, we shall grant the State’s motion to dismiss. *See Fuller*, 397 Md. at 380 (“the denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article is not an appealable order”).

**MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
GRANTED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.**