

Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CT210538B

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 640

September Term, 2023

KEIMONI SHEPPARD

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Wells, C.J.,
Tang,
Woodward, Patrick L.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Tang, J.

Filed: January 23, 2025

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Md. Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the appellant, Keimoni Sheppard, was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. The circuit court sentenced the appellant to life plus twelve years of incarceration, after which he noted this appeal. The appellant asks us to consider the following questions, which we quote:

1. Did the trial court err in allowing Detective Kenneth Lin to give expert testimony regarding cell phone and cell phone tower technology and calls placed on [the appellant’s] cell phone on March 29, 2021, when he was not qualified as an expert?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to convince any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that [the appellant] was the second man firing shots into the blue Volks Wagon [sic] Jetta and killing Marceese Norman and thus was guilty of first[-]degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2021, shortly after 7:30 p.m., police officers were dispatched to a 911 call that reported a shooting at a residence on Whitehall Street in Suitland, Prince George’s County, Maryland. Upon arrival, officers noticed a blue Volkswagen Jetta parked in the driveway of the home, with the driver’s window riddled with bullet holes. Inside the vehicle, they found Marceese Norman (“Marceese”) deceased in the driver’s seat.¹ The cause of her death was multiple gunshot wounds, and her death was ruled a homicide.

¹ We use first names throughout this opinion for clarity. We mean no disrespect in doing so.

Investigators later recovered multiple cartridge casings from the scene, which were determined to have been fired from two different firearms.

The appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree murder and related offenses. The court held a three-day jury trial, during which the State called several witnesses and introduced various pieces of evidence, including Ring doorbell camera footage, photographs of items recovered from a search warrant executed at the appellant's home, a recording of the appellant's interview with police, and call detail records related to the appellant's cell phone. Although the appellant did not testify, he presented two family members to support his alibi that he was at home during the shooting. We summarize the relevant evidence.

Before the Shooting

Marceese was in a romantic relationship with Taleah Cooley ("Taleah"). Taleah lived with her mother and brothers at their home on Whitehall Street. Taleah's family disapproved of Marceese, and Marceese was "not really allowed" in the house. The relationship between Marceese and one of Taleah's brothers, Brendan Cooley ("Brendan"), was particularly strained. This tension also extended to Brendan's girlfriend, Diamond Perry ("Diamond").

Before the shooting on March 29, Marceese, who was driving the Jetta, picked Taleah up from work and went to the Whitehall Street house. While parked in the driveway, Marceese said "something smart" to Brendan, who was outside walking his dog. Taleah told Marceese to be quiet, but Marceese continued to talk "trash." To avoid further confrontation, the couple drove to the end of the street.

At some point, Marceese and Taleah returned to the house and sat in the car in the driveway while Taleah worked on her taxes. Later, Taleah exited the vehicle to go inside and grab some snacks. After a few minutes, she heard gunshots and ran outside, where she found Marceese motionless in the Jetta.

Ring Camera Videos

Police recovered Ring camera footage from the Whitehall Street home that captured events before and during the shooting. The video shows a dark-colored Jeep backed into the driveway of the Whitehall Street home, next to the Jetta that was already parked there. Brendan and Diamond exited the Jeep and entered the house. After walking Brendan’s dog, they left the house and drove away.

Approximately ninety minutes later, the Jeep returned, backing into the driveway next to the Jetta. Brendan exited the driver’s side of the Jeep, displaying a handgun, and fired several shots into the driver’s window of the Jetta. A second man exited the rear passenger side of the Jeep and also fired multiple shots into the Jetta. The rear passenger wore sneakers and a hoodie with writing down the sleeve. Brendan and the second shooter then returned to the Jeep and drove away. Meanwhile, Taleah ran from the house toward the Jetta, screaming.

Hoodie Found in Appellant’s Bedroom

The investigation into the second shooter led police to the appellant, who was arrested. Police executed a search warrant at his home on Halloway Street in Upper Marlboro, Prince George’s County, Maryland. During the search, they recovered a gray and black American Eagle hoodie with writing down the sleeve, matching what the second

shooter wore in the video. They also found a pair of greenish, Nike sneakers in his bedroom. However, no firearm was recovered.

The right sleeve of the hoodie was later found to have particles characteristic of gunshot residue, indicating a positive result for having discharged a firearm. According to the testimony of the State’s forensic scientist, who was admitted as an expert in the field of gunshot residue, these results were consistent with the shooting by the second shooter as depicted in the video.

Appellant’s Alibi

Detective Kenneth Lin was assigned as one of the primary investigators on the case. Detective Lin interviewed the appellant following the appellant’s arrest. During the interview, the appellant stated that on the day of the shooting, he had gone shopping with his mother. Upon returning home at approximately 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he fell asleep. He was awakened around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. by a phone call from his brother, who asked for a ride home from work. According to the appellant, his mother offered to pick up his brother, so the appellant went to his room, where he stayed for the rest of the night.

When asked about Brendan, the appellant claimed he did not interact much with him. However, he mentioned that Brendan and Diamond had come to his house around 9:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting and were acting strangely. The appellant referred to Diamond as his sister, explaining that although they were not blood-related, they grew up together and considered each other siblings. The appellant insisted that he did not know Brendan had a sister (Taleah), claimed not to know about the shooting, and asserted that he was “not there.”

When Detective Lin inquired about what the appellant had worn on the day of the shooting, the appellant said he wore an Armani Exchange sweater and the shoes he still had on. When confronted with the fact that a search of his home had uncovered an American Eagle hoodie similar to one worn by the second shooter in a video, the appellant continued to deny being at the scene of the shooting.

The appellant's half-sister lived with the appellant and their mother, and she testified in the defense's case. The half-sister recalled that on the day of the shooting, the appellant and their mother went shopping around noon or 1:00 p.m. and returned home later that evening. After arriving home, the whole family "chilled" in the house. At two points that evening, Brendan and Diamond visited the house. According to the half-sister, when the couple left the house, the appellant did not go with them.

The appellant's mother also testified in the defense's case, confirming that she and the appellant went shopping before returning home to have dinner and watch movies the day of the shooting. Besides their trip to the store, she did not see the appellant leave the house that day. She testified that she washed all her son's clothes and denied seeing the American Eagle sweatshirt that was recovered by the police after his arrest. Contrary to the appellant's statement to the detective, the appellant's mother denied that she offered to pick up her other son from work, explaining that she had recently undergone surgery and could not drive then.

Appellant's Call Detail Records

Detective Lin reviewed call detail records for the appellant's cell phone number as part of the investigation. The certified records, admitted into evidence without objection,

included a spreadsheet containing various columns with information such as the date and time of calls, whether the calls were incoming or outgoing, and the phone numbers for the calls made and received. Brendan’s phone number appeared at least forty times in these records, including at least three times on the date of the shooting.

The spreadsheet also included columns labeled “1st Tower Address,” “1st Tower City,” “1st Tower State,” and “1st Tower Zip.” These columns contained the addresses for the cell towers that the appellant’s phone connected to when various calls were made or received.

Without objection, Detective Lin testified from the records, which indicated that, on the day of the shooting, an outgoing call from the appellant’s cell phone at 4:19 p.m. pinged off a cell tower at “4101 NE Crain Highway” in Upper Marlboro. A second call made at 6:03 p.m. pinged off a cell tower at “16101 Swanson Road” in “Upper Marlboro,” “MD,” “20772.” A third call at 7:52 p.m. pinged off a cell tower at “9701 Apollo Drive” in “Largo,” “MD,” “20774” about twenty minutes after the shooting. A final call made at 10:44 p.m. again pinged off a cell tower at “16101 Swanson Road.”

Detective Lin testified, without objection, that these calls placed the appellant’s cell phone at a distance from the Halloway Street house where the appellant lived. The detective identified the locations of the cell towers on a map of central Prince George’s County, which was admitted into evidence without objection. The map had four yellow stars: one in the bottom left corner near the border of D.C. and Maryland, two in the bottom right corner along Route 301, and one at the top middle of the map near Lake Arbor along Route 202.

Using the stars as reference points, the detective testified, again without objection, that the appellant’s home was marked by the star on the “very bottom right” of the map. Regarding the cell tower on Swanson Road, the detective stated, “That’s going to be—so there are two yellow stars. That’s going to be the one to the north.” The detective explained that the cell tower on Apollo Drive was by Lake Arbor in Largo, corresponding to “the top right middle star” on the map.

Without objection, the detective confirmed that the appellant’s cell phone was “hitting off” these towers during the four calls described above. He further explained, without objection, how a cell phone connects to a cell tower. He explained that a cell phone connects to a cell tower using the strongest signal coming from that tower. He also testified, again without objection, that a cell phone will connect to the tower with the strongest signal, which is not necessarily the nearest one.

Detective Lin testified, this time over objection, about the factors that could affect the strength of the signal between a cell phone and a cell tower. He explained that various elements, such as electrical power generators, the height of buildings, and the presence of concrete blocks, can disrupt the signal. He reiterated that just because a cell phone is near a cell tower does not necessarily mean it will hit off that tower, although it is likely to be relatively close. He also explained the meaning of “azimuth,” which pertains to the directionality of the signal.

Based on the evidence presented, the jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree murder and using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. We will provide further details as needed in the discussion.

DISCUSSION

I.

Detective Lin’s Testimony Regarding Call Detail Records

The appellant tacitly acknowledges that Detective Lin’s testimony regarding the addresses of the cell towers to which the four calls connected was permissible. As mentioned, the appellant did not object to the admission of the call detail records that included these addresses. Additionally, he did not object to the detective’s testimony identifying these addresses based on the records and where the addresses were on the map. Instead, he avers that the “true problem” arose when the court permitted the detective to provide his opinion on why these calls pinged off these cell towers without first qualifying him as an expert.

The appellant challenges Detective Lin’s testimony regarding three main points: (1) the strength of the signal between a cell phone and a cell tower, as well as the reasons a cell phone might ping off a particular tower; (2) the factors that could affect the signal strength; and (3) the definition of the term “azimuth.” The relevant portion of the contested testimony is as follows:

[PROSECUTOR]: Generally what is going to be the strongest signal between the cell phone and a cell phone tower?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[DETECTIVE LIN]: So, there could be a variety of things. If you’re talking about, like, it could be an electrical power generator that could cause disruption, a cell service, elevation of the building. It could be, like, concrete blocks.

Like, even this building, for example, is disrupting the cell phone service. Half of us present don't even have cell phone service right now.

Just because the tower close to you [sic] it doesn't necessarily mean that you're going to hit off that tower. But more than likely it's going to be relatively close to you.

* * *

[PROSECUTOR]: And based on your training on the other factor that you were discussing what over [sic] factors might affect the strength of a signal?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Same objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[DETECTIVE LIN]: So, hum, it's going to be something that's long—have to explain, but basically I will try to simplify it.

The direction of the tower where it's pointing to the cell phone, the cell phone where the tower is pointing towards, like I said, elevation, electrical interference, could be buildings, trees, anything like that could affect the cell phone signal and quality.

The cell phone itself actually connects to all the towers nearby, but when you're having, like, a call connection like this where the call is made or you are receiving a call in this case, it's going to pick the best—it's going to choose the best quality signal tower.

So, in this case, the Apollo, the one at Apollo, the one on Swanson, and—yeah, like that. That's why the cell phone chooses those towers because it's the best quality signal.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And again, objection, same objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[PROSECUTOR]: So, also in the records themselves in addition to the locations of a tower is there anything regarding a directionality of a signal?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[DETECTIVE LIN]: There is.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And what is that?

[DETECTIVE LIN]: It's called a[n] azimuth.

* * *

[PROSECUTOR]: Are you familiar with what the azimuth is—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained at this point, Mr. [Prosecutor].

[PROSECUTOR]: So during the course of the training as well did you discuss what the azimuth meant?

[DETECTIVE LIN]: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: And what is an azimuth?

[DETECTIVE LIN]: Directionality. So, for example, so you guys understand is that different cell phone companies label their azimuths differently. So, I would need a key word direction. Is that what you're actually talking about?

A.

Analysis

The appellant argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Detective Lin “to map the tower locations *vis a vis* [the appellant’s] home and testify over defense objection to why the cell phones would connect to particular cell towers as opposed to another one.” He argues that since the detective was not qualified as an expert in cell phone functionality, he should not have been permitted to give opinions on topics such as signal strength,

directionality, potential disruptions to cell phone signals, or the reasons a cell phone might connect to a particular tower.

According to the appellant, the detective’s testimony that “plotted” the appellant’s location at Crain Highway, Swanson Road, and Apollo Drive—some distance from his home—was based on technical knowledge outside the ken of the average person. He contends that this error was not harmless, as the detective’s opinions contributed to the verdict, particularly by undermining the appellant’s alibi defense that he was at home during the shooting.

The State counters that the appellant’s claim is not preserved because he failed to object to each question on the subject. Even if preserved, the State continues, the detective’s testimony was permissible based on a layperson’s common understanding that cell phones connect to the tower offering the strongest signal. And, even if the court permitted the testimony in error, the State contends that any such error was harmless.

“Whether evidence is properly admitted at trial is typically reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.” *Johnson v. State*, 457 Md. 513, 530 (2018). “However, in some circumstances, the admissibility of a particular item of evidence is a legal question on which we accord no special deference to a trial court.” *Id.*

Under Maryland Rule 5-702, “[e]xpert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”² Expert testimony is required “only when the subject of the inference . . . is so particularly related to some science or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman[; it] is not required on matters of which the jurors would be aware by virtue of common knowledge.” *Bean v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene*, 406 Md. 419, 432 (2008) (citation and quotations omitted). “If a court admits evidence through a lay witness in circumstances where the foundation for such evidence must satisfy the requirements for expert testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702, the court commits legal error and abuses its discretion.” *Johnson*, 457 Md. at 530.

The appellant relies on *Wilder v. State*, 191 Md. App. 319 (2010), and *Coleman-Fuller v. State*, 192 Md. App. 577 (2010), to support his argument that Detective Lin’s testimony required him to be qualified as an expert. In both cases, this Court held that expert testimony was required to introduce evidence of cell phone data plotting. In *Wilder*, the State called a detective to testify as a lay witness and map the defendant’s location at the time a shooting occurred using the defendant’s cell phone records. 191 Md. App. at 347, 354. We ordered a new trial after we held that cell phone record mapping may only be admitted through expert testimony. *Id.* at 368–69. We explained that the “description of the procedures [the detective] employed to plot the map of [the defendant’s] cell phone hits was not commonplace. Because his explanation of the method he employed to translate the

² “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness may not offer an opinion or inference unless it is ‘(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.’” *Johnson*, 457 Md. at 530 n.18 (quoting Md. Rule 5-701).

cell phone records into locations is demonstrably based on his training and experience, we conclude that he should have been qualified as an expert under Md. Rule 5-702” *Id.* at 368.

In *Coleman-Fuller*, the State likewise called a detective as a lay witness, this time to map the defendant’s location during and after a murder. 192 Md. App. at 612, 614. Relying on our holding in *Wilder* that cell phone data plotting may only be admitted through expert testimony, we held that the detective’s testimony required expert testimony. *Id.* at 619. This was because the detective “utilize[ed] the data from the cell phone records” and “rendered an opinion on [the defendant’s] location at the time of the calls, stating that the phone records were consistent with [his] presence in the vicinity of the murder around the time it happened.” *Id.* We further explained that “[f]rom the cell phone records, [the detective] testified that he was able to determine whether the location of individuals was consistent with their statements to police and their testimony.” *Id.*

The appellant’s reliance on *Wilder* and *Coleman-Fuller* is misplaced. Detective Lin did not “translate” the call detail records to determine the location of the appellant’s cell phone, nor did he plot his geographic path based on deciphering these records. The call detail records, which were admitted into evidence without objection, stated in plain language the addresses of the cell towers that the appellant’s cell phone connected to during calls between 4:19 p.m. and 10:44 p.m. on the night of the shooting. Detective Lin merely read the entries containing these addresses as they appeared in the report, which did not require expert testimony. *See Johnson*, 457 Md. at 535 (explaining that an officer was not required to be admitted as an expert because he “was literally reading” entries in a GPS

report that tracked the defendant’s location; “The entries were street addresses and times written in plain language. They were not beyond the ken of the average juror.”). Based on these addresses, Detective Lin testified, while referencing a map, where the towers were in relation to the appellant’s home. As noted, the appellant did not object to this testimony, and thus any challenge to it was not preserved for our review. *See Nalls v. State*, 437 Md. 674, 691 (2014) (“[I]f a party fails to raise a particular issue in the trial court, or fails to make a contemporaneous objection, the general rule is that he or she waives that issue on appeal.”).

Regarding Detective Lin’s testimony about the strength of the signal, the factors that affect it, and the definition of “azimuth” as it relates to the signal’s directionality, we will assume *arguendo* that the appellant’s challenge to this testimony was preserved. Even if the court erred in admitting this testimony, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In *Dorsey v. State*, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976), the Supreme Court of Maryland discussed harmless error:

[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of—whether erroneously admitted or excluded—may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.

The burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not influence the outcome of the case. *Perez v. State*, 420 Md. 57, 66 (2011).

In conducting a harmless error analysis, “the issue is not what evidence was available to the jury, but rather what evidence the jury, in fact, used to reach its verdict.” *Dionas v. State*, 436 Md. 97, 109 (2013). Several factors guide this analysis. *Id.* at 110. These include the nature and effect of the purported error on the jury, the jury’s behavior during deliberations and the length of jury deliberations, the strength of the State’s case from the jury’s perspective, the State’s use of the inadmissible evidence, and whether the inadmissible evidence was central to the case or merely cumulative. *See id.* at 110–12, 116; *Anderson v. State*, 420 Md. 554, 569 (2011); *Dove v. State*, 415 Md. 727, 743–44 (2010). “[W]here credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment of who is telling the truth is critical, an error affecting the jury’s ability to assess a witness’[s] credibility is not harmless error.” *Dionas*, 436 Md. at 110.

The appellant argues that Detective Lin’s opinions played a role in the guilty verdict. The purpose of his testimony was to disprove the alibi defense that the appellant was at home during the shooting. The appellant contends that the detective’s testimony was compelling, and in the absence of any identification, DNA, or fingerprint evidence linking the appellant to the shooting, it cannot be concluded that this testimony did not influence the jury’s rejection of the alibi defense, thereby contributing to the verdict in this case.

As we have established, the testimony regarding the locations of the cell towers for the phone calls in question and their relation to the appellant’s home was not preserved because there was no objection to it. Therefore, our harmless error analysis focuses on the detective’s objected-to testimony regarding the strength of the signal, the factors affecting that signal, and the explanation that “azimuth” refers to the directionality of the signal. This

objected-to testimony did not enhance the unobjected-to evidence. The unobjected-to evidence served as the critical evidence the prosecutor relied on during closing arguments to undermine the alibi defense.

In its closing statement, the prosecutor emphasized the Ring doorbell footage that showed a second shooter wearing a hoodie, which was later found in the appellant's bedroom with gunshot residue. This residue was distributed in a manner consistent with how the second shooter was firing the weapon in the footage. The prosecutor also pointed to the appellant's attempts to distance himself from Brendan despite evidence to the contrary, the information contained in the call detail records, and the detective's unobjected-to testimony about the addresses of the towers located away from the appellant's home between 4:19 p.m. and 10:44 p.m. on the evening of the shooting when the appellant claimed he was home.

In contrast, the prosecutor did not rely on the strength of the signal, the factors affecting the signal, or the meaning of "azimuth" to undermine the alibi defense. *See, e.g., Yates v. State*, 202 Md. App. 700, 711 (2011) (holding that the error was harmless where the prosecutor did not mention the objected-to testimony in its closing argument, even though the defense did, and the evidence was cumulative). That testimony did not add weight to the State's case; the testimony concerning the strength of the cell signal was cumulative to earlier unobjected-to testimony that the cell phone would connect to the tower with the strongest signal, which might not always be the nearest one. Additionally, the detective's testimony about the factors affecting the strength of the signal and the meaning of "azimuth" did not bridge any critical gaps to support the unobjected-to

evidence that the appellant’s cell phone pinged at various locations away from the appellant’s home between 4:19 p.m. and 10:44 p.m. on the night of the shooting when the appellant claimed to be home. *See, e.g., Potts v. State*, 231 Md. App. 398, 410 (2016) (holding error was harmless because the officer’s statement did not bridge a critical gap). In other words, the objected-to testimony was insignificant compared to the other evidence the jury reviewed to reach its verdict. For the reasons stated, we hold that even if the admission of the objected-to testimony was in error, the error is harmless.

II.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The appellant argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence because no one at trial identified him as the second shooter, and no forensic evidence placed him at the scene of the shooting. He claims that the only evidence the State provided was a hoodie that his mother testified did not belong to him. He also argues that the gunshot residue found on the sleeve of the recovered hoodie was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that whoever wore the hoodie had fired a gun. Moreover, the appellant told the police, and his mother and half-sister testified at trial, that he was home the entire evening of the shooting, providing a credible alibi.

“The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Scriber v. State*, 236 Md. App. 332, 344 (2018) (citation omitted). “When making

this determination, the appellate court is not required to determine whether *it* believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Roes v. State*, 236 Md. App. 569, 583 (2018) (citation and quotations omitted). Instead, “weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trier of fact.” *Scriber*, 236 Md. App. at 344 (citation omitted).

“We defer to any possible reasonable inferences the jury could have drawn from the admitted evidence and need not decide whether the jury could have drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the evidence.” *Fuentes v. State*, 454 Md. 296, 308 (2017). In short, “the limited question before an appellate court is not whether the evidence *should have or probably would have* persuaded the majority of fact finders but only whether it *possibly could have* persuaded *any* rational fact finder.” *Scriber*, 236 Md. App. at 344 (citation omitted).

Here, the State presented the jury with Ring doorbell footage of the shooting by two gunmen, one of whom was identified as Brendan. Although the second shooter’s face is obscured on the video by a hood and the angle of his body vis à vis the camera, the State presented circumstantial evidence that the appellant was the second shooter. In his police interview, the appellant attempted to downplay his relationship with Brendan. However, the appellant’s phone records showed that he and Brendan had called one another at least forty times in the weeks leading up to the shooting and at least three times on the day of the shooting.

Moreover, the American Eagle hoodie, recovered from the appellant’s bedroom shortly after the shooting, appeared to match the one the second shooter was wearing in the video. That hoodie was later determined to have gunshot residue on the right arm, which the State’s forensic scientist opined was consistent with the shooting, as shown in the video. A pair of shoes that looked like the ones the second shooter was wearing in the video was also found in the appellant’s room.

As for evidence of the appellant’s alibi, the State’s evidence permitted the jury to infer that the alibi was false, as the appellant’s cell phone pinged off different towers some distance from his house on the evening of the shooting when the appellant, his mother, and half-sister claimed the appellant was home. The jury was, therefore, free to reject the alibi evidence in reaching its verdict. *See Abbott v. State*, 190 Md. App. 595, 615–16 (2010) (noting that a fact-finder is free to discount or disregard a defendant’s version of the incident). For the reasons stated, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s convictions.

**JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
AFFIRMED; COSTS ASSESSED TO
APPELLANT.**