Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. C-03-CR-21-003109

UNREPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 1083

September Term, 2023

ALIVIA FRANZONE

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Nazarian,
Kehoe, S.,
Zarnoch, Robert A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Kehoe, J.

Filed: July 22, 2024

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

A jury, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, convicted Alivia Franzone, appellant, of detaining a child out of state. The court sentenced appellant to a term of one-year imprisonment, with all but 60 days suspended.

In this appeal, appellant presents three questions for our review. For clarity, we have rephrased those questions as[1]:

1. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a video depicting appellant's child and the child's father reuniting at the airport after appellant had allegedly detained the child out of state?

2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in allowing appellant's ex-husband to testify that he and appellant "had a brand new Mercedes" and that appellant had "smashed the car to pieces?"

3. Was the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction?

For reasons to follow, we hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

[1] Appellant phrased the questions as:

1. Did the court err in admitting an irrelevant and unduly prejudicial video?

2. Did the court err in allowing direct examination of appellant's ex-husband on an irrelevant and unduly prejudicial matter that constitutes prior bad acts evidence?

3. Is the evidence sufficient to support appellant's conviction for detaining a child out of state?

BACKGROUND

Appellant and her ex-husband, John Franzone, were married in 2014 or 2015.[2] In 2015, the parties had a child, M.F. The parties lived together for several years until, in January 2019, appellant informed Mr. Franzone that she wanted a divorce and Mr. Franzone moved out.

In the summer of 2020, appellant and M.F. left Maryland and went to live with appellant's mother in another state. Around that same time, Mr. Franzone filed for divorce and requested custody of M.F. Appellant subsequently filed a counter-complaint for custody.

On November 5, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the parties' custody requests. Shortly thereafter, the court entered an order awarding temporary custody to Mr. Franzone. The court ordered appellant to return M.F. to Maryland by November 20, 2020. Appellant subsequently failed to return M.F. to Maryland on that date.

In June 2021, appellant's mother took M.F. to visit a family friend, who lived in Michigan, and left M.F. in the friend's care. The friend immediately called Mr. Franzone, and Mr. Franzone flew to Michigan to retrieve M.F. Appellant was arrested and charged with violating § 9-305 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code. That law states, in pertinent part, that a parent of a child under the age of 16 years "who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not, with the intent to deprive the lawful

[2] Mr. Franzone and appellant provided conflicting dates of marriage in their respective testimony.

custodian of the custody of the child ... detain the child in another state for more than 48 hours after the lawful custodian demands that the child be returned[.]" Md. Code, Family Law § 9-305(a)(2).

Trial

At trial, Mr. Franzone testified that the parties lived together in Arizona following the marriage and that they moved to Maryland in 2017. Mr. Franzone testified that he moved out of the family home in January 2019 after appellant told him that she wanted a divorce. Mr. Franzone stated that, over the next few months, the parties had a "nesting" arrangement whereby appellant would stay in the family home with M.F. during the weekdays and Mr. Franzone would stay with M.F. in the family home during the weekends.

Mr. Franzone testified that the parties' nesting arrangement ended in July 2019 after an incident in which appellant called him "one night late and kept calling and calling." Mr. Franzone testified that, when he finally answered the phone, appellant "was just in a very foul mood and she proceeded on face time. We had a brand new Mercedes S550 in the garage and she took my driver and ... smashed the car to pieces." Mr. Franzone filed for divorce shortly thereafter. Mr. Franzone stated that, from that point forward, his contact with appellant and M.F. was sporadic.

Mr. Franzone testified that, after appellant and M.F. left Maryland in the summer of 2020, he engaged in various efforts to locate appellant and M.F. Mr. Franzone testified that, on November 5th and 6th of 2020, the court held a custody hearing (hereinafter the "November 2020 hearing"), which was part of the divorce proceedings that Mr. Franzone

had initiated the previous year. Mr. Franzone testified that appellant participated in that hearing virtually. Mr. Franzone testified that, during that hearing, the court informed appellant that M.F. was to be delivered to Mr. Franzone in Maryland. Following that hearing, the court issued its order directing appellant to produce M.F. at the courthouse by November 20, 2020. Mr. Franzone testified that he later sent an email to appellant and her attorneys explaining when and where he intended to meet appellant for the exchange. Mr. Franzone stated that, when he went to the designated place on November 20, 2020, appellant did not show up. Mr. Franzone testified that he did not obtain physical custody of M.F. until the following year, when the family friend called him and reported that appellant's mother had delivered M.F. to the family friend in Michigan.

The family friend, Ralph Kosowski, testified that, on June 10, 2021, he obtained custody of M.F. at his home in Michigan and immediately contacted Mr. Franzone, who then met Mr. Kosowski at the airport to receive M.F. and take her back to Maryland. Over objection, a video of Mr. Franzone's reunion with M.F., which was recorded by Mr. Kosowski at the airport, was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

Thomas Murphy, an attorney, testified that he represented Mr. Franzone during the divorce proceedings and that he was present for the November 2020 hearing. Mr. Murphy testified that Mr. Franzone had requested custody of M.F. and that the hearing was being held to determine the merits of that request. Mr. Murphy stated that appellant was present for the hearing and that she was represented by counsel. Mr. Murphy testified that, on the second day of the hearing, the court ordered M.F. to be returned to Mr. Franzone in

Maryland within 10 days. Mr. Murphy identified the court's written order, which was admitted into evidence, that stated that appellant was to return M.F. to Mr. Franzone's custody in Maryland by November 20, 2020. Mr. Murphy testified that, when appellant failed to deliver M.F. by that date, he informed the court, and, on November 23, 2020, the court issued a second order. Mr. Murphy testified that appellant's counsel would have received copies of those orders.

At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had failed to prove that appellant knew Mr. Franzone was the lawful custodian of M.F. or that Mr. Franzone had demanded M.F. be returned to his care. The court denied the motion.[3]

Appellant then testified in her own defense. In so doing, appellant admitted that, in July 2020, she and M.F. moved out of state. Appellant also admitted that she was present for the November 2020 hearing and that, during that hearing, the court stated that M.F. had to be returned to Maryland. Appellant claimed, however, that the court never indicated when or where M.F. was to be returned and that she never received any of the court's orders. Appellant also claimed that she never received any communications from Mr. Franzone directing her to bring M.F. to Maryland. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that, during the November 2020 hearing, the court told her that she needed to relinquish custody of M.F. to Mr. Franzone and that M.F. needed to be brought to Maryland within ten days of the hearing.

[3] Appellant subsequently renewed her motion at the close of all evidence. The court again denied the motion.

Later, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of detaining a child out of state:

> The Defendant is charged with the crime of detaining a child from the state. In order to convict the Defendant of this offense, the State must prove, first, that [M.F.] was under the age of sixteen years; second, that Alivia Franzone is a relative of [M.F.]; third, that Alivia Franzone had obtained legal custody of [M.F.]; fourth; that as of November 2020, Alivia Franzone knew that John Franzone was the lawful custodian of [M.F.]; and fifth, that Alivia Franzone intended to deprive John Franzone of custody of [M.F.] by detaining her in another state for more than forty-eight hours after the lawful custodian demands the child to be returned.

Ultimately, the jury found appellant guilty of the charged crime. This timely appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as needed below.

DISCUSSION

I.

Parties' Contentions

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the video depicting Mr. Franzone and M.F. reuniting at the airport in June 2021. Appellant argues that the video was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

The State contends that the court properly admitted the video, as it was relevant in proving that appellant had detained M.F. in another state. The State contends that appellant's other argument – that the video was unduly prejudicial – is not preserved because, when appellant objected to the evidence at trial, she did so only on relevancy grounds. The State contends further that, even if preserved, appellant's argument is

without merit, as the evidence's probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Relevant Law

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Md. Rule 5-401. "'Evidence which is thus not probative of the proposition at which it is directed is deemed irrelevant.'" *Urbanski v. State*, 256 Md. App. 414, 432 (2022) (quoting *Sifrit v. State*, 383 Md. 116, 129 (2004)), *cert. denied* 483 Md. 448. Relevancy is "a relational concept," and "an item of evidence can be relevant only when, through proper analysis and reasoning, it is related logically to a matter at issue in the case[.]" *Snyder v. State*, 361 Md. 580, 591 (2000). Whether evidence is legally relevant is a question we review *de novo*. *Calloway v. State*, 258 Md. App. 198, 216 (2023).

Even if relevant, evidence may still be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]" Md. Rule 5-403. "We determine whether a particular piece of evidence is unfairly prejudicial by balancing the inflammatory character of the evidence against the utility the evidence will provide to the jurors' evaluation of the issues in the case." *Smith v. State,* 218 Md. App. 689, 705 (2014). "The inflammatory nature of the evidence must be such that the 'shock value' on a layperson serving as a juror would prevent the proper evaluation or weight in context of the other evidence." *Urbanski*, 256 Md. App. at 434.

That said, "[e]vidence is never excluded merely because it is prejudicial." *White v. State*, 250 Md. App. 604, 645 (2021) (citing *Moore v. State*, 84 Md. App. 165, 172 (1990)). "'[T]he fact that evidence prejudices one party or the other, in the sense that it hurts his or her case, is not the undesirable prejudice referred to in Maryland Rule 5-403.'" *Ford v. State*, 462 Md. 3, 58-59 (2018) (quoting *Odum v. State*, 412 Md. 593, 615 (2010)). "Nor is the evidence excluded because the danger of prejudice simply outweighs the probative value; it must, 'as expressly directed by Rule 5-403, do so *substantially*.'" *Sykes v. State*, 253 Md. App. 78, 100 (2021) (quoting *Montague v. State*, 244 Md. App. 67, 135 (2019)) (emphasis in original). We review a court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 5-403 for abuse of discretion. *Montague*, 471 Md. at 674. "[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court, or where the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court." *Brown v. State*, 470 Md. 503, 553 (2020) (quoting *Alexis v. State*, 437 Md. 457, 478 (2014)) (internal quotations omitted).

Analysis

We hold that the video was relevant and thus admissible. One of the elements of the crime that the State needed to prove was that appellant had detained M.F. in another state for more than forty-eight hours after Mr. Franzone demanded M.F. be returned. At trial, Mr. Franzone testified that he demanded M.F. be returned to Maryland in November 2020 and that he did not finally obtain custody until a year later, when Mr. Kosowski, the

family friend, contacted him. Mr. Kosowski then testified that appellant's mother had given M.F. to him in Michigan in June 2021, that he immediately contacted Mr. Franzone, and that Mr. Franzone subsequently met him and M.F. at the airport. The video, which depicted that reunion, corroborated Mr. Franzone's and Mr. Kosowski's testimony and further established that appellant had detained M.F. in another state for more than forty-eight hours.

As to appellant's claim that the video was unfairly prejudicial, we agree with the State that the issue is unpreserved. When the State first introduced the video into evidence, defense counsel objected and stated: "I don't see the relevance." The court overruled the objection without any further argument from defense counsel. Thus, because appellant offered a basis for the objection that did not include an argument that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, that argument is not preserved for our review. *See Paige v. State*, 226 Md. App. 93, 122 (2015) ("'[I]t is well-settled that when specific grounds are given at trial for an objection, the party objecting will be held to those grounds and ordinarily waives any grounds not specified that are later raised on appeal.'") (quoting *Klauenberg v. State*, 355 Md. 528, 541 (1999)); *see also Bazzle v. State*, 426 Md. 541, 559-63 (2012).

Assuming, *arguendo*, that the issue was preserved, we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video. As noted, the video was relevant in establishing an element of the crime. And, while the video may have resulted in some prejudice to appellant, we cannot say that video's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

II.

Parties' Contentions

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in permitting Mr. Franzone to testify regarding the incident in June 2020, during which, according to Mr. Franzone, appellant called him "in a foul mood" and proceeded to "smash[] the [parties'] car to pieces." Appellant contends that the testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because "the jury would be more likely to view appellant's testimony with skepticism if they believed that she intentionally crashed a car as part of an argument with Mr. Franzone." Appellant contends, alternatively, that the testimony constituted inadmissible "bad act" evidence and that the court did not engage in the requisite analysis before admitting it.

The State argues that the disputed evidence was relevant in establishing that appellant was angry with Mr. Franzone and that she kept M.F. out of state with the intent to deprive Mr. Franzone of custody, which was an element of the charged crime. The State argues further that the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial because it had no bearing on appellant's credibility and was not elaborated upon or repeated at any other point in the trial. For the same reasons, the State argues that the testimony did not constitute inadmissible "bad act" evidence. The State also argues that the court was not required to articulate its reasoning for admitting the evidence on the record. Finally, the State argues that, even if the court erred in admitting the evidence, any error was harmless.

Relevant Law

Maryland Rule 5-404 prohibits the admission of "other crimes, wrongs or other acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in the conformity therewith." Md. Rule 5-404(b). "Evidence of other crimes may be admitted, however, if it is substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and if it is not offered to prove the defendant's guilt based on propensity to commit crime or his character as a criminal." *State v. Faulkner,* 314 Md. 630, 634 (1989).

Before admitting "prior bad act" evidence, a trial court is required to engage in a three-part analysis. *Darling v. State*, 232 Md. App. 430, 463 (2017), cert. denied 454 Md. 665 (2017). First, the court must determine whether the evidence qualifies as an exception to Rule 5-404(b). *Id.* That determination is a legal one that we review *de novo*. *Stevenson v. State*, 222 Md. App. 118, 149 (2015). Second, the court must determine whether the defendant's involvement in the prior bad act is established by clear and convincing evidence. *Vigna*, 241 Md. App. at 727. We review that determination under the clearly erroneous standard. *Oesby v. State*, 142 Md. App. 144, 164-65 (2002). Third, the court must weigh the evidence's probative value against any undue prejudice that may result from the evidence's admission. *Darling*, 232 Md. App. at 463. That determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Vigna v. State*, 241 Md. App. 704, 727 (2019). Because appellant challenges the evidence under the first and third prongs only, we will confine our discussion to those factors.

Under the first prong, evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts may be admitted if it has "'special relevance – that it is substantially relevant to some contested issue.'"

Stevenson, 222 Md. App. at 149 (quoting *Wynn v. State*, 351 Md. 307, 316 (1998)). Rule 5-404(b) states that prior bad act evidence has special relevance if it shows "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident[.]" Md. Rule 5-404(b).

The other relevant step in the analysis is that the court must weigh the evidence's probative value against any undue prejudice that may result from the evidence's admission. *Darling*, 232 Md. App. at 463. Again, that determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Vigna*, 241 Md. App. at 727. Moreover, like the court's determination of admissibility pursuant to Rule 5-403, "the concern with prior bad acts evidence is not avoiding any and all prejudice, but avoiding 'untoward prejudice' or 'unfair prejudice' that creates the risk that the jury will convict the defendant for reasons unrelated to his commission of the crimes charged." *Id.* at 728.

Analysis

We hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting Mr. Franzone's testimony that appellant was "in a foul mood" and that she "smashed the [parties'] car to pieces." In providing that testimony, Mr. Franzone was describing a specific event that caused the parties' nesting arrangement to end and that led to an almost complete breakdown of the relationship. That event was followed, not long after, by appellant's move out of state with M.F. From that evidence, a reasonable inference could be drawn that appellant was angry with Mr. Franzone when she moved out of state with M.F. and that she kept M.F. out of state with the intention of depriving Mr. Franzone of

custody. The testimony was therefore specially relevant in establishing an element of the crime, namely, appellant's intent.

As to the prejudicial nature of the testimony, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. First, as discussed, the testimony was clearly relevant in establishing an element of the crime, particularly given that the "bad act" at issue – appellant's destruction of the parties' vehicle – coincided, temporally, with her decision to take M.F. out of state. *See Sykes v. State*, 253 Md. App. 78, 100-01 (2021) ("'Under some circumstances, where intent is legitimately an issue in the case, and where by reason of similarity of conduct or temporal proximity, or both, evidence of other bad acts may possess a probative value that outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice, the evidence may be admissible.'") (quoting *Howard v. State*, 324 Md. 505, 514 (1991)). Moreover, although informing the jury that appellant had angrily smashed the parties' vehicle may have prejudiced appellant, we cannot say that the prejudice was "untoward" or "unfair." The reference was made once during Mr. Franzone's testimony, and it does not appear from the record that the testimony was discussed at any other point in front of the jury. There was therefore only a small risk that the jury would use the evidence improperly. Given the evidence's clear probative value, the danger of unfair prejudice was slight.

Appellant contends that the trial court failed to properly apply Rule 5-404 "because there was nothing in the record that showed that the [] court carefully assessed the admissibility of the 'other crimes' evidence." Relying on *Streater v. State*. 352 Md. 800

(1999), appellant claims that the court's failure to engage in the requisite analysis constituted reversible error.

Appellant is mistaken. In *Streater*, the defendant was charged with the offenses of stalking, harassment, and telephone misuse. *Streater*, 352 Md. at 803. At trial, the victim testified that she had obtained a protective order against the defendant prior to the events that led to the charged crimes. *Id.* at 804. The protective order, which contained several factual findings by the issuing court that constituted "other crimes" evidence, was subsequently admitted into evidence over objection. *Id*. After the defendant was convicted and this Court affirmed, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed, holding that, although the victim's testimony regarding the existence of the protective order was properly admitted, the defendant's objection to the admission of the protective order itself "should have been sustained because the protective order contained other crimes evidence and there was no threshold inquiry into the admissibility of that evidence." *Id.* at 805. In reaching that holding, the Court noted that the factual findings contained within protective order were not mentioned in the trial transcript, and there was nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge ever actually considered those factual findings before admitting the protective order as substantive evidence. *Id.* at 804-05, 811-12. Rather, the Court continued, the trial judge simply "ruled the entire protective order form admissible without addressing in the record the admissibility of factual references to other crimes that the order contained." *Id.* at 813. The Court emphasized the egregiousness of the trial judge's error by highlighting that the "other crimes" contained within the protective order related to a

time period not discussed by any witness and to acts that were not substantiated by any testimony. *Id.* at 813.

Here, by contrast, the record clearly shows that the trial court considered the disputed evidence before overruling appellant's objection. That is, unlike in *Streater*, where the record was devoid of any indication that the trial judge considered, or was even aware of, the "other crimes" evidence contained within the protective order itself, the record in the instant case establishes that the "other crimes" evidence was presented to the court via Mr. Franzone's testimony and that the court considered that evidence, and defense counsel's objection, before admitting it. Moreover, in *Streater*, the "other crimes" evidence was presented without context or corroboration. Here, the "other crimes" evidence was introduced during the testimony of Mr. Franzone, who provided a framework that detailed both the context and relevance of the disputed evidence. Thus, *Streater* is inapposite, and we can say, with confidence, that the court engaged in the requisite analysis before admitting it. That the court did not place its analysis on the record does not mean that the court erred. *See id.* at 810 ("As a final consideration, we emphasize that, should the trial court allow the admission of other crimes evidence, it *should* state its reasons for doing so in the record[.]") (emphasis added).

III.

Parties' Contentions

Appellant's final claim is that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction for detaining a child out of state. Appellant argues that the State

failed to prove that she knew Mr. Franzone was the lawful custodian or that she intended to deprive Mr. Franzone of custody by detaining M.F. in another state for more than forty-eight hours after Mr. Franzone demanded M.F. be returned to his care. Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that she received notice of the November 2020 order. Appellant also contends that the State failed to prove that Mr. Franzone demanded that M.F. be returned to him. The State disagrees, arguing that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain all the elements of the crime.

Relevant Law

"The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *Scriber v. State*, 236 Md. App. 332, 344 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant question "is not whether the evidence *should have or probably would have* persuaded the majority of fact finders but only whether it *possibly could have* persuaded *any* rational fact finder." *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted). "When making this determination, the appellate court is not required to determine 'whether *it* believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" *Roes v. State*, 236 Md. App. 569, 583 (2018) (quoting *State v. Manion*, 442 Md. 419, 431 (2015)). "This is because weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trier of fact." *Scriber*, 236 Md. App. at 344 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Our deference to reasonable inferences drawn by

the fact-finder means we resolve conflicting possible inferences in the State's favor, because we do not second-guess the jury's determination where there are competing rational inferences available." *State v. Krikstan*, 483 Md. 43, 64 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, we give deference to the fact-finder's "ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation." *State v. Smith*, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2022), *cert. denied*, 482 Md. 264.

To prove that appellant committed the crime of detaining a child out of state, the State needed to show: 1) that M.F. was under the age of sixteen years; 2) that appellant was M.F.'s relative; 3) that appellant had obtained legal custody of M.F.; 4) that, in November 2020, appellant knew that Mr. Franzone was the legal custodian of M.F.; and 5) that appellant intended to deprive Mr. Franzone of custody by detaining M.F. in another state for more than forty-eight hours after Mr. Franzone demanded M.F. be returned. Md. Code, Family Law § 9-305(a)(2). As noted, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to the fourth and fifth elements.

Analysis

The evidence adduced at trial established that appellant and M.F. moved out of Maryland in June 2020. The evidence established further that, on November 5, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing regarding custody of M.F., that appellant was present at that hearing and represented by counsel, and that, during that hearing, the court ordered appellant to relinquish custody of M.F. to Mr. Franzone and to bring M.F. to Maryland within ten days of the hearing. On November 13, 2020, the circuit court issued an order

stating that Mr. Franzone was the lawful custodian of M.F. and that appellant was to return M.F. to his care by November 20, 2020. Mr. Franzone's attorney testified that appellant's counsel would have received a copy of that order. Mr. Franzone testified that, after the circuit court entered its order, he sent an email to appellant indicating when and where to meet him so that he could take custody of M.F. Mr. Franzone testified that appellant did not show up on that date and that he did not obtain custody of M.F. until the following year, when Mr. Kosowski, the family friend, called and reported that he had obtained custody of M.F. Mr. Kosowski later testified that, on June 10, 2021, appellant's mother delivered M.F. to him in Michigan and that, shortly thereafter, he met Mr. Franzone at the airport so that Mr. Franzone could regain custody of M.F. and take her back to Maryland.

From that evidence, a reasonable inference could be drawn that, in November 2020, appellant knew that Mr. Franzone was the lawful custodian of M.F. and that appellant intended to deprive Mr. Franzone of custody by detaining M.F. out of state for more than forty-eight hours after Mr. Franzone demanded custody of M.F. As such, the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. That appellant claimed she never received notice of the court's order or Mr. Franzone's email is irrelevant. *See Omayaka v. Omayaka*, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011) (noting that a fact-finder is "entitled to accept – or reject – all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence").

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.