

Circuit Court for Frederick County  
Case No.: C-10-FM-20-001424

UNREPORTED  
IN THE APPELLATE COURT  
OF MARYLAND

No. 1742

September Term, 2023

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DWIGHT DOUGLAS LARCOMB

v.

SHELLEY DORINDA LARCOMB

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Zic,  
Tang,  
Meredith, Timothy E.  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

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PER CURIAM

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Filed: June 4, 2024

\*This is a per curiam opinion. Consistent with Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.

Dwight Douglas Larcomb, appellant, filed, in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, a complaint seeking an absolute divorce from Shelley Dorinda Larcomb, appellee. The divorce trial was scheduled for October 18, 2023. Mr. Larcomb requested a continuance but was denied. Although he appeared for the trial, when the court denied his renewed request for a continuance, Mr. Larcomb refused to participate in the proceedings and soon voluntarily removed himself from the courtroom. At the close of evidence, the court made some preliminary findings but reserved ruling on certain property issues pending further review. The court scheduled a disposition hearing for November 20. Before that hearing, on November 2, Mr. Larcomb noted this appeal. The court then delivered an oral ruling at the November 20 hearing, signed a written order the next day, and entered the judgment of absolute divorce the day after.

Section 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article provides, with exceptions not here relevant, that “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” “A final judgment is one that either determines and concludes the rights of the parties involved or denies a party the means to prosecute or defend his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” *Douglas v. State*, 423 Md. 156, 171 (2011) (cleaned up). When Mr. Larcomb filed his notice of appeal, the circuit court had neither announced nor entered a final judgment. *See* Md. Rule 8-602(f) (saving otherwise premature appeals “filed after the announcement or signing by the trial court of a ruling, decision, order, or judgment but before entry . . . on the docket”).

What is more, the only orders entered in the 30 days preceding the filing of Mr. Larcomb’s notice of appeal are two related orders denying his request for a

continuance and an order denying his motion to strike a prior court order permitting remote testimony from a witness at trial. *See* Md. Rule 8-202(a) (A “notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.”). “[I]t is clear that the denial of a continuance is an unappealable interlocutory order [because] [i]t is not among the appealable interlocutory orders listed in § 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” *Blanton v. Equitable Bank, Nat’l Ass’n*, 61 Md. App. 158, 163 (1985). So too for the denial of a motion to strike. Accordingly, this appeal is not allowed by law and must be dismissed. *See* Md. Rule 8-602(b)(1).

**APPEAL DISMISSED. COSTS TO BE  
PAID BY APPELLANT.**